State v. Ruiz

No. 979 October 14, 2026 691 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVE AUSTIN RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant. Jefferson County Circuit Court 22CR13251; A185947 Annette C. Hillman, Judge. Submitted August 5, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Stacy M. Chaffin, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. POWERS, J. Affirmed. 692 State v. Ruiz POWERS, J. In this criminal appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his driving privileges after he pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree, ORS 163.125. Defendant contends that not only is “operation of a motor vehicle” a fact to be proved at trial and sentencing, but it also is an element of the offense such that the state must plead it in the charging instrument. As explained below, we conclude that the operation of a motor vehicle is not an element of second-degree manslaughter, that the lifetime revocation of driving privileges provided by ORS 809.235 does not define an offense separate from second-degree manslaughter, and that there is no pleading requirement for the fact of operation of a motor vehicle before imposing a revocation of driving privileges. In short, the operation of a motor vehicle is simply a fact to be proved to support the permanent revocation. Here, because it is undisputed that the state established that defendant’s conviction resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle, we conclude that the court did not err in imposing a permanent revocation under ORS 809.235. Accordingly, we affirm. The pertinent facts are undisputed and relatively few. Defendant drove at an excessive rate of speed and wrecked his car, causing the death of one of his passengers and injury to a second passenger. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree manslaughter, one count of third-degree assault, ORS 163.165, and one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010. At sentenc- ing, the parties agreed that the deceased and injured pas- sengers were in a car that defendant crashed while he was drunk and speeding. The state sought a lifetime revocation of defendant’s driving privileges under ORS 809.235(1)(a), which provides: “Notwithstanding ORS 809.409(2) [relating to relief from an administrative revocation of driving privileges], the court shall order that a person’s driving privileges be permanently revoked if the person is convicted of any degree of murder and the court finds that the person inten- tionally used a motor vehicle as a dangerous weapon result- ing in the death of the victim, or if the person is convicted of Cite as 353 Or App 691 (2026) 693 aggravated vehicular homicide, manslaughter in the first or second degree resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, criminally negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle or assault in the first degree resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.” Defendant objected, arguing that, because the indictment had not pleaded that the offense resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle, he could not be subject to the permanent revocation provided by ORS 809.235. The trial court acknowledged that the charging instrument had not pleaded operation of a motor vehicle but nonetheless imposed the lifetime revocation, explaining: “Despite how it’s pled, this did involve the operation of a motor vehicle and your license is permanently suspended. You lost the privilege to drive.” Defendant timely appeals. On appeal, defendant argues that the fact of “oper- ation of a motor vehicle” is not merely a fact to be proved at trial or sentencing but an element of the offense that the state must plead in the charging instrument. And, although it is undisputed that defendant’s operation of a vehicle caused the death that resulted in his manslaughter conviction, defendant contends that—absent an allegation in the charging instrument—he was not “convicted of * * * manslaughter in the first or second degree resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.” Thus, he contends that he should not suffer the enhanced penalty of permanent revo- cation of his driving privileges. The state responds that ORS 809.235(1)(a) does not define a separate offense that must be pleaded; rather, in the state’s view, it describes a non-element fact that the court can find in imposing a sentence. The state contends that, because the court found that defendant’s manslaughter con- viction resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle, the court was required by ORS 809.235 to revoke defendant’s driving privileges. The parties’ arguments present a question of statu- tory construction, viz., to impose a permanent revocation of driving privileges under ORS 809.235, is it necessary for a 694 State v. Ruiz charging instrument to have alleged, and a person to have been convicted of, manslaughter “resulting from the opera- tion of a motor vehicle”? To answer that question, we begin by turning to the familiar framework of statutory interpre- tation discussed in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), to ascertain the legislature’s intent. We begin with the statutory text. See DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745, 380 P3d 270 (2016) (noting the importance of paying careful attention to the “exact word- ing of the statute” because “only that wording received the consideration and approval of a majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly”). As noted above, ORS 809.235 requires a court to order a person’s driving privileges to be permanently revoked “if the person is convicted of * * * man- slaughter in the first or second degree resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, criminally negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle or assault in the first degree resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.” As relevant here, ORS 163.005 defines “criminal homicide”: “(1) A person commits criminal homicide if, without justification or excuse, the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of another human being. “(2) ‘Criminal homicide’ is murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or aggravated vehicular homicide.” ORS 163.125, in turn, defines the offense of manslaughter in the second degree: “(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter in the second degree when: “(a) It is committed recklessly[.]” Thus, a person commits second-degree manslaughter—a form of criminal homicide—if, without justification, the per- son recklessly causes the death of another person. There is no reference to the operation of a motor vehicle; thus, it would appear that the operation of a motor vehicle is not an element of the offense. Cite as 353 Or App 691 (2026) 695 In State v. Morales, 326 Or App 177, 181, 530 P3d 932, rev den, 371 Or 509 (2023), we noted that a material ele- ment of a criminal offense “refers to any fact that the state must prove to convict a defendant.” See also State v. Vasquez- Rubio, 323 Or 275, 279, 917 P2d 494 (1996) (explaining that an element of a crime exists when the fact to be proved is a “necessary ingredient” to the definition of the offense as enacted by the legislature (quoting State v. Tamler & Polly, 19 Or 528, 530, 25 P 71 (1890))). Indeed, the legislature knows how to define the factual elements in an offense, and it does so explicitly, by identifying the facts that must be proven as elements of the crime. For example, ORS 161.610(2) provides that “[t]he use or threatened use of a firearm, whether operable or inoperable, by a defendant during the commission of a felony may be pleaded in the accusatory instrument and proved at trial as an element in aggravation of the crime[.]” See State v. Mickels, 330 Or App 633, 637, 544 P3d 446 (2024) (con- cluding that a plain reading of ORS 161.610(2) “is that the conduct at issue is an element—which suggests that ‘use or threatened use of a firearm’ is an element of a new, aggra- vated crime” (emphasis omitted)). The statutory definitions that define criminal homicide and manslaughter in the sec- ond degree make no reference to the operation of a motor vehicle, and the operation of a motor vehicle is not a fact that the state is required to prove to convict a person of man- slaughter. Thus, the operation of a motor vehicle is not an element of the offense as defined in ORS 163.125. Additionally, there is no textual support for defen- dant’s argument that ORS 809.235 defines a separate offense of manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle. The statute does not provide that it is defining an offense of manslaughter or place a manslaughter result- ing from the operation of a motor vehicle within the context of other criminal homicide offenses. We have reviewed the legislative history of ORS 809.235 and conclude that it does not reflect an intention to create a separate offense of man- slaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle. The offense of manslaughter in the second degree is estab- lished by proof that the person recklessly caused the death 696 State v. Ruiz of another person. ORS 163.125. Accordingly, the fact of operation of a motor vehicle is not an element to be proved to convict a person of second-degree manslaughter. Defendant nonetheless contends that ORS 809.235 requires the state to plead that the manslaughter resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle if a person is to be subject to a permanent revocation of driving privileges. In light of our conclusions that the operation of a motor vehi- cle is not an element of the offense defined in ORS 163.125 and that ORS 809.235 does not define an offense separate from manslaughter in the second degree as defined in ORS 163.125, we conclude that there is no pleading requirement for the fact of operation of a motor vehicle. Thus, to return to the question posed by the parties’ arguments, it is not necessary for a charging instrument to have alleged, and a person to have been convicted of, manslaughter “resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle” before a trial court imposes a permanent revocation of driving privileges under ORS 809.235. Accordingly, the operation of a motor vehi- cle is simply a fact to be proved to support the permanent revocation. The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hamann, 363 Or 264, 422 P3d 193 (2018), in which the court deter- mined that the revocation of driving privileges under ORS 809.235 is a civil disability and not an enhancement of pun- ishment, supports our conclusion. In that case, the court considered whether the revocation of the defendant’s driv- ing privileges under ORS 809.235, based on an uncounseled guilty plea to a third driving-under-the-influence convic- tion, offended the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 268. The court noted that the defen- dant’s uncounseled conviction itself certainly violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. The court explained, however, that unconstitutional convictions are not invalid for all purposes. Id. The analysis of whether the imposition of the permanent revocation violated the Sixth Amendment, the court observed, “boils down to whether the revocation of driving privileges is essentially a ‘civil disability’ * * * which the state urges, or a punishment enhancement * * * which defendant urges.” Id. at 269. The court’s study of the case Cite as 353 Or App 691 (2026) 697 law under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution led the court to conclude that, in determining whether a revocation is a civil disabil- ity or a punishment enhancement, the court should apply a two-part intent-effects test: “First, did the legislature intend for a particular result to be civil or criminal? Second, if the legislature intended to create a civil penalty, is the effect nonetheless so punitive as to negate that intention?” Id. at 270. In making that determination, the court explained that it would apply the “seven-factor” test first described by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-69, 83 S Ct 554, 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963): “The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it was historically regarded as punishment; (3) whether it requires a finding of scienter; (4) whether it serves the traditional aims of punishment; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether there is a rational non-punitive purpose; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168-69.” Hamann, 363 Or at 270-71. After analyzing the statutory text and the legisla- tive history of ORS 809.235, the court concluded that the legislature “intended the permanent driving privilege revo- cation to be a civil, remedial sanction, aimed at safeguard- ing public safety.” Id. at 271. The court explained that it was persuaded by the statutory text and the legislative history that the legislature’s primary motivation for the provision was the protection of the public and not punishment of the offender. Id. at 272-75. As to the “effect” component of the two-part test, the court acknowledged the difficult effect of a “permanent” revocation but concluded that the difficulty did not outweigh the legislature’s remedial purpose of protection of the public. Id. at 275. The court noted that the revocation required by ORS 809.235 is not truly “permanent,” because, under ORS 809.235(4), “[e]ven a ‘permanent’ revocation is not entirely 698 State v. Ruiz permanent if the court determines that a particular per- son has successfully effected long-term behavioral changes and can once again be allowed driving privileges without posing a significant danger to society.” Id. In applying the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the court concluded that the defendant had not presented proof of a punitive effect that overcame the legislature’s remedial intent. Id. at 278. Notably, the court concluded that, because the revo- cation of driving privileges provided by ORS 809.235 is a civil disability and not an enhancement of punishment, the defendant’s uncounseled conviction could be used to support the permanent revocation of his driving privileges. Id. at 281. The court thus held that the defendant’s uncounseled conviction, even one in violation of the Sixth Amendment, could nonetheless support a revocation under ORS 809.235, because the revocation is a remedial “civil disability” and not punishment. Id. at 281-82. The Supreme Court’s holding in Hamann that the permanent revocation is a civil penalty and not punishment lends support to our conclusion that the fact of the operation of a motor vehicle is not an element of the manslaughter offense that must be alleged in the charging instrument, nor is it a fact that must be pleaded in order for the provi- sions of ORS 809.235 to apply. It is simply a fact to be proved to the court at sentencing. The requirement for a permanent revocation applies if the court finds that the person’s man- slaughter offense is one that “result[ed] from the operation of a motor vehicle.” ORS 809.235. Here, it is undisputed that the state established that defendant’s conviction resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle. Accordingly, the sen- tencing court did not err in imposing a permanent revoca- tion of defendant’s driving privileges as required by ORS 809.235. Affirmed.