SARA RENEE MCINTYRE v. BLAKE ANTHONY STOREY

09/15/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE May 13, 2026 Session SARA RENEE MCINTYRE v. BLAKE ANTHONY STOREY Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County No. 22-0261 Jeffrey M. Atherton, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. E2025-00688-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ In this divorce action, the trial court declared the parties divorced on stipulated grounds. Following a bench trial on the remaining contested matters, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and final decree for divorce (1) naming the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child; (2) setting forth a “two weeks for wife/one week for husband” rotating residential co-parenting schedule; (3) directing the husband to pay child support; (4) finding that the husband owed $12,500.00 in child support arrearage; (5) distributing the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence; and (6) declining to award attorney’s fees to either party. The court subsequently entered a final order and permanent parenting plan wherein the court made slight adjustments to the residential co- parenting schedule according to proposed parenting plans submitted by the parties. The final permanent parenting plan granted to the wife 243 days per year of co-parenting time and to the husband 122 days. The court set the husband’s monthly child support obligation at $272.00. The wife has appealed, asserting issues related to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the permanent parenting plan and best interest of the Child, the amount of child support and arrearage awarded, and the equitable division of marital property. Upon careful review, we vacate the trial court’s determination of the husband’s child support obligation and the award of child support arrearage in the amount of $12,500.00. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part; Case Remanded THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., and WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, II, J., joined. Michele L. Coffman and Whitley S. Aikman, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sara Renee McIntyre. Adam U. Holland and Phillip E. Fleenor, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Blake Anthony Storey. OPINION I. Factual and Procedural Background On April 19, 2022, the plaintiff, Sara Renee McIntyre (“Wife”), filed a complaint for divorce in the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”) against the defendant, Blake Anthony Storey (“Husband”). The parties had been married in August 2020, and their only child, L.M. (“the Child”), had been born in April 2021. In the complaint for divorce, Wife averred that she had obtained an ex parte order of protection in the trial court against Husband and was awaiting a hearing on her petition for a one-year order of protection. Wife alleged that Husband had exhibited anger toward her and the Child and that Husband was incapable of providing adequate care for the Child. Wife requested sole custody of the Child and submitted a proposed permanent parenting plan with no co- parenting time allotted to Husband. Wife also requested child support and attorney’s fees. On April 27, 2022, Husband filed a motion to adopt a temporary parenting plan, arguing that it would be in the Child’s best interest “to have the maximum amount of parenting time with both parents.” Husband averred that on April 21, 2022, the trial court had dismissed Wife’s petition for an order of protection and had entered an agreed mutual restraining order, enjoining the parties from coming around or communicating with each other except for matters pertaining to the Child. Husband further alleged that Wife was in the process of relocating to Sewanee, Tennessee, and had not allowed him to visit or communicate with the Child. Husband attached a certificate indicating that he had completed a parenting course. Husband subsequently filed an answer and counterclaim, admitting the ground of irreconcilable differences but denying all other substantive allegations. In addition, Husband requested spousal support, child support, and attorney’s fees. He included a proposed permanent parenting plan, designating the parents as “joint” primary residential parents with 182.5 days of co-parenting time each. The trial court entered an agreed order on June 13, 2022, setting forth a temporary parenting plan with Wife as the Child’s primary residential parent. The court granted Husband “temporary residential time” with the Child in three phases, beginning with supervised parenting time on Sundays for six hours in phase one, adding four hours of supervised parenting time on Wednesdays in phase two, and adding two hours of parenting time on two weekday afternoons in phase three. For the supervised parenting time, the order required Husband to either transport the Child with a supervisor or send to Wife a photograph of the Child with the supervisor upon reaching his destination. The order also provided for two FaceTime calls per week between Husband and the Child. Concerning -2- child support, the court entered an agreed order on February 9, 2023, directing Husband to pay to Wife $875.00 monthly. In February 2023, Wife filed a motion to sell the parties’ marital residence, a parcel of improved real property located on Haney Drive in Chattanooga (“the Marital Residence”). In March 2023, Husband filed a motion seeking to expand his co-parenting time with the Child. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an “Order Setting Visitation Schedule and Ordering Sale of Marital Home” on June 30, 2023. As to co- parenting time, the court granted to Husband supervised parenting time with the Child, to be supervised by one of Husband’s parents, on alternate weekends with two hours of supervised parenting time on alternate Wednesdays. The court directed that the Wednesday sessions must be supervised by a third-party supervisor. In July and August of 2023, Husband filed two motions to end supervised parenting time, which Wife opposed. Husband also filed a motion to set holiday co-parenting time. On November 17, 2023, the trial court entered an agreed order granting to Husband unsupervised parenting time with the Child on alternate weekends and alternate Thursday afternoons. The court also set forth a holiday co-parenting schedule. In the same agreed order, the trial court ordered partial disbursement of funds held in Wife’s counsel’s trust account, as agreed upon by the parties. In February 2024, the trial court entered an agreed order disbursing an additional $5,000.00 each to the parties’ respective counsel from Wife’s counsel’s trust account. In January and February of 2024, Husband filed motions to modify his “temporary visitation” schedule, seeking more co-parenting time with the Child. Husband subsequently filed another motion in August 2024 for additional co- parenting time. The trial court conducted a bench trial over the course of ten days, including five days in September 2024 and five days in January 2025. The parties each testified. In addition, Wife presented eight witnesses: Shannon Farr, a certified public accountant (“CPA”), whom Wife had retained to determine Husband’s income; Caroline Thompson, Wife’s friend and Associate Director of Dining at the University of the South (“Sewanee”); Laura Gibson, Wife’s close friend; Juliet Thomas, Ph.D., a mental health provider and licensed professional counselor testifying regarding child development; Eric Ezell, a Sewanee employee whose children had attended the Child’s pre-kindergarten program; James Schriok, Wife’s mother’s domestic partner; Mary Standefer, Wife’s mother; and Tamika Wright, who had served as a parenting supervisor in this litigation. Husband presented seven additional witnesses, including Elle Johnson, Husband’s friend whose children had been on play dates with the Child; Matthew Storey, Husband’s father; Stephanie Storey Hobbs, Husband’s mother; William H. Weathers, the real estate agent who assisted in the sale of the marital residence; Serena Elise Cambrea, Husband’s friend whose children had spent time with the Child; Susan Johnson, CPA., regarding Husband’s income; and Andrea Chase, a compensated parenting supervisor in this matter. -3-  The trial court entered a “Memorandum Opinion and Final Decree” on April 10, 2025 (“Memorandum Opinion”), noting that it had “heard numerous witnesses out of order, saw the interruption of directs, crosses, and redirects, and mod-podged a trial schedule to allow each party the opportunity to clarify his or her viewpoint.”1 The court incorporated into the Memorandum Opinion sixteen stipulations that the parties had filed on April 24, 2024. The court rendered a credibility determination regarding each witness and explained the impact of each witness’s testimony upon the court’s decisions. To determine the residential co-parenting arrangement, the court undertook an analysis of each of the best interest factors delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and set forth a rotating co-parenting schedule wherein Wife would enjoy two weeks’ co-parenting time with the Child followed by Husband’s co-parenting the Child for one week. The trial court determined that Husband should pay Wife “$356 per month for child support” and awarded to Wife a child support arrearage in the amount of $12,500.00. Regarding division of the marital assets, the trial court noted that the parties had waived any request for spousal support and had agreed to the division of all assets except the proceeds from the sale of the Marital Residence. The court ordered that the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence be distributed such that Husband would receive $79,731.60 as partial reimbursement for what the court found to be his separate contribution to the home’s purchase, minus the $12,500.00 that had been awarded to Wife in child support arrearage. The court discerned that the parties had waived attorney’s fees when they waived awards of spousal support in their stipulations. The parties had stipulated that there was no remaining marital debt. The court also stated that the parties had agreed that “going forward, they would utilize and defer to the Clerk and Master, Robin Miller, and/or her Staff Attorney, Rachael Kapperman, for their guidance and neutral decision-making upon party disagreements, and further for the purpose of acting as ‘parenting coordinators.’” The court instructed the parties to submit proposed parenting plans for the court’s review. On July 18, 2025, the trial court entered a final order incorporating a permanent parenting plan that the court had crafted after both parties had missed the court’s deadline to submit proposed parenting plans. However, the parties did subsequently submit proposed parenting plans, and the court considered those along with its own. The court stated in the final order that upon consideration, it had adjusted Wife’s total co-parenting days each year to 243 and Husband’s to 122. Because of this adjustment, the court modified the amount of Husband’s child support obligation to $272.00 monthly. The final order and permanent parenting plan (“PPP”) otherwise memorialized the trial court’s rulings in the Memorandum Opinion. 1 Upon Husband’s motion and the parties’ stipulation, both filed in April 2024, the trial court entered an order on March 17, 2025, nunc pro tunc to May 14, 2024, declaring the parties divorced on stipulated grounds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129. -4-  Wife filed a premature notice of appeal, which this Court treated as final upon entry of the trial court’s final order. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(d). In her appellate brief, Wife has included an appendix with proposed permanent parenting plans apparently filed by her in the trial court. However, these plans do not appear to be in the record. She has also included written closing arguments of the guardian ad litem and of Wife’s counsel. Although the transcripts are in the record, these written closing arguments are not in the record. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(a), (e); Jennings v. Sewell-Allen Piggly Wiggly, 173 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2005) (“This attachment [to an appellate brief] . . . does not serve to supplement the record on appeal.”). We therefore will not consider Wife’s appendix on appeal. II. Issues Presented Wife has presented the following issues on appeal, which we have restated slightly: 1. Whether the trial court erred in its witness observations and credibility determinations for Ms. Gibson and for Husband. 2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that the court’s permanent parenting plan was in the best interest of the Child. 3. Whether the trial court erred in its calculations of child support and the child support arrearage. 4. Whether the trial court erred in its equitable division of the marital property. 5. Whether the trial court erred by declining to award Wife her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. 6. Whether Wife should be awarded her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. III. Standard of Review In a divorce action, we review a trial court’s determinations regarding custody and co-parenting schedules as follows: Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, Holloway v. Bradley, 190 Tenn. 565, 230 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1950); Brumit v. Brumit, 948 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, -5-  are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)). “It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88. Brunetz v. Brunetz, 573 S.W.3d 173, 178-79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). Regarding our review of a trial court’s division of marital assets: This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial court’s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002). -6- Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). Questions relating to the classification of assets as marital or separate are questions of fact. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 398-99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 196 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). See Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Wife has raised an issue focused on the trial court’s credibility determinations. In addressing this issue, we rely on the following instruction from our Supreme Court: Unlike appellate courts, trial courts are able to observe witnesses as they testify and to assess their demeanor, which best situates trial judges to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990); Bowman v. Bowman, 836 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App.1991). Thus, trial courts are in the most favorable position to resolve factual disputes hinging on credibility determinations. See Tenn-Tex Properties v. Brownell- Electro, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 423, 425-26 (Tenn. 1989); Mitchell v. Archibald, 971 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Accordingly, appellate courts will not re-evaluate a trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315, 315-16 (Tenn. 1987); Bingham v. Dyersburg Fabrics Co., Inc., 567 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tenn. 1978). Wells v. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W. 3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). “In order for evidence to be clear and convincing, it must eliminate any ‘serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 404 (Tenn. 2012)). IV. Witness Credibility Wife contends that the trial court erred in its credibility determinations concerning the testimony of Wife’s friend, Ms. Gibson, and the testimony of Husband. We consider each argument in turn. A. Testimony of Laura Gibson Ms. Gibson was called to testify regarding her knowledge of Wife’s and Husband’s relationship with one another and with the Child. Regarding Ms. Gibson’s testimony, the trial court found: -7-  Ms. Laura Gibson is an extraordinarily close friend with [Wife]. Although called to present testimony favorable to [Wife] relating to her parenting style, Ms. Gibson’s inclination was, whenever the evidentiary “door” was opened, to criticize [Husband]. Although the Court usually attempts to temper its unfavorable description of a witness’ testimony, doing so with this witness represents a great challenge. In short, her testimony and observed demeanor was unreasonably biased and was not credible. The Court was troubled by her testimony detailing how she and [Wife] would conduct a detailed “previsitation” physical examination of the child before [Husband’s] visits and, immediately thereafter, conduct a detailed “post- visit” physical examination. As an example of her bias, on re-direct, in an apparent attempt to rehabilitate this witness after certain scathing cross- examination inquiries into her relationships with and viewpoints of men, this witness was asked about her perspective on a man’s role in parenting. Her response, in essence if not exactly quoted, was that “a man might have a place in a child’s life, but not in the child’s home.” As a result, this witness’ testimony was not helpful to [Wife’s] case or to consideration of the Tenn. Code Ann. § [36-6-]106(a) factors, other than negatively, in that upon continued intrusion/participation by this witness, the likelihood of [Wife’s] encouraging a close parent-child relationship with [Husband], is, at best, minimal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § [36-6-]106(a)(2). In the above excerpt, the trial court predicated its credibility determination upon its observation that Ms. Gibson’s “demeanor” appeared “unreasonably biased” and upon Ms. Gibson’s criticism of Husband’s behavior, her participation with Wife in “previsitation” and “post-visit” physical examinations of the Child surrounding Husband’s co-parenting time, and her viewpoints on men in general. Regarding the trial court’s conclusion that “Ms. Gibson’s inclination was, whenever the ‘evidentiary door’ was opened, to criticize [Husband],” the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion. Ms. Gibson outlined several instances during which she had observed Husband’s behavior at his medical practice, at the home Husband shared with Wife and the Child, and outside the courtroom during trial. Relaying these encounters, Ms. Gibson consistently gave a negative account of Husband’s interactions with Wife, the Child, or herself. Ms. Gibson stated that she had observed Husband acting “controlling” and disrespectful of “boundaries” toward Wife and the Child. Ms. Gibson additionally expressed her opinion that Husband was “not a truthful person” based upon her interactions with him at his business. Specifically, Ms. Gibson explained that Husband had treated Ms. Gibson using acupuncture prior to her medical procedure but had failed to “disclose that he was running a fever and sick at the time of treatment.” Additionally, Ms. Gibson detailed certain interactions between herself and Husband in the Marital Residence, as well as in the courtroom during the litigation, that had caused Ms. Gibson to feel -8- “uncomfortable.” Our review of the trial transcripts reveals that Ms. Gibson’s testimony was consistent with the trial court’s credibility determination on this point. Regarding what the trial court characterized as Wife’s and Ms. Gibson’s “post-visit examinations” of the Child, Ms. Gibson’s testimony, together with the documents in the record, supports the trial court’s findings. Ms. Gibson testified that Wife would regularly visit Ms. Gibson’s house after Wife had picked up the Child from Husband’s home. When prompted, Ms. Gibson testified at length concerning observations she had made over time regarding the Child’s physical condition upon return from Husband’s co-parenting time, including: “sunburn” “on [the Child’s] shoulders and on her back and on her face”; “matted” hair; “dirt” under the Child’s fingernails and toes, which indicated to Ms. Gibson that the Child had “not had a bath for a few days”; “severe blisters on the back of her heels and the top of her feet”; “the remnants of a bowel movement in [the Child’s] diaper area where she was not cleaned properly”; “underwear that smelled of urine”; “rashes on her legs” that appeared as if the Child had “peed” in her pants and “had not been changed”; and small, “puncture marks” on the Child’s knee. Ms. Gibson further described a “book” that she and Wife had kept and updated over the course of several months, which they had used to “document” their observations regarding the Child’s well-being after her visits with Husband. Ms. Gibson stated that she and Wife would observe and document the Child’s condition and would then “take a picture of it for records.” The exhibits at trial included several entries from the book containing detailed observations of the Child’s body, including her genitalia. Contrary to Wife’s assertion on appeal, this evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Ms. Gibson and Wife conducted “post-visit physical examinations” of the Child. Significantly, Wife has provided no countervailing evidence to undermine the trial court’s credibility determination respecting Ms. Gibson’s criticism of Husband or her participation with Wife in examining the Child following Husband’s co-parenting time. See Worth v. Cumberland Mountain Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. 03A01-9709-CV-00442, 1999 WL 61629, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1999) (“[F]indings that are related to the issue of credibility will not be disturbed by this court, absent other concrete evidence to the contrary which shows that the trial judge erred in his judgment of the veracity of the witnesses.”). On the other hand, the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that Ms. Gibson and Wife would conduct “detailed ‘previsitation’ physical examinations” of the Child before Husband’s visits with the Child. During direct examination, the following exchange ensued: Attorney: Did [you and Wife]-- do you document what you were seeing after she gets back with [the Child]? -9-  Ms. Gibson: Yes. When or if we are noticing that we feel we need to document, we write them down. I have a book that we have kept that I initial, and then we take a picture of it for records. Attorney: And have you had the opportunity to actually see [the Child] before she goes? Ms. Gibson: No. Attorney: You’ve never seen her before she went to her dad’s? Ms. Gibson: No. Later, on cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Attorney: So, are you aware of the fact that prior to overnight visits with—[the Child’s] overnight visits with [Husband], that [Wife] does a pre-visit body check? Ms. Gibson: No. Attorney: Are you aware of that? Ms. Gibson: No. Twice Ms. Gibson was questioned regarding whether she was aware of or participated in physical examinations of the Child before Husband’s co-parenting time, and twice Ms. Gibson denied knowledge of or participation in such examinations. There is a dearth of evidence or other testimony indicating that Ms. Gibson participated in or was aware of “previsitation” examinations conducted of the Child prior to Husband’s co-parenting time. In the Memorandum Opinion, the trial court found that Ms. Gibson’s testimony in essence was that “a man might have a place in a child’s life, but not in the child’s home.” The record does not reflect that Ms. Gibson specifically articulated that a man “might have a place in a child’s life, but not in the child’s home.” When opposing counsel asked Ms. Gibson during cross-examination, “You don't feel that men have any place in the home, do you?” Ms. Gibson responded, “I never said that, ever.” When counsel followed up with the statement, “You don’t believe that men have any place in the home, do you?” Ms. Gibson responded, “I don’t feel that way.” On redirect, Wife’s attorney asked Ms. Gibson, “when [Husband’s attorney] was saying men don’t have a place in that home, you’re saying you don’t feel that that statement is correct, right?” to which Ms. Gibson responded, “Yes. That is not my opinion.” - 10 -  Nonetheless, upon careful review, we determine that although the statement assigned to Ms. Gibson does not appear in the transcript, the trial court relied on other facts and observations that did support its ultimate credibility determination. Significantly, the trial court predicated its credibility determination not only on Ms. Gibson’s oral testimony but on her “observed demeanor,” which the court determined to be “unreasonably biased.” It is well settled in Tennessee that, “trial courts are able to observe witnesses as they testify and to assess their demeanor, which best situates trial judges to evaluate witness credibility.” Wells, 9 S.W.3d at 783. Moreover, “[w]hen it comes to live, in-court witnesses, appellate courts should afford trial courts considerable deference when reviewing issues that hinge on the witnesses’ credibility because trial courts are uniquely positioned to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses.” Barton v. Barton, 696 S.W.3d 571, 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we afford considerable deference to the trial court’s determination concerning Ms. Gibson’s credibility and, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, will not disturb the court’s resultant credibility determination. B. Husband’s Testimony Wife next posits that the trial court improperly failed to make an adverse credibility finding against Husband despite Husband’s “continued dishonesty” with Wife “concerning the parenting of the minor child” and his “dishonesty and inability to follow the trial court’s orders throughout the parties’ litigation.” Concerning Husband’s testimony, the trial court found: [Husband] is the father of the minor child in this case and is a co- owner of Chattanooga Holistic Medicine, LLC, where he works as an acupuncturist. Based on all of the testimony provided, it is clear to the Court that while [Husband], like most parents, clearly loves his child, he is still learning how to parent a toddler, especially considering the limited time with which he has been able to have hands-on parenting experience. This does not negate, however, the series of missteps that [Husband] seemed to take part in during his parenting time, i.e., sunburns, splinters, missed doses of medication, etc. While there was not testimony surrounding any inherently dangerous or significantly injurious issues that arose over the course of [Husband’s] custodial time with the child, the Court does want to reiterate to [Husband] that the missteps above do tend to arise when a parent overlooks certain aspects of raising a child, aspects which took [Husband] quite some time to learn which he should henceforth remember. As discussed below, the Court is cognizant of, and deems as credible, the growth and maturity which [Husband] has been able to muster up throughout this litigation. Though perhaps not always the best example of a - 11 -  perfect parent, the Court feels that [Husband] has shown a dedication to and an intention of becoming a better and more present father to the parties’ child. Nevertheless, the same issues of distrust and disdain felt by [Wife] toward [Husband] are clearly reciprocated in full. In fact, testimony from [Wife] directly raised the issue of [Husband] name-calling [Wife] in front of the child or even telling the child that she had multiple “mommies.” While [Husband] denied such claims, the Court would remind both parties that children can be like parrots—they will often repeat everything they hear to anyone who will listen. While name-calling may have been cute in elementary school, such antagonistic behavior rarely produces positive results in Court. (Footnote omitted.) Wife urges that Husband had demonstrated that he was not a “credible source” throughout the litigation because he had “not followed court orders, ha[d] made contradictory statements, ha[d] been unforthcoming and ha[d] demonstrated an inability to take accountability or compromise with [Wife]” regarding co-parenting the Child. Wife cites to several portions of Husband’s testimony and asserts that he (1) had not been truthful regarding supervised visits with the Child, (2) had not timely paid his child support obligation, (3) had thrown away medications sent by Wife with the Child and had administered “herbal” remedies to the Child without informing Wife, (4) had “made an assumption” that Wife received a reduced “campus housing” rate without knowing for certain that this was the case, (5) had kept the Child in shoes that were “too small” despite Wife’s messages regarding the Child’s correct shoe size, (6) had failed to disclose “water damage” at his home upon the recommendation of his realtor, (7) had been the object of a “court order” directing that he remain on his porch during pick-up and drop-off times, (8) had been aware that his mother had “trimmed” the Child’s “frayed bangs” but had informed Wife at the time that he had not “cut her hair,” (9) had not consistently complied with the court’s order regarding his supervised co-parenting time with the Child, and (10) had made “assumptions” without having actual knowledge of certain topics. Upon reviewing Wife’s concerns listed above, we note that each of Wife’s accusations points to Husband’s actions or statements during the pendency of the litigation rather than to any untruthfulness of Husband’s testimony as a witness during trial. Indeed, Husband acknowledged and explained or clarified each of the accusations and questions that were presented to or asked of him during his testimony. Additionally, we note that the trial court did not discount Husband’s “series of missteps” in parenting, but the court focused its credibility determination on Husband’s “growth and maturity” in bettering himself as a parent during the pendency of the litigation. Finding no clear and convincing evidence to contradict the trial court’s credibility determination as to Husband, we will not re-evaluate the trial court’s assessment. See Wells, 9 S.W.3d at 783. - 12 -  V. Permanent Parenting Plan and Child’s Best Interest Wife contends that the trial court erroneously adopted a PPP that is “impractical, non-forward-looking, and contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-404 et seq.” Foremost among Wife’s concerns is the trial court’s decision to set forth a “two (2) weeks with [Wife] to one (1) week with [Husband] schedule.” Wife urges that such a schedule is “impractical,” “particularly considering the parties’ significant geographical distance.” Wife further asserts that such a schedule is not in the Child’s best interest because it results in the Child’s placement “in the position of attending a different school each week.” As stated above, although we presume the trial court’s factual findings are correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, we review the court’s rulings regarding the details of a residential co-parenting schedule for an abuse of discretion. See Brunetz, 573 S.W.3d at 178-79. As relevant to Wife’s issue on appeal, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-404(a) (West July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2026) instructs, inter alia, that a “permanent parenting plan shall . . . [p]rovide for the child’s changing needs as the child grows and matures, in a way that minimizes the need for further modifications to the permanent parenting plan.” Section 36-6-404(b) provides: Any permanent parenting plan shall include a residential schedule as defined in § 36-6-402. The court shall make residential provisions for each child, consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances, which encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child. The child’s residential schedule shall be consistent with this part. If the limitations of § 36-6-406 are not dispositive of the child’s residential schedule, the court shall consider the factors found in § 36-6-106(a). The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) (West March 18, 2022, to April 22, 2024), in effect when the complaint for divorce was filed in this action provided the following best interest factors for a court to consider when making a custody determination: (1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child; (2) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, consistent with the best interest of the child. In - 13 -  determining the willingness of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either parent or any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order; (3) Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be considered by the court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings; (4) The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care; (5) The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental responsibilities; (6) The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child; (7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child; (8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it relates to their ability to parent the child. The court may order an examination of a pa