State v. Molina

[Cite as State v. Molina, 2026-Ohio-4050.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114849 v. : SABRINA MOLINA, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 15, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-685670-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alyssa Waite, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: The Ohio Supreme Court reversed our opinion in State v. Molina, 2025- Ohio-4758 (8th Dist.) (“Molina I”) and remanded the cause to us to reconsider the appeal filed by defendant-appellant Sabrina Molina (“Molina”) in light of the Court’s decision in State v. Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281.  In Fontanez, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a trial court does not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) so as to render a guilty plea invalid when it fails to expressly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt “as long as the trial court otherwise complies with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the defendant’s admission of guilt is obvious from the context of the plea colloquy, and the defendant does not assert actual innocence.” Fontanez at ¶ 47. Molina claimed the following three assignments of error in her appeal: 1. The trial court erred by accepting appellant’s guilty plea when it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 2. The trial court erred by failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into appellant’s request for new counsel prior to her change of plea. 3. The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After applying Fontanez to the facts of this case, we find that the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). We further find that the trial court sufficiently inquired into Molina’s request for new counsel and that Molina’s guilty pleas were valid because she demonstrated that she understood the effect of her guilty pleas and that the trial court did not err in denying Molina’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History Molina was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); one count of robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2); one count of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); three counts of assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A); three counts of obstructing official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A); and two counts of criminal damaging, in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). The aggravated robbery and robbery charges included one- and three-year firearm specifications. The court called the case for trial on April 10, 2024. Molina appeared for trial and expressed dissatisfaction with her assigned counsel. She complained that her lawyer was not communicating with her and that when she asked about her case, she was “given the runaround.” (Tr. 5.) Her lawyer acknowledged that he had been preoccupied with an aggravated-murder trial but indicated that now that the defendant in the aggravated-murder case had pleaded guilty, he was available to discuss Molina’s case with her. Before doing so, however, the State described the evidence in its possession that placed Molina at the crime scene and documented her communications with her codefendant regarding the crimes she was accused of having committed. The trial court encouraged Molina to meet with counsel to review the evidence. The court stated: So, now is the best opportunity for you to have this conversation. If you’re dissatisfied and I hear a reason to disqualify — or to have him withdraw, then I’ll consider whether you’re indigent — sounds like you have a job — and I will decide whether another attorney should be appointed. (Tr. 16.) The court continued the trial to June 24, 2024, to allow Molina time to discuss her case with counsel.  On June 24, 2024, the court again called the case for trial. A few days before trial, Molina’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that “Defendant Molina has told counsel that she wants new counsel and will not communicate with counsel.” (Motion to withdraw filed June 20, 2024.) The court addressed the motion on the record, and Molina indicated that she wanted a new lawyer to defend her because she did not believe her appointed lawyer was preparing the case for an optimum resolution. (Tr. 23-24.) The court recounted the fact that there had been several pretrials in the case, that Molina’s lawyer was an experienced criminal lawyer, and that Molina and her lawyer had several opportunities to discuss her case. (Tr. 24.) The court also noted that the case had previously been set for trial and had been continued, that Molina’s case was again set for trial, and that “[t]oday is not the day for you to ask for a new attorney.” (Tr. 24.) Following a recess, the State advised the court that the parties had reached a plea agreement. Molina’s codefendant, Artemous Roulette Sr., had just pleaded guilty and agreed to testify at Molina’s trial. (Tr. 23, 65, and 69.) The prosecutor outlined the terms of the plea agreement on the record, and Molina’s lawyer confirmed that Molina agreed to the delineated terms. Before proceeding further, the court addressed Molina. THE COURT: And, Miss Molina, have you understood what the prosecutor has said, what your attorney has agreed and is that also your understanding of the plea? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (Tr. 31.) Thereafter, the court engaged in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy wherein the court advised Molina of the nature of the charges, the maximum penalty involved, and the constitutional rights she would be waiving by virtue of her guilty pleas. (Tr. 34-43.) Molina indicated that she understood the court’s advisements. The court then reviewed each count individually by the count number, the name of offense, the applicable code section, and the degree of felony, and asked Molina how she intended to plead. (Tr. 43-44.) The court did not describe the factual allegations related to each count, but Molina replied that she was pleading “guilty.” Ultimately, Molina pleaded guilty to one count of robbery with a one-year firearm specification, one count of aggravated theft, two counts of assault on a peace officer, two counts of criminal damaging, and two counts of obstructing official business. The remaining counts and firearm specifications were nolled. After accepting Molina’s guilty pleas, the court again reviewed the charges and asked Molina if she had in fact committed the specific acts alleged in each count to which she pleaded guilty. (Tr. 44.) Molina admitted that she did in fact commit the alleged offenses. (Tr. 44-45.) Molina also confirmed there were no threats or promises made to induce her guilty pleas and that she was not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or medication that would impair her judgment. (Tr. 32.) The trial court accepted Molina’s guilty pleas as having been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Molina subsequently filed a letter with the court, requesting a court date to withdraw her guilty pleas. The letter states, in relevant part:  Dear [Judge], I am writing this letter to request a court date to change my plea back to not guilty. On Monday June 24, 2024, I was forced to enter a guilty plea without the knowledge of understanding my case and the consequences of the plea. I was not psychologically competent due to being off my mental health medication for a couple of months due to health reasons these couple months. I also told you that my lawyer has been incompetent and hasn’t been able to investigate my case, provide me with any information pertaining to my case, he doesn’t answer or return calls [and] he was and still is not ready to represent my case for trial. . . . [M]y lawyer . . . had me under the impression if I didn’t accept the plea, I would not be able to go home and I had to make sure my kids were going to be okay. I told him several times I wanted to take my case to trial there in the lobby and he still didn’t honor my wishes[.] [I]nstead he coerced me into changing my plea to guilty. On July 11, 2024, Molina failed to appear for a scheduled presentence investigation, and the trial court issued a warrant. On July 25, 2024, Molina appeared in court, and the court appointed new counsel to represent her. On October 21, 2024, Molina, through new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. In the motion, she reiterated that “she was told a number of times that if she did not accept the plea agreement she would go to prison for a very long time.” Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court sentenced Molina to an indefinite sentence of 8 to 12 years in prison on the robbery charge, as amended in Count 2, plus one year on the firearm specification for a term of 9 to 13 years. The court also sentenced Molina to 12-month prison terms on the aggravated theft conviction and on each of the two obstructing official-business convictions; 18-month prison terms on the two assault convictions; and 60 days and 90 days on each of the two criminal-damaging convictions. The court ordered all prison terms to be served concurrently for an aggregate prison term of 9 to 13 years in prison. This appeal followed. II. Law and Analysis A. Guilty Plea In the first assignment of error, Molina argues the trial court should not have accepted her guilty pleas because they were not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. She contends she did not enter her guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the court completely failed to advise her of the effect of a guilty plea. “The standard for reviewing whether the trial court accepted a plea in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is a de novo standard of review.” State v. Cardwell, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86 (1977). In a de novo review, we review the merits of the case independently, without any deference to the trial court. Sosic v. Stephen Hovancsek & Assocs., Inc., 2021-Ohio-2592, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Crim.R. 11(C) outlines the procedures a trial court must follow when accepting guilty or no contest pleas. The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is “‘to convey to the defendant certain information so that he [or she] can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.’” State v. Woodall, 2016-Ohio-294, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480 (1981). It also “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his [or her] rights and the consequences of his [or her] plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). Ordinarily, when a defendant seeks to reverse his or her conviction on grounds that his or her plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, the defendant must demonstrate (1) an error in the proceedings, and (2) that the error caused prejudice to the defendant. Dangler at ¶ 13. There are, however, two exceptions applicable to convictions rendered following a guilty or no contest plea. The first occurs when “a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that the defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest.” Id. at ¶ 14; Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, at ¶ 25. The second occurs if the trial court completely fails to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)’s requirement that it explain the nonconstitutional aspects of the plea proceedings. Dangler at ¶ 15; Fontanez at ¶ 26. “Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he [or she] demonstrates he [or she] was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1990). “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Nero at 108. In Dangler, the Ohio Supreme Court sought to simplify our review of the criminal-plea analysis by dispensing with the different tiers of compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), i.e., partial, substantial, or strict compliance. Id. at ¶ 17. Instead, the Court identified the following questions to be asked when reviewing a trial court’s Crim.R. 11(C) colloquy: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? And (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden? Dangler at ¶ 17. In Fontanez, 2026-Ohio-3281, the Court explained that “[g]iven the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘guilty,’ a court may presume that a defendant understands that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt when the defendant has decided to plead guilty after being presented with the charges.” Fontanez at ¶ 41. And, as previously stated, the Court held that a trial court does not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) so as to render a guilty plea invalid when it fails to explicitly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt as long as the trial court otherwise complies with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the defendant’s admission of guilt is obvious from the context of the plea colloquy, and the defendant does not assert actual innocence. Fontanez at ¶ 47. Molina contends the trial court completely failed to explain the effect of her guilty pleas. Crim.R. 11(B)(1) provides that the effect of a “plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) provides that during the plea colloquy, the trial court must inform “the defendant of and determine[e] that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.” The trial court did not explicitly explain the effect of a guilty plea to Molina prior to accepting her guilty pleas. In taking Molina’s pleas, the court recited the statutory name of each offense, the applicable code section, and the felony or misdemeanor level of each offense, and Molina indicated she understood the offenses to which she was pleading guilty. After Molina entered her guilty pleas, the court described the factual allegations that gave rise to each charge and specifically asked Molina if she committed the acts alleged therein. For instance, with respect to Molina’s guilty plea to the charge of criminal damaging, the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: And, Miss, are you, in fact, guilty, and is this true on or about August 7, 2023, in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, that you did knowingly cause or create a substantial risk of physical harm by any means to the property of the North Olmsted Police Department, specifically a police cruiser, without the North Olmsted Police Department’s consent? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (Tr. 44.) The trial court asked similarly detailed questions regarding all the other offenses to which Molina pleaded guilty, and she admitted that she did in fact commit those acts. (Tr. 44-45.) It would have been a better practice to place the factual basis for each guilty plea on the record before accepting the guilty plea, but the record in this case demonstrates that Molina understood that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt. She understood that by pleading guilty, she admitted that she committed the acts alleged in each charge. She, therefore, cannot demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to expressly state the effect of the guilty plea on the record. The first assignment of error is overruled. B. Motion for New Counsel In the second assignment of error, Molina argues the trial court erred in failing to sufficiently inquire into Molina’s reasons for requesting new counsel prior to her change of plea. We review a trial court’s decision regarding a defendant’s request for newly appointed counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Petty, 2017-Ohio-8732, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. State v. Milligan, 40 Ohio St.3d 341 (1988). Thus, the trial court has a duty to inquire into a criminal defendant’s request to disqualify his or her court-appointed counsel and to make the inquiry part of the record. State v. Stoves, 2018-Ohio-2947, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). However, the inquiry need only be brief and minimal. Id. at ¶ 13, citing State v. King, 104 Ohio App.3d 434, 437 (4th Dist. 1995). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating justifiable grounds for the appointment of new counsel. Id., citing State v. Patterson, 2014-Ohio-1621, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). The trial court’s limited duty to inquire into a defendant’s request for new counsel only arises “‘if the allegations are sufficiently specific; vague or general objections do not trigger the duty to investigate further.’” State v. Philpott, 2020-Ohio-5267, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson, 2006-Ohio-6404, ¶ 68. To warrant the appointment of new counsel, the defendant must show “‘a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 292 (1988), quoting People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 (1970). “‘“A trial court does not abuse its discretion in finding that a general allegation of unhappiness is so vague that it does not require additional investigation.’”” Philpott at ¶ 24, quoting Petty, 2017-Ohio-8732, at ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Griffin, 2013-Ohio-5389, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). As previously stated, Molina initially expressed dissatisfaction with her trial counsel in April 2024. Molina’s trial counsel admitted that while he was occupied with an aggravated-murder trial, he was unable to direct his full attention to Molina’s case. As a result, the court continued the trial to allow Molina time to discuss the case with her attorney. On June 24, 2024, the court again called the case for trial. A few days earlier, Molina’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that “Defendant Molina has told counsel that she wants new counsel and will not communicate with counsel.” (Motion to withdraw filed June 20, 2024.) On the day of trial, the court once again inquired into Molina’s reasons for requesting new counsel and the following colloquy occurred:  THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the representation you have received from your attorney? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Why are you not satisfied with your attorney? THE DEFENDANT: Because I already tried to get this lawyer off of my case twice. THE COURT: Okay. Have you been able to communicate with him today and understand he’s working on your behalf? THE DEFENDANT: No, it did not feel like it. THE COURT: Because you disagree with his advice? Is that why? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. [Attorney], have you, as far as you consider, knowing all of the facts and circumstances, the legal issues in this matter, given your best advice to Miss Molina? DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have, Your Honor. We have had a chance to communicate here this afternoon. We had a chance to talk with a friend of hers on a speaker phone across the hall in an empty courtroom. I think Sabrina understands it and I think a lot of the dissatisfaction folks have with their lawyers is because they think the plea should be better, that I should be able to get a better deal. Based on how this case unfolded, I have been back and forth with the supervisor this afternoon on several occasions. We were able to improve the mark. It was a three-year firearm specification when we were here earlier this morning. We were able to take two years mandatory off since then. I understand Sabrina’s frustration. She is 28 years old. She has five children. I know she’s frustrated that I couldn’t get a better deal. I just frankly couldn’t. (Tr. 33-34.)  The trial court sufficiently inquired into the potential conflict between Molina and her counsel before accepting her guilty pleas. Although Molina expressed disappointment in her counsel, she failed to articulate a specific reason why she should be appointed new counsel other than that she generally disagreed with his advice. Nothing in the record indicates that Molina’s attorney-client relationship deteriorated to such an extent that her right to the effective assistance of counsel was jeopardized. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for new counsel. The second assignment of error is overruled. C. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas In the third assignment of error, Molina argues the trial court erred in denying the presentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea. A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 should be “freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). A defendant does not, however, have an absolute right to withdraw his or her plea, even if the motion is made prior to sentencing; the motion must demonstrate that the movant has “a reasonable and legitimate basis” for withdrawing the plea. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Before ruling on the defendant’s motion, “the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing the plea.” State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, ¶ 13.  Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of a guilty plea but it “gives no guidelines for a trial court to use when ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Xie at 526. Nor does the rule contain any factors a court must consider when ruling upon a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Crim.R. 32.1. Nevertheless, courts have identified nine nonexhaustive factors for evaluating a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Wilder, 2025- Ohio-3075, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). Those factors include whether (1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before he or she entered his or her plea, (3) the defendant is given a complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, (4) the record reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea-withdrawal request, (5) the motion was made in a reasonable time, (6) the motion stated specific reasons for withdrawal, (7) the record shows that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, (8) the defendant had evidence of a plausible defense, and (9) the State would be prejudiced by permitting the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Wilder at ¶ 20-21, citing State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 (8th Dist. 1980), paragraph three of the syllabus. Determining whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the defendant’s request to withdraw his or her plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Barnes at ¶ 13, citing Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. We, therefore, will not disturb the trial court’s judgment absent an abuse of discretion. Id.  Molina concedes that there is no evidence that her trial counsel was incompetent and that the court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 hearing. She nevertheless argues the trial court failed to give her a complete and impartial hearing on the motion to withdraw and that the court failed to give full and fair consideration to her plea-withdrawal request. Molina made a timely motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. She also provided a specific reason for the withdrawal request. Molina’s attorney stated that she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea because she felt pressured to do so by her former attorney, who told her she would go to prison for a long time. Her newly appointed counsel stated: Your Honor. As indicated by the motion, my client feels that there was a lot of pressure on her and she also feels as if she was going through a lot when she entered the plea of guilty, she felt as if she had no choice, and she didn’t feel a lot of confidence in her present attorney. (Tr. 63.) However, to substantiate a claim of coercion, “a defendant ‘must submit supporting material containing evidence that the guilty plea was induced by false promises.’” State v. Bradley, 2020-Ohio-30, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Thomas, 2005-Ohio-4145, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). Molina failed to present evidence of coercion. In response to Molina’s argument that she felt pressured to plead guilty, the prosecutor asserted that Molina merely had “buyer’s remorse” and that Molina did not profess her innocence. In response to the prosecutor’s statements, Molina’s counsel added that Molina was professing innocence. However, she previously admitted in open court and on the record that she committed each of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty. (Tr. 44-45.) Therefore, Molina’s subsequent claim of innocence was not credible. Furthermore, the case had been set for trial multiple times and continued in order to allow Molina to work with defense counsel. And, it is undisputed that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 when it accepted Molina’s guilty pleas and that Molina understood the rights she was waiving by virtue of her guilty pleas. There simply was no justifiable reason to withdraw the guilty pleas under the circumstances presented in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Molina’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. The third assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.  A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR