Neal v. Muradov
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket30610
JudgeTucker
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Neal v. Muradov, 2026-Ohio-4607.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
MICHAEL NEAL :
: C.A. No. 30610
Appellant :
: Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 00314
v. :
: (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
ISKANDAR MURADOV ET AL. : Court)
:
Appellees : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30610
RONALD J. MAURER, Attorney for Appellant
LEONARD J. BAZELAK and GREGORY JAMES PARKER, Attorneys for Appellees
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Michael Neal appeals from a summary judgment rendered against him on his
personal injury claim stemming from injuries he sustained when he was struck by a Dayton
Police Department cruiser. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Facts and Course of the Proceedings
{¶ 2} On March 3, 2023, Neal was crossing a pedestrian crosswalk on Smithville
Road at the intersection of Smithville Road and Watervliet Avenue in Dayton when he was
struck by a police cruiser operated by Dayton Police Officer Iskandar Muradov. There is no
dispute that Neal was crossing the roadway in a marked crosswalk and that he did so while
the crosswalk light indicated that he had the right of way. Neal sustained serious injuries as
a proximate result of the accident.
{¶ 3} In January 2024, Neal filed a complaint for personal injuries against Muradov,
the City of Dayton, and the City of Dayton Police Department.1 Following discovery, the
City filed a motion for summary judgment, which asserted that Muradov had been
responding to an “emergency call” at the time he struck Neal. The City further argued that,
because there was no evidence that Muradov had acted in a wanton or willful manner while
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On March 21, 2025, Neal voluntarily dismissed his cause of action against Muradov.
Additionally, the trial court dismissed Neal’s claims against the Dayton Police Department.
Neal did not appeal the dismissal of the police department.
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on the emergency run, the City was immune from Neal’s claims and thus entitled to summary
judgment.
{¶ 4} On August 14, 2025, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the
City, finding that because Muradov had been responding to an emergency call, the City was
immune from liability on Neal’s claims.
{¶ 5} Neal appeals.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review
{¶ 6} We review a decision granting summary judgment de novo, “which means that
we apply the same standards as the trial court.” GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 2007-Ohio-
2722, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). In a de novo review, we independently review a trial court’s decision
and accord it no deference. Northeast Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
121 Ohio App.3d 188, 192 (8th Dist.1997).
{¶ 7} “Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any material fact
remains, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears
from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and construing
the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the
party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.” State ex rel. Duncan v.
Mentor City Council, 2005-Ohio-2163, ¶ 9, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d
317, 327 (1977). It is well established that the party seeking summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 330 (1987); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115 (1988). In determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be construed in favor of
the nonmoving party. Springboro Commons Retirement Villa, Inc. v. Feltner, 2021-Ohio-544,
¶ 11 (12th Dist.). “Because summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation,
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it must be awarded with caution.” Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 359 (1992).
Discussion
{¶ 8} Neal’s first and second assignments of error state:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
APPLIED AN IMPROPER LEGAL STANDARD AND HELD THAT OFFICER
MURADOV WAS ON AN “EMERGENCY CALL” WHEN HE CLAIMED A
“PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION” TO DRIVE BY ANOTHER OFFICER’S
CALL AND THAT, THEREFORE, STATUTORY IMMUNITY APPLIED FOR
HIM AND THE CITY OF DAYTON.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT BY WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE
EXISTENCE OF AN “EMERGENCY CALL” AND THERBY GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN REASONABLE MINDS COULD COME TO
DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS ON THAT ISSUE.
Political Subdivision Tort Liability
{¶ 9} R.C. Chapter 2744, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, “sets forth a
comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the tort liability of political subdivisions and their
employees. McConnell v. Dudley, 2019-Ohio-4740, ¶ 20, citing Supportive Solutions, L.L.C.
v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 2013-Ohio-2410, ¶ 11. As a general rule, R.C.
2744.02(A)(1) exempts a political subdivision from liability for injuries caused by the acts of
the political subdivision or its employees. Specifically, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provides that
“[e]xcept as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in
damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by
any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in
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connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” An exception to this rule is provided
by R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), which states that political subdivisions “are liable for injury, death, or
loss to person or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their
employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and
authority.” However, R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) grants a full defense to this liability when “[a]
member of a municipal corporation police department or any other police agency was
operating a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency call and the operation of the
vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct . . . .”
{¶ 10} R.C. 2744.01(A) defines “emergency call” as “a call to duty, including, but not
limited to, communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal observations by
peace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response on
the part of a peace officer.”
The Existence of an “Emergency Call” is a Question of Law
{¶ 11} There is confusion concerning whether the determination of an “emergency
call” is a question of law or fact. Broadly speaking, “[s]tatutory immunity for a political
subdivision or its employees is a question of law.” Gillespie v. City of Troy, 2026-Ohio-2526,
¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing Burgin v. Eaton, 2011-Ohio-5951, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.), citing Conley v.
Schearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284 (1992). But our court and other appellate districts have stated,
or at least implied, that the existence of an “emergency call” is a question of fact. Horton v.
Dayton, 53 Ohio App.3d 68 (2d Dist. 1988); Malone v. Torres, 2010-Ohio-157, ¶ 23 (8th
Dist.); Hewitt v. Columbus, 2009-Ohio-4486, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.); Brown v. City of Cuyahoga
Falls, 2010-Ohio-4330, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). However, the Eighth District has more recently
concluded that “[w]hether a police officer was responding to an ‘emergency call’ is generally
a question of law.” Jones v. Schramm, 2016-Ohio-7403, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing Colbert v.
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Cleveland, 2003-Ohio-3319. We conclude that whether an officer was responding to an
“emergency call” is a question of law for the court to decide. We come to this conclusion
because, by its nature, the “emergency call” determination is a legal — not a factual — one.
In our view, it is akin to the issue of “duty” in a tort action, which, of course, is a legal issue
for the court to decide. But if there is a dispute regarding where the officer was traveling or
the reason for the officer’s response at the time the accident occurred, this would be a factual
dispute subject to jury resolution. See Baker v. Cleveland, 2010-Ohio-5588, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.),
(The trial court correctly overruled the city’s motion for directed verdict when there was
conflicting testimony whether, when the accident occurred, the officer was responding to a
property damage accident or to a parade assignment, and the city conceded that responding
to a parade assignment would be a non-emergency situation.). Here, however, there is no
dispute about what Muradov was doing and where he was going when Neal was struck.
Thus, based upon the undisputed facts, our role is to determine whether Muradov was, as
a matter of law, on an “emergency call” when the accident occurred.
Civ.R. 56 Record
{¶ 12} The Civ.R. 56 record in this case consists of the depositions of Muradov and
two Dayton Police Department officers who were assigned to investigate the collision. The
undisputed facts established that Muradov was on routine patrol on the date of the accident.
At 7:44 p.m., Muradov “self-dispatched” to a parking complaint.2 While still on the parking
complaint call, dispatch issued a call directing other officers to investigate a possible
breaking and entering 3 at a structure close to Muradov’s location. Muradov spent
2
Muradov defined a self-dispatch as pulling a call without dispatch answering the call and
thereafter being designated as the assigned officer for the call.
3
During the deposition testimony, the potential crime to which the officers were dispatched
was referred to as a burglary and as a breaking and entering. Our analysis is the same
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approximately two additional minutes clearing the parking complaint after the breaking and
entering dispatch, at which time he began driving toward the scene of the possible breaking
and entering in progress. Muradov did not speed or activate his overhead lights or his siren
as he drove toward the scene. Muradov testified that he did not self-dispatch to the call or
alert others in any other manner that he was responding, because he wanted to remain
available if another dispatch call occurred. Muradov testified that he merely intended to drive
by the scene to see if his help was needed and that, if it was not, he intended to continue on
patrol. When he arrived at the intersection of Smithville Road and Watervliet Avenue,
Muradov entered the left turn lane and waited for the light to turn green. He then waited for
oncoming traffic to pass before beginning his turn onto Smithville Road when, unfortunately,
he struck Neal. In his written statement on March 3, 2023, Muradov stated in relevant part:
On March 3, 2023, at approximately 2000 hours, I . . . was engaged in routine
patrol . . . travelling East on Watervliet Avenue. I was in route to a burglary call
to see if officers needed any assistance.
Locke Depo. Ex. 5.
{¶ 13} Officer Timothy Rizer investigated the accident. Officer Rizer provided the
following deposition testimony:
Q. Well, the circumstances in this particular case was this breaking and
entering and we’re talking about Officer Muradov, okay? Did that particular call
demand an immediate response on the part of Officer Muradov?
...
A. That would be completely up to the officer.
whether the dispatch was for a possible burglary or a breaking and entering, because both
offenses are felonies that required an immediate police response.
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Q. Uh-huh.
A. So an officer reading the comments and seeing how close they are, it could
be that they indeed want to be in the area or close by because there is a
suspect there, for other officers.
Rizer Depo. p. 31-32.
{¶ 14} At the time of the accident, Sergeant Matthew Locke was assigned to the
Dayton Police Department’s Professional Standards Bureau, and he investigated Officer
Muradov’s involvement in the accident. Sergeant Locke provided the following deposition
testimony:
Q. . . . This breaking and entering call. Did you note anywhere in your report
or anywhere else that Officer Muradov was required to respond to that call?
...
A. . . . No, I mean they can - - the people that are dispatched on the call by
call, they are required. Anyone else that may be close by has the ability to
respond if they choose to.
Locke Depo. p. 28-29.
The Trial Court’s Decision
{¶ 15} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, stating in
pertinent part:
In the instant case, the undisputed facts establish that while clearing a
call on a nearby parking complaint, Officer Muradov was advised of a separate
call made through dispatch regarding a burglary in process. The burglary in
process constituted a “Priority 2” call. Officer Muradov described a “Priority 2”
call as a crime “in progress so officers have to get there in a swift, fastest way
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of lights and sirens.” Officer Muradov acknowledged that he was not
dispatched, nor did he self-dispatch to the call because he wanted to remain
available to dispatch if another call came through. Nevertheless, in an effort to
assist the other officers already present at the scene if necessary, Officer
Muradov proceeded to the reported burglary in process. Officer Muradov relied
on his training and experience as a DPD officer and his own judgment to
determine that a response at the scene was necessary.
...
This is not a case where an officer was merely on routine patrol; rather,
Officer Muradov was responding to the scene of a potentially dangerous crime
in order to aid and assist his fellow officers. . . . Thus, the Court finds that
Officer Muradov was responding to an “emergency call” when he accidentally
struck Plaintiff, as set forth in R.C. 2744.01. . . In other words, Officer Muradov
responded to a “call to duty” derived from a professional obligation stemming
from his training and experience as a DPD officer and his own judgment to
determine that a response at the scene was necessary, thereby rendering the
City immune from Plaintiff’s claims.
Case Law Review
{¶ 16} Our review must begin with an examination of Colbert v. Cleveland, 2003-
Ohio-3319. In that case, two Cleveland patrol officers observed what they believed to be a
hand-to-hand drug sale involving two individuals inside a car and a third person outside the
car on foot. The officers decided to “pursue the car on a parallel route, but they did not
activate their emergency lights or siren or call for backup.” Id. at ¶ 3. While pursuing the
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suspects’ car, the officers were involved in an intersection collision with Colbert’s vehicle,
prompting Colbert’s suit against the City of Cleveland.
{¶ 17} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cleveland, finding that
when the collision occurred the officers were responding to an “emergency call.” Id. at ¶ 5.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that
observing and then responding to a suspected drug transaction was a “call to duty” under
R.C. 2744.01(A), making Cleveland immune from liability for the collision. Id. at ¶ 6.
{¶ 18} The Supreme Court began its analysis by observing that, under R.C.
2744.01(A), an “‘emergency call’” means a ‘call to duty.’” Id. at ¶ 13. The court then stated
that:
“Duty” is defined as “obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions enjoined
by order or usage according to rank, occupation, or profession.” Webster’s
New International Dictionary (1986). Thus, a “call to duty” involves a situation
to which a response by a police officer is required by the officer’s professional
obligation.
Id. From this, the Supreme Court stated that an “‘emergency call’ as defined by R.C.
2744.01(A) involves a situation to which a response by a police officer is required by the
officer’s professional obligation.” Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 19} The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the officers’ “need to investigate
[what they believed to be a criminal drug transaction] was a call to duty. Thus, the officers
were responding to an emergency call when their patrol car collided with Colbert’s car[,]”
and the City of Cleveland was immune from liability to Colbert. Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶ 20} Since Colbert, courts, quite understandably, have expansively construed when
an officer is responding to an emergency call. E.g., Seege v. Smith, 2014-Ohio-5450 (2d
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Dist.) (officer was on an emergency call when dispatched to an automobile collision involving
property damage); Rutledge v. O’Toole, 2005-Ohio-1010 (8th Dist.) (transporting a prisoner
based on a supervisor’s order was an emergency call); Longley v. Thailing, 2009-Ohio-1252
(8th Dist.) (officer was engaged in an emergency call when re-entering the highway after
investigating a vehicle stopped in the breakdown lane with its emergency lights activated).
{¶ 21} There are two cases with facts analogous to the pending case which inform
our decision, one decided by the Ohio Supreme Court and one by this court. In Smith v.
McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, Officer Travis Carpenter, who was employed by Franklin
County’s Clinton Township, was involved in a motor-vehicle accident while responding to a
general call for assistance from the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department. The call for
assistance was prompted by a deputy sheriff on foot who was chasing a “fleeing suspect.”
Id. at ¶ 2. Upon hearing the call, Officer Carpenter began driving toward the deputy sheriff’s
location. In so responding, Officer Carpenter did speed – driving 64 miles per hour in a
posted 45 miles per hour speed zone – but he did not activate the cruiser’s siren or
emergency lights. While enroute and outside of Clinton Township’s jurisdiction, Officer
Carpenter was involved in a motor-vehicle collision, resulting in the filing of a personal injury
lawsuit by Lea Smith, a passenger in the second vehicle involved in the accident. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Carpenter and Clinton Township. The
Tenth Appellate District affirmed, and the Supreme Court accepted Smith’s appeal.
{¶ 22} Smith argued that, in the absence of proof of a mutual-aid agreement between
Franklin County and Clinton Township, Officer Carpenter was not on an emergency call,
because he had no professional obligation to respond to the call for assistance. The
Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that “the absence of a mutual-aid agreement between two
jurisdictions is not determinative of whether a police officer who leaves his jurisdiction is on
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an emergency call for purposes of R.C. 2744.01(A) and 2744.02(B)(1)(a).” Id. at ¶ 42. The
Court further stated that “the record supports the trial court’s ruling that the unrebutted
evidence establishes that Carpenter’s actions were undertaken pursuant to his professional
obligation as a police officer and were a legitimate response to a general call for assistance
regarding a nearby deputy sheriff pursuing a fleeing suspect after dark in a high crime area.”
Id. at ¶ 44. The Court concluded: “[T]here was no error in the holdings of the trial and
appellate courts that Carpenter was on an emergency call when the accident occurred.” Id.
{¶ 23} The second case, from our district, is Carder v. City of Kettering, 2004-Ohio-
4260 (2d Dist.). In that case, Kettering police officer William Aldrich was on routine patrol
when he heard a dispatch regarding a robbery at a nearby commercial establishment. The
dispatch reported that the suspect appeared to be “on drugs, possibly armed, and fleeing
on foot toward a residential area.” Id. at ¶ 3. Although other, presumably closer, officers were
dispatched to respond to the robbery, Aldrich informed dispatch that he was also going to
respond, thinking that, as a bike patrol officer with a bicycle attached to his cruiser, he could
effectively use his bicycle to search for a suspect who was on foot. Aldrich activated his
cruiser’s siren and emergency lights and, at a high rate of speed, began driving toward the
area where the suspect was thought to be. While en route, Aldrich was involved in an
intersection collision with a vehicle driven by Terry Carder and occupied by his wife, Bonnie.
Aldrich was traveling at approximately 84 miles per hour when the collision occurred. The
Carders filed a personal injury lawsuit against Aldrich and the City of Kettering. The trial
court granted summary judgment, finding that, when the accident occurred, Aldrich was on
an emergency call and his conduct was neither willful or reckless.
{¶ 24} We concluded, as a matter of law, that Aldrich had been on an emergency call
when the accident occurred, because Aldrich was “attempting to get to [the] crime scene
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when he collided with the Carder vehicle” and “was vested with the discretion to determine
whether to respond to the dispatch,” as conceded by the Carders. Id. at ¶ 13.4
Analysis
{¶ 25} In Smith, 2011-Ohio-4674, Officer Carpenter had the discretion to respond, or
not, to the call for assistance, even in the absence of a mutual-aid agreement. And in Carder,
Officer Aldrich had the discretion to respond, or not, to the reported breaking and entering,
even though he had not been specifically dispatched to respond. Each officer, using his
professional judgment, decided to respond, and, in each instance, it was decided that the
response was a professionally obligated call to duty. As such, each officer was engaged in
an emergency call when the respective accidents occurred.
{¶ 26} Turning to the pending case, Officer Muradov did not have to respond in any
fashion to the reported breaking and entering in progress. But, using his professional
judgment, he decided to respond because he was nearby to determine if the dispatched
officers needed assistance; such a response was prudent and appropriate. Consistent with
Smith and Carder, Muradov’s response was a professionally obligated call to duty. Thus, we
conclude that, as a matter of law, Muradov was on an emergency call when Neal was struck.
As such, the City of Dayton is immune from liability for Neal’s injuries under R.C. 2744.02(A)
and 2744.02(B)(1)(a).
{¶ 27} In coming to this conclusion, we realize that, unlike Officers Carpenter and
Aldrich, Officer Muradov was driving in a normal, routine fashion when Neal was struck.
However, the emergency call decision does not turn on how robust the officer’s response
was but, instead, on whether the response was based on a professionally obligated call to
4
In Carder, we did, however, reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in another
respect, finding that there was a factual issue as to whether Aldrich’s conduct was reckless.
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duty.
Conclusion
{¶ 28} Having decided that Officer Muradov was on an emergency call, Neal’s
assignments of error are overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
.............
LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
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