Dept. of Human Services v. N. M. / J. M.

No. 982 October 14, 2026 713 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of N. M., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. N. M., J. L. M., aka J. P.-S., and C. E. M., aka C. C.-H., Appellants. Marion County Circuit Court 25JU04373; A189788 (Control), A189834, A189856 In the Matter of J. M., a Child, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. M., J. L. M., aka J. P.-S., and C. E. M., aka C. C.-H., Appellants. Marion County Circuit Court 25JU04374; A189816, A189837, A189887 Tiffany Underwood, Judge. Submitted August 19, 2026. Ginger Fitch and Youth, Rights & Justice filed the brief for appellant J. M. G. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant N. M. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, and Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant J. L. M. 714 Dept. of Human Services v. N. M. / J. M. George W. Kelly filed the brief for appellant C. E. M. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. Cite as 353 Or App 713 (2026) 715 HELLMAN, J. In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, mother, father, and their two children (J and N) appeal a juvenile court’s judgments taking jurisdiction over J and N. On appeal, the family collectively challenges each individ- ual basis on which the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over each child, all of which related to domes- tic violence by father. The family also contests the juvenile court’s ultimate ruling to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children because, it argues, the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) failed to produce legally suffi- cient evidence of a nonspeculative risk of serious harm to J and N.1 Among other things, the family emphasizes that, at the jurisdiction trial, each family member testified that no domestic violence was occurring in the home. We affirm. After holding a trial, the juvenile court took juris- diction over J and N on the following three bases that ODHS alleged in the petition: • “The mother was subjected to domestic violence by the father and mother is unable to protect the child[ren] from exposure to this violence.” (4A) • “The father has engaged in a pattern of violence with the child[ren]’s mother, he has not successfully engaged in treatment for his conduct/address[ed] his violen[t] behavior/ameliorated this conduct and he is currently in an intimate relationship with the child[ren]’s mother, placing the child[ren] at risk of being exposed to this type of violence.” (4C) • “The child[ren] ha[ve] been exposed to domestic violence by the father, placing the child[ren] at risk of harm.” (4E) Although the jurisdictional bases are written in terms of exposure to domestic violence, we have held that a child’s “exposure to domestic violence does not necessarily create a risk of serious loss or injury to a child sufficient to warrant juvenile court intervention.” Dept. of Human 1 J also raises two unpreserved arguments regarding the admissibility of witness testimony. We conclude that J did not establish that any error was plain and do not consider the arguments further. See ORAP 5.45(1) (appellate court has discretion to consider a plain error); State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629-31, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (explaining qualifications for plain error). 716 Dept. of Human Services v. N. M. / J. M. Services v. D. W. M., 296 Or App 109, 121, 437 P3d 1186 (2019) (emphasis added). Instead, the juvenile court is autho- rized to assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when the child’s condition or circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that is reasonably likely to be realized. ORS 419B.100(1)(c); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). The petitioner, here ODHS, bears the burden of proof. A. L., 268 Or App at 397. That burden includes demonstrating a nonspeculative nexus between the “child’s allegedly risk- causing conditions or circumstances,” and a “threat of harm to the child of the type, degree, and duration as to justify juvenile court intervention into the constitutionally pro- tected family sphere.” Dept. of Human Services v. A. T., 349 Or App 399, 404, 592 P3d 998 (2026). Proof of harm or risk at some point in the past is insufficient; the threat must be current at the time of trial. State v. S. T. S., 236 Or App 646, 654, 238 P3d 53 (2010). And evidence about general risks from exposure to domestic violence is insufficient; instead, the record must contain specific evidence of the risk of harm to the children involved in the case. Dept. of Human Services v. J. C. R.-W., 352 Or App 297, 305-07, __ P3d __ (2026). Under our caselaw, ODHS thus had the burden to prove that the exposure to domestic violence created a non- speculative risk of serious harm to J and N. To determine whether the juvenile court erred in taking jurisdiction over J and N, we “view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018). In doing so, we assume the correctness of the juve- nile court’s express and necessarily implied factual findings, if supported by any evidence in the record. Dept. of Human Services v. T. N. M., 315 Or App 160, 162, 501 P3d 76 (2021).2 2 We decline mother’s request for discretionary de novo review. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (providing for discretionary de novo review of certain actions). This is not an “exceptional case” warranting such. See ORAP 5.40(8)(c); see also Dept. of Human Services v. T. H., 313 Or App 560, 562, 496 P3d 704 (2021), rev den, 368 Or 637 (2021) (explaining the reasons for not exercising de novo review). Cite as 353 Or App 713 (2026) 717 A detailed recitation of the factual record would not benefit the parties and is unnecessary for the bench and bar. For purposes of our holding, it is sufficient to explain that the record contains evidence of father’s multiple decades of domestic abuse against mother, which encompassed regular physical violence (including strangulation) and severely con- trolling conduct. The record further includes testimony from both an ODHS caseworker and an ODHS domestic violence intervention coordinator about the general risks of harm to children who are exposed to domestic violence, including risks of harm to psychological functioning, physical health, the ability to form healthy relationships, and physical injury. The record also contains evidence about the specific risk of harm to J and N from father’s abuse of mother. N and J told third parties (including a teacher, an ODHS case- worker, and a police officer) about the abuse that they had witnessed, including father pinning mother to a wall, throw- ing her to the ground, and beating her, in addition to moth- er’s recurring bruising and black eyes. J also witnessed an incident where father had his hands around mother’s throat as she stood on her tiptoes. Both children feared father. And both children stated that father was physically violent with J. N and J also told third parties that their parents had threatened them not to tell anyone about the abuse; J said that the threat was that if they told, father would hurt them more. Father’s abuse of mother caused J severe stress and stomach issues, and he made statements about wanting to kill himself. Despite father not being present, N was shak- ing while he talked to the ODHS caseworker about father’s abuse of mother, and his teacher noticed that he became “shut down” on the topic of father’s abuse of mother and J around the time of his disclosures. Both J and N were also observed to have made comments that mimicked father’s disparagement and control of mother and blaming mother for the abuse. Further, at trial, mother and father both expressed their desire to remain in a relationship and reside together with the children, which evidenced a current risk of harm. That level of specificity about the risk of harm to J and N thus differentiates this case from J. C. R.-W, 352 Or App at 305-07, in which we reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional ruling. 718 Dept. of Human Services v. N. M. / J. M. To be sure, the family members all testified at trial that there was no domestic violence in the home, and mother, J, and N testified that they were not afraid of father and wanted him to return home. In addition, at trial, the fam- ily members provided alternative explanations for mother’s many injuries and reasons that N and J had made prior inconsistent statements to third parties. However, the juve- nile court was not required to credit that trial testimony or those alternative reasons, and indeed, the juvenile court’s ruling demonstrates that it found credibility issues with the family’s trial testimony. In sum, we conclude that the evidence here is legally sufficient for the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over N and J because it demonstrates a nonspeculative risk of seri- ous harm to N and J that is reasonably likely to occur. Affirmed.