Full Opinion

J-A05022-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 KARON REHRIG : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : NATHAN V. HAY, SPLASH : No. 1865 EDA 2025 TRANSPORT, INC., AND KEURIG DR. : PEPPER, INDIVIDUALLY AND : JOINTLY Appeal from the Order Entered June 25, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-2023-05035 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 29, 2026 Plaintiff Karon Rehrig (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Nathan V. Hay, Splash Transport Inc., and Keurig Dr. Pepper (collectively, Appellees). After review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. By way of background, the underlying matter arose from a motor vehicle accident (MVA) that occurred on October 18, 2021. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/25/25, at 1. On July 20, 2023, Appellant filed a civil complaint against Appellees for damages resulting from injuries that she suffered during the accident. See id. The trial court set forth the underlying facts and procedural history as follows: J-A05022-26 [Appellant’s] . . . civil complaint against [Appellees] alleg[ed] that she was operating a motor vehicle owned by her employer while working in her position as a licensed practical nurse when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by [Appellee] Hay while he allegedly was working for [Appellees] Splash Transport, Inc. and Keurig Dr. Pepper. The complaint was reinstated on January 2, 2024. [Appellees] filed an answer and new matter on May 20, 2024. On May 29, 2024, [Appellant] filed an answer to [Appellees’] new matter. . . . * * * In her complaint, [Appellant] alleges that she suffered bodily injuries including, but not limited to, “neck pain, left shoulder pain, right wrist pain, headaches/confusion and concussion symptoms, radiating left arm pain, a left sided C6-7 disk herniation with associated nerve pressure by which she was rendered sick, sore and disabled all of which has been to her great financial loss.” During discovery, [Appellees] learned that [Appellant] had also filed a workers’ compensation claim against her employer for the same accident in which she alleged injury to “right wrist, left shoulder, neck, low back, strs-sprs; head contusion/MVA.” She later added [to her workers’ compensation injury claim that she suffered a] disk herniation at C6-7 [which she claimed required an anterior discectomy and fusion surgery] . . . . The employer in the workers’ compensation claim disputed [Appellant’s] claims that her injuries were the result of the [MVA]. . . . Expert opinions offered on behalf of the employer established that [Appellant’s] injuries were not related to the [MVA]. Accordingly, . . . [the workers’ compensation judge [(WCJ)] issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its decision] . . . that [Appellant’s] injuries were not related to the [MVA] and treatment was not reasonable and necessary for the alleged work injury. [See WCJ Decision.] [Appellant] thereafter filed an appeal to the workers’ compensation appeal board [(WCAB)] which affirmed the [WCJ’s] decision. Id. at 1-2, 5-6 (citations omitted and some formatting altered). Appellant did not file any further appeals after the WCAB affirmed the WCJ’s decision. -2- J-A05022-26 On February 27, 2025, Appellees moved for summary judgment asserting that Appellant’s claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Specifically, Appellees argued that Appellant’s claim of injury had already been litigated based on the decision denying her workers’ compensation claim. Ultimately, after holding oral argument on the matter, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion on June 25, 2025. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Did the [trial court] err in applying as a matter of law the Superior Court decisions in Capobianchi v. Bic Corporation, 666 A.2d 344 ([Pa. Super.] 1995) (citing Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313 ([Pa. Super.] 1983)), to make a specific finding that Appellant in this matter was collaterally estopped from bringing her matter before a jury pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, the “inviolate right to a jury trial?” 2. Did the [trial court] abuse its discretion in not accepting the differences between the administrative law proceeding and the right to a jury trial in finding factually that Appellant received a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in the prior action?” 3. Did the [trial court] err and abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims given the Constitutional right provided by the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, § 11, concerning courts to be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation [and], shall have remedy by due course of law? 4. Did the [trial court] commit an error of law or abuse of discretion in not recognizing that the grant of Workers’ Compensation establishment to the general assembly -3- J-A05022-26 pursuant to Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 3, § 18 only permitted the exercise of this power and excluded by its very language recoveries for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property and specifically states "the right of action shall survive, and the general assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such action shall be prosecuted?” 5. Did the [trial court] commit an error of law and/or abuse in discretion in not recognizing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent contained in Wagner vs. National Indemnity Co., 422 A. 2d 1061 [(Pa. 1980)], specifically ruled that the scope of the Act (Workers’ Compensation Act) cannot be extended in any manner which would destroy either the employee’s common law rights against third persons or their common law conception of third persons? 6. Did the [trial court] commit a clear error of law or abuse of discretion in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel where the issues decided were not identical between the two actions, and the issue of causation of the injuries should never have been allowed to proceed under the facts extant in this matter? Appellant’s Brief at 5-7 (citations and some formatting altered). The crux of Appellant’s claims is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. See id.1 Appellant ____________________________________________ 1 Appellees contend that Appellant waived her argument, that “the issues decided were not identical between the two actions and the issue of causation should have been allowed to proceed ‘under the facts extant in [] this matter,’” because Appellant’s “argument as framed was not made below.” Appellee’s Brief at 21-22 (citing Appellant’s Brief at 33-34). Our review of the record reflects, however, that the trial court noted that Appellant had argued that collateral estoppel “should not preclude [her] from relitigating the cause of her injuries in this action” when it granted summary judgment. Trial Ct. Op., 6/25/25, at 6. Specifically, Appellant’s response to the motion for summary judgment included the argument that “a workers’ compensation proceeding is an administrative law proceeding, which differs significantly on both a procedural and evidential level from the protections afforded in a civil trial.” (Footnote Continued Next Page) -4- J-A05022-26 argues that the inherent differences between a jury trial and an “administrative law proceeding” are significant enough to warrant a trial despite claiming the same injuries which were raised in the previous action. See id. at 5. Additionally, Appellant argues that she did not have “a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue” during the workers’ compensation proceeding and, further, that the Pennsylvania constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in these circumstances. See id. Further, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel “where the issues decided were not identical between the two actions.” See id. at 7. Our scope of review for grants of summary judgment is plenary and we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party [to] determine whether the moving party has established that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The non- moving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences. Any doubts ____________________________________________ Appellant’s Brief Opp. Summ. J., 6/3/25, at 6 (some formatting altered). Further, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement included the claim “that the worker’s compensation proceeding did not provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims because of the forum being one of an administrative law proceeding lacking the strict rules of evidence and procedure applied in jury trial settings,” as well as the claim that “the issue decided was not identical between the two actions.” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Stmt., 7/28/25, at 2-3 (some formatting altered). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant fairly raised the argument below and, further, preserved it for appeal in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (directing that an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement “shall concisely identify each error . . . with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). -5- J-A05022-26 as to the existence of a factual dispute must be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor and summary judgment is appropriate only in the clearest of cases. Nelson v. Heslin, 806 A.2d 873, 876 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). 2 Additionally, summary judgment is appropriate in cases where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there [is] no genuine issue of material fact. The moving party has the burden of proving the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact. [To avoid summary judgement] the non-moving party must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial and may not rest on averments in its pleadings. The trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving party and examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free from doubt that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * The doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as issue preclusion, operates to prevent questions of law or issues of fact which have once been litigated and adjudicated finally in a court of competent jurisdiction from being relitigated in a subsequent suit. Collateral estoppel is applicable when: (1) An issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; ____________________________________________ 2 We note that Nelson addressed a legal malpractice claim where the underlying cause of action was the appellees’ failure “to initiate a third-party action against the alleged tortfeasors whose defective product caused [the appellant] work-related injuries” within the applicable period. Id. at 874 (some formatting altered). In Nelson, appealing summary judgment in favor of the appellees, the appellant argued that collateral estoppel should not have precluded him from relitigating his work-related injuries despite the WCAB’s finding that he was not disabled. See id. While Nelson was an action filed against the appellant’s counsel rather than directly against alleged third-party tortfeasors, as is the case here, Nelson aptly stated and applied the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment. See id. at 874, 876. -6- J-A05022-26 (2) The prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Id. at 876-77 (citations omitted and some formatting altered). Even where a claimant is denied relief in a workers’ compensation proceeding, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not necessarily bar that individual from pursuing relief for the same injuries in a claim against a third party. See Nelson, 806 A.2d at 877–78 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that “[s]imply because the worker’s compensation proceedings resulted in a finding that [the appellant] failed to prove that he was entitled to disability benefits under the [WCA], does not mean that he could not show that he was injured at the time of the accident”). Indeed, this Court has explained: [T]o prove that [the plaintiff] was entitled to disability benefits under the [WCA], [the plaintiff] was required to show that such work-related injury was so significant as to render him unable to perform his pre-injury work . . . . [but] such a showing of disability is not required to successfully litigate a third-party tort action. All [the plaintiff] would had to have shown . . . to successfully litigate his case before a jury is that he suffered some compensable injury as a result of the negligence of another. Nelson, 806 A.2d at 877–78 (citations omitted, some formatting altered, and emphasis added). -7- J-A05022-26 Further, Nelson clarified that a claimant is awarded disability benefits under the WCA based on “loss of earning capacity, not solely on the basis of medical injury.” Nelson, 806 A.2d at 877–78.3,4 In order to receive compensation benefits under the WCA, a claimant must establish: (1) an injury; (2) that the injury was work-related; and (3) the work-related injury was so significant as to render the claimant unable to perform his pre-injury work. Id. at 877. In the context of the WCA, the term “disability” is synonymous with “loss of earning power”—not just physical impairment. See id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). As Nelson noted, the terms “disability” and “injury” are often used interchangeably in decisions by Pennsylvania courts, which has routinely caused confusion. See id. Thus, the question of whether a complainant suffers from a “disability” for WCA ____________________________________________ 3 The legal standard in a worker’s compensation proceeding differs from the legal standard in a tort action. “In a [worker’s compensation] claim petition, the claimant has the burden of proving all elements necessary to support an award, including the burden to establish the duration of disability. A claimant establishes ongoing disability by the presentation of unequivocal medical evidence.” Wagner v. W.C.A.B. (O'Malley Wood Products, Inc.), 805 A.2d 683, 684 (Pa. Cwlth. 2002) (citation omitted); see Rocco v. W.C.A.B. (Parkside Realty Const.), 725 A.2d 239, 244 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (stating that “[w]here medical testimony is required to establish causation [in a workers’ compensation claim], as is the case here, the testimony must be unequivocal in order to support an award” (citation omitted)). “The medical witness must testify that in his or her professional opinion the result did come from the assigned cause for the testimony to be unequivocal.” Rocco, 725 A.2d at 244. 4 We may cite to published decisions of the Commonwealth Court as persuasive authority. See Turner v. Estate of Baird, 270 A.3d 556, 561 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022). -8- J-A05022-26 purposes may differ from whether a plaintiff is “injured” in the context of a third-party civil action. See id. This Court considered whether collateral estoppel applied to the facts in Nelson as follows: The difference between proving a disability in a workers’ compensation tribunal versus proving a compensable injury in a negligence action is not merely semantic. Rather, this distinction is central to the issue of whether the first element of collateral estoppel has been met. If, by failing to prove that he suffered a disability meant that [the appellant] also failed to prove any injury, then the first element of collateral estoppel would have been satisfied. To that end, if the WCAB and the WCJ had stated that [the appellant] did not suffer any work-related injury or that his injuries were not caused by the work-related incident, then collateral estoppel could be applicable here. However, because that tribunal made no such findings, we believe that the first element has not been satisfied here because the issue of whether [the appellant] sustained an injury has not been previously determined. Id. at 878 (some formatting altered). Here, the trial court explained: [Appellant] concedes that the injuries at issue in the case before us are the same injuries for which [she] sought compensation in the workers’ compensation case. [Appellant] also concedes that a workers’ compensation court is a court of competent jurisdiction. [Appellant] argues, however, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not preclude [her] from relitigating the cause of her injuries in this action because of her “inviolate” right of a jury trial under the Pennsylvania Constitution. [Appellant] asserts that a workers’ compensation proceeding is an administrative law proceeding which differs significantly on both a procedural and evidential level from the protections afforded in a civil trial where a jury is demanded[,] as in the instant matter. Although [Appellant] goes on to raise a number of interesting arguments as to why [she] should not be [barred by] collateral[] estoppel, arguments that [Appellant] claims have never been considered by -9- J-A05022-26 our Supreme Court, we believe that we must apply the current state of [the] law based on appellate court rulings. In [Grant v. GAF Corp., 608 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. 1992)], our Superior Court addressed a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial [where the defendants had raised a defense of] collateral estoppel [based on the plaintiff’s] workers’ compensation cases. Our Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a tort action wherein the trial court collaterally estopped a widow from relitigating the cause of [the] injury where a [workers’] compensation referee had found that the plaintiff’s carcinoma was not related to occupational exposure. The Superior Court rejected the argument that application of collateral estoppel to a workers’ compensation case violates the Pennsylvania Constitution’s right to a trial by jury. As set forth above, the law of this Commonwealth is clear in that principles of collateral estoppel apply to judgments of workers’ compensation appeal boards. In the matter before us, the [WCJ] determined that [Appellant’s] treatments/injuries were not related to the accident at issue. The aforesaid decision was affirmed by the workers’ compensation appeal board. Accordingly, we are compelled to grant summary judgment in favor of [Appellees]. Trial Ct. Op., 6/25/25, at 6-7. Following a careful review of the record, the decisions in Appellant’s workers’ compensation case, and the opinion rendered by the trial court, we conclude that the issue of whether Appellant suffered an injury that could be the basis of tort action as a result of the MVA has not been previously - 10 - J-A05022-26 litigated.5,6 See Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. Indeed, there are several instances within the findings of fact from the WCJ7 and WCAB8 decisions which ____________________________________________ 5 We note that the WCJ concluded that the “[Appellant] did not sustain a concussion in the course of employment on 10/18/21.” WCJ Decision, 2/27/25, at 14 (emphasis added). Since the MVA occurred “in the course of employment,” see id. at 4, 14, and the MVA is what Appellant claims to have caused her concussion, we conclude that Appellant’s current claim concerning whether she sustained a concussion as a result of the MVA has been previously litigated. See Grant, 608 A.2d at 1052; Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. Accordingly, to the extent Appellant seeks to pursue a claim that she sustained a concussion as a result of the MVA, that fact was addressed in a final adjudication by the WCJ and Appellant is therefore barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating it. See id. 6 Additionally, we note that the WCJ concluded that “[Appellant] did not sustain a C6-7 disc herniation resulting in cervical radiculopathy and requiring surgical intervention as a result of her 10/18/21 work related MVA.” WCJ Decision, at 14 (emphasis added). To the extent that Appellant wishes to litigate the issue of whether she suffered from a C6-7 disc herniation resulting in cervical radiculopathy and requiring surgical intervention as a result of her 10/18/21 work-related MVA, we are compelled to conclude that this issue has also been previously litigated and is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Grant, 608 A.2d at 1052; Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. However, to the extent Appellant did suffer some form of back injury as a result of the MVA, that claim has not been previously litigated and is not barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. Specifically, the WCJ’s factual findings indicate that Appellant did suffer some form of back injury as a result of the MVA, albeit not to the degree that she could have suffered cervical radiculopathy requiring surgical intervention. See WCJ Decision at 4 (stating that “pursuant to an 12/1/21 notice of compensation payable, on 10/18/21, [Appellant] suffered “right wrist, left shoulder, neck, low back strs-sprs; head contusion/MVA” in the course of employment with [Appellant’s employer] entitling her to weekly wage loss benefits . . .”) (emphasis added and some formatting altered). 7 The language used in the WCJ decision itself indicates that Appellant suffered, or could have suffered, some form of injury as a result of the 10/18/21 MVA. Such instances include, but are not limited to: (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 11 - J-A05022-26 indicate that Appellant did suffer some form of injury as a result of the MVA on 10/18/21. See WCJ Decision at 1, 14; WCAB Decision, at 1-2, 9. Although the WCJ and WCAB concluded that Appellant’s injuries did not rise to the level of a work-related disability that would require ongoing compensation, that is different determination than whether Appellant suffered any injury for which she could be awarded damages in a tort action. See WCJ Decision at 6, 8; see also Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. ____________________________________________ 1. “pursuant to an 12/1/21 notice of compensation payable, on 10/18/21, [Appellant] suffered “[r]ight wrist, left shoulder, neck, low back strs- sprs; head contusion/MVA” in the course of employment with [Appellant’s employer] entitling her to weekly wage loss benefits . . . ;” 2. “Dr. Auerbach was of the opinion that if [Appellant] sustained a right wrist injury, it was a right wrist sprain from which she has recovered;” 3. “[Appellant] was fully recovered from her work injuries as of 5/13/22;” and 4. “[Appellant’s] 10/18/21 work related MVA.” WCJ Decision, at 4, 14 (emphasis added and some formatting altered). 8 Similarly, the WCAB opinion stated: 1. “The NTCP accepted right wrist, left shoulder, neck, and low back strains/sprains and a head contusion, and provided for indemnity benefits beginning November 13, 2021.” 2. “The WCJ concluded [Appellant] did not prove additional injuries and had fully recovered from the accepted injuries as of May 13, 2022.” 3. “[Dr. Auerbach] diagnosed [Appellant] with a cervical spine sprain from which she had recovered.” WCAB Decision, at 1-2, 9 (emphasis added). - 12 - J-A05022-26 Further, the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s “injuries were not related to the [MVA].” Trial Ct. Op., 6/25/25, at 5-6. Specifically, the workers’ compensation proceeding does not reflect that Appellant did not suffer any injury from the MVA that would be compensable in a tort action, as the WCJ found that Appellant suffered some form of injury in that accident. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/25/25, at 5-6; see also WCJ Decision at 4, 14; WCAB Decision, at 1-2, 9; Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. Rather, the WCJ found that Appellant did sustain some, but not all, of her claimed injuries as a result of the MVA and then, for the injuries related by the MVA, the WCJ adjudicated whether Appellant had the right to workers’ compensation benefits. See WCJ Decision, at 14. Therefore, Appellant is not collaterally estopped from litigating a tort action against Appellees for injuries related to the MVA that have not been adjudicated as being unrelated to the MVA in Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim. See Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878. Conversely, Appellant is only estopped from litigating a tort action based on the MVA for the injuries that the WCJ found were not related to the MVA. See id. On this record, viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party, we conclude that Appellant presented sufficient evidence to establish that she suffered an injury from the MVA that may serve as the basis of a tort action against Appellees. See Nelson, 806 A.2d at 878; Crespo v. Hughes, 292 A.3d 612,617 (Pa. Super. 2023). In other words, an issue of material fact remains regarding whether Appellant suffered an - 13 - J-A05022-26 injury cognizable as a tort as a result of the MVA. 9 Nelson, 806 A.2d 876. Accordingly, summary judgment was not warranted and, therefore, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. Order vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. Date: 10/29/2026 ____________________________________________ 9 Given our disposition vacating and remanding the matter to the trial court, we need not address Appellant’s other claims on appeal. - 14 -