Ishimatsu v. Royal Crown Insurance Corp.

E-FILED CNMI SUPREME COURT E-filed: Jun 1 2010 11:57AM Notice: This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Clerk Review: Jun 01, 2010 certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any event of Case No.: CV-06-0043-GA Lynette Camacho discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication, the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, PO Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236-9715, fax (670) 236-9702, e-mail SupremeCourtClerk@justice.gov.mp. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS HIROSHI ISHIMATU, Plaintiff, BERNARDO A. HIPONIA, and SERAFIN ESPERANCILLA, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. ROYAL CROWN INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. SUPREME COURT NO. 06-0043-GA SUPERIOR COURT NO. 02-0065 SLIP OPINION Cite as: 2010 MP 8 Decided June 1, 2010 David G. Banes, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant G. Anthony Long, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Defendant- Appellant/Cross- Appellee  BEFORE: MIGUEL S. DEMAPAN, Chief Justice; ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice; and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Associate Justice CASTRO, J.: ¶1 Royal Crown Insurance Corporation (“Royal Crown”) appeals the trial court’s decision on the grounds that (i) the common law theories of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract are preempted by statute; (ii) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of liability under the common law theories and the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”); (iii) there is insufficient evidence to support all of the damage awards; (iv) the punitive damage award does not comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (v) a new trial is warranted for numerous reasons; and (vi) the award of attorney’s fees and costs was in error. Serafin Esperancilla (“Esperancilla”) and Bernard A. Hiponia (“Hiponia”) cross-appeal the decision arguing that the trial court improperly granted judgment as a matter of law on their Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”) cause of action, improperly ordered a remittitur, and that punitive damages should be restored to the amount the jury originally awarded. We find that the trial court’s decision was correct on all of these issues except for two findings concerning attorney’s fees and costs. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND this matter to the trial court to enter judgment consistent with this opinion. I ¶2 The events leading up to this lawsuit occurred when Esperancilla’s truck collided with Hiponia’s car; Hiponia’s car was parked on the side of the road outside of his automotive repair shop, Jen Marz. Esperancilla immediately told Hiponia about the collision, admitted striking the vehicle, and informed him of his insurance policy. Both automobiles sustained damages, but no one suffered any personal injury. At the time of the accident, Esperancilla was Hiponia’s employee at Jen Marz, and each man maintained automobile insurance with Royal Crown. Esperancilla had a full policy that included comprehensive coverage, and Hiponia had third-party liability coverage. The police investigated the accident, and did not cite Hiponia or Esperancilla for their roles in the collision. Both men then made claims on Esperancilla’s insurance policy, and they each obtained repair estimates from other repair shops and submitted those estimates, together with a repair estimate for each vehicle from Jen-Marz, to Royal Crown. Jen Marz estimated it would cost $3,483.60 to repair Esperancilla’s truck, and $2,841.76 for Hiponia’s car. ¶3 Royal Crown, however, harbored suspicions concerning the validity of the collision. After an investigation, it sent a letter to Esperancilla acknowledging his claim, but advising him that a coverage question existed. Then in a letter sent a week later, Royal Crown informed Esperancilla that it was denying his claim, alleging that he violated the policy’s cooperation clause by admitting fault. As an  additional reason for denying the claim, Royal Crown stated in another letter that the damage to the vehicles, and Esperancilla’s account of the accident, was inconsistent with its own investigation; at trial it alleged collusion between the parties. Royal Crown also believed that Hiponia was at fault for the accident because he parked on the wrong side of the road. Hiponia’s claim was denied under Esperancilla’s policy because Royal Crown refused to cover the accident, and under his own policy because it was only for third-party liability coverage. Although Royal Crown denied coverage, it obtained an estimate for the repair of Esperancilla’s truck from the Rajamsbelle Auto Repair Shop; the Rajamsbelle quote was for $1,159.00. Royal Crown alleges that it then offered to repair Esperancilla’s vehicle at Rajamsbelle, but that Esperancilla denied the offer on grounds that only Jen Marz could make the repairs. Esperancilla and Hiponia, however, claim that Royal Crown never offered to repair their vehicles at Rajamsbelle, but instead, authorized Jen Marz to fix the damage, and subsequently refused to pay for the work after Jen Marz performed the repairs. Royal Crown never paid anything to either Esperancilla or Hiponia. ¶4 As a result, Hiponia and Esperancilla brought this lawsuit against Royal Crown to recover the insurance proceeds and other damages related to Royal Crown’s handling of the claim. They filed claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, violation of the CPA, and violation of the UCSPA. The jury found in favor of Esperancilla and Hiponia on all of their claims and awarded damages in the amount of $129,480.11. After post-trial motions, however, the trial court granted judgment as a matter of law and reversed the jury’s findings of liability on the UCSPA claim, and reduced the total damage award to $39,741.71.1 Royal Crown appealed and Hiponia and Esperancilla subsequently cross-appealed. 1 Esperancilla’s Damages Cause of Action Jury Verdict Final Judgment Breach of Contract $2,150.00 included in figure below Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing $3,383.07 $3,383.07 UCSPA $25,000.00 $0 Consumer Protection Act $4,300.00 $3,383.07 Total Compensatory Damages $34,833.07 $6,766.14 Punitive Damages $85,000.00 $23,681.49 Grand Total $119,833.07 $30,447.63 Hiponia’s Damages Cause of Action Jury Verdict Final Judgment Breach of Contract dismissed by stipulation dismissed by stipulation Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing dismissed by stipulation dismissed by stipulation UCSPA $5,000.00 $0 Consumer Protection Act $4,647.04 $9,294.08 Total Compensatory Damages $9,647.04 $9,294.08 Punitive Damages not sought not sought Grand Total $9,647.04 $9,294.08  II ¶5 The following issues are before the Court: whether (1) 4 CMC §§ 7302(g) and 7505(h) preempt Esperancilla’s and Hiponia’s common law claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and punitive damages; (2) there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding: (i) a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (ii) a breach of contract, (iii) a violation of the CPA, (iv) supporting the compensatory damage award, and (v) supporting the punitive damage award; (3) Royal Crown’s actions constitute a violation of the CPA; (4) the award of liquidated damages was proper; (5) the punitive damage award complied with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) the judgment as a matter of law finding that Esperancilla and Hiponia could not maintain their UCSPA claim was proper; (7) a new trial was warranted: (i) for the remark made about Royal Crown’s counsel, (ii) for the failure to give certain jury instructions, (iii) because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and (iv) because a Batson error occurred; (8) Esperancilla and Hiponia may challenge the remittitur on cross-appeal; and (9) the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs: (i) failed to segregate the fees, (ii) was for an unreasonable amount, (iii) was excessive, (iv) properly determined that the bad faith claim could support the award of fees, and (v) awarded costs that were unreasonable, excessive, and amounted to an abuse of discretion. The Court addresses these issues in turn. A. Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal ¶6 Royal Crown argues for the first time on appeal that Esperancilla’s first party common law bad faith claim is preempted by 4 CMC § 7302(g),2 his claim for punitive damages is preempted by 4 CMC § 2 4 CMC § 7302(g) Claim Settlement Practices. (1) No insurer doing business in the Commonwealth shall engage in unfair claim settlement practices. Any of the following acts by an insurer, if committed without just cause and performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, shall constitute unfair claim settlement practices: (A) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at issue; (B) Failing to acknowledge with reasonable promptness pertinent communications with respect to claims arising under its policies; (C) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under its policies; (D) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear; or (E) Compelling policyholders to institute suits to recover amounts due under its policies by offering substantially less than the amount ultimately recovered in suits brought by them. (2) Evidence as to numbers and types of complaints to the Insurance Commissioner against an insurer, and Insurance Commissioners complaint experience with other insurers writing similar lines of insurance, shall be admissible in an administrative or judicial proceeding brought under this division; provided, no insurer shall be deemed in violation of this section solely by reason of the number and types of such complaints. (3) If it is found, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that an insurer has violated this section, each instance of noncompliance may be treated as a separate violation of this section for purpose of 4 CMC § 7509.  7505(h),3 and his common law breach of contract claim is preempted by both 4 CMC §§ 7302(g) and 7505(h). As a general rule, this Court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Demapan v. Bank of Guam, 2006 MP 16 ¶ 9. There are, however, three exceptions to this rule: “(1) a new theory or issue arises because of a change in the law while the appeal was pending; (2) the issue is only one of law not relying on any factual record; or (3) plain error occurred and an injustice might otherwise result if the appellate court does not consider the issue.” Id. We must determine whether the second and third exceptions from Demapan apply4 and would allow us to consider these issues. ¶7 In Demapan, the plaintiff customer attempted to cash a check at the defendant bank, but the bank refused claiming that the plaintiff was not an account holder and seized the check. Later that evening, however, the bank recognized its error, went to the plaintiff’s house, and provided him with a cashiers’ check. The plaintiff brought suit for common law conversion but failed to prove all of the necessary elements. For the first time on appeal, the plaintiff raised a claim for damages under 5 CMC § 4103. We stated “where a purely legal issue is being raised for the first time on appeal, this Court will not review it if it is necessary to refer to the record, even if the facts already exist in the record.” Id. ¶ 9. In refusing to hear the claim, we found that reaching a decision would require examining the record. Id. We additionally found that there was also no plain error that would amount to an injustice by our refusal to determine whether plaintiff had a right to recovery under the statute. Id. ¶8 In Santos v. Public School System, 2002 MP 12, a husband sought workers’ compensation benefits when his wife died on a business trip. During an informal conference, the hearing officer recommended awarding benefits; however, at a subsequent formal hearing the officer denied benefits. The parties stipulated that the Workers’ Compensation Commission Rules & Regulations (“WCCRR”) § 3.102, known as the twenty-four hour rule, did not apply; this was used as the justification for denying benefits. The husband appealed the decision to the full Workers’ Compensation Commission (WCC), but he failed to raise the issue of whether the twenty-four hour rule applied; as a result, the WCC denied 3 4 CMC § 7505(h) Failure to Pay Loss: Recovery of Amount Due and Damages. In all cases where loss occurs and the insurer liable therefor fails to pay the same within the time specified in the policy, after demand made therefor, the insurer shall be liable to pay the holder of the policy, in addition to the amount of the loss, 12 percent damages upon the amount of the loss, together with all reasonable attorney’s fees for prosecution and collection of the loss; the attorney’s fees to be taxed by the court where the same is heard on original action, by appeal or otherwise, and to be taxed as a part of the costs therein, and collected as other costs are or may be by law collected; and writs of attachment or garnishment filed or issued after proof of loss or death has been received by the insurer shall not defeat the provisions of this section; provided, the insurer desiring to pay the amount of the claim as shown in the proof of loss or death may pay the amount into the registry of the court after issuance of writs of attachment and garnishment, in which event there shall be no further liability on the part of the insurer. 4 The first exception is inapplicable because there was no change in the law applicable to the issues raised before us.  benefits. The husband then sought review of the decision by the trial court, and he alleged that he was entitled to benefits under WCCRR § 3.102, but the court found that this issue was not properly raised during the full WCC hearing. We found that the parties failed to properly raise the twenty-four hour rule below, and that considering whether it applied required us to make factual findings. Id. ¶ 9. Specifically: [t]he applicability of WCCRR § 3.102 to this case hinges on factual determinations, which must be made, such as: Susana (1) was an employee of an employer in the Commonwealth; (2) was traveling on behalf of her employer; and (3) was injured or died. Although the requisite facts were either found by the court or admitted by the parties, we will not consider the issue unless it does not rely on any factual record. Id. ¶ 11. Thus, even though these facts were not in dispute, we could not consider them in determining whether the twenty-four hour rule applied because an examination of the record is not allowed. ¶9 The Court did, however, find that plain error occurred concerning the stipulation because the parties labored under a misconception of law, id. ¶ 13; specifically, the parties thought the law was repealed when they entered into the stipulation, when in reality it was only renumbered and still fully in effect. Id. ¶ 18. We found that the hearing officer and the husband committed plain error in stipulating that the twenty-four hour rule did not apply, and that this error, which precluded the plaintiff from asserting his only theory of recovery, might result in an injustice. Id. As a result, we allowed the plaintiff to raise the applicability of the twenty-four hour rule for the first time on appeal,5 and determined that the statute applied to his claim. Id. ¶ 43. See also Commonwealth v. Kaipat, 1996 MP 20 ¶¶ 8, 9 (allowing appellant to argue for first time on appeal – because plain error occurred that might result in an injustice – that the judge should have recused himself from the case because he had personal knowledge of the facts). ¶ 10 To ascertain whether the two statutory provisions preempt the three common law claims requires this Court to examine the record. Numerous factual findings occurred during the course of the trial concerning the auto accident and Royal Crown’s conduct in handling the claim. We would have to consider some of the following facts: whether (1) Royal Crown reasonably or unreasonably refused to fix Esperancilla’s automobile; (2) Royal Crown offered to have the car repaired at Rajamsbelle; (3) Esperancilla refused to have the car repaired by Rajamsbelle, and (4) Royal Crown unreasonably denied the claim. This is not an exhaustive list of the facts we would consider in determining whether the Insurance Act preempts the common law claims, but it is illustrative of what we would need to consider in determining whether the facts of this case are sufficient to sustain a cause of action pursuant to 4 CMC §§ 7302 and 7505. 6 Furthermore, unlike Santos, some of these facts are in dispute, so not only would we examine the record, but we would also have to make findings of facts as well; this is clearly prohibited by 5 Since the twenty-four hour rule was not before the full WCC panel when it reviewed the claim, it was not properly before the lower court and thus not properly before this Court at the time of the appeal. 6 While we will review these factual findings and others in the context of other claims, like in Santos, we cannot examine the record for a claim raised for the first time on appeal.  Demapan. Thus, statutory preemption in this case is not solely a question of law because it requires us to review the record, and therefore, the second Demapan exception does not apply. ¶ 11 The other question is whether allowing the suit to proceed under the common law theories of recovery and not considering the statutory preemption arguments constitutes plain error that might result in an injustice. Royal Crown’s failure to make an argument of statutory preemption is similar to the plaintiff in Demapan failing to sue under the most favorable theory; in both cases, the party failed to make the potentially best arguments at trial. In this instance, Royal Crown argues on appeal that plaintiff’s common law theories are statutorily preempted, but failed to make this argument at the appropriate time. Our treatment of an argument that the case should be heard under a new theory, or an argument that the case never should have been heard under the theories pleaded is the same, in both instances the correct time to make these arguments is at trial and not on appeal. Also, the situation is unlike Kaipat because the integrity of the judge was not questioned, and it is dissimilar from Santos because unlike the plaintiff in that case who would have been denied any chance at a recovery, Royal Crown was able to try its case and utilize every available legal defense at its disposal. If an oversight occurred and counsel failed to assert a potentially valid defense at trial, an appeal to this Court is not the appropriate remedy. See In re Estate of Teregeyo, 1997 MP 14 ¶ 17 (failure to raise the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations at trial prevents party from raising it on appeal). We find that no plain error was committed that might result in an injustice as a result of our refusal to hear the preemption arguments. Therefore, we refuse to consider whether the bad faith claim is preempted by 4 CMC § 7302, the punitive damages claim is preempted by 4 CMC § 7505, and the breach of contract claim is preempted by both 4 CMC §§ 7302 and § 7505. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence, Liability, and the Damage Awards 1. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing ¶ 12 We first address whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Isla Fin. Servs. v. Sablan, 2001 MP 21 ¶ 3. Specifically, when considering sufficiency of the evidence questions the Court determines if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party is sufficient to support the conclusion of the finder of fact. Torres v. Fitial, 2008 MP 15 ¶ 7 (citing Manglona v. Kaipat, 3 NMI 322, 329 (1992)). ¶ 13 Since every claim is supported by the same evidence, and the bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, whereas the others are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, we will review the sufficiency of the evidence for the bad faith claim first. Every contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the parties, and when a party acts in bad faith they breach the covenant and become liable for that breach. Restatement  (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981). Before we can review the sufficiency of the evidence, we must first determine what constitutes bad faith in an insurance contract; this is a question of first impression in the Commonwealth. We will address the parameters of bad faith before determining whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. To prove bad faith in the insurance context, “a plaintiff must show: (1) benefits due under the policy were withheld; and (2) the reason for withholding benefits was unreasonable or without proper cause.” Guebara v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting California law). Otherwise stated, bad faith occurs when “‘the refusal to pay policy benefits . . . was unreasonable,’ and not as a result of mere negligence or bad judgment.” Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 335, 346 (2001)). Therefore, we will determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Royal Crown acted unreasonably in refusing to pay Esperancilla’s claim. ¶ 14 Royal Crown first argues that it justifiably denied Esperancilla’s claim on the grounds of collusion. It points out that the police report did not find Esperancilla at fault, Hiponia’s car was illegally parked, and after the collision Esperancilla told Hiponia that he had full coverage and that they could both claim under his policy. Royal Crown argues that these facts support its position that it acted reasonably in denying the claim on the grounds that the parties colluded. In the alternative, it claims that it did offer to repair Esperancilla’s vehicle at Rajamsbelle even though it questioned the legitimacy of the collision. In support of this contention, the record contains an estimate by Rajamsbelle for how much it would cost to repair Esperancilla’s vehicle, and one of Royal Crown’s employees testified about the offer. Royal Crown also argues that under the policy’s terms a party can not insist that a certain auto shop perform the repairs or decide what parts are used; in other words, the insurance company determines who makes the repairs and how the repairs are performed. Therefore, they argue the jury’s finding of bad faith was not supported by the record. Esperancilla argues that there is no dispute that a collision occurred, his policy obligated Royal Crown to pay for damage caused by a collision involving his vehicle with another automobile, and since he had full coverage, it did not matter who was at fault. The policy also obligated Royal Crown to pay “all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages . . . caused by [an] accident and arising out of ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.” Appellant’s Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at 690. Therefore, they argue the decision to deny the claim amounted to bad faith. ¶ 15 The claim was initially denied on the basis that Esperancilla violated “item 15” of the policy by not “cooperating.”7 Esperancilla admitted immediately after the accident and at trial that he hit Hiponia’s 7 “Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured Except Coverage C. The insured shall cooperate with the company and upon the company’s request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits. The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense other and for  car. A truthful statement explaining an accident and an acknowledgment of liability coverage, however, does not violate an insurance contract’s cooperation clause forbidding a party from admitting liability. Porter v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., 104 P.2d 1087, 1095 (Cal. 1940).8 The jury also heard the testimony of Esperancilla’s expert witness, Mr. Kirby, who testified that a party who admits hitting a parked car does not breach the cooperation clause of its insurance contract. Porter, Blake, and Wenig all stand for the proposition that making a truthful statement about an auto accident does not violate a cooperation clause; it would violate public policy to prevent one party from giving an honest factual account to another party, or a police officer, about an auto accident because doing so would void insurance coverage. We will not encourage individuals involved in auto accidents to lie about the surrounding events and about whether they have insurance coverage because they fear voiding their insurance policy. Therefore, the violation of the cooperation clause was not a reasonable basis to deny coverage. ¶ 16 Esperancilla also claims that Royal Crown’s shifting justifications for denying the claim amount to bad faith. He points out that in two letters Royal Crown sent in February, it denied the claim on the basis of the cooperation clause, but explicitly stated that it could deny the claims for other reasons. In March, Royal Crown denied the claim on the basis that Esperancilla’s statement and sketch of the accident was not congruent with its own investigation, interviews, expert opinions, and its determination of the location of the damage sustained by the cars. Esperancilla, however, never actually drew a sketch of the accident, but instead wrote “see police report.” Then in November, Royal Crown provided additional grounds for denying the claim citing that the damage to the vehicles was not consistent with a head-on collision. A witness for Royal Crown testified that a head-on collision would not result in damage to the front center of Esperancilla’s truck and the front right of Hiponia’s car. Esperancilla’s expert, Mr. Kirby, contradicted this evidence and testified that the explanation for denying coverage was nonsensical because regardless of the angle of the collision, the front of Esperancilla’s truck hit the front of Hiponia’s car. Thus, the numerous letters providing different rationales for denying the claim and the expert testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the claim was unreasonably denied. ¶ 17 Esperancilla next argues that Royal Crown’s claim of collusion was so unreasonable that it provides support for the finding of bad faith, and that ample evidence presented at trial disputed the collusion accusation. Specifically, when counsel asked the investigating officer if he thought anyone was lying or if anything seemed unreal he answered “no.” Additionally, Mr. Kirby testified that there was no such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of the accident.” Appellant’s ER at 716. 8 See Blake v. Continental Cas. Co., 278 Ill. App. 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1934); Wenig v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 61 N.E.2d 442 (N.Y. 1945).  evidence indicating that the parties staged the accident, and that nothing hinted at collusion. A Royal Crown employee who testified also stated that she believed that Hiponia was telling the truth. This testimony was sufficient for the jury to reject the collusion argument. Finally, Esperancilla argues that Royal Crown never offered to repair the automobiles at Rajamsbelle, but instead offered to repair the vehicles at Jen Marz only to subsequently refuse to make any payment. 9 At trial Hiponia testified that he had no intention of making the repairs at his shop, but that Royal Crown authorized him to perform the work. The evidence supporting Royal Crown’s position consists of the repair estimate and the testimony of one of its employees; whereas the evidence supporting Esperancilla’s version of the events is Hiponia’s testimony. Viewing this finding in the light most favorable to Esperancilla, and considering the numerous letters denying coverage, there was a sufficient basis for the jury to believe Hiponia’s account over Royal Crown’s version. ¶ 18 We find that the record contains more than sufficient evidence for the jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that Royal Crown acted in bad faith by unreasonably denying Esperancilla’s claim. Our role is to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict viewed in a light favorable to Esperancilla; our role is not to reweigh the evidence and re-decide the case. Torres, 2008 MP 15 ¶ 7. First, Royal Crown had a duty to repair Esperancilla’s truck, and there was ample evidence indicating that on numerous occasions it refused to make the repairs, and the Rajamsbelle price quote coupled with the employee’s testimony is insufficient for this Court to overturn the jury’s verdict. Second, Esperancilla provided evidence explaining that he did not violate the cooperation clause of the contract; as a matter of law, Esperancilla’s truthful recitation of what occurred did not void the policy. Third, the record contains ample testimony, such as by the investigating officer, Mr. Kirby, and even Royal Crown’s own employee stating that no one appeared to be lying; this casts serious doubt on the reasonableness of the collusion argument. Fourth, Esperancilla made a persuasive argument supported by the record that Royal Crown’s letters denying coverage were shifting, groundless, and unreasonable, and its expert provided testimony explaining why these letters did not provide a sound rationale for denying the claim. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Royal Crown acted in bad faith by unreasonably denying Esperancilla’s claim. 2. Breach of Contract ¶ 19 The Court must determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict for the breach of the insurance contract by a preponderance of the evidence. Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Isla Fin. Servs., 2001 MP 21 ¶ 3. An insurance contract is 9 We do not rule on whether Royal Crown or Esperancilla had the right to choose where the car was to be repaired under the insurance policy because it is irrelevant to determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.  construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 351 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The interpretation of language in an insurance policy is a question of law, Century Insurance Co. v. Hong Kong Entertainment Investments Ltd., 2009 MP 4 ¶ 15, and “[a] policy will be enforced according to its terms by reading it as a whole.” Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc., 4 NMI 46, 77 (1993).The exception to this rule is where there is an ambiguity, in which case the ambiguous term is interpreted in favor of coverage. Id. Therefore, the evidence must be sufficient to find that under the terms of the contract Royal Crown breached its duties. ¶ 20 Royal Crown argues that it did not breach the insurance contract with Esperancilla because it offered to fix his truck at Rajamsbelle’s shop. Royal Crown maintains that “Condition 12” in the contract gave it the option of repairing the vehicle or making a cash payment, and that it opted to have the truck fixed by Rajamsbelle but that Esperancilla refused. It asserts that the evidence presented at trial precludes a finding that it breached the contract because of its offer to repair. The evidence Esperancilla cites to support the jury’s breach of contract finding is the same as for the finding of bad faith; we will not recite all of the evidence previously discussed.10 The only evidence in the record that Royal Crown offered to fix Esperancilla’s car was an estimate by Rajamsbelle, and one of the insurer’s employee’s testimony. No memorialized offer to this effect, however, was put into evidence. On the other hand, the record contains multiple letters denying coverage. Furthermore, neither Esperancilla nor Hiponia testified that they received an offer from Royal Crown for Rajamsbelle to fix their cars, and counsel did not question either of them on this point during cross-examination. Upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Esperancilla, there is sufficient evidence to support the breach of contract finding. 3. Consumer Protection Act ¶ 21 We must next determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding a violation of the CPA, and additionally, whether any of Royal Crown’s actions constituted a violation of the Act. Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo, Isla Fin. Servs., 2001 MP 21 ¶ 3, and whether a specific act complies with or violates the CPA is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 19. i. Esperancilla’s Claim ¶ 22 In Isla Financial Services, 2001 MP 21 ¶ 23, we specified that a violation of the CPA, 4 CMC § 5105,11 “consists of (1) an unlawful act or practice, (2) in the conduct of trade or commerce.” Royal 10 See ¶¶ 15-17. 11 4 CMC § 5105 states in pertinent part: The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful: … (m) Engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the consumer; …  Crown argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that it breached the CPA with respect to its handling of Esperancilla’s claim. As established above, Royal Crown breached the insurance contract and acted in bad faith in handling the claim, but a showing that Royal Crown engaged in an unlawful act or practice as specified in 4 CMC § 5105 is necessary for Esperancilla to prevail. Royal Crown contends that it was straightforward and consistent in its reasons for denying Esperancilla’s claim, and that it also offered to repair Esperancilla’s car at Rajamsbelle. Like the bad faith and breach of contract claims, Esperancilla relies on the same evidence to prove that a violation of the CPA occurred; we will not undertake an in-depth review the evidence discussed supra.12 ¶ 23 In Isla Financial Services, 2001 MP 21, a financial services company procured a promissory note from a decedent’s daughter that obligated her to make payments on her deceased mother’s loan. The financial services company convinced the defendant that her mother would not be able to rest in peace with the loan outstanding, so the daughter took out a loan to pay off the mother’s outstandin