State of Tennessee v. Harshal Dilip Trivedi

09/16/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE August 11, 2026 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HARSHAL DILIP TRIVEDI Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lincoln County No. 24-CR-9 Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge1 ___________________________________ No. M2025-00328-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________ The defendant, Harshal Dilip Trivedi, was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court jury of three counts of assault and one count of resisting arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to probation after service of 150 days in jail. At a later contempt hearing, the defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt and received a sentence of ten days in jail. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting arrest or alternatively failing to declare the statute unconstitutional; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence he made racial epithets; (4) the trial court wrongly instructed the jury on protection of property; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for assault; (6) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing; and (7) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of criminal contempt. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., joined. Drew Justice, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Harshal Dilip Trivedi. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth Evan, Assistant Attorney General; Robert J. Carter, District Attorney General; and Amber Sandoval and Cindy Wiseman, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 1 Judge Durard recused himself from hearing the Motion for Criminal Contempt; therefore, Chancellor James B. Cox presided over the defendant’s contempt hearing.  OPINION Facts and Procedural History The defendant was indicted for three counts of aggravated assault involving the display of a deadly weapon and one count each of resisting arrest and evading arrest,2 arising out of an incident at the Budget Inn which the defendant and his family operated in Fayetteville, Tennessee. State’s Proof On December 2, 2022, Peyton Keith, Brandon Thompson, and Roger Wilbur, employees of Star Construction, a telecommunications subcontractor for AT&T, were assigned a job at Budget Inn in Fayetteville. The crew was “installing an anchor for a telephone pole in the back” and was working “in the field beside the Budget [Inn] . . . [with] no intention of going in to the back of the Budget [Inn].”3 As Mr. Thompson explained, they were “staying outside working on a utility right-of-way which is the . . . power route easement.” Their work trucks, which were marked with “Star Construction, AT&T contractor,” were parked “[r]ight up the fence line, . . . not in the driveway of the Budget [Inn]” or “blocking traffic from going in and out of the [m]otel.” Budget Inn had ordered fiber installation from AT&T, and the Star Construction crew was doing the prep work for AT&T. The crew went onto “a construction site next door to [the motel]” in an “open field” where they were working on a utility pole. At some point, Mr. Keith walked back to the truck to get a tool, and the defendant “c[a]me out of the motel and . . . started yelling . . . about moving the truck,” to which Mr. Keith yelled back that he did not have a key. The other two crew members “heard the commotion and came walking up” to find out what was going on. The defendant was “cussing and saying white hillbilly trash get off my property.” According to Mr. Keith, the defendant was “being very aggressive with it, just the hand gestures he was making at the time.” The defendant went back inside the motel and returned holding what appeared to be a knife from what the crew members could tell from a distance. After the defendant’s arrest, it was discovered that the alleged knife was actually a letter opener. The defendant “approach[ed] closer” while making “threatening gestures” with the “knife,” saying he was going to “slice all ya’ll’s white hillbilly trash throats[.]” Mr. Thompson testified that he 2 The evading arrest charge was dismissed based on the statute of limitations prior to trial. 3 Witnesses used the terms “motel” and “inn” interchangeably throughout the trial. However, there is no dispute they all were referring to the same location. -2- heard the defendant threaten to get a gun and saw the defendant holding his hand under his shirt while asserting, “I have a gun[.]” The crew started to move the work trucks, and while they were doing so, Mrs. Gayatri Trivedi, the defendant’s mother, approached the workers and inquired what they were doing on her property. They informed her that they were “out here for your service order for fiber,” and she told them, “[J]ust stay here, you are fine.” Mrs. Trivedi “start[ed] yelling back at [the defendant] . . . and then that is when he took his knife or whatever and chunked it at her and that is when she ducked down[.]” At some point, Mr. Thompson called 911. All three of the crew members testified they were afraid the defendant might hurt them. Mr. Wilbur elaborated, “[T]o be honest, . . . I had looked to make sure there was a shovel or something there if he did come where I could defend myself.” The State introduced the 911 calls and surveillance video recording from the motel into evidence. The video recording showed the defendant gesturing wildly and aggressively at someone outside the motel lobby, apparently yelling. Then, the defendant and Mrs. Trivedi can both be seen going outside. The defendant then walked quickly back into the lobby and went behind the desk. He can then be seen taking a metal object from a can on the desk and returning outside, holding the object in the air. The defendant returned to the door of the lobby holding the metal object and then went back outside. He repeated this pattern several times. Eventually, he returned to the lobby, and Mrs. Trivedi remained outside. Several officers from the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office responded to the call at the motel. According to dispatch, there was an incident involving an “[a]ggravated assault potentially with a knife or firearm involved, possible domestic.” When the officers arrived, they “could hear what appear[ed] to be some type of argument or exchange of words between a male and female inside the Budget Inn.” The State entered the bodycam footage from three officers, Officer Doug Allen, Deputy Owen Blackwelder, and Sergeant Tull Malone,4 as evidence and played it for the jury. As the bodycam footage was played, Sergeant Jacob Campbell narrated that officers entered the lobby of the motel as Mrs. Trivedi is clapping and “yelling . . . they are coming.” Deputy Trey Minor described that Mrs. Trivedi “was a little confrontational at first” and told the officers the male voice was her “employee.” The officers caught sight of the defendant behind Mrs. Trivedi and asked him to come out. He refused. They also “asked him to show . . . his hands.” However, the defendant refused to comply and actually turned and “fled back into the – it ended up being the living quarters of the Budget Inn, that’s when the taser was deployed striking the left upper portion of the back and pulling him 4 Sergeant Malone had become Sheriff of Lincoln County at the time of trial. -3- back[.]” Deputy Minor explained, “He turned and ran from me, still the whole time I am asking him to stop and show me his hands and come and talk to me[.]” The defendant did not comply, and Deputy Minor “didn’t know if he had a weapon, a knife or gun, or what and if he was going to get it. So yes, I tased him.” The officers reiterated at trial that they were responding to a call concerning a subject armed with a knife and gun and had not been able to rule out the presence of a weapon when the tasing occurred. Despite having been tased, the defendant continued to fight Deputy Minor and “tr[ied] to roll around,” so the deputy tased the defendant a second time. In the bodycam footage, other officers are heard telling the defendant to “stop fighting.” Deputy Minor recounted that the defendant “resisted me by running from me, resisted while I was trying to cuff him, resisted when he was trying to go to the car.” He testified, “And once I get him through the corridor of the office and house part to the outside, I’m thinking one of the videos I reviewed you could see where he kind of turns from me . . . several times he kept trying to turn from me, instead of walking with me.” Deputy Minor suffered a significant injury to his shoulder and torn biceps,” requiring surgery, due to his struggle with the defendant. According to Sergeant Campbell, after they seized the defendant inside the motel, the defendant proclaimed that the officers needed a warrant and has since filed a lawsuit against the police department. While the other officers were dealing with the defendant, Sergeant Campbell escorted Mrs. Trivedi out of the living quarters into the lobby. After the defendant was arrested, Mrs. Trivedi accompanied the officers through the living quarters, and she picked up a stainless-steel letter opener from the top of the defendant’s dresser and showed it to the officers. Defendant’s Proof Mrs. Trivedi, the defendant’s mother and owner of the Budget Inn, noticed the three unfamiliar men in front of the motel on December 2, 2022. None of them approached to explain their presence, and she did not know why they were there. One of them was wearing a blue checked shirt and another was wearing a blue baseball cap. According to Mrs. Trivedi, none of the victims were dressed in any sort of uniform. She claimed the three men must have “jump[ed]” over their “big gate” bearing a private property sign because she specifically saw at least one of them doing so. According to Mrs. Trivedi, when the defendant saw the three men, he “don’t do nothing. He just was scared about 3 unknown people and he tried to save his mother’s life.” She said the defendant simply went outside and told the men to “get off my property[.]” She admitted the defendant waved the letter opener but said he did not threaten the men. He never said anything about getting a gun or shooting anyone. While reviewing -4- a portion of the surveillance video, Mrs. Trivedi claimed that when she bent down, she was picking up a rock to throw at the men because she did not know who they were and wanted them to leave her property. She denied that the defendant threw a knife or letter opener at her. On cross-examination, Mrs. Trivedi denied putting in a work order to have fiber installed. She agreed that on the day the AT&T subcontractors were there, there was also electrical work being done at the back of her property. Mrs. Trivedi claimed that the workers with whom she was angry were in a van and were not wearing the same clothes as those depicted in the bodycam footage. Mrs. Trivedi insisted that she was angry with the AT&T subcontractors but claimed they had changed clothes and vehicles. The defendant testified that on the day in question, he was cleaning one of the rooms when he noticed that the cable to the room had gone out. The cable service was provided by a satellite in the motel’s back yard. As he was going to the office to discuss the outage with his mother, he noticed a “strange suspicious male coming out of [the] back yard[.]” Concerned, the defendant asked the man “who are you, and why are you here,” but the man “gave no response.” The defendant claimed that he interacted with the men for two and a half minutes before he procured the letter opener. During that time, he asked the men multiple times for their identities and reason for being on the motel’s property. However, “[n]ever at no point do they say who they are, why they are on the property and if they are leaving.” The men were dressed like “regular Joe’s” and not wearing reflective vests or hard hats. The defendant also claimed that one of their vehicles “was blocking the main entrance of our motel, completely.” The defendant averred the letter opener was “harmless” and “useless as a letter opener.” He demonstrated to the jury that the letter opener could not slit his throat. He denied telling the men he would “slit their throats” and explained that he only grabbed the letter opener because it looked “kind of scary” and he wanted “to have them go away.” However, he admitted to holding the letter opener up in the air and repeatedly saying “move away, go away.” Yet, he never got close enough to the victims that he could have hurt them even if the letter opener had been capable of doing so. The defendant denied throwing a “knife” at his mother and explained that when she was shown bending down on the surveillance video it was because she was picking up a rock to throw at “the remaining truck trespassing on our property.” The defendant went back inside the motel and did not observe any subsequent interaction his mother might have had with the men. The defendant was in his bedroom inside the living quarters of the motel when he saw the police arrive on the surveillance feed. He assumed the “trespassers” had called the -5- police, having made up some lie to get the police involved. He watched from the surveillance video as a deputy “push[ed]” his mother to the side and entered the office. When he encountered the deputy in the foyer area between the motel office and residential area, he instinctively turned away fearful of being shot because the deputy had his arm raised holding what appeared to be a gun. He was not resisting arrest. After he was tased the first time, the pain forced him to the floor, and he was “simply lying on the ground” when he was tased a second time. Throughout the ordeal, he did not fight with the officers, but he did declare that he would call his lawyer and sue the police. Despite his anger, he did not fight with the officers as they walked him to the patrol car and claimed that, instead, the bodycam video showed the deputy “slinging me around like I was a rag doll.” On cross-examination, the defendant explained that there had been instances in the past when he called the police on trespassers, and the deputies from the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office were “hostile and aggressive” and “treat[ed] us like we [we]re the criminals.” The jury returned with verdicts convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense of assault in Counts 1 through 3 and resisting arrest in Count 5. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to probation after service of 150 days in jail. Subsequently, the defendant was held in criminal contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail. The defendant appealed. Analysis On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of resisting arrest or alternatively failing to declare the statute unconstitutional; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence he made racial epithets; (4) the trial court wrongly instructed the jury on protection of property; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for assault; (6) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing; and (7) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of criminal contempt. I. Motion to Suppress The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The State responds that the trial court properly denied the motion. We agree with the State. -6-  Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, namely his identification as the suspect, gleaned during the warrantless intrusion into his home and arrest. At the onset of the suppression hearing, the State entered the 911 call and police bodycam footage as exhibits. On the 911 call, Mr. Thompson reported that he and his co-workers were threatened by a man with a knife and gun at the Budget Inn. In the background, Mrs. Trivedi is heard asking Mr. Thompson, “Did you do your work?” When Mr. Thompson responded that the police were on the way, Mrs. Trivedi said, “Police? Oh . . . . Don’t worry . . . . You finish your work. You finish out here. You finish.” Mr. Thompson told the dispatcher that Mrs. Trivedi was telling them to finish, but “this guy’s crazy. He literally brought a knife outside and started running toward our trucks with it.” The bodycam footage showed officers at the entrance to the motel lobby saying, “Police department, come outside.” Mrs. Trivedi came outside, and an officer asked, “Where’s your husband?” Mrs. Trivedi responded that her husband was out of the country, and an officer asked, “Where’s the other male?” Mrs. Trivedi said the other male was her employee. An officer told Mrs. Trivedi to bring him out, and she said, “No sir, I’m sorry.” The officers then made entry in the motel lobby, and Mrs. Trivedi said, “No, he’s coming, he’s coming.” The officers repeatedly told the defendant to “come out,” but he did not comply and instead yelled that the officers were trespassing. The defendant took off towards the back area behind the motel office, and an officer followed and ultimately tased him. From the bodycam footage, it appeared that the tasing officer was in the intermediary area between the office and residential area, and the defendant was essentially in the doorway of the intermediary area and residential area. Another officer escorted a hysterical Mrs. Trivedi back to the lobby. An officer told the defendant to “roll over and put your hands behind your back,” and another officer told the defendant to get his “hands off” one of the officers. When one of the officers attempted to handcuff him, the defendant “reared up” and continued struggling at which point another officer yelled at him to “quit fighting.” The defendant continually yelled that the officers were trespassing and that he wanted a lawyer. Finally, after the defendant was handcuffed and in custody and as he was being escorted to a patrol car, the defendant at least twice called the escorting officer a “white trash pig.” The defendant also kept pulling against the officer escorting him, while turning around to shout more slurs and curses at the officers behind him. Then, as the defendant sat in the patrol car, he continued yelling, “white trash pigs, f*cking hillbill[i]es, dirty f*ucking KKK.” -7-  Mrs. Trivedi informed the officers that the defendant “has some mind problems.” She explained that the “AT&T people” came to put in fiber, and “they are not [a] problem. They are doing [our] work.” The defendant was only upset because they did not ask for permission first. Mrs. Trivedi said that she told the defendant she would throw a rock at him if he did not stop. She elaborated that the defendant was scared because they had a drug dealer on the property the night before. She tried to get the defendant to calm down and told him she would call the police if he did not, so the defendant went inside. After the defendant was secured in the patrol car, Mrs. Trivedi escorted officers into the living quarters behind the motel office. She took the officers to the defendant’s bedroom, where she picked up a letter opener from the top of the dresser and showed it to them. An officer held up the letter opener, and Mrs. Trivedi said, “He don’t use this.” One of the officers spoke with the victims. The side of their truck read, “Star Construction, LLC, A Telephone Company Contractor,” and reflective cones were in the bed of the long truck. The victims were dressed in reflective vests and wearing hard hats. One of the victims asked the officer if they could return to the property on the other side of the motel where they had abruptly left some machinery. The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that the motel is his home in addition to his business. He entered photographs of the motel lobby and residential area as exhibits to explain the layout of the area. In the lobby, there is a door marked “private” that leads to an office behind a glass partition. In the office, there is another door marked “private” that leads to an intermediary room between the office and residence. Lastly, there is a door in the intermediary room, also marked “private,” that leads to the residential hallway. The defendant said he was tased in the residential hallway. Regardless, defense counsel asserted that the same Fourth Amendment rights applied to whether the defendant was in a “residence” or a “business.” The trial court reserved ruling on the issue and ultimately issued an order denying the motion to suppress. The court found that the officers were responding to a call that someone armed with a knife was threatening utility workers with bodily harm and that the suspect had indicated he had a firearm. The complainant on the call also said that he saw the suspect throw a knife at a woman. The court recounted: Body cam footage shows two officers arriving to the scene in about eight minutes after the 911 call. By this time, [the] [d]efendant had retreated back into the [m]otel. Officers approach and met with the mother just outside the exterior door to the small lobby. She is a bit evasive and dishonest with her answers. At this point, officers have not located the [d]efendant, any knife or any gun. When the mother refuses to get her son, Deputy Minor steps into -8-  the lobby then the mother exclaims “he is coming, he is coming.” [The] [d]efendant apparently has either entered the office area through the rear door or, at least, opened the same and then tried to slam the door on [Deputy] Minor when he approached. Once the door is breached, the [d]efendant is finally subdued and escorted out to a patrol vehicle. Later, with the mother present, [Sergeant] Campbell finds what he believes to be the weapon laying in plain view on the [d]efendant’s dresser. The mother is actually the one who picks up the weapon as she seemingly is voluntarily escorting officers through the apartment. The court concluded that the above-mentioned facts “justif[ied] a warrantless intrusion into the apartment” due to the exigencies of the situation. Then, citing State v. Hutchison, 482 S.W.3d 893, 919-20 (Tenn. 2016), the court held that the letter opener was admissible because it was in plain view. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantee freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. These guarantees exist to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997). A search and seizure conducted under a valid search warrant is presumptively reasonable, but a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, and the evidence discovered is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2016) (internal citations omitted). The State has the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a warrantless search passed constitutional muster. State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The commonly recognized exceptions to these warrant requirements are: (1) search incident to an arrest, (2) the plain view doctrine, (3) consent to the search, (4) Terry stop and frisk, and (5) the existence of exigent circumstances. State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005). Our supreme court has provided the following non-exclusive list of “frequently-arising situations that have been found to be sufficiently exigent” to justify the warrantless search of a residence: “(1) hot-pursuit, (2) to thwart escape, (3) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, (4) in response to an immediate risk of serious harm to the police officers or others, and (5) to render emergency aid to an injured person or to protect a person from imminent injury.” State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 723 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). “To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of the circumstances.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013). This analysis focuses on the information -9- known to the officer at the time of the search and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 723-24. Suppression issues on appeal are subject to a well-established standard of review. Appellate courts are bound by a trial court’s findings of facts determined after a suppression hearing unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tenn. 2014). “The credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial court as the trier of fact.” Id. at 529 (citing State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012)). “The prevailing party in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). However, this Court reviews the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of correctness. See State v. Montgomery, 462 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)). The defendant disagrees with the trial court’s finding of “hot pursuit” as an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry into his business/home. However, the facts, in the light most favorable to the State, justified the entry. Officers were dispatched to the Budget Inn in response to a domestic disturbance. A 911 call reported that a man who worked at the motel was threatening utility workers with a knife and gun, that he had thrown a knife at a woman on the scene, and that he was “going crazy.” Officers arrived at the scene within minutes, and as they began to assess the situation, they heard a male and female arguing inside. Mrs. Trivedi came to the door and told the officers the man was her employee, and she would not have him come outside. The officers directed the defendant to come out, but he did not comply. They also requested that the defendant show them his hands, and again, he refused to comply. At this point, they reasonably believed that the armed and extremely agitated defendant posed an immediate threat justifying the warrantless entry. The Sixth Circuit cases relied on by the defendant, namely United States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), are readily distinguishable. In Saari, the Sixth Circuit determined that officers’ “constructive entry” was not justified by exigent circumstances because they were not “responding to a swiftly developing situation” or an “immediate threat,” and the defendant “was peaceably occupying his home when the officers arrived.” Saari, 272 F.3d at 809- 10. It is also of note that there was some significant lapse of time before the officers encountered the defendant in Saari considering they first went to the residence of the defendant’s ex-wife and then “eventually” went to the defendant’s apartment. See id. at 806. In Morgan, the Sixth Circuit determined that officers were not “responding to an emergency” or in “hot pursuit” of the defendant where they assembled at a coffee shop and - 10 - waited for the sheriff before proceeding to the defendant’s house. 743 F.2d 1162. The court also observed that neither was the “warrantless intrusion . . . the result of an ongoing field investigation.” Id. at 1164. Whereas here, the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time were that the defendant had verbally threatened the victims while yielding a knife and one of the victims had seen the defendant throw something at Mrs. Trivedi, all while yelling aggressively and threatening to get a gun. Officers quickly responded to the developing domestic situation and immediate threat. Moreover, we also observe that in both Saari and Morgan the defendants’ motions to suppress had been granted and the appeals were made by the State, meaning the standard of review was in the defendants’ favor. Additionally, though not relied on by the trial court, the parties were questioned during oral argument as to whether the defendant’s identity would have inevitably been discovered by law enforcement. Though the defendant claimed he would not have been discovered, the record does not support his argument. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the evidence would have otherwise been discovered by lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); State v. Ensley, 956 S.W.2d 502, 511 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996). Proof of inevitable discovery “involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501. Here, most of the defendant’s interactions with the victims and Mrs. Trivedi were captured on the motel’s security cameras which were obtained and reviewed by law enforcement. Additionally, as testified to by Deputy Minor, the defendant had a history with the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department being called to the motel to resolve disputes between the defendant and a guest. Thus, law enforcement was familiar with the defendant prior to the instant matter and would have been able to identify him from the security video. Therefore, even if their entry into the motel office and residential space was improper, the discovery of the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator was would have been inevitably discovered. Finally, we note the defendant did not specifically challenge admission of the letter opener at the suppression hearing because he considered it “exculpatory” in that it was not a knife. Regardless, because the entry into the business/home was justified, the officers’ finding the letter opener in plain view was permissible. See Hutchison, 482 S.W.3d at 919- 20. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. - 11 - II. Motion to Dismiss The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare the resisting arrest statute unconstitutional and/or dismiss the resisting arrest charge. The State responds that the defendant waived this issue for failing to request a ruling from the trial court and that he cannot establish plain error. We determine the trial court did not err in denying the motion and decline to reach the constitutional issue. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to declare the resisting arrest statute unconstitutional and/or dismiss the charge from the indictment. However, the trial court failed to enter a pretrial ruling on the motion, and the defendant did not bring it to the court’s attention until the motion for new trial three months later. The court acknowledged in its ruling on the motion for new trial that it had inadvertently failed to enter an order on the motion to dismiss, but that it was overruled for the same reason as the motion to suppress – because the officers’ entry into the motel was not unlawful. We need not belabor whether the defendant waived this issue because, waiver notwithstanding, the defendant is not entitled to relief. The defendant argues that his arrest was unlawful because the officers’ entry was unlawful, and therefore, he should be permitted to resist an unlawful arrest against officers who are essentially “criminal[s] with a badge.” However, as explained above, exigent circumstances warranted officers’ entry into the motel, meaning the officers’ entry was not unlawful and the defendant’s arrest was not unlawful. We need not reach the defendant’s constitutional question as “[i]t is well- settled in Tennessee that ‘courts do not decide constitutional questions unless resolution is absolutely necessary to determining the issues in the case and adjudicating the rights of the parties.’” Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002)). Our research has revealed a case in accord with our determination. In State v. Roberts, a defendant convicted of resisting arrest argued that “the Tennessee Constitution protect[ed] his actions” and “section 39-16-602(b) [wa]s unconstitutional because it abolishe[d] his right to resist an unlawful arrest.” 106 S.W.3d 658, 663-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The court of appeals determined it need not reach the constitutional issue because the lower court had not acted arbitrarily in having the defendant taken to a holding cell, from which the resisting arrest charge transpired. Id. at 661, 664. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. - 12 - III. Evidence of Racial Epithets The defendant argues that the racially derogatory comments he directed towards the victims and police officers were irrelevant and prejudicial and, therefore, should have been excluded. The State responds that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence. We agree with the State. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion seeking exclusion of racially charged comments, such as “white trash hillbillies” and “white trash pigs,” that he made toward the victims and police officers during the course of the encounter. The trial court denied the motion in a written order,5 finding that the defendant’s comments to the victims were relevant “to show his intent to harm and . . . supporting the element of placing them in reasonable fear of bodily injury.” The court continued that the defendant’s comments to the officers showed his “intent to be uncooperative and resistant while being placed in custody.” The court determined that the probative value of the evidence was “not substantially outweighed by their potential prejudicial effect.” However, the court offered to give a limiting instruction upon the defendant’s request. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401 provides that “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is typically admissible, while irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice is defined as “[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978) (internal quotation omitted). Further, “[p]rejudice becomes unfair when the primary purpose of the evidence at issue is to elicit emotions of ‘bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror.’” State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 106 (Tenn. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere with that discretion absent a clear showing of abuse of 5 The order indicates there was a hearing on the motion on September 10, 2024, but the transcript from that hearing is not in the record. - 13 - discretion. See State v. Clayton, 535 S.W.3d 829, 859 (Tenn. 2017). This Court finds an abuse of discretion when the trial court applies “an incorrect legal standard or reaches a conclusion that is “illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party complaining.’” State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006)). On appeal, the defendant argues that the racial comments should have been excluded because they had no probative value and “tended to inflame” the jury. The record, however, indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such evidence. The defendant’s aggressive and agitated manner toward the victims while hurling racial slurs and threatening them with a metal object all painted the picture of showing the defendant’s intent to place the victims in fear of bodily injury. We can easily say the slurs were “a step on one evidentiary route to the ultimate fact.” See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997). Likewise, the defendant’s belligerence toward the police officers was indicative of his being uncooperative and resistant throughout the encounter. Cf. State v. Forrest, No. M2002-02434-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21909350, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2003) (testimony of the defendant’s being hostile and using racial slurs relevant to establish the defendant’s belligerent demeanor as evidence of intoxication). Moreover, while certainly offensive, the comments were not so inflammatory that the prejudicial effect would substantially outweigh their probative value. The defendant’s reliance on United States v. Hazelwood, 979 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2020), is unpersuasive. Hazelwood was a wire and mail fraud case in which recordings of the defendant, a businessman, using profanity and making racial slurs was admitted to show that the defendant’s conduct was incompatible with his defense theory that he would never do anything to jeopardize his company’s reputation or success. Id. at 402-05. The 6th Circuit commented that the fact the defendant used “utterly repulsive language in private” did not make it more likely t