Full Opinion

FILED Nov 09, 2026 12:04 PM(CT) TENNESSEE WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD Patrick Shumaker Docket No. 2026-80-1343 v. State File No. 860056-2026 Barnhart Crane and Rigging, et al. Appeal from the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims Allen Phillips, Judge Affirmed and Remanded In this interlocutory appeal, the employee contends the trial court erroneously denied his request for certain benefits. The employee alleged suffering physical and mental injuries from an altercation with his supervisor and filed a petition for benefit determination. The employer provided a panel of medical providers and initiated temporary disability benefits after the employee’s first appointment with the authorized treating physician but declined to pay unauthorized medical expenses and disability benefits the employee alleged had accrued since the date of his injury. At an expedited hearing, the employee sought to compel the employer to provide temporary disability benefits from the date of the injury, reimburse certain unauthorized expenses, and pay a 25% penalty for its failure to initiate disability benefits timely. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order instructing the employer to continue providing temporary disability and medical benefits for the employee’s physical and mental injuries but denied the employee’s other requests. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case. Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined. Patrick L. Shumaker, employee-appellant, pro se Ryan C. Edens, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Barnhart Crane and Rigging 1 Factual and Procedural History Patrick L. Shumaker (“Employee”) was working for Barnhart Crane and Rigging (“Employer”) as a crane operator on November 13, 2025, when he alleges he sustained multiple injuries as a result of an altercation with his supervisor.1 On March 3, 2026, Employee filed a petition for benefit determination seeking medical and temporary benefits. Employer voluntarily provided a panel of physicians in Texas, Employee’s home state, from which Employee selected Ashley Health Physicians (“Ashley”). During Employee’s first visit on March 24, 2026, an advanced practice registered nurse signed a “Texas Workers’ Compensation Work Status Report” stating that Employee had diagnoses of lumbar, right knee, and right ankle strains and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Employee was also given numerous work restrictions, and Employer initiated temporary disability benefits (“TTD”) as of that date. Employee continued to treat with providers at Ashley, primarily seeing a nurse practitioner, Gerard Obnial (“NP Obnial”), but also seeing Dr. Maria C. Arango on one occasion. On May 26, 2026, NP Obnial released Employee without restrictions to follow up as needed, although he noted Employee “reported having PTSD and difficulty sleeping.” Employee returned to NP Obnial on June 9, 2026, complaining of PTSD, insomnia, and lumbar radiculitis.2 At some point, Employer also provided Employee a panel of psychiatrists, which he did not return. Without notifying Employer, Employee saw one of the providers on the panel, South Texas Mental Health Associates (“South Texas”). On July 9, a physician’s assistant at South Texas, Edna Villarreal (“PA-C Villarreal”), signed a medical record stating Employee’s “PTSD symptoms, including panic attacks and trauma-related nightmares, are more likely than not (>51% probability) related to the workplace accident.” An expedited hearing was scheduled for August 11. Prior to that date, Employee filed two Standard Form Medical Reports (“Form C-32”). The first Form C-32 was signed by PA-C Villarreal and stated Employee was completely off work for two time periods, from March 24, 2026 to May 28, 2026, and from June 18, 2026 to “current.”3 On August 6, five days prior to the hearing date, Employee filed a “motion to supplement,” to which 1 Although the details of the alleged altercation are disputed, those factual issues are not pertinent to the current appeal. 2 The June 9 medical note identified Employee as a “New Patient” for reasons that are unclear in the record. 3 It is unclear on what date the Form C-32 signed by PA-C Villarreal was provided to the trial court or opposing counsel. It is stamped “filed” September 2, 2026, as part of the exhibits from the expedited hearing, but Employer’s counsel stated during the expedited hearing that it was filed “after the medical record deadline of 15 business days, and I believe without being within 20 days of the hearing.” 2 he attached an almost identical Form C-32, the only difference being the added signature of Dr. John Lusins, III, a psychiatrist with South Texas. Employee and Thomas Cochran, Employer’s operations manager, were the only witnesses to appear at the expedited hearing, which was held virtually. Employee told the court he was seeking “back pay” from November 13, 2025, the date of the injury, to March 24, 2026, when Employer initiated TTD payments, as well as payment of unauthorized medical expenses for treatment with a chiropractor and another mental health facility. He also wanted Employer to pay a penalty for its alleged failure to timely initiate benefits. Employer responded that it had met its statutory obligations and had provided all the benefits to which Employee was entitled. Although it disputed the compensability of Employee’s PTSD, it maintained that it had not denied any medical care for Employee’s alleged physical or mental injuries. In regard to the altercation that Employee contends caused his injuries, he testified that he objected to an assignment given to him by his supervisor due to safety concerns while working on a project in Memphis. Employee testified that his supervisor began saying “racial stuff” and “told [him] he was going to spit on [him].” After that, according to Employee, his supervisor “rushed” him and they “tussled,” causing Employee to twist his back and hurt his neck, right knee, and right hip. Employee stated he was fired before he could seek medical treatment and began having nightmares the night of the incident. Employee testified that he texted Mr. Cochran on November 14 regarding his injuries. Mr. Cochran testified that he spoke on the phone with Employee on November 14 regarding the incident the day before but denied that Employee mentioned any injuries. Employee then texted Mr. Cochran that same day and said he had injuries but did not describe them. Mr. Cochran testified he did not know what injuries Employee was claiming to have sustained until the day of the expedited hearing. He testified he does not handle workers’ compensation claims for Employer; that he was not present at the November 13 incident, and that injuries were to be reported to the on-site supervisor when they occurred. Following the witnesses’ testimony, the parties had a lengthy discussion on the record regarding the proposed exhibits for the hearing. Employer objected to the Form C- 32 signed by PA-C Villarreal because the form was not signed by a physician and had not been filed timely. Employer likewise objected to the second Form C-32 because it was untimely. It then objected to various medical records from Ashley as hearsay because they were not signed by a physician, most specifically, the medical note from June 9. It also objected to the July 9 note completed by PA-C Villarreal, again arguing it was hearsay.4 4 Employer had previously filed medical records from both Ashley and South Texas and identified the records as potential exhibits for the hearing. 3 Finally, it objected to receipts filed by Employee from his chiropractic treatment as hearsay. The trial court took the evidentiary disputes under advisement. In its September 2, 2026 expedited hearing order, the trial court ordered Employer to provide ongoing treatment with South Texas and Ashley. It also awarded ongoing TTD, finding that the July 9, 2026 medical report from PA-C Villarreal constituted “expert medical proof that [Employee] became disabled from working due to a compensable injury” and that he was still incapable of working. The trial court denied Employee’s request for TTD from the date of the injury through March 24, 2026, finding that he had offered no proof he was disabled during that time.5 The trial court also denied Employee’s request to require Employer to pay for unauthorized medical treatment or provide a new panel, as there was no indication Employee could not have returned to the authorized physician for further care. The court’s order was silent as to the evidentiary disputes regarding the medical records, although it relied on the July 9 medical note in awarding benefits. Despite finding that both Form C-32s were deficient, the court relied on the second Form C-32 containing Dr. Lusins’s signature to conclude Employee was entitled to the benefits it awarded. Employee has appealed. Standard of Review The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2025). When the trial judge has had the opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable deference to credibility determinations made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “when it comes to deposition testimony, an appellate panel is in the same position as the trial court to make credibility determinations.” Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, No. W2024-01034-SC-R3-WC, 2025 Tenn. LEXIS 514, at *18 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025). Thus, when medical proof is presented by deposition, “the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of the expert testimony.” Id. Moreover, the interpretation and application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2025). 5 Given this conclusion, the trial court did not award a penalty for Employer’s alleged failure to timely initiate TTD pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-205(b)(3)(A) (2025). 4 Analysis On his notice of appeal, Employee states the purpose of his appeal is to “appeal decision for backpay and penalty,” noting that both Form C-32s indicate that the injury occurred in November 2025. In his brief, Employee more clearly identifies the issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: (1) whether the trial court should have awarded Employee TTD from November 13, 2025 to March 23, 2026; (2) whether the trial court should have assessed a penalty against Employer; (3) whether the trial court should have awarded Employee reimbursement for payments he made for his chiropractic treatment; and (4) whether the trial court should have ordered Employer to authorize continuing care with Employee’s chiropractor. For its part, Employer argues in its brief that Employee was conclusively presumed to be at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) when he was released on May 27, 2026, with no restrictions and no indication of a need for further medical treatment, and as such, no further TTD is owed. It also contends the appeal is frivolous. TTD and Penalty Employee contends the trial court erred in denying TTD from the date of injury until Employer began paying him TTD on March 24, 2026. He further argues that Employer’s failure to pay those benefits entitles him to a penalty. It appears he is relying on the date of injury and his text message to Mr. Cochran in support of this contention. At an expedited hearing, an employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, but he or she must come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2025); Buchanan v. Carlex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sep. 29, 2015) (Although an employee need only prove a likelihood of prevailing at trial to secure benefits at an interlocutory hearing, “[t]his lesser evidentiary standard . . . does not relieve an employee of the burden of [production] at an expedited hearing.”). Id. To be entitled to TTD, an employee must prove: (1) total disability from working as the result of a compensable injury; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the inability to work; and (3) the duration of the period of disability. Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tenn. 1978). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed, “[e]xcept in the most obvious, simple[,] and routine cases, the claimant in a workers’ compensation action must establish by expert medical evidence the causal relationship . . . between the claimed injury (and disability) and the employment activity.” Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991). Here, Employee has provided no evidence that he was restricted from working as a result of injuries from the incident at work prior to March 24, 2026. There is no proof in the record that he sought medical treatment during that time, either through Employer or 5 on his own. Although an injured worker’s assessment of his or her physical condition is relevant evidence for the court’s consideration, it is not, alone, sufficient to meet the injured worker’s burden of production regarding work restrictions or disability. Employee simply did not meet his burden of production at this interlocutory stage of the case to establish that he was entitled to TTD prior to March 24, 2026.6 Payment of Unauthorized Medical Bills Next, Employee sought reimbursement for medical payments for his treatment at South Texas and with a chiropractor, and he provided at least some receipts for that treatment to the court.7 Employer objected to the admissibility of the receipts, arguing they were hearsay, and the trial court took the objection under advisement. Although the trial court’s order is silent as to the admissibility of the documents, it denied payment for the chiropractic treatment.8 Specifically, the trial court found that Employee sought the chiropractic treatment on his own without consulting with Employer and that it was unauthorized. As we have stated previously, both employers and employees have an obligation to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204, the portion of the statute governing the provision of medical care. See, e.g., Berdnik v. Fairfield Glade Cmty. Club, No. 2016-04-0328, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 32, at *13 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 18, 2017). This includes a requirement that Employee “accept the medical benefits afforded under this section.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2025). In general, an employee who is receiving authorized medical care cannot seek unauthorized care without giving the employer a reasonable opportunity to comply with its statutory obligations. See, e.g., Brown v. State, No. 01S01-9502-BC- 00020, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 712, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Nov. 22, 1995). At the expedited hearing, Employee acknowledged that the medical records contained no referral to a chiropractor. Furthermore, his brief makes no argument regarding payment of the medical bills, despite raising it as an issue on appeal. As stated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of 6 Given that Employee has not met his burden of establishing that he is entitled to past TTD, the issue of a penalty due to his allegations that Employer failed to timely initiate benefits is pretermitted. 7 He also asserted that payment for his June 9 visit to Ashley remained outstanding, but he failed to provide admissible evidence supporting that assertion. 8 The trial court did not specifically address the outstanding bill from South Texas, but the court did identify South Texas as a provider authorized to provide ongoing treatment. Employer is responsible for arranging the payment of medical bills or reimbursement to Employee for any and all authorized medical care. See Hands v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., No. 2020-08-0199, 2026 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 49, at *15 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 7, 2026). 6 Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). In short, the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s denial of reimbursement of the chiropractic bills. Ongoing Chiropractic Treatment Employee also asserts in his brief that Employer should have been ordered to authorize his chiropractor as a treating physician. We can find no indication that Employee asked specifically at the hearing for his chiropractor to become his authorized treating physician. As we have previously observed, it is not the role of the Appeals Board to address a party’s issues in the first instance, see Buckner v. Eaton Corp., No. 2016-01- 0303, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 84, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 9, 2016), and we decline to do so here. However, Employee did request a new panel at the hearing, which the trial court denied. For purposes of this appeal, we will presume that the reference in Employee’s brief to the trial court’s alleged error as described above actually refers to his request for a new panel and the trial court’s denial of that request. Employer previously provided a panel, from which Employee chose to receive care at Ashley. There is nothing in the record to suggest the providers at Ashley are unwilling or unable to see or treat Employee at this time or that the doctor-patient relationship has deteriorated to such an extent that a change in physicians is warranted. See Baker v. Elextrolux, No. 2017-06-0070, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 65, at *9-10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 20, 2017.) In sum, Employer has provided authorized medical treatment, and Employee has an obligation to accept those benefits. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s decision on this issue. Statutory Presumption of MMI Employer did not appeal the trial court’s order but argues in its brief that Employee is statutorily presumed to be at MMI as of May 27, 2026.9 Thus, although Employer did not file a notice of appeal, we will address this issue in accordance with our opinion in Morgan v. Macy’s, No. 2016-08-0270, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *24 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 31, 2016) (“Once an appeal is properly perfected, the statute does not restrict the Appeals Board to considering only issues identified by the appealing party in a notice of appeal but allows consideration of issues specified and argued by a party as long as the issue was properly presented and decided below.”). We can find nothing in the record on appeal, including in the transcript of the expedited hearing, to suggest that Employer raised this argument in the trial court. In fact, the medical record in which Employee was released without restrictions was not discussed 9 “[W]hen the treating physician ends all active medical treatment and the only care provided is for the treatment of pain or a mental injury,” the employee is conclusively presumed to be at MMI. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(1)(E) (2025). 7 during the expedited hearing. As stated above, we cannot address a party’s issues in the first instance. Therefore, we conclude this issue was not properly raised before the trial court and cannot be raised on appeal at this stage of the case. Frivolous Appeal Finally, Employer asserts Employee’s appeal is frivolous. As we have noted previously, a frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit or brought solely for delay. Yarbrough v. Protective Servs. Co., Inc., No. 2015-08-0574, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 3, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 25, 2016) (citing Combustion Eng’g, Inc. v. Kennedy, 562 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tenn. 1978)). Stated another way, “[a] frivolous appeal is one that . . . had no reasonable chance of succeeding.” Adkins v. Studsvik, Inc., No. E2014-00444-SC-R3-WC, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 588, at *30 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 21, 2015) (internal citations omitted). Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Employer attempted to raise an issue on appeal, we do not find Employee’s appeal so inadequate or devoid of merit as to deem it frivolous. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee. 8