Full Opinion

No. 931 October 7, 2026 473 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALFREDO SUAREZ-MENDEZ, Defendant-Respondent. Marion County Circuit Court 24CR38592; A186712 J. Channing Bennett, Judge. Argued and submitted July 29, 2026. Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the opening brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. On the reply brief was Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Anna Johnson, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* AOYAGI, P. J. Reversed and remanded. ______________ * Lagesen, Chief Judge, vice Pagán, Judge. 474 State v. Suarez-Mendez Cite as 353 Or App 473 (2026) 475 AOYAGI, P. J. The state appeals an order granting the suppression of evidence. Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation. The stop quickly turned into an investigation for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, the offense with which defendant was ultimately charged. The court ruled pretrial that it would suppress the “entirety of the stop.” The state challenges that ruling as legally erroneous. For the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand. BACKGROUND At the suppression hearing, the officer who stopped defendant testified as follows, and his body camera record- ing of the stop itself was admitted into evidence. The officer saw defendant driving very slowly, stop- ping in the middle of the road, swerving, and turning with- out signaling. He turned on his lights to initiate a traffic stop. Defendant continued driving for approximately 100 feet before turning into an alley and stopping. Defendant immediately exited his car and approached the patrol car, despite the officer ordering him to stop and stay in his car. Upon seeing defendant, the officer recognized him as a person whom he had seen publicly drinking alcohol about 15 minutes earlier. The officer perceived multiple signs of intoxication. The officer, who is a native Spanish speaker, proceeded to question defendant in Spanish. Defendant responded in Spanish. No translation was offered into evi- dence, but, according to the officer, defendant admitted to drinking three 12-ounce beers before driving, and he agreed to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs). Defendant was unable to finish the first FST, performed poorly on the sec- ond, and resisted performing the third. At that point, the officer arrested defendant for DUII and took him to the sta- tion. The officer obtained a warrant for a blood draw, which revealed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Defendant was charged with DUII. He moved to suppress evidence on the bases that (1) he was interro- gated during the stop in compelling circumstances without Miranda warnings; (2) the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for DUII; and (3) the officer failed to read the 476 State v. Suarez-Mendez implied-consent form at the station. The state opposed the motion and countered each argument. At the suppression hearing, the parties maintained their positions. As part of his arguments, defendant pointed to perceived flaws in the officer’s administration of the FSTs and suggested that defendant’s performance on the FSTs therefore should not be viewed as contributing to probable cause. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. In doing so, it did not address defendant’s Miranda argument or his argument regarding the implied-consent form. It instead explained its ruling as follows: “Okay, well, I heard the testimony of the officer, I’ve read both your memos, I’ve watched portions of the video as pre- sented by counsel and the officer certainly had reasonable suspicion to make a stop for traffic violations and conduct an investigation.[1] However, the officer conducted a very sloppy investigation; did not comport with any of the stan- dards for administering field sobriety tests or other things. I mean, * * * it’s not uncommon in cases that make it to the Court, or charges where field sobriety tests are terminated due to inability or refusal to comply. There’s a procedure for dealing with that which is not present here and so, I would say that the entirety of the stop is suppressed.” The court subsequently entered an order stating, “The entirety of the stop is suppressed.” The state requested clarification of the court’s rea- soning. The trial court declined to clarify its ruling. ANALYSIS We review a suppression ruling for legal error. State v. Hill, 347 Or App 18, 20, 585 P3d 1127, rev den, 375 Or 497 (2026). In doing so, we are bound by the trial court’s explicit and implicit findings of historical fact if supported by evi- dence. Id. We begin with the scope of the issue on appeal. In its opening brief, the state expresses uncertainty about 1 We understand the trial court to have meant that the officer had probable cause to stop defendant for a traffic violation and then developed reasonable sus- picion for a DUII investigation. Although the court slightly misspoke, neither of those points was in dispute, and the parties have treated the statement in the same way that we do. Cite as 353 Or App 473 (2026) 477 the trial court’s rationale for granting defendant’s motion to suppress and addresses all three bases argued in defen- dant’s motion. We ultimately share defendant’s understand- ing, however, that although the trial court did not explicitly refer to “probable cause” in explaining its ruling, the trial court granted suppression based on a lack of probable cause (the second basis for the motion), without reaching either the alleged Miranda violation or the implied-consent issue (the first and third bases for the motion). Because the trial court did not reach the other bases, and because defendant does not argue them as alternative bases to affirm, we do not address them, leaving them to be considered on remand.2 We address only whether it was error to grant suppression based on a lack of probable cause. In doing so, we divide the suppressed evidence into three parts, in line with how the parties have argued the appeal: evidence obtained prior to administration of the FSTs, the FST evidence, and post- arrest evidence. With respect to evidence obtained prior to adminis- tration of the FSTs, the parties essentially agree that such evidence could not be suppressed based on a lack of probable cause. The only argued basis for suppression that would sup- port suppressing the pre-FST evidence is a Miranda viola- tion at the very beginning of the stop, something that every- one agrees was not found. Rather than defend suppression of the pre-FST evidence, defendant argues that we should interpret the trial court’s ruling as suppressing only the FST and post-arrest evidence. We are unable to reconcile that approach with what the court said. The order states that “[t] he entirety of the stop is suppressed.” We see no way to read that as meaning anything less than all of the evidence from the traffic stop, including the pre-FST evidence. It was error to suppress evidence obtained prior to the administration of FSTs, in the course of an investigation that the trial court itself described as supported by reasonable suspicion, on the basis that probable cause did not exist. See State v. Hall, 339 2 Regarding the Miranda issue, we note that the Supreme Court recently granted review in State v. Moran, 349 Or App 181 (2026) (nonprecedential mem- orandum opinion), rev allowed, 375 Or 579 (Sept 24, 2026), a case that presents issues as to when Miranda warnings should be required to question drivers about DUII during routine traffic stops. 478 State v. Suarez-Mendez Or 7, 24, 115 P3d 908 (2005) (suppression is limited to evi- dence obtained “as a result of a violation” of the defendant’s constitutional rights). We next consider suppression of the FST evidence. The trial court found—apparently based on its own knowl- edge of FST administration—that the FSTs “did not comport with any of the standards for administering [FSTs].” We do not understand defendant to have sought suppression of the FST evidence based on how the FSTs were administered. Moreover, to the extent the trial court sua sponte suppressed the FST evidence based on poor administration, defendant does not defend its doing so, nor do we see how poor FST administration would amount to a constitutional violation requiring suppression of the FST evidence. Defendant sug- gests an alternative explanation for suppression of the FST evidence—that the trial court might have disbelieved the officer’s testimony that defendant consented to perform FSTs, given the lack of an English-translated transcription of the officer’s request and defendant’s response, and found that probable cause did not exist to justify the FSTs under the exigent-circumstances warrant exception. But defen- dant never argued that the court should disbelieve the offi- cer’s testimony on that point, nor did the court suggest that it disbelieved that testimony. We understand the court to have suppressed the FST evidence based on poor adminis- tration, which was legally erroneous. We lastly consider the post-arrest evidence, includ- ing defendant’s blood-test results. The state argues that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUII before administering the FSTs, such that it was error to suppress the post-arrest evidence based on lack of probable cause for arrest, even assuming that the trial court viewed defendant’s FST performance as contributing nothing to probable cause due to the FSTs being poorly administered. Defendant counters that the trial court did not err, because, if one assumes various factual findings favorable to defen- dant, it was legally correct to conclude that probable cause did not exist. Under the standard of review, we “presume that a trial court implicitly resolves factual disputes consistently Cite as 353 Or App 473 (2026) 479 with its ultimate conclusion.” Pereida-Alba v. Coursey, 356 Or 654, 670-71, 342 P3d 70 (2015). “That presumption has its limits, however[,]” and “does not apply” unless a finding was “necessary” to the conclusion. Id. at 671. “[W]e attribute a finding of fact only where ‘we can deduce that the trial court’s chain of reasoning must necessarily have included that fact as one of its links.’ ” State v. Kamph, 297 Or App 687, 697, 442 P3d 1129 (2019) (quoting State v. Lunacolorado, 238 Or App 691, 696, 243 P3d 125 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 530 (2011)). Here, defendant asks us to imply certain find- ings that by all indications the trial court did not make. Moreover, the errors in the trial court’s reasoning that we have already identified undermine our ability to identify its chain of reasoning and thus discern its implied findings. Under the circumstances, we decline to assume the series of implicit findings that would be necessary for us to affirm the suppression of the post-arrest evidence while reversing the suppression of the pre-FST and FST evidence. The bet- ter course is to simply reverse the suppression ruling as a whole—that is, the ruling suppressing all evidence from the stop—and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.