Full Opinion

[Cite as Paciorek v. Englewood Police Dept., 2026-Ohio-4609.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY GENEVIEVE PACIOREK, ET AL. : : C.A. No. 30832 Appellees : : Trial Court Case No. 2025 CV 04946 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas CITY OF ENGLEWOOD POLICE : Court) DEPARTMENT, ET AL. : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellants : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30832 JOSEPH K. MERICAL, JUSTIN M. BURNS, & KELLEY B. GOGUL, Attorneys for Appellants JESSICA M. BACON & KEVIN C. QUINLAN, Attorneys for Appellees HUFFMAN, J. {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-Appellees Genevieve Paciorek, Joseph Paciorek (individually and as spouse of Genevieve Paciorek), and Shannon Blair (individually and as executor of the estate of Marie Hansen) filed a complaint for personal injury and wrongful death against Defendants-Appellants City of Englewood Police Department and Officer Deanna Roe. Their complaint stemmed from injuries Paciorek and Hansen sustained as a result of a high-speed chase in which Officer Roe pursued a suspect vehicle in a residential area; the driver of the vehicle lost control and struck Paciorek and Hansen, who were sidewalk pedestrians. {¶ 2} Appellants appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying their Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to political subdivision immunity. Because appellees asserted sufficient factual allegations in their complaint that exceptions to appellants’ political subdivision immunity may apply, we cannot say that appellees could prove no set of facts overcoming the City’s and Officer Roe’s political subdivision immunity. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Background Facts and Procedural History {¶ 3} On September 10, 2023, Genevieve Paciorek and Marie Hansen were walking with their husbands after lunch on a Sunday afternoon on a sidewalk adjacent to Sweet Potato Ridge Road in Englewood, Ohio. At the same time, Officer Deanna Roe of the City of Englewood Police Department (“the City”) was engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a vehicle operating with fictitious license plates. The pursuit allegedly occurred on residential 2 roads at speeds reaching 90 miles per hour, without regard to traffic control devices or the safety of other motorists and pedestrians. The pursued vehicle eventually hit another vehicle turning left onto Sweet Potato Ridge Road, lost control, drove onto the sidewalk, and struck pedestrians Paciorek and Hansen. Both Paciorek and Hansen were critically injured, and Hansen later died from her injuries. {¶ 4} Appellees filed a complaint for personal injury and wrongful death against the City and Officer Roe (as an employee of the police department), asserting claims for wrongful death, survivorship, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. The basis of appellees’ complaint centered on Officer Roe’s conduct when she engaged in a high-speed chase through a residential area, while weaving into oncoming traffic and ignoring traffic devices. According to appellees, Officer Roe’s conduct was in reckless disregard of safety and violated the police department’s pursuit policies, which ultimately resulted in Paciorek’s injuries and Hansen’s death. {¶ 5} The City and Officer Roe moved to dismiss appellees’ complaint for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing that appellees’ claims were barred by political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744. As to Officer Roe, they asserted that the complaint failed to allege operative facts demonstrating malicious purpose, bad faith, or reckless or wanton conduct that were sufficient to overcome employee immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). As to the City, they argued that there was no exception to its immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) and that, even if there were an exception, immunity reattached because Officer Roe was responding to an emergency call and had not exhibited willful or wanton misconduct in the operation of her vehicle. {¶ 6} The trial court overruled appellants’ motion to dismiss. First, the court found that, at the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) stage, the question was not whether appellees had proved 3 recklessness but whether the facts alleged in the complaint, accepted as true and construed in appellees’ favor, were sufficient to allege that Officer Roe was not entitled to employee immunity. The court noted that the complaint alleged specific facts concerning speed, location, traffic conditions, and the circumstances of the pursuit, and it concluded that whether those allegations could be substantiated and rose to the level of reckless conduct were questions better addressed on a developed factual record. The court determined that it could not conclude as a matter of law that appellees could prove no set of facts overcoming Officer Roe’s employee immunity. {¶ 7} The trial court also found that, construing the allegations in appellees’ favor with respect to the City, it could not determine on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion whether (1) appellees could establish the negligent operation of a vehicle exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), and (2) appellants could establish reattachment of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) (e.g., Officer Roe’s operation of the vehicle fell within the statutory emergency call exception and did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct). The court again reasoned that those issues would be more appropriately resolved on a developed factual record. {¶ 8} Appellants appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. II. Assignment of Error {¶ 9} On appeal, the City and Officer Roe raise the following assignment of error: The trial court erred by failing to dismiss appellees’ complaint for failure to state a claim on the basis of immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act., R.C. 2744.01 et seq. Related to that assignment of error, they state three arguments: A. The City and Officer Roe are immune from suit based on the face of the 4 complaint absent an adequately pleaded exception to immunity. B. The trial court erred by not dismissing the claims against Officer Roe because she is presumptively immune from suit and appellees failed to plead an exception to that immunity, i.e., that she engaged in wanton or reckless conduct. C. The trial court erred by not dismissing the claims against the City because appellees failed to sufficiently allege application of the negligent operation exception. Standard of Review {¶ 10} Civ.R. 12(B)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), a motion to dismiss should only be sustained if it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). A motion to dismiss is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit. See State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548 (1992). {¶ 11} When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all factual allegations must be taken as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988); Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1997). “[T]he movant may not rely on allegations or evidence outside the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson, 65 Ohio St.3d at 548. In other words, in order to sustain a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the trial court must find beyond doubt from the allegations and pleadings, without resort to any extraneous material, that there is no set of facts which could conceivably be proved by the plaintiff that would 5 allow the case to be submitted to the jury. A trial court does not evaluate the merits of a claim when deciding on the motion. “A court cannot dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) merely because it doubts the plaintiff will prevail.” Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., 92 Ohio App.3d 232, 234 (1st Dist. 1994). {¶ 12} We conduct a de novo review of trial court decisions that grant or deny a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Student Doe v. Adkins, 2021-Ohio-3389, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), citing Alexander Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Village of Albany, 2017-Ohio-8704, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.); e.g., Menorah Park Ctr. for Senior Living v. Rolston, 2020-Ohio-6658, citing Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-4193. Accordingly, we afford “no deference to the trial court’s decision,” but instead independently review it. Id., citing Struckman v. Bd. of Edn. of Teays Valley Local School Dist., 2017-Ohio-1177, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). Notice Pleading {¶ 13} In their first argument, the City and Officer Roe broadly contend that they were immune from suit because the complaint did not adequately plead an exception to immunity, and thus appellees’ claims were barred by political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744. Appellants assert that, because their immunity defense appeared on the face of the complaint, appellees were required to allege sufficient facts showing that immunity did not bar their claims. We disagree. {¶ 14} Political subdivision immunity is outlined in the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act under R.C. Chapter 2744, which sets forth rules for when local governments and their employees can or cannot be sued for injury, death, or loss and “establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme for the tort liability of political subdivisions and their employees.” Reynolds v. Hamilton Cty. Dev.l Disabilities Servs., 2024-Ohio-83, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), citing Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2019-Ohio-2499, ¶ 11. Under the Act, law 6 enforcement officers working for a county are political subdivision employees. See R.C. 2744.01(B). {¶ 15} Political-subdivision immunity is an affirmative defense. Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1995). “[T]he affirmative defense of immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 may be the basis of a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Student Doe, 2021-Ohio-3389, at ¶ 20, quoting Parra v. Jackson, 2021-Ohio-1188, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment [or a motion to dismiss].” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018-Ohio-2121, ¶ 12, citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992); see also Windsor Realty & Mgt., Inc. v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 2016-Ohio-4865, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing, e.g., Srokowski v. Shay, 2014-Ohio-3145, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Conley at 291, and Feitshans v. Darke Cty., 116 Ohio App.3d 14, 19 (2d Dist. 1996). We recognize “that while many public employees face the potential for liability under R.C. 2744.03, no other public employee faces the potential danger, violence or unique statutory responsibilities a law-enforcement officer faces. Not only does Ohio law require an officer to arrest and detain a person who is violating the law, R.C. 2935.03(A)(1), it also subjects that officer to potential criminal liability for negligently failing to do so, R.C. 2921.44(A)(2).” Gillespie v. City of Troy, 2026-Ohio-2526, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing Argabrite v. Neer, 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 15. {¶ 16} However, a trial court “may grant a motion to dismiss on the basis of political- subdivision immunity only when the complaint bears ‘conclusive evidence that the action is barred by the defense.’” Student Doe at ¶ 18, citing Plush v. Cincinnati, 2020-Ohio-6713, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting Bucey v. Carlisle, 2010-Ohio-2262, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). Consequently, “unless the pleadings obviously or conclusively establish the affirmative defense,” a trial 7 court may not dismiss the complaint. Id., quoting Steele v. City of Cincinnati, 2019-Ohio- 4853, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). We conduct “a de novo review of a trial court’s determination regarding political-subdivision immunity.” Id., citing Wright v. Village of Williamsport, 2019-Ohio-2682, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). {¶ 17} In specifically addressing a plaintiff’s burden on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion based on political subdivision immunity, the court in Windsor Realty explained: “In Ohio, a notice-pleading state, the plaintiff need not prove his or her case at the pleading stage. . . . Thus, a plaintiff need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage. . . . Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate an exception to immunity at this stage would be tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to overcome a motion for summary judgment at the pleading stage. . . . Instead, a plaintiff must merely allege a set of facts that, if proven, would plausibly allow for recovery." Windsor Realty at ¶ 37, citing Srokowski at ¶ 14, quoting Scott v. Columbus Dept. of Pub. Utils., 2011-Ohio-677, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.); see also Molnar v. City of Green, 2019-Ohio-3083, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.) (“[plaintiff] is under no obligation to prove his case in his initial pleadings and ‘need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage,’” citing Chunyo v. Gauntner, 2017-Ohio-5555, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting Scott at ¶ 8. {¶ 18} The City and Officer Roe ask us to consider our conclusion in Gillespie to support their dismissal argument. In Gillespie, 2026-Ohio-2526, the decedent was killed while she drove to work as the result of a collision with a Jeep driven by a pursued suspect. Id. at ¶ 5. The suspect was being pursued by a City of Troy police officer. Id. The officer was familiar with the Jeep; he knew the suspect who was driving it and knew that warrants for the suspect’s arrest had been issued in two counties. The officer wanted to pick up the 8 suspect on his warrants. Id. {¶ 19} The officer activated his lights to stop the Jeep, but it failed to stop. Id. The officer initiated a pursuit, and the Jeep attempted to evade capture. The pursuit continued, reaching speeds of 65 miles per hour in a residential neighborhood and over 100 miles per hour on a state route. Id. As the pursuit was ongoing, the officer never turned off his lights and siren. Id. The officer radioed ahead to deputies who were setting up tire spike strips. Id. The tire spikes were successful but did not stop the pursuit. The pursuit eventually ended when the Jeep collided with the decedent’s vehicle. The driver of the Jeep was also killed. Id. {¶ 20} The decedent’s estate brought an action against the police department and several employees, including the officer engaged in the chase. The trial court denied their motion for summary judgment, finding that they were not immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744. Id. at ¶ 3. The police department and the officer in pursuit appealed; the officer argued that he had not acted in a wanton or reckless manner so as to deny him individual immunity, and the police department argued that the officer had been involved in an emergency call and had not engaged in willful or wanton misconduct. Id. {¶ 21} Applying the immunity statute, we concluded that neither the police department nor the officer could be held liable for damages because there were no genuine issues of material fact and reasonable minds could only conclude that the police department and its employees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 4. We emphasize, however, that our conclusion was based on a fully developed factual record and was reached at the summary judgment stage. {¶ 22} At the motion to dismiss stage in this case, though, we decline to consider the similar facts and apply our reasoning in Gillespie. Here, our analysis is limited to the facts 9 alleged in appellees’ complaint. Appellees were not required “to prove the applicability of an exception to immunity or to disprove the applicability of a claimed defense to an exception to immunity to avoid the dismissal of [their] amended complaint.” Windsor Realty, 2016- Ohio-4865, at ¶ 37. Because Ohio is a notice-pleading state, appellees were only required to allege a set of facts that, if proven, would allow for recovery. Appellees alleged that Officer Roe, as an employee of the City, had engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a driver operating his vehicle with fictitious license plates through a residential neighborhood, while weaving into oncoming traffic and ignoring traffic control devices. This pursuit allegedly ended with the pursued driver striking another vehicle, losing control, driving on the sidewalk, and striking Paciorek and Hansen. While the facts asserted by appellees were not particularly expansive, a review of their amended complaint reveals that appellants made sufficient assertions concerning facts supporting the elements of their claims and the recklessness or wantonness of Officer Roe’s conduct. As pointed out by appellees, political subdivision immunity is an affirmative defense, and we cannot say that the complaint bears conclusive evidence that the action is barred by the defense. Officer Roe {¶ 23} In their second argument, appellants argue that Officer Roe was presumptively immune from suit as an employee of a political subdivision and that appellees failed to plead an exception to that immunity (e.g., that she engaged in wanton or reckless conduct). They contend that the circumstances of the pursuit, including any “mirroring” of the suspect’s driving by Officer Roe, could not support a finding of recklessness or wantonness, that any alleged violations of departmental policies could not overcome immunity, and that assertions concerning Officer Roe’s use of sirens or manner of pursuit were immaterial to the question of immunity. Again, we disagree. 10 Political Subdivision Employee Immunity of Officer Roe {¶ 24} R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) governs a political subdivision employee’s individual immunity. Under that provision, individuals working for a local government start with a broad presumption of immunity from individual civil lawsuits when performing their job duties. This protection applies as long as they are employees acting within the scope of their employment. {¶ 25} A plaintiff, however, can overcome an employee’s presumptive immunity. In those circumstances, a plaintiff can hold the employee personally liable by proving that at least one of three exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) applies. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) states that an employee loses personal immunity and can be sued individually if (a) the employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities; (b) the employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or (c) civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by another specific section of the Revised Code. {¶ 26} In this case, there were no allegations that Officer Roe acted outside of the scope of her employment or official responsibilities or that civil liability was expressly imposed on her by another section of the Revised Code. There were also no allegations that her actions were carried out with malicious purpose or in bad faith. The issue was whether she was alleged to have acted in a wanton or reckless manner. {¶ 27} “Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson v. Massillon, 2012-Ohio-5711, ¶ 34, citing Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 104-105 (1990), adopting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500, at 587 (1965); see also Black’s 11 Law Dictionary 1298-1299 (8th Ed.2004) (explaining that reckless conduct is characterized by a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and a conscious disregard of or indifference to the risk, but the actor does not desire harm). Recklessness requires a showing that “the actor knew his or her conduct ‘in all probability’ would result in injury” and is a rigorous threshold to meet. Wyatt v. Springfield, 2024-Ohio-3334, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), citing McDonald v. Lacy, 2018-Ohio-2753, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). {¶ 28} Wanton misconduct, on the other hand, is “the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.” Anderson at ¶ 33, citing Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 117-118 (1977); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1613-1614 (8th Ed.2004) (explaining that one acting in a wanton manner is aware of the risk of the conduct but is not trying to avoid it and is indifferent to whether harm results). “‘Human error’ might mean negligence, but it does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.” Whitley v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 2010-Ohio-356, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.); see also Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St. 3d 351, 357 (1994) (“mere negligence in [an officer’s] official duties should not give rise to personal liability”). {¶ 29} Whether a political subdivision employee acted in a wanton or reckless manner, however, is generally a question of fact. Cannavino v. Rock Ohio Caesars Cleveland, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-380, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.); Long v. Hanging Rock, 2011-Ohio-5137, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), citing Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-6208, ¶ 14; Fabrey, 70 Ohio St.3d at 356. To overcome Officer Roe’s presumed immunity, appellees must demonstrate that Officer Roe committed acts or omissions in a wanton or reckless manner. In their complaint, appellees alleged the following facts regarding Officer Roe: (1) Officer Roe’s pursuit occurred at speeds reaching 90 mph through residential roads; (2) Officer Roe 12 observed the pursued driver weaving into oncoming traffic and ignoring traffic control devices, but continued the pursuit (mirroring the suspect driver’s actions), despite not learning of any crimes committed by the vehicle’s occupants; (3) her sole justification for the pursuit was fictitious license plates; (4) her actions in the pursuit were in conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to others that was unreasonable under the circumstances; and (5) her actions in the pursuit were in violation of Ohio law and the standard operating procedures of the City of Englewood Police Department. {¶ 30} To support their argument that they had set forth sufficient factual allegations regarding an exception to Officer Roe’s employee immunity, appellees cite Hardesty v. Alcantara, 2015-Ohio-4591 (8th Dist.). In Hardesty, a police officer initiated a traffic stop, but the vehicle suddenly sped off to elude arrest. Id. at ¶ 7. The officer pursued the vehicle during heavy rush-hour traffic at speeds of 80 to 100 m.p.h. Id. at ¶ 9. The suspect’s vehicle crashed at an intersection into a car driven by the plaintiff, causing her severe injuries. Id. at ¶ 12-14. The court concluded that, although the officer’s initial choice to pull over the vehicle was reasonable, his subsequent actions created a genuine factual dispute—namely, that a factfinder could conclude that pursuing a suspect at extreme speeds during heavy traffic, while violating departmental policy by intermittently turning off the siren, amounted to wanton or reckless actions. Id. at ¶ 36-46. Using the reasoning in Hardesty, appellees contend that factual issues exist in this case, particularly when considering whether Officer Roe’s actions in failing to terminate a high-speed chase of a fleeing motor vehicle and putting the public at risk were wanton or reckless, which would deprive her of immunity protection in this action. We find this argument persuasive. {¶ 31} Here, we express no opinion as to the merits of appellees’ claims or Officer Roe’s immunity defense. But we cannot conclude that there is no set of facts that would 13 entitle appellees to relief when taking the material allegations in their complaint as true. Again, “when a complaint invokes the exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), notice pleading suffices and the plaintiff may not be held to a heightened pleading standard or expected to plead the factual circumstances surrounding an allegation of wanton or reckless behavior with particularity.” Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2021-Ohio-4096, ¶ 11, citing Parmertor v. Chardon Local Schools, 2016-Ohio-761, ¶ 49-51 (11th Dist.); Thompson v. Buckeye Joint Vocational School Dist., 2016-Ohio-2804, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.); see also York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 144-145. Accordingly, all that was required of appellees at the pleading stage was to put Officer Roe on notice of the claims against her and to raise the possibility that an exception to her statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) applied. See Maternal Grandmother at ¶ 15. We conclude that the complaint’s allegations were sufficient to suggest that Officer Roe’s actions were conducted in a wanton or reckless manner and that Officer Roe may not have personal immunity. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss. The City {¶ 32} In their third argument, appellants contend that the City is immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and that appellees failed to allege facts sufficient to bring the case within the negligent operation of a vehicle exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). They also contend that, even if the exception did apply, immunity for the City reattaches under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), because Officer Roe was responding to an emergency call and appellees failed to sufficiently allege that Officer Roe willfully or wantonly operated the police vehicle. They argue that there was no connection between any negligent operation of the vehicle by Officer Roe in her pursuit of the suspect driver and the driver’s collision with 14 the pedestrians. They assert that, because Officer Roe’s cruiser did not physically strike Paciorek and Hansen, her operation of the vehicle could not have been the proximate cause of their injuries. {¶ 33} At the outset, we recognize that appellants ask us to adopt the following per se rule: when there is a high-speed pursuit of a vehicle initiated by an officer, an injury or death to another occurs due to the fleeing suspect’s vehicle, and the officer’s vehicle itself did not cause the injury or death, dismissal of the complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) must be granted. We decline to adopt this rule. We will proceed in our analysis of the City’s political subdivision immunity in the context of appellants’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion. Political Subdivision Immunity of the City {¶ 34} Determining whether a political subdivision itself is immune from liability under R.C. 2744 generally requires a three-tier analysis. The first tier of the immunity analysis is a statement of the general rule that political subdivisions are immune from tort liability. R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) establishes that political subdivisions, such as cities, counties, and townships, are typically immune from liability for injury, death, or loss, and that this immunity applies to acts or omissions of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision connected to performing either a governmental or proprietary function. “Employee” means “an officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part- time, who is authorized to act and is acting within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, employee’s, or servant’s employment for a political subdivision.” R.C. 2744.01(B). “Governmental function” is defined in R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a)-(c) and includes the examples listed in R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a)-(x). Particularly, R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a) provides that a governmental function includes “the provision or nonprovision of police, fire, emergency medical, ambulance, and rescue services or protection.” Because the City of Englewood 15 Police Department and its employees like Officer Roe are engaged in a governmental function, the City is generally immune from liability under the first tier of the immunity analysis. {¶ 35} Once immunity is established under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), it can be removed, however, under the second tier of the analysis pursuant to any one of the five exceptions to immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B). R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), for example, applies to the allegations in this case relating to motor vehicle negligence; it provides that political subdivisions are typically liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property “caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority.” {¶ 36} Appellees maintain that Officer Roe’s operation of her vehicle during the pursuit was not only negligent but also constituted willful or wanton misconduct, and thus the negligent operation exception removes the City’s immunity. Ordinarily, the next step in the three-tier analysis is to consider whether the political subdivision can restore its immunity with one of the statutory defenses or discretionary immunities outlined in R.C. 2744.03 (such as policy-making, planning, or enforcement discretion). However, a police department or other police agency is offered a limited defense to that liability (and loss of immunity) under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), which creates a strict exception to motor vehicle liability due to the negligent operation of the vehicle specifically for law enforcement, if two conditions are met: (1) the officer was operating a motor vehicle while responding to an “emergency call,” and (2) the officer’s operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct. “Emergency call” means “a call to duty, including, but not limited to, communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal observations by peace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response on the part of a peace officer.” 16 R.C. 2744.01(A). Because of this defense, a party injured in an accident involving a police cruiser responding to an emergency call cannot establish liability by proving the officer was merely negligent in operation of the vehicle; the injured party must prove the officer acted with willful or wanton misconduct. {¶ 37} In their complaint, appellees alleged that Officer Roe operated her police vehicle at extreme speeds on residential roads under dangerous traffic conditions and that such operation contributed to the injuries and death alleged in the complaint. At this stage, construing those allegations in appellees’ favor, and without the benefit of a fully developed factual record, we agree that the trial court could not determine whether the negligent operation of a vehicle exception applies or whether appellants could establish reattachment of immunity for the City (i.e., whether Officer Roe’s operation of the vehicle fell within the statutory emergency call exception and her conduct was not willful or wanton). {¶ 38} Again, we express no opinion on the merits of appellees’ claims or the City’s immunity defense. But we cannot conclude that there is no set of facts that would entitle appellees to relief when taking the material allegations in their complaint as true. All that was required of appellees at the pleading stage was to put the City on notice of the claims against it and to raise the possibility that an exception to its statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) could apply. We conclude that the complaint’s allegations were sufficient to suggest that the negligent operation of a vehicle exception to the City’s immunity may apply to negate immunity and that Officer Roe’s actions, even if in response to an emergency call, may have constituted willful or wanton misconduct. Lastly, with respect to appellants’ proximate cause argument—namely, that the fleeing driver’s conduct constituted an intervening and superseding cause, breaking the causal chain as it related to Officer Roe’s conduct—we cannot conclude as a matter of law that appellees can prove no set of facts 17 establishing proximate cause. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss. {¶ 39} Appellants’ sole assignment of error is overruled. III. Conclusion {¶ 40} Having overruled appellants’ assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ............. TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. 18