State of Tennessee v. Kevin Dragg

09/24/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs July 22, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KEVIN DRAGG Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 123015 Hector Sanchez, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-00877-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The Defendant, Kevin Dragg, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture, a Class B felony; possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent felon, a Class B felony; unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony drug offense, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (possession of cocaine), 39-17-1324(a) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-17-1307(b)(1), (2) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm by a person who has been previously convicted of a felony crime of violence or a felony drug offense), 39-17-425 (2025) (possession of drug paraphernalia). The trial court imposed an effective twenty- six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained by bounty hunters who apprehended the Defendant for failing to appear on other charges; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the count of being a violent felon in possession of a firearm and that the evidence, when considered under a correct statement of the law, is insufficient to support this conviction; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial due to the combined effect of repeated prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., and STACY L. STREET, JJ., joined. Jeffrey C. Coller and Travis E. Dorman (on appeal and at motion for a new trial), Knoxville, Tennessee; and Greg Isaacs and Ashlee Mathis (at trial), Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kevin Dragg. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald Coleman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Joshua R. Gilbert, pro hac vice, Legal Assistant; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha Fitzgerald, Molly Martin, and Willie Lane, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION The Defendant, who had been released on bond, failed to appear for court dates in two cases. Final forfeitures of the bonds were entered. While searching for the Defendant on January 21, 2022, bounty hunters conducted surveillance of the Defendant’s girlfriend’s car, which the Defendant was known to drive. After identifying the Defendant as the car’s driver, the bounty hunters saw him engage in apparent drug sales from the car. They communicated with Knoxville Police Department (KPD) personnel and advised them of the Defendant’s location and their plan to arrest the Defendant on the failure to appear warrants. With KPD officers en route to arrest the Defendant on unrelated charges, the bounty hunters surrounded the Defendant’s car, removed the Defendant from the car, and detained him in handcuffs. The bounty hunters took possession of a bag of suspected crack cocaine that the Defendant held and a handgun in the Defendant’s pocket and placed the items on top of the car the Defendant had driven. The bounty hunters did not take possession of a suspected marijuana blunt the Defendant held and other evidence that the police later seized from the Defendant and the car. KPD officers arrived at the scene, took the Defendant into police custody, and searched the car. The Defendant’s convictions in the present case relate to the items seized by the bounty hunters and the police. Motion to Suppress The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the January 21, 2022 search of the car the Defendant drove and of his person. He alleged that the bounty hunters failed to comply with the statutory requirements for bounty hunters taking a person into custody. See T.C.A. § 40-11-318 (2025). The Defendant also alleged that the bounty hunters violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by searching the car, which was owned by a third party, and because the bounty hunters acted as State agents. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Randall Crisp, a certified professional bondsman, testified that he was asked to assist a bonding company in taking the Defendant -2- into custody on a scire facias related to two warrants charging a drug offense and a firearm offense. Mr. Crisp said the bonding company provided him with certified copies of the warrants, the scire facias, and the bail contract. He said the bail contract was co-signed and co-indemnified by Crystal Hicks, whom he discovered through records checks lived with the Defendant. Mr. Crisp said the records checks showed that Ms. Hicks was the registered owner of a white Kia car, which the Defendant “had reportedly been driving.” Mr. Crisp testified that, on January 21, 2022, he, Jeremy Hancock, and three unnamed individuals, all of whom were professional bondsmen, located the white Kia and conducted surveillance in an effort to find the Defendant. Mr. Crisp explained that the Kia’s windows were tinted and that they were unsure if the Defendant was driving the car. Mr. Crisp said they notified the sheriff’s department’s leads unit to verify that the warrants were active and to advise the unit of the bounty hunters’ actions. Mr. Crisp testified that the Defendant got out of the Kia at a business and “appeared to [be] conducting drug sales.” Mr. Crisp said he wanted to take the Defendant into custody but was unable to do so at this point because “we couldn’t establish an effective perimeter” before the Defendant entered the Kia and resumed driving. Mr. Crisp said that he and Mr. Hancock continued to follow the Defendant and that “we call[ed] personal identification or PID” for “emergency services” due to safety concerns and for “deconfliction” because multiple government agencies may be looking for an individual. Mr. Crisp testified that law enforcement never asked him to search the Defendant. Mr. Crisp said, “[T]he decision was made . . . to execute the arrest warrant, which we had in hand.” Mr. Crisp said that the Defendant had not backed into the parking place “this time” and that he thought they could establish a perimeter. Mr. Crisp said that Mr. Hancock “pulled in behind” the Defendant and that Mr. Crisp “pulled in from the driver’s side” and got out of his car. Mr. Crisp said that he could see the Defendant through the Kia’s windshield and that the Defendant was “engaged in what appeared to be drug sales” with a pedestrian through the open passenger-side window. Mr. Crisp testified that he went to the driver’s side window, noticed the door was locked, and knocked on the window. He said the other bondsmen also approached various points outside the Kia. Mr. Crisp said he identified himself and advised the Defendant that he had warrants for the Defendant’s arrest. Mr. Crisp said the Defendant unlocked and opened the door but remained in the driver’s seat. Mr. Crisp saw a marijuana blunt in the Defendant’s right hand and a plastic bag of apparent crack cocaine on top of the center console, which the Defendant appeared to be sealing. Mr. Crisp said he handcuffed the Defendant, “removed the plastic bag from his hand,” and placed the bag on the Kia’s roof. Mr. Crisp said he took the bag from the Defendant for the Defendant’s safety because, in -3- his experience, people being arrested sometimes ingested drugs. Mr. Crisp agreed that he had not placed the bag of suspected drugs on top of the car to assist law enforcement in arresting the Defendant. Mr. Crisp said he did not search the car in which the Defendant was seated and reiterated that he took the bag of suspected drugs from the Defendant’s hand. Mr. Crisp agreed that no one gave him permission to search the Kia. Mr. Crisp said that Mr. Hancock asked the Defendant if he had a gun and that the Defendant reached for his front right pocket. Mr. Crisp said he placed his hand on the pocket, felt the imprint of a gun, and removed the gun. He said his partner removed the bullets from the gun and placed the gun on the Kia’s roof. Mr. Crisp agreed that the Defendant had not given him permission to search the Defendant’s person. Mr. Crisp agreed that he did not remove the marijuana blunt from the Defendant’s hand and explained that the police were arriving and that “[t]here was a little bit of chaos at the moment.” Mr. Crisp said he was about to ask the Defendant to get out of the Kia when several KPD officers approached. Mr. Crisp said he “released [the Defendant] to KPD’s custody.” Mr. Crisp testified that he was not “taking [the Defendant] into custody at the direction of” KPD or the sheriff’s department. A body camera video recording of the incident was received as an exhibit and played for the trial court. The recording showed the police arriving at the scene, where the Defendant was seated in a car while handcuffed and smoking a cigar or blunt. Individuals whom Mr. Crisp identified as himself and his associates stood outside the car where the Defendant was seated when the officers arrived. The car’s driver’s door was open. After the Defendant was removed from the car, the officers searched it. Mr. Crisp acknowledged that he had not shown the Defendant a copy of the “underlying criminal process,” which he said was inside “our van.” Mr. Crisp said he identified himself verbally but did not show his “pocket card” to the Defendant. Mr. Crisp agreed that he and Mr. Hancock notified law enforcement twice that they had located the Defendant, that their authority was to take the Defendant into physical custody pursuant to the scire facias, and that they had no authority to conduct a search or to arrest the Defendant for new charges. When explaining why they took the Defendant into custody immediately upon engaging with him, Mr. Crisp said that “sound tactics” did not include blocking in a fugitive and waiting until the police arrived. Mr. Crisp agreed that the Defendant had not tried to flee and had not acted in an aggressive or dangerous manner. Mr. Crisp acknowledged a document as his affidavit related to the incident, although the copy received as an exhibit was unsigned and unsworn. Mr. Crisp said he prepared multiple copies of the document and that he had sworn to and signed another copy. The document was largely consistent with Mr. Crisp’s testimony. However, in the document, Mr. Crisp stated (1) that he removed the Defendant from the car “due to his size and history -4- of fleeing” after handcuffing him and before taking the suspected drugs and the gun from the Defendant and (2) that he “observed an officer remove Defendant from the vehicle.” KPD Officer Jonathan Gomez testified that “during this timeframe” of the Defendant’s arrest, he received a call that representatives of a bonding company had located the Defendant at a business. Officer Gomez said he went to the location, where he saw bondsmen surrounding a car with the Defendant inside and a gun and a bag of suspected crack cocaine on top of the car. Officer Gomez approached the Defendant, who was smoking a marijuana blunt and talking on his cell phone. Officer Gomez said he took the blunt and the cell phone from the Defendant, removed him from the car, and placed him in custody. Officer Gomez said the gun, the suspected crack cocaine, the marijuana, and the cell phone “were confiscated.” He said other officers searched the car and found ten grams of suspected marijuana. Officer Gomez agreed that he never authorized Mr. Crisp to arrest the Defendant or to search the Defendant’s person or car. When shown his report from the arrest, Officer Gomez acknowledged that he had stated the suspected crack cocaine was found “in the middle of the console,” which he explained was information he received from “the bondsmen.” The police report was received as an exhibit. After receiving the hearing evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress in a written order. Trial At the trial, Randall Crisp testified that he was employed as a bail bondsman and that he was a retired KPD officer. He said that, on January 21, 2022, he was assisting a bonding company other than his employer by “tracking some of their forfeitures,” meaning locating individuals who had failed to appear for court dates, and for whom arrest warrants had been issued. Mr. Crisp said that he and other bounty hunters searched for the Defendant after having verified the validity of arrest warrants for the Defendant related to his failure to appear in court. They saw a car in which they thought he might be traveling and followed it. Mr. Crisp said the Defendant got out of the car while it was parked at a business. Mr. Crisp said the Defendant “made contact with two or three individuals” and returned to the car. Mr. Crisp said “we” contacted KPD and advised the police that they had located the Defendant and specified the Defendant’s location. Mr. Crisp said they were advised that KPD had arrest warrants for the Defendant for unrelated charges. Mr. Crisp said that the Defendant drove to another business and parked. Mr. Crisp said he and his colleagues were -5- concerned that the Defendant might leave quickly and that they decided to arrest the Defendant, rather than waiting for the police to arrive. Mr. Crisp testified that the bounty hunters parked in a way that blocked the Kia and that Mr. Crisp and other bounty hunters approached the Kia on foot. Mr. Crisp said a pedestrian approached the Defendant, and he said the bounty hunters had seen pedestrians approach the Defendant earlier during their surveillance. Mr. Crisp saw a baggie in the Defendant’s hand and “an exchange” between the Defendant and the pedestrian. Mr. Crisp said that he walked toward the driver’s side door and that the pedestrian left quickly. Mr. Crisp said that he knocked on the driver’s window and tried to open the door, but it was locked. He said that the Defendant unlocked the door and pushed it “to where . . . the latch was open” and that Mr. Crisp opened the door. Mr. Crisp saw that the Defendant was smoking a marijuana blunt and that the Defendant was sealing a baggie of apparent crack cocaine over the center console. Mr. Crisp said that, when his partner, Mr. Hancock, asked the Defendant if he had any weapons, the Defendant reached for his right pocket. Mr. Crisp felt the outline of a gun through the Defendant’s sweatpants and removed it. Mr. Crisp placed the gun and the bag of apparent crack cocaine on the Kia’s roof after his partner “made [the gun] safe.” Mr. Crisp said he was not concerned with collecting evidence or “trying to make a case” and that he collected the items due to safety concerns. He said the police officers stepped in within seconds and removed the Defendant from the car. Mr. Crisp said the officers collected the gun and the suspected drugs from the car’s roof. A police body camera video recording excerpt, from which the audio had been redacted, was played for the jury. The recording depicted the Defendant’s arrest by KPD officers. Kevin Parnell testified that he was employed as a KPD officer on January 21, 2022. He said that, as a result of communication with a bonding company, he went to the scene where the Defendant was detained. Mr. Parnell said that the Defendant was inside a car and that the car door was open. Mr. Parnell identified a video recording of his interactions with the Defendant, which was received as an exhibit and played for the jury. The audio had been redacted from the recording. The recording showed Mr. Parnell’s arrival at the scene and his approach to the Kia, in which the handcuffed Defendant was seated and the driver’s door was open. An officer assisted the Defendant as he stood, and an officer escorted the Defendant away from the Kia. Officers searched the Kia’s interior, and an officer took the gun, an ammunition clip, bullets, three cell phones, a baggie, and cash from the Kia’s roof. An officer removed cash from the Kia’s cup holders, removed a digital scale from the crevice between the driver’s seat and the center console, and searched the console’s closed compartment. -6-  Mr. Parnell testified that the suspected crack cocaine was in the shape of a cookie, along with some smaller pieces, and that it had a gross weight of 38.8 grams. The suspected crack cocaine, digital scale, three cell phones, a .40-caliber Glock handgun, an ammunition magazine, and fourteen bullets were received as exhibits. Mr. Parnell said that, in his opinion based on his prior law enforcement experience, the green leafy substance collected as evidence was marijuana. The green leafy substance was received as an exhibit. Mr. Parnell said that $3,849 was collected as evidence, with the currency including 149 $20 bills and nine $100 bills. KPD Officer Jonathan Gomez testified that he took the Defendant into custody on January 21, 2022. Officer Gomez said he took a cell phone and the marijuana that the Defendant was smoking from the Defendant. Officer Gomez said he removed “a wad of cash” from the Defendant’s pockets. Officer Gomez placed the items on the Kia’s roof. Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Forensic Scientist Jacob White, an expert in forensic chemistry, testified that he examined the suspected crack cocaine collected at the time of the Defendant’s arrest and determined that it was 34.83 grams of cocaine base. KPD Firearms Examiner Bethany Fine Simmons, an expert in firearm analysis, testified that she test-fired the handgun collected as evidence and determined that it was functional. Knox County Criminal Court Clerk supervisor Stephanie Ogle identified previous judgments for the Defendant’s prior convictions as follow: December 17, 2002, robbery, a Class C felony; January 14, 2020, aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and January 14, 2020, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class E felony. The judgments were received as an exhibit. KPD Detective Philip Jinks, an expert in narcotics investigations, testified that crack cocaine was typically “cooked” in a Pyrex measuring glass into a “cookie” that a distributor then cut into smaller pieces for sale. He said a user usually purchased about a 0.2-gram rock for around $20. When shown the 34.83 grams of crack cocaine collected as evidence at the time of the Defendant’s arrest, Detective Jinks said it was consistent with his description of a crack cocaine cookie and rocks that had been broken from it. He said that 35 grams of crack cocaine could be sold in about 175 units of 0.2 gram rocks. When shown the digital scale collected at the time of the Defendant’s arrest, Detective Jinks testified that it was significant because narcotics distributors often used digital scales to weigh small amounts of a substance before selling it. When asked about -7- the significance of the three cell phones collected at the scene, Detective Jinks said that drug dealers often kept multiple cell phones in order to evade detection by law enforcement. Detective Jinks said that drug dealers often possessed firearms due to the danger of robbery because they possessed large amounts of cash. In Detective Jinks’s opinion, the significant amount of cash and the large bills the Defendant possessed indicated that the Defendant was a drug dealer. Detective Jinks opined that, based upon the quantity, packaging, and shape of the crack cocaine; the digital scale; the cash; the cell phones; and the handgun; the Defendant possessed crack cocaine with the intent to sell it. After the State rested, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for the count of the indictment charging misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The court denied the motion as to the remaining counts. The Defendant elected not to present evidence. After receiving the proof, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the following charged offenses: possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court conducted a bifurcated proceeding related to whether the Defendant would serve an enhanced sentence for his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, based upon proof of a qualifying prior felony conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(f)(1), (2), (i)(1)(AA). The State presented a certified judgment of conviction for the Defendant’s January 14, 2015 conviction for possession with intent to sell marijuana in a drug-free zone, a Class E felony. The jury found the Defendant not guilty of having the prior conviction. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-six-year sentence. This appeal followed. I Denial of Motion to Suppress The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained by bounty hunters who apprehended the Defendant after he failed to appear on other charges. He argues (1) that the bounty hunters were state actors and that their search of the Defendant and the car he was driving and the seizure of evidence violated -8- his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) that no exception to the warrant requirement permitted the bounty hunters’ warrantless searches of his person and the Kia. The State responds that the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We agree with the State. Both the State and Federal constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 7. Warrantless seizures are “presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454- 55 (1971); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000). A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Jones, 802 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions about the “credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. The prevailing party is entitled to the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings is a question of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may consider the trial evidence as well as the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn. 1998); see also State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tenn. 2012). We begin our analysis with the question of whether the trial court erred in its determination that the bounty hunters were not state actors required to comply with the Defendant’s State and Federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizures. “Constitutional procedural protections generally shield persons only from acts of the government.” State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2014). “A private party acting for a reason independent of a governmental purpose does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Cowan, 46 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); See State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tenn. 1996). Exceptions to the general rule for actions by private parties exist for (1) criminal informants and (2) individuals acting as an “agent or instrument” of the government in conducting a search or seizure. Burroughs, 926 -9- S.W.2d at 245. In the case of the latter, the actions of the individual who conducted a search or seizure are viewed through the lens of the “legitimate independent motivation” test, which involves consideration of (1) whether the State had knowledge of the search and (2) the acquiescence and intent of the individual who conducted the search. Id. at 246. For a private party to be considered a state actor for purposes of a search or seizure, both Burroughs prongs must be satisfied. State v. Michael Wojnarek, No. M2022-00326-CCA- R3-CD, 2023 WL 3331623, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2023) (citing United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1121 (10th Cir. 2009)). In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court made the following findings: [T]his Court cannot find that bounty hunter Randall Crisp and his associates were acting as state actors when they arrested the Defendant and removed narcotics which were in plain view from the vehicle and a firearm from his person. In applying the Burroughs factors to the facts here, the government only gained knowledge of the plan to arrest Defendant just moments before Crisp and his associates effectuated the arrest. The testimony established that Crisp and his associates originally intended to wait for KPD to effectuate the arrest, but ultimately chose to move in on the Defendant and take him into custody when it appeared that he was preparing to go mobile again. Furthermore, the intent of Crisp and his associates who were performing the arrest was not to build a drug or firearms investigation or case. Based on the testimony at the hearing, the intent of the bounty hunters was to locate and arrest the Defendant on outstanding process after they contracted to do so with K-Town Bonding Company. Therefore, this Court cannot find that Crisp and his associates were operating as state actors when they arrested Defendant and removed contraband from his immediate control. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the bounty hunters were not state actors whose actions were limited by the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 7 rights. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 7. He urges this court to place significance on the fact that the bounty hunters made two calls to the police before, rather than after, they arrested the Defendant and seized items from him. He distinguishes his case from the facts of Poe and Wojnarek, in which the police were not notified until after bounty hunter and bondsman searches, respectively. See Poe, 556 F.3d at 1124; Michael Wojnarek, 2023 WL 3331623, at *5. The Defendant also argues that, given Mr. Crisp’s prior law enforcement career, “[i]t strains credulity” that he had no substantive conversations with law enforcement about the Defendant and that he did not want to assist his former colleagues in arresting the Defendant. - 10 -  The first question raised by the Defendant’s argument is whether the police notification itself is a threshold which, once crossed, conferred state actor status on the bounty hunters. The Defendant cites Michael Wojnarek, a probation revocation case, in which this court considered whether the trial court erred in considering evidence obtained by bail bondsmen who went to a motel looking for an individual who was living there with the probationer, knocked on the door of the motel room which the probationer and the other individual had been occupying, went inside the room with a motel employee when the probationer answered the door, saw drugs and weapons in the room, and notified law enforcement. Michael Wojnarek, 2023 WL 3331623, at *1. At the revocation hearing, the State introduced the testimony of a bail bondsman about his observations of drugs and weapons in the motel room in which the probationer was present. Id. The probationer argued on appeal that the trial court erred “by considering evidence obtained by the bail bondsmen in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at *3. This court held that, because “the exclusionary rule has only limited application in a revocation proceeding,” the probationer was “not entitled to the benefit of the exclusionary rule in this revocation proceeding.” Id. at *4 (citing State v. Hayes, 190 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)). In dicta, the court commented that, even if it were to consider the merits of the argument, the probationer would not be entitled to relief. Id. The court recited the Burroughs legitimate independent motivation test and commented that the probationer would fail in the merits of his argument because “there was no evidence that the law enforcement officers knew anything about the search until the bail bondsmen contacted them” and that the bondsmen’s primary purpose had been to locate the other individual and return her to custody. Id. at *5. In its commentary, the Michael Wojnarek court cited Poe, which involved evidence used against an accused when the evidence had been obtained by bounty hunters while apprehending the accused for absconding from bail in another case. Poe, 556 F.3d at 1117; Michael Wojnarek, 2023 WL 3331623, at *4-5. The Poe court concluded that the government had not acquiesced in the bounty hunters’ actions because they were notified afterward and that the bounty hunters’ primary purpose had been to capture the absconded bailee, rather than to assist the government. Poe, 556 F.3d at 1123- 24. Again, to the extent that the Defendant relies upon Michael Wojnarek, its language regarding the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, including its legitimate independent motivation analysis, is dicta. Likewise, Poe is a Tenth Circuit case and, as such, is merely persuasive authority in this court. We conclude that Tennessee has not recognized police knowledge of an impending search as a bright line threshold for determining whether a private party is acting as a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes. Returning to the present case, the trial court credited Mr. Crisp’s testimony about the calls to law enforcement, first verifying that the arrest warrants for the Defendant were still active, and later informing them that the bounty hunters had located the Defendant and were about to attempt an arrest. Mr. Crisp explained that the first call was to verify that - 11 - the warrants were still good and that the second call was a safety measure for “deconfliction” because multiple government agencies might be looking for the Defendant. Mr. Crisp said no law enforcement agent asked him to search the Defendant’s person. Mr. Crisp also explained that he took the bag of suspected crack cocaine from the Defendant to prevent the Defendant from ingesting it and that, after the Defendant reached for his pocket when Mr. Crisp’s partner asked if the Defendant had a weapon, Mr. Crisp felt the outside of the pocket and removed the gun from the pocket for safety reasons. The bounty hunters’ calls to law enforcement were brief and for the purposes of confirming with the sheriff’s department that the warrants were active and ensuring safety with KPD before attempting to arrest the Defendant. The trial court found that the police became aware of the bounty hunters’ plan to arrest the Defendant “just moments before” the arrest occurred. The evidence does not preponderate against this determination. We note, as well, that the police knew only that the bounty hunters were about to attempt to arrest the Defendant. No evidence shows that the bounty hunters anticipated and planned to seize evidence of criminal activity in the process and that they broadcast any such intent to the police. Likewise, no evidence shows that the police asked or encouraged the bounty hunters to obtain evidence of a crime for the police. The second factor which must be considered is the government’s acquiescence and intent in the bounty hunters’ conducting the search. See Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d at 246. The trial court found that the bounty hunters were not trying to gather evidence for new charges against the Defendant and that their intent was to locate and arrest the Defendant on the outstanding bond revocation warrant as part of the bounty hunters’ business arrangement with a bonding company. The evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings. We have considered the Defendant’s argument that Mr. Crisp surely wanted to assist his former law enforcement colleagues in obtaining evidence for new charges against the Defendant. However, the court accepted Mr. Crisp’s testimony as credible, and no evidence suggests the bounty hunters acted with any motivation or intent other than to arrest the Defendant pursuant to the bond revocation warrant. Mr. Crisp explained that he merely took the bag of suspected crack cocaine to ensure the Defendant’s safety because, in Mr. Crisp’s experience, detainees sometimes swallowed drugs. Mr. Crisp also explained that he took the gun and that his partner cleared the ammunition from the gun to ensure the safety of everyone present. Having reviewed the trial court’s findings on the Burroughs factors, we conclude that those findings support the court’s conclusion that the bounty hunters were not state actors. It follows, then, that because the bounty hunters were private citizens and not state actors, their actions in seizing the drugs and handgun from the Defendant were not subject - 12 - to constitutional limits on unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 7. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. II The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the count of being a violent felon in possession of a firearm. He argues that the court incorrectly instructed the jury that robbery, one of the Defendant’s two prior felony convictions about which the jury was instructed, was a crime of violence. He notes that at the time, the relevant statute listed aggravated assault but not robbery as a crime of violence and a jury finding as to whether the robbery had been committed by the use of violence was required. The Defendant argues that the court’s erroneous instruction usurped the jury’s role as the finder of fact as to the violent felon in possession of a firearm conviction. He further argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for being a violent felon in possession of a firearm due to the combined failures of the State in not presenting proof showing the circumstances of the prior robbery and of the court in usurping the jury’s fact- finding role. The State responds that the Defendant is not entitled to relief because the jury was not misled by the court’s instruction and the court correctly instructed the jury because the other offense charged, aggravated assault, was a crime of violence. Alternatively, the State argues that any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As to the Defendant’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim related to the allegedly flawed jury instruction, the State argues that the issue is waived because the Defendant failed to brief it adequately and that, in any event, the evidence was overwhelming. Addressing first the State’s argument that the Defendant’s sufficiency argument is waived due to inadequate briefing, we conclude that the Defendant has adequately addressed the issue as a component of his jury instruction issue. We will consider the merits of the sufficiency issue, as a function of the jury instruction question. A criminal defendant has “a right to a correct and complete charge of the law.” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000)). As a result, a trial court has a duty “to give proper jury instructions as to the law governing the issues raised by the nature of the proceeding and the evidence introduced at trial.” State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011)); see State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tenn. 1975). An erroneous jury instruction, though, may deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to a jury trial. See Garrison, 40 S.W.3d at 433-34. A jury instruction, though, is “prejudicially erroneous only if the . . . charge, when read as a whole, fails to - 13 - fairly submit the legal issues or misleads the jury as to the applicable law.” State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005). At the time of the offense, the relevant statute provided, “A person commits an offense who unlawfully possesses a firearm, as defined in § 39-11-106, and . . . [h]as been convicted of a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, or a felony involving use of a deadly weapon.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The offense defined under Code section 39-17-1307 was elevated from a Class E felony to a Class B felony if a defendant had a prior conviction for a felony crime of violence. Id. at (b)(3). The definitional statute provided: “Crime of violence” includes any degree of murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated rape, rape, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, trafficking for commercial sex act, especially aggravated sexual exploitation, felony child abuse, and aggravated child abuse[.] Id. § 39-17-1