State v. Kuneki

666 October 14, 2026 No. 976 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LEON JAMIE KUNEKI, Defendant-Appellant. Hood River County Circuit Court 23CR32201; A185590 Karen Ostrye, Judge. Submitted April 14, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Attorney General, and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, O’Connor, Judge, and Walters, Senior Judge. SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. Cite as 353 Or App 666 (2026) 667 SHORR, P. J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010. Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered after police conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle. The state con- tends that the warrantless search was permissible under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. We conclude that the warrantless search was justified under the emergency aid exception, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion. Therefore, we affirm. We are bound by the trial court’s findings of his- torical fact that are supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). Further, “[i]n the absence of express factual findings, we presume that the trial court decided the disputed facts in keeping with its ultimate conclusion.” State v. Garcia, 276 Or App 838, 839, 370 P3d 512 (2016). With that standard of review in mind, we state the following facts. Tracy Miller worked as a pizza delivery driver in Hood River. On the evening of June 22, 2023, Miller arrived at work and observed a car parked halfway in a handicap spot with defendant in the driver’s seat. After completing a few deliveries, Miller noticed that the car was pressed up against the handicap sign, fully in the parking space. Miller completed a couple more deliveries and then went to check on defendant, who was passed out and slumped over in the vehicle. Miller observed that the vehicle was still running and in drive. Miller shook defendant and asked if he was okay. After defendant did not respond, Miller went back inside and called 9-1-1. Hood River County Deputy Sheriff Jubitz and Hood River Police Officer Wilson responded to the call from Miller, which reported that an individual was passed out in the driver seat of his car in a slumped over position. On the scene, the officers attempted to wake defen- dant for more than three minutes by raising their voices, knocking on the car, and shaking his shoulder. Defendant remained unresponsive, and the officers suspected that he was either intoxicated or experiencing a drug or alcohol overdose, stroke, diabetic coma, or dehydration. 668 State v. Kuneki Jubitz told Wilson that he could see a firearm under defendant in the vehicle. The officers acknowledged to one another that they knew that the emergency medical services (EMS) personnel would not render aid to defendant with the car running and in drive, or with the firearm located where it was. Wilson reached through the open window to turn the vehicle off and put it in park. Wilson then lifted defendant up while Jubitz opened the passenger door and removed the firearm. After securing the vehicle and visible firearm, Wilson called for medical assistance, then opened the driver’s door to check for any other weapons. At that point, defendant started waking up and Wilson began ask- ing him questions and asked him to step out of the vehicle. After defendant was standing outside the vehicle, the officers identified him and asked him further ques- tions. EMS personnel arrived and checked on defendant but determined that there was no reason to transport him to the hospital. Wilson then asked defendant about whether he was impaired, and defendant agreed to perform some field sobriety tests. Wilson then arrested defendant for DUII and transported him to the sheriff’s office, where defendant took a breath test for alcohol. Based on the field sobriety tests, oral statements to the officers, and a breath sample, the state charged defen- dant with DUII. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence and statements made by defendant that flowed from the offi- cers reaching into his car, touching him, and opening the car doors. At the suppression hearing, Wilson and Jubitz tes- tified that they suspected defendant was intoxicated but were also concerned that he was suffering some type of medical emergency. Based on their testimony and the body camera footage, the state argued against suppression of the evidence because the officers’ search was permissible under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. In response, defendant argued, as he does on appeal, that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that defen- dant required emergency aid. The trial court agreed with the state and denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Cite as 353 Or App 666 (2026) 669 Defendant then pleaded guilty to one count of DUII, reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. See ORS 135.335(3) (providing for conditional pleas). This appeal followed. Before us, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. Defendant asserts that the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the emergency aid exception applied in this case. The state disagrees, arguing that the trial court was correct in concluding that the emergency aid exception applied. As noted, we agree with the state and, accordingly, affirm. We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress for errors of law. Ehly, 317 Or at 75. “Under Article I, section 9, [of the Oregon Constitution] warrantless entries and searches of premises are per se unreasonable unless falling within one of the few ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant require- ment.” State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 647, 260 P3d 476 (2011) (quoting State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237, 666 P2d 802 (1983)). That warrant requirement also applies to vehicles. State v. Rhodes, 315 Or 191, 197, 843 P2d 927 (1992). One such exception to the warrant requirement is the emergency aid exception: “[A]n emergency aid exception to the Article I, section 9, warrant requirement is justified when police officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that a warrantless entry is necessary to either render immediate aid to persons, or to assist persons who have suffered, or who are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.” Baker, 350 Or at 649 (footnotes omitted). To satisfy the emergency aid exception, the state must prove that, at the time of the warrantless search, the searching officers had the subjective belief “that there was an immediate need to aid or assist a person who has suffered (or is imminently threatened with suffering) serious physical injury or harm” and that that “belief [was] objectively reasonable.” State v. McCullough, 264 Or App 496, 502-03, 334 P3d 973 (2014). Determining an officer’s subjective belief is a ques- tion of fact. State v. McDonald, 168 Or App 452, 459, 7 P3d 670 State v. Kuneki 617, rev den, 331 Or 193 (2000). As noted above, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if evidence in the record supports them. Ehly, 317 Or at 75. Typically, that belief requires “some articulable facts establishing a threat to a particular person.” State v. Hood, 344 Or App 491, 494, 581 P3d 468 (2025). In this case, the trial court ruled that the “officers suspected that defendant was intoxicated” but that his con- dition “could have also been the result of drug or alcohol overdose, stroke, diabetic coma, or dehydration.” That find- ing is supported by sufficient evidence in the record from, among other things, Miller’s initial 9-1-1 report, the officers’ sworn testimony, and the bodycam footage that confirmed Miller’s report and added further details. Together, there was evidence that demonstrated that defendant had been entirely unconscious and slumped over in his vehicle while Miller and then the officers made numerous attempts to wake him. Determining “[w]hether an officer’s perceptions of an emergency are objectively reasonable is a question of law.” State v. Wood, 210 Or App 126, 130, 149 P3d 1265 (2006). As noted, to satisfy that test, the officer’s subjective belief that an individual requires emergency aid must also be supported by “articulable facts, that a warrantless entry is necessary to either render immediate aid” or to assist some- one who has suffered, or who is imminently threatened with suffering, “serious physical injury or harm.” Baker, 350 Or at 649. We have upheld warrantless searches and seizures in numerous situations where the officer had a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that it was necessary to render emergency aid. See id. at 650-51 (officers could enter home without warrant to render aid where they received a coded message in a 9-1-1 call that suggested someone may be in danger, were aware that a child was in the home, and arrived at the house to hear yelling and screaming); Hood, 344 Or App at 494-95 (after receiving a report of a residential fire, officers were justified under the emergency aid exception in entering the building to see if people were inside); State v. Schmitz, 299 Or App 170, 176, 448 P3d 699 (2019) (officer’s observation of the defendant convulsing Cite as 353 Or App 666 (2026) 671 supported an objectively reasonable belief that immediate aid was needed); McDonald, 168 Or App at 459-60 (conclud- ing that an apparent drug overdose justified searching the area for drugs to determine what had been consumed). This case presents a scenario where the officers’ entry into the vehicle was objectively reasonable because defendant was slumped over the wheel of a running vehi- cle that was in drive and wedged against a signpost. The caller and police both attempted numerous times to wake defendant unsuccessfully, which indicated there could be the need for emergency aid. Retrieving the firearm, putting the car in park, and attempting to shake defendant awake, were all actions that were partially motivated by a suspicion of intoxication, but were also in pursuit of attempting to pro- vide emergency aid. We need not decide if each of those facts, standing alone, would have justified a warrantless entry. Together they support the officers’ reasonable belief that defendant was in physical danger and in need of help. Presented with that scenario, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe, “based on articulable facts, that a warrantless entry [was] necessary to either render immediate aid to persons, or to assist persons who have suffered, or who are immi- nently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.” Baker, 350 Or at 481. Indeed, whether the cause of defendant’s unconsciousness was alcohol intoxication, a drug overdose, or another medical condition, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to render aid. For all the reasons above, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that the entry here was justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. Affirmed.