Full Opinion

CLERK OF COURT SUPREME COURT. CNMI FILED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE SUPRE.HE COURT OF THE cm-t.'10l'mE:\LT1f OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS I N lHE MATTER O F THE ) A P PEAL NO. a9-017 ESTATE OF: ) C IV IL NO. 87-295 ) l�RIANA C. DELEO N G UERRERO, ) OPINION ) Deceased. ) ====��-- > Argued and submitted on May 31, 1990. Co�nsel for Appellant, Admini­ Douglas F. Cushnie, Esq. stratrix Diana DL G. Villagome�: p.Q. Box 949 Saipan, M P 96950 CQunsel for Defendant Appellee, David A. Wiseman, Esq. Ok S.oe>n sa Guerrero: Law Offices of Wiseman & Eason P.O. Bo x 404 saipan, MP 96950 CQunsel for tbe Administrator John A. Manglona, Esq. o! the Estate of Francisco c. White, Novo-Gradac & Nanglona Deleon Guerrero, Leonard Sine: P.O. Bo x 222 CHRB saipan, M P 96950 QQ.unsel for Appellee, Ricardo Kenneth L. Govendo, Esq. Camacho: P.O. Bo x 2377 Saipan, M P 96950 BEFORE: DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice; V ILLA GO MEZ, Justice; and ATAL IG, Special Judge. 302 VILLAGOMEZ, JU$tice: FACTS In 1952, Mariana Camacho and. Francisco Deleon Guerrero were married. Both were Chamorro and of Northern Marianas descent. They had three children: Ronald, Mariano, and Diana. In addition, Francisco fathered two children outside of the marriage, Da vi d and Ricardo. In 1978, Mariana died intestate. Thereafter, Francisco married Ok Soon sa. Francisco's second marriage produced two more children. In 1987, Francisco died intestate. Upon his death, he had seven children. While F rancisco was married to Mariana, h e acquir ed pro perty on Saipan, Lot No. 17421 through court action. In r� Est:eyt� Q� Guerrero, 3 T.T.R. 546 (Trial Div. 1968). This land constituted his share of an inheritance from his father, who died in 1950. francisco and Mariana improved Lot No. 1742 by com�tructing houses thereon which they rented out. From the rental proceeds they purchased another parcel of saipan property during their marriage, Lot No. 004 D 39. �:fter Mariana died, Francisco purchased two more Saipan parcels" Lots No. 1763-1 and 002 I 12 . • following Francisco's death, his estate and Mariana's estate were probated concurrently in the Col\Ul\onwealth Trial Court (now superior Court). On october 26, 1989, t h e Superior court entered an order adjudging that there were no assets to be probated in 303 Mariana's estate. In re Estate of' Guerrero, civil Action No. 87- 295 (N.M. I. Super. ct. Oct. 26, 1989). The court held that all parcels mentioned above. and all personal property possessed by Francisco and Mariana at the time of her death belonged to Francisco, and that, upon his death, all of the property vested in his estate. The administratrix of.Mariana's estate, Diana DL G. Villagomez, has appealed. She contends that when Mariana died, her estate consisted of half of all property (both real and personal) acquired during the marriage. Villagomez claims that all of the property is "family property" (including the two lots -purchased by Francisco after Mariana's death), half of which passed exclusively to Hariana's three children (Ronald, Mariano, and Diana) upon her death. Villagomez maintains that the other half of the property passed after Francisco's death in equal shares to all seven of his children. Under Villagomez' claim, Mariana's three children are each entitled to one-third of one-half of the property, and each to an additional one-seventh of the remaining half of the property. Francisco's other children would thus each take only one-seventh of one-half of the property. Villagomez further contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in excluding testimony indicating that Francisco believed that the parcels acquired during his marriage with Mariana belonged to both he and Mariana. ISSUES 1. Whether the trial court made an error of law when it ruled 304 that Mariana's estate had no assets to be probated. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when- it excluded testimony concerning Francisco's beliefs regarding ownership of the land. DISCUSSION 1. Whether the trial court made an error of law when it ruled that Mariana's estate had no assets to be probated. The trial court concluded that the present Commonwealth probate code, 8 C M C § 2101 et seg., did not apply in the probate of Mariana's estate because it did not become effective until February 14, 1984, after her death. It further ruled that since there was Chamorro customary law applicable to the proceeding and the facts of the case, u. s. common law did not apply. 1 TT C § 103.1 The court applied customary law pursuant to 1 TT C § 102.2 Under customary law at the time of Mariana's death in 1978, the estate of a married woman who predeceased her husband did not 1"The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Trust Territory in cases to which they apply, in the absence of written law applicable under Section 101 of this Chapter or local customary law applicable under Section 102 of this Cbapter to the contrary and except as otherwise provided in Section 105 of this Chapter; PROV I DE D, that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution except under the written law of the Trust Territory or recognized local customary law not inconsistent therewith. " 2"The customs of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory not in conflict with the laws of the Trust Territory shall be preserved. The recognized customary law of the various parts of the Trust Territory shall have the full force _and effect of law so far as customary law is not in conflict with the laws mentioned in Section 101 of this Chapter." 305 include na.lf of all prop�rty posse$seq by tne m�_rita,l parti�s at the time of h,e:r de ath. !nstead, thf:! husban d assumed own�rship of all prope:rty •3 This particular customary law applied only to the l and (Lot No. 004 P 39) purchased by Francisco and Mari<:1na du:r ing tneir ma:rriage. 4 Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling th4lt none of the land acquil:"ed by franeis.co , individually or . witn Ma r iana cluring their maz:-r iage , vested in MariC!.na's estate at th� tim e of her death..� rnstead, Francisco a,ss-ume<l ownership and the land became paJ;t of his est at e when he die<l. Lot No. 1742. which was inhez:-ited by Francisco from his father con.stituted "iyon m(lnaina," t J;ans l a te<i to E ng l ish as "ancestoJ;'s ownersh.ip.11 !.� !"�-��-�-�!:� o.� <:=C1!U:�c:l1o, 1.. CE 395, 399 (C.T.c. 1963) •6 VnQ.er Cha:mo:rro custolllary law, "iyon mana ina'·' passes down to the !�· ::rn tnis case, the lancl (LPt No. 1742) passed to Francisco and became nis sep<:!.rate p roperty . 'l'lle trial 3�_9.8 A. Sp9ehr, �aip.��: '!'11� �t}l�c_>�_oqy of (i we�.r -J;}E:ryi:lstate.d I_sland l40 (Chicago Natural History Museum, 1954), and Office of t.he High co:nunissionel;.", Trust 'l'er:r:itory of tbe .Pacific Isl�nds, Land Te.n.�:r;e�attern� 223 {1958).. · · · · · 4As to th.e other p roperty, otber rules of law apply as- will be discusse<l iQti"A· · · 5Had Ma riana died after Feb ru ary 1 5, 1984, her est a te woul� have been subject to the current prol:>ate code . 8 CMC § �102.. Under 8 CMC § 2.903(1:>), her three children would have acquired one- · half of Lot No. 004 o 39. 'The Calll�c:ho c�n�rt tran s late d the Chamorro word "iyon'' as 0land. � 'l'll.�t :i.� :i. nco:rrect. "lyon" mean$ ownership. The Chamor:ro word :for land is " t a no, " and ancestor's land would be " tano Jlla.naina. •• "lyon man a i. na " is not restricte<l to land. It may include personalty. 306 court was correct in concluding that half of Lot No. 1742 did not vest in Mariana's estate at the time of her death. Francisco did not transfer any interest _in such land to Mariana. With respect to the parcels purchased by Francisco after Mariana's death; there is no statute, customary law, or common law :rule supporting the contention that one-half of such land vested in Mariana's estate. The trial court was therefore correct in concluding that her estate has no interest irt such land. With respect to Villagomez' claim to personal property acquired during the marriage, the trial court noted that she offered no proof of Mariana's personal property existing on the date of Mariana • s death except three bank books listing accounts in the names of Francisco or Mariana Guerrero. The bank accounts were held as a tenancy in the entirety. As such, upon Mariana' a death, the funds in the accounts vested solely in the surviving spouset Francisco. 7 The trial court co:crectly concluded that Mariana • s estate did not prove any personal property interest. 2. Whether the trial court abused ita diaoretion vhen it excluded testim6ny concerninq i"rancisco•s beliefs reqardinq ownership of the land. 764 .A.t.R.. 2d s Annotation: Estates by Entirety in Pet"sonal Property (1959). 10 Am.Jur.2d, Banks § J7J (1963): Slack*s Law Di ctionary 1313 (5th Ed. 1979) statest nA tenancy which is created between a husband and wife and by which together they held title to the whcne with right of survivorship • It is esaantially a • • • 1joirtt tenancy,i modified by common-law theory that husband and wife are one person, and survivorship is the predoi'l\inant· and distinguishing feature of each.11 307 The trial court excluded testimony from two witnesses which, . o c. according to Villagomez' brief, would establish "that Francisc Guerrero considered the property which his father owned and that he ultimately received as a result of litigation with his sister and others, as belonging to both he and Mariana." Appellant's brief at 11 (emphasis added). The testimony also relates to the other parcel acquired during the marriage. Villagomez contends that under Com.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) ,8 the testimony does not constitute hearsay because it is an admission by· a .party opponent. Villagomez also maintains that even if it does constitute hearsay, it falls within the family or community history exceptions in Com.R.Evid. 803(19) and (20) •9 It is irrelevant whether Francisco considered some or all the 811A statement is not hearsay if: (2) (t)he statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement in either his individual or a representative cap arity . . •. " 9"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or family history. (20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in the community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or state or nation in which located." 308 land to be owned by he and his. wife together. It is �lso irrelevant whether the testimony offered by Villagomez is not hearsay or falls within exceptions to the hearsay rule. Under Chamorro custom existing when Mariana died, even i� she had an interest in the land, upon her death ownership vested in her husband. Therefore, we find no error on the part of the trial court in excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. ·+i Entered this CJ-0 1 day of ---�=-.:v_\ _!/'v '-----' 1990. 7 ----�- - L . �- C ---=" JOSE S. DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice � 309