State v. Garcia-Rivera

464 October 7, 2026 No. 929 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSE GUSTAVO GARCIA-RIVERA, Defendant-Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 23CR26213; A186299 Jodie A. Bureta, Judge. Submitted September 8, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. Cite as 353 Or App 464 (2026) 465 AOYAGI, P. J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of second-degree murder with a firearm, ORS 163.115 and 161.610 (Count 1), and two counts of recklessly endan- gering another person, ORS 163.195 (Counts 2 and 3). He raises three assignments of error on appeal, all of which raise the same legal issue, which is whether the trial court should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquit- tal as to each count based on the state’s failure to produce evidence sufficient to prove territorial jurisdiction. That is, defendant argues that, on this trial record, a factfinder could not find that the charged crimes took place in Oregon. The state counters that the evidence was sufficient to prove that they took place in Oregon. Alternatively, the state asks that we take judicial notice that Woodburn—where the crimes occurred—lies entirely within the state of Oregon. We agree that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the crimes occurred in Oregon and affirm on that basis, without reach- ing the alternative request for judicial notice. The state’s authority to criminalize conduct or the results of conduct is generally bounded by its territorial jurisdiction. For the state to enforce a criminal law, the con- duct or the result of conduct must have occurred within the state. See ORS 131.205 - 131.235 (defining Oregon’s territo- rial jurisdiction); State v. Williams, 326 Or App 64, 74-76, 530 P3d 919 (2023) (discussing territorial jurisdiction at some length). Whether a crime took place in Oregon “pres- ents a factual issue that implicates a legal question of sub- ject matter jurisdiction.” State v. Marlin, 352 Or App 453, 457, ___ P3d ___ (2026). We review a trial court’s determi- nation of territorial jurisdiction, which is a type of subject matter jurisdiction, for errors of law. Id. In doing so, “we view the underlying evidence” in the entire record “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether that evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it,” was sufficient for the trial court to determine that it had territorial jurisdiction. Id. Here, a Marion County grand jury issued an indict- ment charging defendant with murder and other crimes, based on defendant shooting and killing his brother-in-law 466 State v. Garcia-Rivera when they encountered each other in a Mega Foods store in Woodburn. The charges were tried to a jury in the Marion County Circuit Court. There was evidence at trial that defendant shopped at a Safeway store located in Woodburn, Oregon; that defendant arrived at the Mega Foods within five minutes of leaving the Safeway; and that the Mega Foods is located in Woodburn. Defendant acknowledges that evidence but argues that it was insufficient to prove territo- rial jurisdiction, because “the evidence did not show that all of Woodburn [i]s in Oregon, or where Woodburn [i]s in rela- tion to Oregon’s borders, and the court did not take judicial notice of those putative facts.” He posits that, absent such evidence or the taking of judicial notice, it is possible that Woodburn lies partially in another state and that the Mega Foods is located in the theoretical out-of-state Woodburn. The dispositive issue on appeal reduces to whether a factfinder could reasonably infer from the evidence in the record that the Mega Foods store where the crimes took place is located in Oregon. Generally speaking, “whether circum- stantial evidence is sufficient to support a given inference is a question of law.” State v. Simmons, 321 Or App 478, 483, 516 P3d 1203 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 740 (2023). “Reasonable inferences are permissible; speculation and guesswork are not.” State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460, 467, 83 P3d 379 (2004). An inference is too speculative if it “requires too great an inferential leap—that is, when the logic is too strained”— or if it “requires the stacking of inferences to the point of speculation.” Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, an inference is reasonable if a logical probabil- ity reasonably follows from certain facts. State v. Campbell, 348 Or App 306, 310-11, 590 P3d 612 (2026). “The question is only whether the factfinder reasonably could infer that a particular fact flows from other proven facts, not whether the inference necessarily flows from the proven facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Inferences do not have to take the form of a syllogism, and factfinders may rely on common sense and experience, or common knowledge, in making them. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see, e.g., Marlin, 352 Or App at 460-61 (consider- ing what Douglas County jurors would have understood “Tri City” to mean, as relevant to whether they could reasonably Cite as 353 Or App 464 (2026) 467 infer from its distance to Tri City that a particular bank was in Oregon). In this case, the state points to various evidence in the record as supporting a reasonable inference that the Mega Foods store is located in Woodburn, Oregon, not some theoretical Woodburn, California, or the like. That evi- dence includes that the Mega Foods store is located at “1542 Mount Hood Avenue in Woodburn in Marion County”; that the Mega Foods store is located within a five-minute drive of a Safeway store in Woodburn, Oregon; that the register at the Mega Foods store had an official-looking State of Oregon sticker; that there were two Oregon Lottery machines inside the Mega Foods store; that the Mega Foods store advertised its use of an armored car service based in Portland, Oregon; that vehicles in the parking lot at the time of the shooting had Oregon plates; that police officers from the Woodburn Police Department responded to the 9-1-1 call in patrol cars with Oregon plates; that the victim was carrying an Oregon license with an address in Woodburn, Oregon; and that the autopsy was performed by the Chief Medical Examiner for the Oregon State Medical Examiner’s Office. Moreover, for the jurors, who were necessarily residents of Marion County, it would be common knowledge that Woodburn and Marion County lie entirely within the state of Oregon and are nowhere near a state border. Assuming without deciding that the standard of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that the crimes occurred in Oregon.1 1 We note that it is an open question what standard of proof applies. Defendant argues that the state had to prove territorial jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the state notes the open question and describes other states as split between the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and the preponderance- of-the-evidence standard. Because we agree with the state that either standard is met here, we need not decide in this case which standard should be adopted. We also express no opinion on what, if anything, should have happened after the denial of defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. Existing case law establishes that a criminal defendant can challenge territorial jurisdiction by moving to dismiss, Williams, 326 Or App at 66, or by moving for a judgment of acquittal, Marlin, 352 Or App at 454, in which case, at a minimum, the state must put forth facts (or request judicial notice of facts) sufficient to prove territo- rial jurisdiction. We have also said, however, that territorial jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. Williams, 326 Or App at 77. Here, defendant assigns error only to the denial of his motion for a judg- ment of acquittal, so we confine our analysis to the sufficiency of the evidence of 468 State v. Garcia-Rivera The trial court did not err when it denied the motions for a judgment of acquittal. Affirmed. territorial jurisdiction. We observe that that ruling appears to have been the end of the matter—the jury was not asked to make any findings relating to territorial jurisdiction, nor did the trial court address it again.