Randy Gooden v. Bryant Johnson

11/09/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON February 11, 2026 Session RANDY GOODEN v. BRYANT JOHNSON ET AL. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. CT-2172-22 Felicia Corbin Johnson, Judge ___________________________________ No. W2025-00992-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded $575,000.00 in compensation for injuries he sustained in an automobile collision. The defendant challenges the jury’s verdict as to the plaintiff’s alleged permanent injury and lost earning capacity. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which VALERIE L. SMITH, J., and W. MARK WARD, SR. J., joined. Rachel J. Moore and Richard E. Smith, Birmingham, Alabama and Kevin D. Bernstein Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Bryant Johnson, and Serra Chevrolet, LLC. Eric Lewellyn, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Randy Gooden. OPINION I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellee Randy Gooden (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“the trial court”) against Defendant/Appellant Bryant Johnson. The complaint sought compensation for injuries allegedly sustained in a January 2022 car accident when Mr. Johnson rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle. On July 8, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add Mr. Johnson’s employer, Defendant/Appellant Serra Chevrolet, LLC (“Serra Chevrolet,” and together with Mr. Johnson, “Defendants”), to the action. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Johnson was acting as Serra Chevrolet’s employee and agent at the time of the collision. Plaintiff therefore asserted that Mr. Johnson’s negligence should be imputed to Serra Chevrolet. Plaintiff further alleged that he suffered a permanent impairment and disability as a result of his injuries, and that he was entitled to compensation for past, present, and future lost wages. He asked that he be awarded $1,500,000.00 in compensatory damages. A jury trial occurred on February 3–6, 2025. Relevant to this appeal, there was significant dispute as to whether Plaintiff suffered a permanent injury as a proximate result of the collision. The proof showed that following the January 13, 2022 collision, Plaintiff promptly sought treatment from a primary care physician for back and shoulder pain on his right side. He was prescribed muscle relaxers and anti-inflammatories and instructed to see an orthopedist. Plaintiff then followed up with a physician who specializes in rehabilitation and physical medicine. Plaintiff was again given prescription medication for the pain and recommended physical therapy. Plaintiff began physical therapy on January 31, 2022. Physical therapy showed limited range of motion in Plaintiff’s shoulder and a loss of grip strength in his right hand. Plaintiff then saw orthopedic surgeon Dr. Apurva Dalal for the first time on February 2, 2022; Dr. Dalal provided testimony to the jury via video deposition. Dr. Dalal continued treating Plaintiff through June 1, 2022, and subsequently performed an independent medical examination at the request of Plaintiff’s attorneys on September 21, 2022. In the course of his treatment, Dr. Dalal performed physical examinations of Plaintiff, as well as ordering X-rays and MRIs. Ultimately, Dr. Dalal diagnosed Plaintiff with neck and right shoulder injuries, including inflammation of the rotator cuff, shoulder impingement, arthritis, and small partial tears of the rotator cuff. His treatment plan recommended oral medication, a steroid injection, and continued physical therapy. Plaintiff’s range of motion and grip strength improved, but he was still reporting pain and difficulty sleeping, pushing, pulling, and lifting objects. In April 2022, Dr. Dalal recommended another steroid injection. Dr. Dalal released Plaintiff to work with no restrictions in May 2022. In June 2022, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Dalal that he was still having trouble with his shoulder, that he was in pain and “miserable” and that “his shoulder locks up to the point that he cannot even lower his arm.” Dr. Dalal testified, however, that he did not observe that occurring in his testing. Nevertheless, Dr. Dalal found that Plaintiff had full range of motion at this appointment and did not assign Plaintiff any impairment rating. Plaintiff last saw Dr. Dalal at the September 2022 independent medical examination requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys. Following a physical examination, Dr. Dalal found that Plaintiff had lost shoulder mobility since the last exam. Dr. Dalal explained that the initial improvement and then regression of Plaintiff’s condition could be explained by the temporary reduction in inflammation caused by a steroid injection administered during the earlier appointments. Dr. Dalal also stated that the regression could be the result of Plaintiff’s pre-existing congenital condition. Thus, Dr. Dalal admitted that he could not pinpoint the exact cause of the regression in Plaintiff’s condition with any certainty. But -2- Dr. Dalal agreed that it was common for patients to improve with treatment and then to experience setbacks as they resumed normal activities or when treatment wore off. Moreover, Dr. Dalal explained that nothing else had changed since Plaintiff’s last examination, as he still suffered from pain, tears and inflammation of the rotator cuff, impingement syndrome, and arthritis. Given that Plaintiff had gotten “worse,” Dr. Dalal testified that surgery is “an option.” As a result, Dr. Dalal recommended that Plaintiff avoid repetitive shoulder movements, strenuous overhead activities, and lifting more than twenty-five pounds to prevent further injury. He explained that disregarding these restrictions could result in continued pain, stiffness, and popping in the shoulder. Although he initially determined that surgery was unnecessary because Plaintiff had full shoulder motion, Dr. Dalal later testified that surgery might be appropriate if further physical therapy proved unsuccessful, but that surgery would not guarantee improvement. Dr. Dalal attributed Plaintiff’s shoulder injury to the accident and testified that the injury was permanent because Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement. However, Dr. Dalal acknowledged that diagnostic testing showed that Plaintiff had shoulder arthritis and a congenital condition in which part of his shoulder was not fully fused. These issues pre-existed the collision. The congenital condition in particular contributed to Plaintiff’s shoulder impingement because it created pressure on the rotator cuff. Dr. Dalal asserted, however, that neither of these issues caused Plaintiff’s injury and pain because Plaintiff consistently reported that he never experienced any pain prior to the collision. Dr. Claiborne Christian, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records on behalf of Defendants but did not personally examine him. Dr. Christian agreed with Dr. Dalal’s diagnosis of right shoulder impingement and acknowledged that the accident could have caused such an injury. He also agreed that Dr. Dalal’s treatment was reasonable and appropriate, that shoulder impingement can be permanent, and that the condition could possibly interfere with Plaintiff’s work as a United Parcel Service (“UPS”) driver, but that many people with similar conditions are able to work similar jobs. However, Dr. Christian attributed Plaintiff’s ongoing shoulder problems to pre-existing conditions rather than the accident. In his opinion, Plaintiff’s accident-related injuries had resolved by June 2022, and any continuing symptoms, need for treatment, or physical limitations were unrelated to the collision. Plaintiff, who was approximately forty-six at the time of trial,1 testified that he continues to experience pain due to the injury he sustained in the collision. According to Plaintiff, the injury also sometimes interferes with his range of motion. But he never 1 The medical records read into evidence showed that Plaintiff was forty-four years old when he saw Dr. Dalal on February 2, 2022, less than a month following the collision. -3- experienced any such pain or impairment in his shoulder prior to the collision. Plaintiff explained that he continues to perform his job as a UPS driver but sometimes requires assistance from his customers to perform his work. He further testified that due to his injury, he fears he will not be able to continue doing the job in the future. He had planned to work until he was fifty-two or fifty-three but did not believe he would make it that long. But Plaintiff swore on a form during a physical examination for the Department of Transportation in April 2023 that his only physical ailment was high blood pressure; he did not note limited use of his arm, neck, or back, or bone, muscle, joint, or nerve problems. Dr. David Strauser, who holds a doctorate degree in rehabilitation psychology, testified as an expert in rehabilitation psychology. He opined that Plaintiff’s shoulder injury and resulting physical restrictions diminished his future earning capacity, potentially reducing his annual earnings by $74,000.00 to $84,000.00 if he could no longer perform his UPS job or if he was required to undergo surgery.2 Dr. Strauser further testified that Plaintiff’s job requires that he operate beyond the limitations placed by Dr. Dalal and that in his experience, people working beyond medical restrictions typically become unable to continue that work after approximately five or six years. He acknowledged, however, that Plaintiff had suffered no actual reduction in wages as of the date of the trial, as he currently maintained his pre-injury job. Nor could Dr. Strauser point to any medical evidence that Plaintiff would be required to undergo surgery or that UPS was planning to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Defendants moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of proof as to Plaintiff’s claims for permanent injury and loss of earning capacity, characterizing Plaintiff’s evidence on those claims as speculative. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding Defendants to be one hundred percent at fault for the collision. Plaintiff was awarded $225,000.00 for lost earning capacity, $40,000.00 for past pain and suffering, $40,000.00 for future pain and suffering, $250,000.00 for permanent injury, $10,000.00 for past loss of enjoyment of life, and $10,000.00 for future loss of enjoyment of life. The jury’s verdict totaled $575,000.00. Defendants filed a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, renewing their arguments made in connection with the motion for directed verdict and arguing that Plaintiff was not entitled to lost earning capacity damages as he maintained his same employment. Defendants also requested a remittitur of the damages. The trial court once again denied the motion, finding that there was sufficient proof to support the jury’s verdict and that the amount of damages was within a reasonable range given the evidence. Defendants thereafter appealed to this Court. 2 In other words, Dr. Strauser testified that if Plaintiff could no longer work as a delivery driver, his income would be approximately $30,000.00 per year, compared to the $105,000.00 to $115,000.00 Plaintiff could earn with UPS, depending on overtime. Dr. Strauser agreed that the latter figure was both “in line” with what Plaintiff “was actually earning” before the collision and also the industry standard for UPS drivers with Plaintiff’s experience. -4-  II. ISSUES PRESENTED Defendants raise two issues in this appeal, which are taken from their appellate brief: 1. Whether the trial court’s denial of [Defendants’] Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or Motion for Remittitur should be reversed because the jury’s award of $575,000.00 to [Plaintiff] included damages for permanent injury and future treatment of his injuries, which was based on speculative medical expert testimony that lacked any reasonable degree of medical certainty? 2. Whether the trial court’s denial of [Defendants’] Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and/or Motion for Remittitur is due to be reversed because the jury’s award of $575,000.00 to [Plaintiff] included loss of future earnings, which was based on speculation and conjecture from a vocational expert’s testimony that [Plaintiff’s] alleged injury from the motor vehicle accident may possibly impair his future earning capacity? III. STANDARD OF REVIEW In this case, Defendants assert that they should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the damages awarded to Plaintiff for permanent injury and future treatment of his injuries and loss of future earning capacity. As this Court has explained, In ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the standard applied by both the trial court and the appellate court is the same as that applied to a motion for a directed verdict made during the trial. See Holmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tenn. 1977); Robert Banks, Jr. & June F. Entman, Tennessee Civil Procedure § 12–1(c) (1999). In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, both the trial court and the appellate court are required to review the record, discard all countervailing evidence, take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, and allow all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Williams v. Brown, 860 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1978)); Jones v. Zayre, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). “The court may grant the motion only if, after assessing the evidence according to the foregoing standards, it determines that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tenn. 1994). When reviewing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court and the appellate court may not assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Mullins v. Seaboard Coastline Ry. Co., 517 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). -5- Mairose v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 86 S.W.3d 502, 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, “[o]nly if there is no material evidence in the record that would support a verdict for the plaintiff under any of the plaintiff’s theories, may the trial court’s action in directing a verdict [or granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict] be sustained.” Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Jamestowne on Signal, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 807 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)). “Material evidence is ‘evidence material to the question in controversy, which must necessarily enter into the consideration of the controversy and by itself, or in connection with the other evidence, be determinative of the case.’” Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co., 417 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Knoxville Traction Co. v. Brown, 115 Tenn. 323, 331, 89 S.W. 319, 321 (Tenn. 1905)). The material evidence standard also applies to Defendants’ arguments that a remittitur should be granted as to the damages for permanent injury and lost earning capacity. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained regarding damages generally, An award of damages, which is intended to make a plaintiff whole, compensates the plaintiff for damage or injury caused by a defendant’s wrongful conduct. Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tenn. 1975). A plaintiff may be compensated for any economic or pecuniary losses that naturally result from the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Id. Economic damages include out-of-pocket medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, and lost earning potential. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving damages to such a degree that, while perhaps not mathematically precise, will allow the jury to make a reasoned assessment of the plaintiff’s injury and loss. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 156 Tenn. 571, 576–77, 3 S.W.2d 1057, 1058 (1928); Overstreet [v. Shoney’s, Inc.], 4 S.W.3d [694,] 703 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)]. A plaintiff is also entitled to recover compensatory damages for non- economic loss or injury. Elliott v. Cobb, 320 S.W.3d 246, 247 (Tenn. 2010). “Non-economic damages include pain and suffering, permanent impairment and/or disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life.” Id. at 248 n.1 (quoting Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715). Damages for pain and suffering are awarded for the physical and mental suffering that accompany an injury. Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715. Damages awarded for loss of enjoyment of life are intended to compensate a plaintiff for the impairment of the ability to enjoy the normal pleasures of living. Lang v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 170 S.W.3d 564, 571–72 (Tenn. 2005). Assigning a compensable, monetary value to non-economic damages can be difficult. See Wolfe [v. Vaughn], 177 Tenn. [678,] 688, 152 S.W.2d [631,] 635 [(1941)] (citing Power Packing Co. v. Borum, 8 Tenn. App. 162 (1928)). The assessment of non-economic damages is not an exact science, nor is there a precise mathematical formula to apply in determining -6-  the amount of damages an injured party has incurred. See McCullough v. Johnson Freight Lines, Inc., 202 Tenn. 596, 606, 308 S.W.2d 387, 392 (1957); S. Ry. Co. v. Sloan, 56 Tenn. App. 380, 392, 407 S.W.2d 205, 211 (1965). Thus, a plaintiff is generally not required to prove the monetary value of non-economic damages. Health Cost Controls [v. Gifford], 239 S.W.3d [728,] 733 [(Tenn. 2007)] (citing 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 200 (2007)). Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 419–20 (footnotes omitted). The trial judge serves an important function in checking the jury’s discretion as to damages: Generally, if the trial judge is not satisfied with the jury’s verdict, the judge must set aside the verdict and order a new trial. If the trial judge’s dissatisfaction, however, is based only upon the jury’s award of damages, the trial judge may suggest a remittitur, which, if accepted by the plaintiff, would reduce the award to an amount the judge deems appropriate. Id. at 420 (citation omitted); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-10-102(a) (“In all jury trials had in civil actions, after the verdict has been rendered and on motion for a new trial, when the trial judge is of the opinion that the verdict in favor of a party should be reduced and a remittitur is suggested by the trial judge on that account, with the proviso that in case the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered refuses to make the remittitur, a new trial will be awarded, the party in whose favor such verdict has been rendered may make such remittitur under protest, and appeal from the action of the trial judge to the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals.”). When the trial court suggests a remittitur, it may do so “even if the verdict is within the range of reasonableness.” Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 420. To determine the range of reasonableness we “establish[] the upper and lower limits of an award of damages that can be supported by material proof.” Id. at 421. And to evaluate “whether a verdict is within the range of reasonableness, the trial judge must consider the credible proof at trial regarding the nature and extent of the injuries, pain and suffering, economic losses including past and future medical bills, lost wages and loss of earning capacity, age, and life expectancy.” Id. The first step in this analysis is to ascertain “a figure that represents the point at which excessiveness begins,” often by considering the damages awarded in similar cases. Id. (citing Ellis v. White Freightliner Corp., 603 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tenn. 1980)). “An excessive verdict may be cured by remitting the sum by which the award exceeds that figure.” Id. (citing Ellis, 603 S.W.2d at 126). The plaintiff then has three options: “accept the remittitur, refuse the remittitur and opt for a new trial, or accept the remittitur under protest and seek relief from the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 421–22. When a trial court judge has approved the jury’s verdict and refused to grant a -7- remittitur, this Court retains the power to suggest a remittitur on appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-10-103(a). But our review is limited to determining whether the verdict is supported by material evidence. Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 422. Because the trial court approved of the jury’s verdict, we apply this “far more circumscribed” standard of review in this appeal. Id. at 423. IV. ANALYSIS A. Permanent Injury On appeal, Defendants first argue that Dr. Dalal’s testimony was too speculative to support the jury’s verdict that Plaintiff should be awarded $250,000.00 for a permanent injury. Defendants point out that the last time Dr. Dalal treated Plaintiff on June 1, 2022, Dr. Dalal diagnosed Plaintiff with no impairment, no reduction in range of motion, and no need of surgery or continued treatment. It was only during the independent medical examination requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys for purposes of litigation, rather than treatment, that Dr. Dalal diagnosed a permanent impairment. According to Defendants, Dr. Dalal’s September 2022 opinions should not be relied upon because Dr. Dalal had not seen Plaintiff since June, and Dr. Dalal could not be certain as to why Plaintiff’s condition had deteriorated. In general, an expert must establish the occurrence of a permanent injury with reasonable certainty: Testimony of a physician as to the probable effect of the injury is admissible, but it should show that such result is reasonably certain and not a mere likelihood or possibility. To warrant a recovery for a permanent injury, the future effect of the injury must be shown with reasonable certainty. It is not necessary that the evidence show conclusively or without a shadow of doubt that the injuries are permanent. But while absolute certainty should not be required, a mere conjecture, or even a probability, does not warrant the giving of damages for future disability which may never exist. Porter v. Green, 745 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted) (quoting Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Whittemore, 59 Tenn. App. 495, 512– 13, 442 S.W 2d 266, 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969)). Testimony that something is a mere possibility is therefore not sufficient: The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility . . . is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture -8-  or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant . . . . The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The plaintiff need not negat[e] entirely the possibility that the defendant’s conduct was not a cause and it is enough to introduce evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not . . . . Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 861–62 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 41, p. 269 (5th ed. 1984)) (involving the question of proximate cause). Thus, an expert’s opinion “that a certain thing is possible is no evidence at all. His opinion as to what is possible is no more valid than the jury’s own speculation as to what is or is not possible.” Id. (citing Palace Bar, Inc. v. Fearnot, 269 Ind. 405, 381 N.E.2d 858, 864 (1978)). Respectfully, however, we cannot agree that Dr. Dalal’s testimony was no more than speculative. As Plaintiff points out, Defendants raise no objection to Dr. Dalal’s qualifications or expertise in this area. Moreover, while Defendants disputed his conclusion, there is no question that Dr. Dalal testified unequivocally that Plaintiff suffered a permanent impairment that was caused by the collision.3 Rather, Defendants take issue with the fact that although Plaintiff had significantly improved at the June 1, 2022 appointment, such that he had no restriction on his work or life, his condition was markedly worse at the September 2022 independent medical exam. Defendants also point out that Dr. Dalal could not definitively state the cause for Plaintiff’s deterioration. While it is true that Dr. Dalal stated that there was an “unknown diagnosis” as to exactly what caused Plaintiff’s condition to deteriorate, the proof shows that Plaintiff was still reporting pain and difficulty with movements throughout his treatment. Indeed, Dr. Dalal noted that Plaintiff was “miserable” with pain at the June 1, 2022 appointment. Moreover, Dr. Dalal explained that Plaintiff’s deteriorated condition could have been the result of “[o]ngoing inflammation” that was reduced temporarily by the steroid shot, but then “flared up again.” And Dr. Dalal stated that this was not uncommon in patients that he treats. It is not our role to weigh the evidence for and against the jury’s verdict. Rather, we merely perform “a search of the record to ascertain if material evidence is present to support the verdict.” Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 586 S.W.2d 117, 119–20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). Here, Dr. Dalal’s testimony provides material evidence that Plaintiff’s shoulder injury was caused by the collision and was permanent. Defendants cite no authority even suggesting that the jury is not entitled to rely on an expert’s permanency 3 Dr. Dalal specifically attributed Plaintiff’s injuries to the collision, rather than any pre-existing conditions. -9- opinion when the expert is unable to explain with certainty the mechanism of a later deterioration to the plaintiff’s condition. This is especially true here where Dr. Dalal explained plausible reasons for the deterioration in Plaintiff’s mobility. Obviously, Defendants presented their own evidence to undermine Dr. Dalal’s conclusions, including questioning the credence that Dr. Dalal gave to Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, difficulty sleeping, and issues with movement over the results of diagnostic testing, as well as attempting to cast doubt as to whether Plaintiff’s accident-related injury resolved by June 2022. But the jury was ultimately free to disregard that proof and evidently did so. So Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the jury lacked any material evidence from which it could have concluded that Plaintiff suffered a permanent injury caused by the collision. We likewise reject Defendants’ argument that the $250,000.00 award for permanent injury should be remitted. Importantly, Defendants treat this argument as little more than a perfunctory request in their initial appellate brief. Their argument on this issue does not discuss the $250,000.00 figure in any depth, much less mention any range of reasonableness for Plaintiff’s permanent injury award. Defendants’ reply brief also only briefly mentions this argument. And neither brief discusses analogous cases to which this Court should compare the jury’s $250,000.00 award. See Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 421. Defendants’ argument as to this issue is therefore little more than skeletal. See Sneed v. Bd. Prof. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”). Rather, Defendants’ only real argument as to this issue is that material evidence did not support the jury’s verdict that Plaintiff suffered a permanent injury, which we have rejected, supra. We therefore conclude that Defendants failed to demonstrate that the jury’s $250,000.00 award for permanent injury was unsupported by the material evidence in the record. B. Lost Earning Capacity Next, Defendants assert that the trial court should have granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict or remitted the damages awarded for loss of future earning capacity. Defendants once again assert that the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert on this issue was speculative and conjectural. Plaintiff contends, however, that there was material evidence from which the jury could sustain its verdict. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, Loss or impairment of future earning capacity is an element of damages in a personal injury action. Earning capacity refers not to actual earnings, but rather to the earnings that a person is capable of making. The extent of an injured person’s loss of earning capacity is generally - 10 -  arrived at by comparing what the person would have been capable of earning but for the injury with what the person is capable of earning after the injury. If the injury is permanent, this amount should be multiplied by the injured person’s work life expectancy, and the result should be discounted to its present value. The injured party has the burden of proving his or her impairment of earning capacity damages. In order to recover these damages, the injured person must first prove with reasonable certainty that the injury has or will impair his or her earning capacity. Then, the injured party must introduce evidence concerning the extent of the impairment of his or her earning capacity. The proof concerning impairment of earning capacity is, to some extent, speculative and imprecise. However, this imprecision is not grounds for excluding the evidence. Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 703–04 (footnote and citations omitted). In this appeal, Defendants assert that no material evidence supports the jury’s award of $225,000.00 for future lost earning capacity because Dr. Strauser’s opinion was based on speculation as to whether Plaintiff would lose his job or need surgery in the future, given that Plaintiff was still employed at his pre-injury income level. Dr. Strauser also admitted that he had seen no medical opinion establishing to a reasonable degree of certainty that Plaintiff would require surgery in the future and had received no information from UPS indicating that Plaintiff would lose his employment. Indeed, Defendants note that Plaintiff was currently working at the time of trial. Moreover, Defendants point out that in order to keep his job, Plaintiff underwent a work-related physical in 2023, during which he did not identify any impairments to his shoulder. And Dr. Strauser acknowledged that he did not review this form in forming his opinions, nor did he perform any vocational testing on Plaintiff. Thus, Defendants essentially assert that the loss of Plaintiff’s pre-injury earning capacity depends on contingencies that have not yet occurred and may not occur in the future. In addressing this issue, we must keep in mind that the jury is permitted to draw inferences from the evidence presented. Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn. 1992). Moreover, in considering whether the jury had material evidence from which to draw its conclusions, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. See Mullins, 517 S.W.2d at 201. And we must disregard all countervailing proof, such as Plaintiff’s responses relative to his physical. See Eaton, 891 S.W.2d at 590 (“[T]he court must remove any conflict in the evidence by construing [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the non-movant and discarding all countervailing evidence.”). Under this lens, it is clear that Plaintiff presented material evidence to demonstrate with reasonable certainty that he will suffer lost earning capacity as a result of his injury. - 11 - The proof showed that while Plaintiff was still working with UPS, he was required to work beyond the restrictions set by Dr. Dalal. Plaintiff testified that while he had hoped to work until he was fifty-two or fifty-three, he now believed that his injury made him unable to do so. Plaintiff continued to work for the time being despite his pain because it was necessary to support his family; he further confirmed that he did not inform UPS of his restrictions because he did not want to be unemployed. And Dr. Strauser testified, based on his experience and expertise, that individuals who work beyond their restrictions “because they need to keep income flowing” are typically only able to do so for “around five, six years[.]” Dr. Strauser then reiterated that “[t]here will come a point where that person will no longer be able to continue to do that.” Thus, it was not unreasonable for the jury to infer from Plaintiff’s and Dr. Strauser’s testimony that it was likely that Plaintiff would only be able to maintain his current employment until he was approximately forty-nine to fifty years old—i.e., five to six years following the injury and the September 2022 independent medical examination in which Dr. Dalal identified Plaintiff’s injuries as permanent—compared to Plaintiff’s expectation before the accident that he would work with UPS until he was fifty-two or fifty-three. Thus, there was material evidence that Plaintiff’s expectation of working in his current employment was likely to be cut short by Plaintiff’s permanent injury and that Plaintiff would, as a result, lose between two and four years of anticipated wages at his pre-injury earning capacity. Defendants therefore have not demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to this award. Defendants further assert that the damages awarded for lost earning capacity are excessive and should be remitted. Much like their argument as to the permanent injury damages, Defendants’ argument on this issue was largely deficient in their initial brief to this Court. See Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615. Defendants attempt to remedy this failure in their reply brief, in which they do offer more argument as to the amount of the damages awarded for lost earning capacity. But reply briefs are typically not vehicles for correcting deficiencies in initial briefs. Augustin v. Bradley Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 598 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). Still, even if we consider Defendants’ reply brief, it offers little more analysis on this issue. Neither brief cites any analogous caselaw for comparison to the jury’s verdict; Defendants simply argue that the total award should be reduced by at least $225,000.00. Thus, Defendants did not discuss the range of reasonableness for what they consider the appropriate award; they simply request a total elimination of the jury’s lost earning capacity award. Cf. generally Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 421 n.8 (“A suggested remittitur should not be so substantial as to destroy the jury’s verdict.”). Regardless, we conclude that material evidence supports the jury’s calculation of damages as to the lost earning capacity. Dr. Strauser testified that in the event that Plaintiff is no longer able to maintain his employment at UPS, he would suffer an annual loss of - 12 - earning capacity between $74,000.00 and $84,000.00.4 Given that the jury was permitted to infer that Plaintiff was likely to lose between two and four years working at his pre- injury earning capacity, as discussed, supra, the jury’s award, which represents approximately 2.7 years of lost earning capacity at $84,000.00 per year, falls well within the range of reasonableness presented by the evidence. As such, Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to a complete remittitur of Plaintiff’s lost earning capacity damages respectfully lacks merit.5 V. CONCLUSION The judgment of the Shelby County Circuit Court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as necessary and consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellants Bryant Johnson and Serra Chevrolet, LLC, for which execution may issue if necessary. S/ J. Steven Stafford J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE 4 Defendants do not challenge this calculation on appeal. 5 Defendants raise no challenge as to whether the jury’s award was properly “discounted to its present value.” Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 704. - 13 -