Caroline Long Kilpatrick v. Connor Lewis Kilpatrick

09/25/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 30, 2025 CAROLINE LONG KILPATRICK v. CONNOR LEWIS KILPATRICK Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County No. 18CV-47281-H Deana C. Hood, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2024-00803-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ In this post-divorce action to modify child support, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s: (1) calculation of Appellee/Father’s gross income; (2) determination that she was willfully underemployed; (3) imputation of income to her; (4) exclusion of summer work- related childcare expenses from the child support worksheet; (5) denial of an upward deviation; and (6) denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Both parties seek an award of appellate attorney’s fees. Because we determine that the trial court improperly excluded certain sources of income from its calculation of Father’s gross income, we vacate Father’s child support obligation. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Mother was willfully underemployed and its imputation of income to her as well as its exclusion of summer work-related childcare expenses and its denial of an upward deviation. Mother’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is granted. Father’s request for same is denied. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed in Part; Vacated in Part; Affirmed in Part; and Remanded VALERIE L. SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., joined. Demeka Kay Church, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Caroline Long Kilpatrick. Gregory D. Smith, Elizabeth Garrett, Brenton H. Lankford, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Connor Lewis Kilpatrick.  OPINION I. Background Appellant Caroline Kilpatrick (“Mother”) and Connor Kilpatrick (“Father”) are the parents of three children, Benjamin (d/o/b March 2012), Luke (d/o/b March 2012), and Meredith (d/o/b April 2015) (together, the “Children”). On February 19, 2019, the Chancery Court for Williamson County, Tennessee (the “trial court”) entered the final decree of divorce as to Mother and Father. Incorporated into the final decree was the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) and Permanent Parenting Plan (the “Parenting Plan”). The Parenting Plan named Mother as the primary residential parent and awarded her 225 days with the Children; Father was awarded 140 days with the Children. The Parenting Plan set Father’s gross monthly income at $25,000.00 and Mother’s gross monthly income at $2,441.00. Father’s monthly child support obligation was set at $2,505.00 per month. On January 24, 2022, Mother filed a petition to modify child support (the “Petition”). Therein, she alleged that Father’s income had increased since the trial court entered the final decree, and that a significant variance existed between Father’s current child support obligation and the amount he should have been paying under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). Mother also alleged that she began working after the divorce was finalized and that she was incurring work-related childcare costs. Mother asked the trial court to award her attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing the Petition. On February 24, 2022, Father filed an answer. On April 12, 2022, Mother filed a motion to maintain status quo with regard to private school expenses.1 In Father’s response to the motion, he alleged that Mother was “voluntarily under[]employed, choosing to work only 15-16 hours per week, no more than two (2) days per week.” As discussed further, infra, Father’s trial brief also alleged that Mother was underemployed and asked the trial court to impute a monthly income to her between $5,130.67 and $6,4133.33. On November 27, 2023 and December 8, 2023, the trial court heard the Petition. Six witnesses testified: (1) Mother; (2) Father; (3) Kurt Myers, CPA, Mother’s expert on Father’s income; (4) Vic Alexander, CPA, Father’s expert on his income; (5) Michelle Weiss, Father’s expert on vocational rehabilitation; and (6) Camden Filer, a caregiver who provided Mother’s childcare during the summer. Thirty-nine exhibits were entered into evidence. On May 7, 2024, the trial court entered its memorandum and order. Relevant here, concerning Father’s gross income for prospective child support, the trial court: (1) 1 The issue in this motion is not an issue on appeal. -2- concluded that a three-year average of Father’s income from 2020, 2021, and 2022 was the most appropriate reflection of his income; (2) omitted a one-time software sale from being included in Father’s income calculation; (3) included in Father’s income consulting fees that his company, the Kilpatrick Group, received; (4) concluded that the forgiveness of loans that the Kilpatrick Group received from the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) during the Covid-19 pandemic did not fall within the definition of gross income under the Guidelines; (5) determined that Father’s annual income was $468,649.00 per year or $39,054.00 per month; (6) concluded that the three-year average for Father’s self- employment tax was $1,352.00; and (7) determined that Father’s total gross monthly income was $39,394.00. As to Mother’s prospective income, the trial court found that: (1) Mother had a bachelor’s degree in fashion merchandising but earned her dental hygienist license shortly before the birth of the oldest children; (2) Mother began working as a dental hygienist after the parties’ divorce; (3) Mother worked from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays, earning $37 per hour; (4) for 2022, Mother earned $30,656.79 or $2,554.73 per month; and (5) additional gross monthly income should be imputed to Mother for a total gross monthly income of $4,933.00 per month. The trial court also limited its consideration of Mother’s work-related childcare expenses to before and after care at the Children’s school, which totaled $67 per month and declined Mother’s request for an upward deviation in child support. Based on the foregoing, the trial court set Father’s prospective child support amount at $3,418.00 per month. It awarded Mother retroactive child support from February 2022 through December 2023 of $3,592.00 per month, giving Father a credit of $2,505.00 for support he paid during such time. The trial court entered a judgment for retroactive child support in Mother’s favor of $16,522.00. The trial court declined to award either party attorney’s fees. On May 31, 2024, Mother filed a motion to alter or amend. Therein, Mother alleged that the trial court erred when it: (1) failed to consider certain fringe benefits Father received from the Kilpatrick Group when calculating Father’s child support obligation; (2) calculated her monthly childcare costs; and (3) calculated the judgment Father owed to Mother for retroactive child support. Father filed a response. On September 26, 2024, the trial court entered an order on the motion to alter or amend. In the order, the trial court included Father’s fringe benefits when calculating his child support obligation. The trial court concluded that Father’s prospective monthly income was $40,806.00, and Father’s monthly income for retroactive support purposes was $40,279.00. The trial court declined to adjust its calculation of Mother’s childcare expenses. Based on the foregoing, the trial court set Father’s prospective child support obligation at $3,509.00 per month and entered a new judgment for retroactive child support, totaling $31,332.00. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court. II. Issues As stated in her appellate brief, Mother raises the following issues for our review: -3-  1. Whether the trial court erred in calculating Appellee/Father’s income by: a. Limiting Appellee/Father’s income for child support calculation to his total taxable income; b. Adopting gross income reduced by self-employment tax; and c. Excluding from Appellee/Father’s income the purported []sale of software. 2. Whether the trial court erred in imputing Appellant/Mother with additional income. 3. Whether the trial court erred in omitting Mother’s summer work-related childcare for inclusion in the child support worksheet. 4. Whether the trial court erred in declining to consider an upward deviation of child support. 5. Whether the child support and retroactive support amounts should be recalculated. 6. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find Appellant/Mother the prevailing party and awarding her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. 7. Whether Appellant/Mother should be awarded her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs for appeal. As Appellee, Father raises the additional issue of whether he is entitled to the attorney’s fees he has incurred defending this appeal. III. Standard of Review We review a non-jury case “de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and “are accorded no presumption of correctness.” Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. 2008). -4-  IV. Analysis A. Child Support Modification Calculation “Parents have ‘deeply rooted moral responsibilities’ to support their minor children[,]” and “Tennessee law imposes a legal obligation on parents to support [them] in a manner commensurate with [the parents’] own means and station in life.” Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 847 (1997) and citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-102(a)) (other citations omitted). The Guidelines, promulgated by the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Services Division, govern awards of child support. Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(e)(2)). For this reason, courts have very limited discretion when determining awards of child support and such decisions “must be made within the strictures of the [Guidelines].” Richardson, 189 S.W.3d at 725. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision concerning child support under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. Under this standard, a trial court’s decision will be upheld as long as it is not clearly unreasonable and reasonable minds could disagree about its correctness. Id. (citing Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tenn. 2001); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)). A trial court abuses its discretion “when it applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches a decision that is illogical, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Richardson, 189 S.W.3d at 725 (citing Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003)). We are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 85. The Guidelines are “based on an Income Shares Model,” which “presumes that both parents contribute to the financial support of the child[ren] in pro rata proportion to the actual income available to each parent.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.03(1). All modifications of child support orders are also calculated under the Income Shares Model. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.05(1). The initial inquiry in a petition to modify child support is whether a “significant variance,” “defined as at least [a] fifteen percent (15%) difference in the current support obligation and the proposed support obligation,” exists. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.05(2)(b); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(g)(1); Wine v. Wine, 245 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Huntley v. Huntley, 61 S.W.3d 329, 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)) (“[T]he initial inquiry in a petition for child support modification is ‘whether there is a ‘significant variance’ between the current obligation and the obligation set by the Guidelines.’”). Whether a significant variance existed is not at issue in this appeal, so we need not address it. “Upon a demonstration of a significant variance, the tribunal shall increase or decrease the support order as appropriate in accordance with the[] Guidelines.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240- 02-04-.05(5). The first step in making a child support award is to determine each parent’s gross -5- income. The Guidelines provide: 1. Gross income of each parent shall be determined in the process of setting the presumptive child support order and shall include all income from any source (before deductions for taxes and other deductions such as credits for other qualified children), whether earned or unearned, and includes, but is not limited to, the following: (i) Wages; (ii) Salaries; (iii) Commissions, fees, and tips; (iv) Income from self-employment; (v) Bonuses; (vi) Overtime payments; (vii) Severance pay; (viii) Pensions or retirement plans including, but not limited to, Social Security, Veterans Affairs Department, Railroad Retirement Board, Keoughs, and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs); (ix) Interest income; (x) Dividend income; (xi) Trust income; (xii) Annuities; (xiii) Net capital gains; (xiv) Disability or retirement benefits that are received from the Social Security Administration pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act or from the Veterans Affairs Department, whether paid to the parent or to the child based upon the parent’s account; -6-  (xv) Workers compensation benefits, whether temporary or permanent; (xvi) Unemployment insurance benefits; (xvii) Judgments recovered for personal injuries and awards from other civil actions; (xviii) Gifts that consist of cash or other liquid instruments, or which can be converted to cash, or which can produce income such as real estate, or which reduces a parent’s living expenses such as housing paid by others; in whole or in part; (xix) Inheritances that consist of cash or other liquid instruments, or which can be converted to cash, or which can produce income such as real estate; (xx) Prizes; (xxi) Lottery winnings; (xxii) Alimony or maintenance received from persons other than parties to the proceeding before the tribunal; and (xxiii) Actual income earned during incarceration by an inmate. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)1. Relevant here, and as discussed further, infra, the Guidelines allow a trial court to impute additional gross income to a parent who is willfully under- or unemployed. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)2. Also discussed further below, courts may consider additional expenses, such as work- related childcare expenses, and adjust a support obligation accordingly. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(8)(c). Lastly, relevant here and discussed below, the Guidelines provide that they “are a minimum base for determining child support obligations,” and “[t]he presumptive child support order may be increased according to the best interest of the child[ren] [and] the circumstances of the parties[.]” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.01(4); see also Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.07. With the foregoing in mind, we turn to review the trial court’s child support award. 1. Father’s Income We first address Mother’s argument that the trial court erred in its calculation of Father’s gross income. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court: (1) only considered -7- Father’s taxable income in its calculation; (2) excluded the software sale proceeds from the calculation of Father’s income; and (3) misapplied the deduction for self-employment taxes. Below, we review Mother’s first and second arguments together before turning to the third. a. PPP Loan Forgiveness and Software Sale Before beginning our analysis, we briefly discuss Father’s employment as well as the foregoing alleged sources of his income. Father is a founder and 50% owner of the Kilpatrick Group, which he described as a third-party marketing company whose clients consist of funeral homes. Mr. Myers, Mother’s expert who testified as to Father’s income, considered three documents when creating his report: (1) Father’s personal tax returns; (2) the Kilpatrick Group’s tax returns; and (3) Father’s K-1 statements. Mr. Alexander, Father’s expert on the matter, reviewed only Father’s tax returns when making his report. Relevant here, Mr. Myers testified that a K-1 “is what a member or partner in a partnership receives to tell them how much of the company’s profits should be reported on their personal taxes.” Mr. Myers further testified, and the trial exhibits support, that Father’s distributions from the company were higher than his taxable income for 2020, 2021, and 2022. The record shows that, in 2020, Father’s taxable income was $560,421.00, and he received distributions from the Kilpatrick Group totaling $593,208.00. In 2021, Father’s taxable income was $621,962.00, and he received $662,551.00 in distributions. Finally, in 2022, Father’s taxable income was $430,624.00, and he received $509,431.00 in distributions. Mr. Myers testified that Father received the difference between the distributions and his taxable income, tax free. When asked the source of the tax-free funds, Mr. Myers testified that he could not say “unequivocally,” but that, in 2020 and 2021, the Kilpatrick Group received funds under the PPP, which was not taxable income to the company, and that the company had “additional cash to pay out.” Father’s K-1 from 2020 shows that his share of the tax-free funds the Kilpatrick Group received from the PPP loans was $121,617.00. Similarly, Father’s 2021 K-1 shows his share of the funds received was $103,643.00. Concerning the PPP loans, Mr. Myers testified: [T]he way that the PPP money worked was [that a business] applied for the loan under the PPP, and then if you spent it in accordance with the requirements of it, the government would forgive it. And normally under normal circumstances, a loan that is forgiven is taxable income. But under this program, because of COVID and the pandemic . . . [the] government decided that the forgiveness of that loan would be tax-free. For this reason, neither expert included the PPP loan forgiveness amounts in their calculation of Father’s taxable income. Turning to the software sale, one component of the Kilpatrick Group’s business was to provide their clients with a customer relationship management (“CRM”) software system. In 2020, the Kilpatrick Group sold the software to Homesteaders Life Insurance Company (“Homesteaders”) for $400,000.00. In his -8- report, Mr. Myers did not exclude from Father’s income the income he received from the proceeds the Kilpatrick Group received from the software sale. Mr. Alexander excluded such income on his conclusion that the sale was “a non-recurring item that could not be expected to occur in the future.” Turning to the trial court’s order, it first acknowledged that a child support obligation is based on a parent’s gross income, quoted 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)1 of the Guidelines, discussed above, and emphasized that the list of income sources in the Guidelines was non-exclusive. The trial court then quoted the Guideline’s provision concerning self-employment, to-wit: 3. Self-Employment Income. (i) Income from self-employment includes income from, but not limited to, business operations, work as an independent contractor or consultant, sales of goods or services, and rental properties, etc., less ordinary and reasonable expenses necessary to produce such income. (ii) Ordinary and Reasonable Expenses of Self-Employment Necessary to Produce Income. (I) Excessive promotional expenses, excessive travel expenses, excessive car expenses or excessive personal expenses, or depreciation on equipment, the cost of operation of home offices, etc., shall not be considered reasonable expenses. (II) Amounts allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for accelerated depreciation or investment tax credits shall not be considered reasonable expenses. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)3. Concerning Father’s income, the trial court’s order provided: Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the [c]ourt concludes that a three-year average of Father’s income for the years of 2020, 2021 and 2022 is the most appropriate reflection of Father’s income. The one-time sale of software should not be included in [Father’s] gross income as it was a one- time occurrence and is an aberration to his regular income. This sale occurred in 2020 and his portion of the income was $200,000.00. However, -9-  the income derived as a result of consulting fees earned in 2020 ($30,000), in 2021 ($97,500) and in 2022 ($66,083) should be included as it is income earned monthly for over a two-year period for services provided. *** In 2020, Father received a tax-exempt loan in the amount of $121,617 and in 2021, in the amount of $103,643 as a recipient of the PPP. Father argues that loan forgiveness is not included in the definition of gross income as set forth in Tenn. Comp. R. & Refs. 1240-02-04-.(3)(a)(1). . . . The [c]ourt concurs that [the] PPP loan[s] do[] not fall within the definition of gross income as promulgated by the Child Support Regulations. Nor would it as the COVID-19 pandemic and the historic response thereto is indeed an aberration: One in which the [c]ourt is not comfortable including for child support purposes, as it most assuredly cannot be relied upon in the future as a source of income. *** At the [c]ourt’s request, Mr. Myers revised his calculations to deduct the one- time software sale and to exclude the PPP loan forgiveness payment. For years 2020, 2021 and 2022, Father’s average gross annual salary is $468,649.00. . . . The [c]ourt concludes that Father’s gross monthly income for child support purposes is $39,054.00. Given Father’s self-employment, the trial court then considered Father’s ordinary and reasonable expenses and increased Father’s gross monthly income to $39,394.00. On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court considered Father’s taxable income only and disregarded distributions Father received from the Kilpatrick Group when setting his income for child support purposes. This argument is predicated on the trial court’s exclusion of the PPP loan forgiveness from its calculations. Similarly, Mother argues that the trial court should have included the proceeds Father received from the software sale in its calculation of his income. On review of the trial court’s order, it appears that the trial court’s rationale for excluding the PPP loan forgiveness and the software sale from its calculation of Father’s gross income was because these were “aberration[s]” and “one-time” occurrences that could not “be relied upon in the future as a source of income.” This reasoning is not aligned with our case law. In Moore v. Moore, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “income from a single or ‘one-time’ capital gain” should have been considered when calculating a - 10 - parent’s income for child support purposes, even when the income arose from “an isolated transaction.” 254 S.W.3d 357, 359-60 (Tenn. 2007). The Court noted that the Guidelines also included bonuses, gifts, severance pay, and prizes as “gross income,” “all of which are typically nonrecurring income.” Id. (citing Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.03(3)(a)(l) (1994)). The Court concluded that its holding was “consistent with the plain language of the [] Guidelines and with the goal expressed in the [] Guidelines that ‘to the extent that either parent enjoys a higher standard of living, the child(ren) share(s) in that higher standard.’” Id. (citing Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4.01(3)(e) (2006)). This Court has extended this reasoning to money a parent receives via an inheritance. See generally Collins v. Harrison, No. M2023-00248-COA-R3-JV, 2024 WL 1750072, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2024), perm. app. denied (Sept. 12, 2024); Wadhwani v. White, No. M2015- 01447-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4579192, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016). Although the Guidelines specifically include capital gains and inheritance as sources of income, see Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)1(xiii), (xix), the Guidelines explicitly state that the list is non-exclusive, to-wit: courts “shall include all income from any source . . . whether earned or unearned[.]” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)1 (emphases added). We conclude that the trial court should have considered both the income Father received from the PPP loan forgiveness as well as the income Father received from the software sale in its calculation of his income. As noted above, “sales of goods or services” are included in self-employment income under the Guidelines. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)3. This Court previously held that transactions involving software programs are transactions involving “goods.” Highland Rim Constructors v. Atl. Software Corp., No. 01-A-01-9104CV00147, 1992 WL 184872, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1992). Accordingly, the Guidelines specifically provide that the income Father received from the sale of the software should have been included in his income calculation. As to the PPP loan forgiveness, although there is no explicit provision designating same as income, we conclude that it should have been considered as such. As noted above, the Guidelines explicitly provide that courts “shall include all income from any source . . . whether earned or unearned” in income calculations. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02- 04-.04(3)(a)1 (emphases added). The PPP loan forgiveness income was unearned income that Father received. It matters not that these forms of income arose from isolated transactions. When a parent’s income is variable, courts are required to average his or her income “over a reasonable period of time consistent with the circumstances of the case[.]” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(b) (“Variable income such as commissions, bonuses, overtime pay, dividends, etc. shall be averaged over a reasonable period of time consistent with the circumstances of the case and added to a parent’s fixed salary or wages to determine gross income.”); Smith v. Smith, No. M20000-1094-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 459108, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2001) (“Although that provision of the guidelines applies to variable components of income, the reasoning is just as applicable to situations - 11 - where a parent is self-employed or whose total income is variable.”). “The time period used for purposes of averaging ‘lies within the discretion of the trial court based upon the facts of the situation.’” Wadhwani, 2016 WL 4579192, at *17 (quoting State ex rel. Moss v. Moss, No. M2013-00393-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1998738, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2014)); see also Cox v. Cox, No. M2024-00827-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 1517810, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2025); Robeson v. Robeson, No. M2023-01449-COA-R3- CV, 2025 WL 368233, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2025), perm. app. denied (June 18, 2025). “Thus, while the Guidelines afford the court discretion to average variable income or prorate one-time income amounts . . . , it does not permit the court to merely disregard a source of income.” Collins, 2024 WL 1750072, at *6. While the trial court calculated Father’s income based on a three-year average (2020, 2021, and 2022), it omitted the software sale and PPP loan forgiveness as income earned during 2020 and 2021 for prospective child support purposes. However, the trial court acknowledged that the Children should have benefitted from the additional income Father received and stated that it included it in Father’s retroactive child support amount. While we understand the trial court’s reasoning for proceeding in this way, the Guidelines simply do not provide for a tribunal to omit a source of income from a parent’s gross income calculation when setting/modifying a prospective child support award. We also note that, despite stating that it included the PPP loan forgiveness and software sale in Father’s retroactive child support obligation, it does not appear that these sources of income were, in fact, included. In its order on Mother’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court found Father’s monthly income for prospective child support to be $40,806.00 and his monthly income for retroactive child support to be $40,279.00. On review of the record, the difference in Father’s monthly income is due to the trial court’s inclusion of certain fringe benefits, rather than the PPP loan forgiveness or software sale. Indeed, the order shows that the trial court used $39,054.00 as the base income for both the prospective and retroactive child support obligations. Thus, over $400,000.00 in income ($200,000.00 from the software sale and $225,260.00 from the PPP loan forgiveness) was excluded from Father’s gross income. This was error. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s exclusion of the proceeds from the software sale and the income received from the PPP loan forgiveness from Father’s gross income for his prospective child support obligation. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order concerning Father’s child support obligation. On remand, the trial court is instructed to include both the software sale and the income received from the PPP loan forgiveness when calculating Father’s gross income. b. Self-Employment Taxes Mother’s next issue concerns the trial court’s application of self-employment tax to Father’s child support obligation. The Guidelines provide for adjustments to gross income for self-employed parents, including accounting for any self-employment tax, to-wit: - 12 -  (e) Any self-employment tax paid up to one-half of the maximum amounts due in a year shall be deducted from gross income as part of the calculation of a parent’s Adjusted Gross Income, as indicated in Part II of the CS Worksheet. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(4)(e); see also Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240- 02-04-.02(1)(b) (defining “adjusted gross income” as the net determination of a parent’s income, calculated by modifying the parent’s gross income by deducting from it any self- employment taxes the parent pays). Mother argues that the trial court included the deduction for self-employment tax twice when calculating Father’s child support obligation. We agree. As noted above, the trial court averaged Father’s income for 2020, 2021, and 2022 to arrive at an average gross annual income of $468,649.00. The trial court used Mr. Myers’ calculations of Father’s gross income for 2020, 2021, and 2022 to obtain this number. The record shows that the yearly incomes Mr. Myers used already included a reduction in income for the self-employment tax. Thus, when the trial court concluded that Father’s average gross annual income was $468,649.00, the deduction for self- employment tax was already included in this number. The trial court divided $468,649.00 by 12 to obtain a gross monthly income for Father, which amount was entered on the Child Support Worksheet. Thereafter, the trial court included $1,352.00 on the Child Support Worksheet for self-employment tax paid. As such, Father was twice allowed a deduction from his gross income for the self-employment tax. Given that we vacate Father’s child support obligation, we need not engage in a calculation to correct this error. As noted further, infra, on remand the trial court is not to include a double deduction for self- employment tax in its calculations. 2. Mother’s Income Having reviewed Father’s income, we turn to address Mother’s income. Mother argues that the trial court erred when it imputed additional income to her. To “impute” income means to “assign or attribute an income level to the parent that may not reflect the parent’s actual gross income.” Massey v. Casals, 315 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). The Guidelines allow courts to impute additional gross income to a parent “[i]f a parent has been determined by a tribunal to be willfully underemployed or unemployed.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)2(i)(I). “The Guidelines do not presume that any parent is willfully underemployed or unemployed.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)2(ii). Rather, “[t]he purpose of the determination is to ascertain the reasons for the parent’s occupational choices, to assess the reasonableness of these choices in light of the parent’s obligation to support his or her child(ren), and to determine whether such choices benefit the children.” Id. A determination of willful under- or unemployment “is not limited to choices motivated by an intent to avoid or reduce the payment of child support,” but “may be based on any intentional choice or act that adversely affects a parent’s income.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)2(ii)(I)I. Before turning - 13 - to the substantive issues, we briefly address an argument from this portion of Mother’s appellate brief that she did not list as a separate issue for our review. a. Estoppel/Res Judicata Mother alleges that Father should be estopped from arguing that she is willfully underemployed or that his claim should be barred by res judicata. In his appellate brief, Father argues that, because Mother failed to raise this argument in the trial court, she has waived it on appeal. In her reply brief, Mother argues that she did not waive this issue, rather, the parties did not present opening or closing statements during trial. Although the trial court initially asked the parties to submit post-trial arguments, the trial court later deemed them unnecessary. Mother argues that she “put on ample proof on the issues of estoppel and res judicata [] without objection or contradiction.” Specifically, she argues that she showed there had been no changes to her education, skill set, or ability since the parties’ divorce. On our review, both parties filed pretrial briefs, witness and exhibit lists, and statements of issues for trial. In one of Father’s issues/requests for relief from the trial court, he asked that it “impute income to Mother consistent with her hourly rate at full- time employment.” Additionally, nearly three pages of Father’s pretrial brief was devoted to arguing that Mother was willfully underemployed. The first issue listed in Mother’s pretrial brief concerns whether she was underemployed. Notably absent from Mother’s list of issues was that Father should be estopped or precluded from asserting that she was willfully underemployed. The only mention of this “argument” in Mother’s pretrial brief was a single sentence stating that “Father should be estopped at this juncture to request she be imputed at higher income.” Even when Mother later supplemented her pretrial brief with additional arguments, she did not provide a substantive argument concerning either estoppel or res judicata. Lastly, we note that while the trial court’s lengthy and methodical order addressed each argument the parties presented in their pretrial briefs, it made no mention of estoppel or res judicata. It is well-settled in Tennessee that “issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886, 898 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991)). Given the foregoing, we conclude that Mother failed to raise the estoppel and res judicata arguments with the trial court and, consequently, waived these issues for our review. We now turn to the substantive issues. b. Willful Underemployment Courts may use the following factors when determining whether a parent is under- or unemployed: (I) The parent’s past and present employment; (II) The parent’s education, training, and ability to work; - 14 -  (III) The State of Tennessee recognizes the role of a stay-at-home parent as an important and valuable factor in a child’s life. In considering whether there should be any imputation of income to a stay-at-home parent, the tribunal shall consider: I. Whether the parent acted in the role of full-time caretaker while the parents were living in the same household; II. The length of time the parent staying at home has remained out of the workforce for this purpose; and III. The age of the minor children. (IV) A parent’s extravagant lifestyle, including ownership of valuable assets and resources (such as an expensive home or automobile), that appears inappropriate or unreasonable for the income claimed by the parent; (V) The parent’s role as caretaker of a handicapped or seriously ill child of that parent, or any other handicapped or seriously ill relative for whom that parent has assumed the role of caretaker which eliminates or substantially reduces the parent’s ability to work outside the home,