Full Opinion

FILED Oct 26, 2026 01:30 PM(CT) TENNESSEE WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD Crystal Green Docket No. 2024-50-3519 v. State File No. 860183-2024 101 Vape & Smoke, LLC Appeal from the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims Dale A. Tipps, Judge Affirmed and Remanded This is the second appeal in this matter. The employee alleged that she injured her right ankle at work, but the defendant company asserted it did not meet the statutory definition of “employer” and, therefore, was not subject to Tennessee’s workers’ compensation laws. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court initially determined that several related companies with one or more common owners operated as a single business entity that, when considered collectively, was subject to the workers’ compensation laws. The trial court ordered the company to provide a panel of physicians but denied the employee’s claim for temporary disability benefits, and both parties appealed. We reversed the trial court’s order to the extent the court found sufficient evidence to aggregate several related but separate business entities for the purpose of determining whether the defendant had a sufficient number of employees to bring it within the scope of Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied on procedural and substantive grounds. It then filed a second motion for summary judgment, which the court denied because it determined that certain disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The defendant timely filed a notice of appeal but failed to file a brief on appeal or a transcript of the summary judgment hearing. Having reviewed the available record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case. Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined. Ben M. Rose, Nashville, Tennessee, for the defendant-appellant, 101 Vape & Smoke, LLC Crystal Green, employee-appellee, pro se 1 Memorandum Opinion1 In this second interlocutory appeal in this case, 101 Vape & Smoke, LLC (“Defendant”) asserts the trial court erred in denying its second motion for summary judgment. Crystal Green (“Employee”) worked for Defendant and, on April 2, 2024, reported tripping over a cord at the store where she was working and injuring her right ankle. Defendant did not provide workers’ compensation benefits. In response to a petition for benefit determination Employee filed in May 2024, Defendant challenged the applicability of Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law, asserting it did not meet the statutory definition of an “employer” because it did not have five or more employees as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(11). After a June 26, 2025 expedited hearing, the trial court determined that a “threshold question” was whether Defendant was an “employer” subject to Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Specifically, the court concluded that Employee did not come forward with sufficient evidence “to prove that [Defendant] employed five or more people.” Despite that determination, the court found that, because Defendant’s owners operated more than one vape shop through different business entities in the same geographical area, the stores could be considered “collectively” for purposes of determining whether Defendant had five or more employees. Thus, the trial court found Defendant met the statutory definition of an “employer” subject to the requirements of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law and ordered it to provide certain benefits. Both parties appealed the trial court’s interlocutory order. On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s finding that Employee is likely to prevail in establishing that Defendant meets the statutory definition of “employer.” We observed that relevant Tennessee precedents do not address whether a trial court can consider separate but related business entities collectively in determining the number of employees a business has for purposes of triggering the Workers’ Compensation Law. We concluded that the preponderance of the evidence at that interlocutory stage of the case supported only a finding that Defendant operated a single business entity at a single location with fewer than five employees. We further clarified that the relevant inquiry was whether this particular employer can be considered to have “us[ed] the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay” as of the date of Employee’s accident pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(11). As a result, we concluded that Employee had not come forward with sufficient evidence to show a likelihood of prevailing on this issue at trial. We therefore reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case. On remand, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court denied on procedural and substantive grounds. Defendant then filed a second motion for summary judgment and included what it alleged was a statement of two undisputed 1 This decision is being filed pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-.03(1) (2023). 2 material facts based on the expedited hearing testimony of one of Defendant’s owners. Those statements were: 1. [Defendant] is not, nor has it ever been, an “employer” in accordance with Tenn Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11). 2. [Defendant] cannot be considered to have “us[ed] the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay” as of the date of [Employee’s] accident in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11). Employee disputed both statements in her Rule 72 Declaration, asserting: (1) she worked in three separate store locations owned (or partially owned) by Defendant; (2) ten employees exchanged shifts across the three locations; and (3) all employees of the three locations were paid at the “Nissan Drive location.” Employee asserted that the locations operated as a single entity, sharing inventory and cash and having a common owner. Employee also submitted the affidavit of a co-worker, which supported certain factual assertions made by Employee. Defendant responded that it was entitled to summary judgment because it had negated an essential element of Employee’s claim, namely that it is an “employer” as defined by the statute. Defendant argued that the facts alleged by Employee were immaterial and, at most, supported a finding that all three of the businesses’ employees were paid in cash from a single location. The court denied the second motion for summary judgment, concluding that the assertions in Employee’s Rule 72 Declaration and the corroborating affidavit were sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact relevant to the threshold question of whether Defendant qualifies as an “employer” under Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law. The court observed that resolving this issue would require it to assess the credibility of witnesses and make factual findings, which the court cannot do at the summary judgment stage. Defendant then timely filed a notice of appeal stating only that it “appeals all aspects of the Order denying [its] Second Motion for Summary Judgment.”2 We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are correct. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Mem., MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). Thus, we must “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Id. 2 Defendant’s notice of appeal did not identify any alleged errors made by the trial court or any specific issues for our consideration on appeal. 3 In its notice of appeal, Defendant states that it appeals “all aspects” of the trial court’s order denying its second motion for summary judgment. However, neither party filed a brief on appeal, and there is no transcript of the summary judgment hearing. Moreover, in the absence of a brief on appeal, Defendant has presented us with no meaningful legal argument to explain how it believes the trial court erred. See Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.”). Courts on appeal will not “dig through the record in an attempt to discover arguments or issues that [a party] may have made” because doing so “would place [the opposing party] in a distinct and likely insurmountable and unfair disadvantage.” Webb v. Sherrell, No. E2013-02724-COA-R3-CV, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015). Here, Defendant did not identify any legal issue on its notice of appeal. Moreover, it did not file a brief on appeal explaining how the trial court allegedly erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. Consequently, due to these deficiencies in the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Defendant. 4