Full Opinion

J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 ORDOM HUOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF : PENNSYLVANIA JENNIFER HUOT : : : v. : : : GONG THACH, DAVID THACH, GLOBAL : No. 703 EDA 2025 STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., AND : HERR FOODS, INC. : : : APPEAL OF: GONG THACH : Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 210300367 CYNTHIA BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AS ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE : PENNSYLVANIA OF NATHAN ROYAL : : : v. : : : GONG THACH, DAVID THACH, GLOBAL : No. 704 EDA 2025 STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., AND : HERR FOODS, INC. : : : APPEAL OF: GONG THACH : Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 200601058 SOEUP DY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 : : GONG THACH, DAVID THACH, GLOBAL : STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., AND : HERR FOODS, INC. : No. 705 EDA 2025 : : APPEAL OF: GONG THACH : Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 211000157 ORDOM HUOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF : PENNSYLVANIA JENNIFER HUOT : : Appellant : : : v. : : No. 809 EDA 2025 : GONG THACH, DAVID THACH, GLOBAL : STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., AND : HERR FOODS, INC. : Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 210300367 CYNTHIA BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AS ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE : PENNSYLVANIA OF NATHAN ROYAL : : Appellant : : : v. : : No. 810 EDA 2025 : GONG THACH, DAVID THACH, GLOBAL : STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., AND : HERR FOODS, INC. : -2- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 200601058 SOEUP DY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : GONG THACH, DAVID THACH, GLOBAL : No. 811 EDA 2025 STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., AND : HERR FOODS, INC. : Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 211000157 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 2, 2026 In this memorandum we address the cross-appeals of Gong Thach (Thach), a co-defendant in the underlying civil cause of action, and Ordom Huot, individually and as administrator of the estate of Jennifer Huot; Cynthia Brown, individually and as administrator of the estate of Nathan Royal; and Soeup Dy (collectively, Plaintiffs), co-plaintiffs in the underlying civil cause of action. Thach appeals from the trial court’s grant of delay damages to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) to Thach’s co-defendant, Global Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Global). Because Plaintiffs, Thach, and Global raise the same claims and identical arguments in support of the claims in all three sets of -3- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 cross-appeals, we hereby consolidate these matters. 1 After careful review, we affirm both orders. By way of relevant background: On October 16, 2019, [Thach] was employed by [Global] as a van driver. On that day, Global was in the business of providing transportation for workers to Herr[] Foods, Inc. [(Co-Defendant Herr Foods)]. While driving on Route 1 in New Garden Township, [Pennsylvania,] in heavy rain, [Thach’s] van veered off the road and overturned, killing and injuring multiple passengers . . . . Among those killed were . . . [Jennifer Huot and Nathan Royal]. . . . David Thach ([Thach’s] brother []) was the owner of Global and the van. [Thach] is believed to have fled the country after the accident. Global filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection[.] Trial commenced on October 28, 2024[.] Trial Ct. Op., 5/9/25, at 2 (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered). At trial, Plaintiffs presented the following fact witnesses and expert witnesses: [Plaintiffs’] fact witnesses were Steven Lewis and Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Khon Tang. . . . Steven Lewis testified that he noticed a van driving “side by side” with him on the date of the accident. He described poor road conditions due to heavy rain and noticed that the van passed him. He specifically stated that he did not notice the van speeding. Lewis testified that he saw the van move to the right lane and thought it was getting off at the exit. According to Lewis, the van was moving “. . . kind of, gradual . . . . I didn’t see it coming off the road.” At no time did Lewis testify that the van was being driven too fast or erratically. ____________________________________________ 1 On June 27, 2025, this Court consolidated the two cross-appeals at dockets 703 EDA 2025 and 809 EDA 2025, the two cross-appeals at dockets 704 EDA 2025 and 810 EDA 2025, and the two cross-appeals at dockets 705 EDA 2025 and 811 EDA 2025. See Orders, 6/27/25. -4- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 * * * Plaintiffs’ expert, Crystal Soto-Kent[,] offered her opinions concerning Global’s direct liability. [Ms. Soto-Kent] relied upon numerous depositions, documents[,] and accident reports to form the basis of her opinion that Global was negligent for employing Thach and allowing him to drive while knowing he was a bad driver. Ms. Soto-Kent’s testimony was offered by way of video play-back[ and,] during [the play-back for the jury,] portions of depositions were read into the record. For instance, excerpts of Clifford White’s deposition were read by Plaintiffs’ counsel where [Mr.] White stated that he knew that Thach was a bad driver and he [had] made complaints to Global’s management. Deposition testimony of Jason Royal was read wherein he stated that he also complained to Global management about Thach’s poor driving skills and that he knew [] other people [had] made similar complaints. Ms. Soto-Kent then confirmed that she relied on these statements when forming her opinion concerning Global’s negligence. Neither Mr. White nor Mr. Royal testified at trial, nor was there any representation that they were unavailable to do so. Frank Cost[a]nzo was [P]laintiffs’ accident reconstructionist. Deposition of the investigating officer, Corporal James Mooney[,] concerning Thach’s speed; and deposition testimony of Thuy Nguyen] and Thi Ngo were read by counsel to support [Mr.] Cost[a]nzo’s opinion that [Thach] was a bad driver who was speeding and lost control of the vehicle that day. None of these [deponents] testified at trial, nor was there any indication that they were unavailable[.] Id. at 4-5, 8-9 (footnotes and citations omitted and some formatting altered). After Plaintiffs presented their evidence, Global made a motion for nonsuit on the basis that “every consequential fact in evidence [related to Global’s liability] was presented through an expert . . . [who] merely regurgitated deposition testimony of witnesses who did not testify in court [and who Plaintiffs] failed to establish their inability to testify under Rule 804.” -5- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered).2 The trial court denied Global’s motion for nonsuit at that time. See id. at 9. Subsequently, the jury entered a verdict . . . in favor of Plaintiffs and against Global and Thach for a total amount of $15 million; Global was found 60% negligent and Thach was found to be 40% negligent.[3] Global filed a timely post-verdict motion [again] seeking JNOV . . . On February 18, 2025, JNOV was granted [on the grounds of] the sufficiency of the evidence. On the same date, plaintiffs’ petition for delay damages was granted in the amount of $3,009,630.15 against [] Thach[.] * * * Plaintiffs motion for delay damages did not include the [ ] notice [required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 238(c)]. [Thach] timely responded to the motion for delay damages, arguing, in part, that failure to include the required notice . . . was fatal to Plaintiffs’ request for delay damages. [See Thach’s Ans., 11/20/24.] Id. at 2, 10 (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered). Thach and Plaintiffs both filed timely notices of appeal and the trial court as well as both Thach and Plaintiffs complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We address below first Thach’s claim and then Plaintiffs’ claim. On appeal, Thach raises the following claim: ____________________________________________ 2 The certified record does not contain Global’s written motion for nonsuit made at the close of Plaintiffs evidence and we presume that Global made an oral motion. Additionally, the trial transcripts are not in the certified record and therefore this Court is unable to confirm how Global made this motion for nonsuit. 3 See Jury Verdict Sheet, 10/30/24. -6- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Whether the trial court committed reversible error by granting [Plaintiffs’] motion for delay damages where [Plaintiffs] failed to comply with the strict and unambiguous notice requirements of Pa. R.C[iv].P. 238(c) when requesting delay damages? Thach’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered). In support of his claim, Thach contends that he “does not seek to void the entire action” due to Plaintiffs’ failure to attach the required notice to plead to her motion; rather, Thach only seeks to “strike the award of delay damages.” Id. at 37. Thach argues that failure to include the notice language “required by the clear and unambiguous words of Rule 238(c) is a fatal flaw when a plaintiff . . . request[s] delay damages.” Id. at 23-24.4 In the absence of directly on-point authority, Thach directs our attention to precedents in which default judgments were struck because plaintiffs had failed to include required notices to defend in the initial petition or complaint, or failed to serve notice of intent to enter a default judgment. See id. at 25- 27, 30-31, 34-35 (citing, inter alia, Gould v. Wagner, 316 A.3d 634 (Pa. Super. 2024); Gerber v. Emes, 511 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. 1986); Penn Nat’l ____________________________________________ 4 Thach directs our attention to the “In re Arreguin, . . . 2024 Pa. Super. 258 (Pa. Super. 2024),” opinions issued by this Court on November 5, 2024, stating that the disposition had been withdrawn, the appeal then heard en banc, and that no new decision had been issued by the time of brief filing. Id. at 23-24. We note that the withdrawn opinions referenced by Appellant were issued in a matter captioned as Arreguin v. Kinsing and that the opinions were withdrawn on January 6, 2025. Further, on December 23, 2025 – while the instant appeal was pending but after Thach’s and Plaintiffs’ briefs were filed – this Court issued its en banc opinions on the matter. See Arreguin v. Kinsing, 350 A.3d 231 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc), appeal denied, 362 A.3d 726 (Pa. 2026). -7- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 276 A.3d 268 (Pa. Super. 2022). Because Rule 238(c) directs that a plaintiff ‘shall’ include a notice to plead in a motion for delay damages; because Plaintiffs failed to include the required notice and did not attempt to cure this deficiency even after Thach pointed out the deficiency in his response to the motion; and because Rule 238 does not expressly require that Thach establish prejudice as a result of the deficiency, Thach argues that the trial court should not have awarded Plaintiffs delay damages. See Thach’s Brief at 30, 32-33, 37. Thach further contends that whether he responded in a timely fashion to the motion for delay damages or not should not bear on the outcome of this matter because to award delay damages under such circumstances would unfairly “punish[ Thach] for proactively responding to . . . Plaintiffs motion.” Id. at 33-34. In response, Plaintiffs argue that they “made a substantial attempt to comply” with the directives in Rule 238 in their motion and that the omission of the notice to plead should not “automatically invalidate[] an otherwise proper motion” for delay damages. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 12-13. Specifically, Plaintiffs characterize Rule 238(c)’s notice requirement as “a procedural directive” rather than a “jurisdictional prerequisite to the award of delay damages.” Id. at 10. Because subsection (a)(1) of the rule also mandates that delay damages “shall be added” once entitlement is established by the plaintiff, Plaintiffs argue that their failure to provide a notice to plead with their -8- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 motion should not invalidate their right to delay damages. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 238(a)(1), (c). Noting that Rule 238 was fashioned to “encourage defendants to settle meritorious claims as soon as reasonably possible” and “to remedy the time- value loss caused by litigation delay,” Plaintiffs also contend that the rule does not expressly require the forfeiture of delay damages when a plaintiff fails to include the required notice language with the filed motion. See id. at 11-13, 19-20 (citations omitted). Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Thach suffered no prejudice because his “substantive rights . . . were unaffected” given that Thach “timely filed an opposition to . . . [the] motion for delay damages[] and both parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues therein.” Id. at 12. We evaluate a trial court’s decision regarding delay damages to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. See Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529, 561 (Pa. Super. 2021). An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error of judgment” but, rather, when “in reaching a conclusion[,] the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Id. (citation omitted.) Where the claim requires this Court to interpret a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure – a question of law – our standard of review is de novo and -9- J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 our scope of review is plenary. Arreguin, 350 A.3d at 235 (citation omitted). Further, “The object of all interpretation and construction of rules is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Supreme Court.” Pa.R.J.A. 108(a). In so doing, “[t]he rules shall be liberally applied to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 126. Id. (footnotes omitted).5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 provides, in relevant part: Damages for Delay in Actions for Bodily Injury, Death or Property Damage (a)(1) At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, damages for delay shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each defendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of a jury . . . , and shall become part of the verdict, decision or award. * * * (c) Not later than ten days after the verdict or notice of the decision, the plaintiff may file a written motion requesting damages for delay and setting forth the computation. The motion shall begin with the following notice: NOTICE You are hereby notified to file a written answer to the attached motion for delay damages within twenty days from ____________________________________________ 5 We note that changes in our Rules of Judicial Administration and Rules of Civil Procedure are applied retroactively to cases pending on appeal. See id. at 235 n.2, n.3 (citing Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps., Inc., 856 A.2d 43, 51 (Pa. 2004)). - 10 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 the filing of the motion or the delay damages sought in the motion may be added to the verdict or decision against you. Pa.R.Civ.P. 238(a)(1), (c). An en banc panel of this Court in Arreguin recently considered whether a trial court erred in denying a plaintiff’s motion for delay damages solely based on the plaintiff’s failure to state in her Rule 238(c) notice the twenty- day deadline for the defendant to respond in writing to the motion. See Arreguin, 350 A.3d at 234, 237. While noting that a plaintiff “seeking delay damages . . . must provide notice in the form set forth” in Rule 238(c), the Arreguin Court held that, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 126(a), the trial court “may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.” Id. at 235-36 (citations omitted). The Court noted that our Supreme Court, promulgated Rule 126 to incorporate the equitable principle that the trial court should consider the doctrine of substantial compliance when applying the Rules of Civil Procedure . . . [because] procedural rules are not ends in themselves, and [] the rigid application of our rules does not always serve the interests of fairness and justice. . . . Rule 126[ gives] trial courts the latitude to overlook any “procedural defect” that does not prejudice a party’s rights. Thus, while we look for full compliance with the terms of our rules, we provide a limited exception under Rule 126 to those who commit a misstep when attempting to do what any particular rule requires. . . . That is, Rule 126 does not excuse total noncompliance with a procedural rule. Rather, Rule 126 is available to a party who makes a substantial attempt to conform. Id. at 236 (citing, inter alia, Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 276 (Pa. 2006)) (some formatting altered). The Arreguin Court concluded that, - 11 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 because the plaintiff had “complied in all respects with Rule 238 except in providing the notice that [the defendant] had 20 days to respond in writing to the motion for delay damages,” the plaintiff’s error “did not affect or prejudice [the defendant’s] substantive rights.” Arreguin, 350 A.3d at 237. Here, in resolving Thach’s procedural defect claim, the trial court relied in large part on Pa.R.Civ.P. 126(a), reasoning that [w]hile Pa.R.C[iv].P. 238(c) does state that “the motion shall begin with the [] notice,” Pa.R.C[iv].P. 238(a)(1) also states that “at the request of the plaintiff . . . delay damages shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each defendant. * * * Here, the substantive rights of the parties were unaffected by plaintiffs’ procedural failure. [Thach] timely filed an opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for delay damages and both parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues therein. Trial Ct. Op., 5/9/25, at 12, 14. After our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs’ procedural error did not affect Thach’s substantive rights and, therefore, the court could apply Rule 126(a) to disregard the error. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 126(a); see also Spencer, 249 A.3d at 561; Arreguin, 350 A.3d at 235-37. While Plaintiffs’ error is the complete omission of the notice to plead, whereas the plaintiff in Arreguin merely omitted the deadline to respond in her notice to plead, in both cases the defendants’ substantive rights were not adversely affected by the error. See Arreguin, 350 A.3d at 235-37. Nor are we persuaded by Thach’s argument - 12 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 that he should not be penalized for responding to the motion in a timely manner. Here, Thach timely responded to Plaintiffs’ motion for delay damages despite the fact that he had not been advised of the requirement to timely respond to the motion. Thach’s conduct aptly illustrates that he was, in fact, aware of the relevant procedural requirements to respond to the request for delay damages and took action to protect his rights; further, his arguments on the matter were heard and considered by the trial court. We therefore decline to elevate form over substance to strike the award of approximately $3 million in delay damages due to a procedural misstep that caused Thach no harm. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting delay damages to Plaintiffs.6 ____________________________________________ 6 We note that the cases Thach relied on in his argument, e.g., Gould, Gerber, and Penn Nat’l Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., addressed the notice to defend a right either at the commencement of actions or where the defendant had not received notice that a right was at stake. Gould addressed a plaintiff’s failure to include a mandatory notice to defend when he filed his petition to fix the fair market value of property; this Court affirmed the trial court’s striking of the default judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor. See Gould, 316 A.3d at 637, 644. Gerber addressed a complaint in assumpsit where the plaintiff had failed to include a notice to defend in the complaint; this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the petition to strike default judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor. Gerber, 511 A.2d at 78-79. In Penn Nat’l Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., the plaintiffs had served the defendant with their praecipe to enter default judgment but “failed to attach . . . either the [required] ten-day notice or a certification that they sent written notice of their intention to file a praecipe for default judgment” and the defendant did not respond before the entry of default judgment. See Penn Nat’l Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 276 A.3d at 271-73. After the entry of default judgment, the defendant petitioned to strike the judgment and the trial court denied the petition; this Court found the notice defective and directed that the judgment be struck. See id. at 272-73, 278-79. - 13 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Turning to Plaintiffs’ appeal, Plaintiffs raise the following claim: Whether the trial court erred in granting [JNOV] to [Global] where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winners, the jury’s verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence on both vicarious liability and direct negligence theories. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 5. In considering Global’s motion for JNOV, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in “discrediting the testimony of two of Plaintiffs’ critical experts[,] human resources and employment-practices specialist[, Ms.] Soto-Kent[,] and senior accident-reconstruction expert[, Mr.] Costanzo, on the mistaken premise that each relied on inadmissible hearsay from depositions of non- testifying witnesses.” Id. at 26. Plaintiffs contend that the experts had not, as Global had complained, acted as “impermissible ‘conduits’ for inadmissible hearsay” contained in the “depositions of non-testifying witnesses,” in violation of Pa.R.E. 804; i.e., that Plaintiffs had not used the experts to present statements from non-testifying witnesses to the jury “to establish the facts of the case.” Id. at 26-27, 29 (citing Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 8B; some formatting altered). Rather, Plaintiffs argue that their experts used these statements as “background data” and “synthesiz[ed] multiple data sources and appl[ied] independent professional judgment to form their own admissible conclusions,” as permitted by Pa.R.E. 703. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 26, 29. As such, Plaintiffs contend that “the opinions and testimony of the experts, themselves, are admissible” pursuant to Pa.R.E. - 14 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 703, “regardless of whether each isolated piece of evidence relied upon by the expert would have otherwise been independently admissible.” Id. at 28. In granting JNOV, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court also “ignored the fact that . . . regardless of the experts’ reliance on the depositions, those experts’ ultimate opinion, which the jury heard, were admissible.” Id. at 26. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court ignored the evidentiary distinction between underlying data admitted solely to explain an expert’s opinion and substantive evidence offered for its truth . . . [and that Plaintiffs were not required] to prove declarants ‘unavailable’ under Rule 804 before their experts’ opinions could be considered sufficient evidence . . . [because not] every fact underlying an expert’s opinion must be independently admissible[.] Id. at 31. Plaintiffs argue that the case they presented at trial – including evidence that “numerous individuals had warned [Global’s] management about Thach’s poor driving well before the accident,” Thach’s “own admission of excessive speed,” and Mr. Lewis’ eyewitness testimony of Thach’s driving at the time of the accident – was “more than sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of 60 percent negligence against Global.” Id. at 34, 37 (citing S.R.R. at 1275B- 1315B); 36-38 (citing S.R.R. at 162B, 343B, 472B, 469B, 525B, 546B, 552B); 40. Addressing the statements of non-testifying witnesses presented to the jury by way of the experts’ videotaped depositions, Plaintiffs contend that their experts were not “a mere mouthpiece for another witness’s narrative”; rather, - 15 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 “each applied specialized reasoning to a wide evidentiary record” and “any disputes about reliability or weight [of the experts’ testimony] were for the jury” to resolve. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 34-35. Plaintiffs describe Mr. Costanzo as having, reviewed the [] police [] report, crash-scene and vehicle photographs, . . . [the] deposition [of] the investigating officer who documented [Thach’]s post-crash statements, [Mr.] Lewis’[] eyewitness account, and []Thach’s own admissions. Based on this data, [Mr.] Costanzo opined that the crash was caused by driver error, specifically, by Thach’s careless operation of the van at an unsafe speed in extremely poor weather. Id. at 39. Plaintiffs describe Ms. Soto-Kent’s testimony as having demonstrated that Global [] was directly negligent in retaining [Thach as a] driver . . . [because] Global knew or should have known that [Thach] was unfit to operate a passenger vehicle, based on his poor driving record and repeated internal complaints. . . . This evidence [was] presented through the testimony of . . . expert Ms. [] Soto-Kent. * * * Ms. Soto Kent reviewed documentation regarding [Thach’s] driving history and workplace conduct, . . . internal complaint reports, and deposition testimony of Global employees . . . and synthesized them to conclude that Global’s retention of [Thach] was reckless and violated industry standards. * * * As expert [Ms.] Soto-Kent testified, employees [Mr.] White and [Mr.] Royal warned management that [Thach] was “dangerous,” “drove too fast,” and “fell asleep behind the wheel.” * * * Certified [Pennsylvania Department of Transportation] records . . . also confirmed [Thach’s] two prior speeding convictions . . . which Global either knew or should have known about. Ms. Soto- - 16 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Kent testified that a responsible staffing company would have immediately suspended or retrained a driver with that record. Id. at 42-44 (citing S.R.R. at 1275B-1315B, 569B-596B). In sum, Plaintiffs contend that their experts did not act as conduits for hearsay or merely repeat the statements of witnesses who did not testify. Instead, they used those statements, together with their own analysis of . . . [the] other materials, to form independent conclusions concerning liability and causation. The underlying information was not presented for its truth, but to explain the foundation of the experts’ opinions, as Rule 703 expressly permits. * * * Indeed, the [trial] court . . . advis[ed] the jury that such materials[, i.e., “inadmissible hearsay” from the deposition testimony of Global’s employees,] could be considered only to evaluate the basis for the expert’s opinions. Having done so, [the trial court] could not later nullify the verdict by treating the same reliance as inadmissible hearsay. * * * Here, the record contained overwhelming support for the jury’s verdict. [Thach] admitted to [Corporal] Tang that he was traveling “between 62 and 64 miles per hour” in heavy rain and that “if he had driven slower, he might not have lost control.” Eyewitness [Mr.] Lewis confirmed that the Global van passed him at a higher speed before veering off the highway. These facts alone supported the jury’s finding of negligence under respondeat superior. Id. at 39-40, 43, 45 (citing S.R.R. at 162B, 343B, 459-60B, 469B). Even “without relying on any challenged expert portions,” Plaintiffs argue that “a reasonable jury could find negligence.” Id. at 46. After excluding the disqualified statements of non-testifying witnesses, Plaintiffs contend that the totality of their remaining evidence – including Thach’s own - 17 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 admissions and Mr. Lewis’ eyewitness testimony – supported “the jury’s finding that [Thach] was negligent in operating the vehicle” and, therefore, also established Global’s liability because “once the servant is negligent within the scope of employment, the master is liable.” Id. at 36 (citation omitted). Ultimately, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly discredited the statements of non-testifying witnesses in the expert witnesses’ videotaped depositions and further erred when it excluded Thach’s admissions admitted via Corporal Tang’s testimony and mischaracterized Mr. Lewis’ testimony. Id. at 36-38. We will not disturb the grant or denial of JNOV unless we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law. See Dooner v. DiDonato, 971 A.2d 1187, 1193 (Pa. 2009). The disposition of a motion for JNOV is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review and plenary scope of review. See id. In reviewing JNOV, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder regarding questions of credibility and the weight of the evidence. See Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv., Inc., 94 A.3d 1057, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2014). A defendant is not entitled to JNOV “if any basis exists upon which the factfinder could properly base its award.” Id. at 1071, 1074 (citation omitted). That is, “JNOV should be entered only in a clear case.” Id. at 1071 (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 states, in relevant part: - 18 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 Rule 703. Bases of an Expert's Opinion Testimony An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. Comment: * * * When an expert testifies about the underlying facts and data that support the expert’s opinion and the evidence would be otherwise inadmissible, the trial judge upon request must, or on the judge’s own initiative may, instruct the jury to consider the facts and data only to explain the basis for the expert’s opinion, and not as substantive evidence. An expert witness cannot be a mere conduit for the opinion of another. An expert witness may not relate the opinion of a non- testifying expert unless the witness has reasonably relied upon it in forming the witness’s own opinion. See, e.g., Foster v. McKeesport Hospital, [] 394 A.2d 1031 ([Pa. Super.] 1978); Allen v. Kaplan, [] 653 A.2d 1249 ([Pa. Super.] 1995). Pa.R.E. 703. We also note that Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804 provides an exception to the rule against hearsay “when the declarant is unavailable as a witness” and that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020 sets forth the qualifying circumstances under which statements from a deposition may be introduced at trial. Pa.R.E. 804; see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 4020. Perhaps most relevantly, however, in Woodard v. Chatterjee, 827 A.2d 433, 444 (Pa. Super. 2003), this Court considered the question of whether the testimony of an expert witness “went beyond the fair scope of his - 19 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 report and/or . . . constituted inadmissible hearsay.” Woodard, 827 A.2d at 440. In applying Rule 703, Woodard explained that an ‘expert’ should not be permitted simply to repeat another’s opinion or data without bringing to bear on it his own expertise and judgment.” . . . In such a situation, the non-testifying expert is not on the witness stand and truly is unavailable for cross-examination. The applicability of the rule permitting experts to express opinions relying on extrajudicial data depends on the circumstances of the particular case and demands the exercise, like the admission of all expert testimony, of the sound discretion of the trial court. Where the expert uses several sources to arrive at his or her opinion, and has noted the reasonable and ordinary reliance on similar sources by experts in the field, and has coupled this reliance with personal observation, knowledge and experience, we conclude that the expert's testimony should be permitted. Id. at 444-45 (citation omitted and some formatting altered). The Woodard Court reviewed the testimony of a medical doctor admitted as the plaintiff’s expert witness and concluded that the expert’s testimony had included inadmissible hearsay statements that “merely parroted the findings and impressions of” other doctors. See id. at 445. While the defendant had cross- examined the plaintiff’s expert, because the defendant could not cross- examine the declarants themselves or take any other action to rebut the findings contained in the hearsay statements and, further, the jury did not have an opportunity to assess the credibility of the declarants, Woodard held that the defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the hearsay statements and reversed the order below. See id. The Woodard Court explained that permitting hearsay to be admitted under such circumstances would - 20 - J-S08041-26 J-S08042-26 J-S08043-26 “encourage[] litigants to violate these important evidentiary rules . . . [to] gain[] a tactical advantage through the element of surprise, thereby strippi