Doe v. Dayton Pub. Schools

[Cite as Doe v. Dayton Pub. Schools, 2026-Ohio-4499.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY JOHN DOE A PSEUDONYM ET AL. : : C.A. No. 30747 Appellants : : Trial Court Case No. 2025 CV 00306 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS ET AL. : Court) : Appellees : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 13, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Costs to be paid as follows: 50% by the Appellants and 50% by the Appellees. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur.  OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30747 MICHAEL L. WRIGHT, ROBERT L. GRESHAM, KESHA Q. BROOKS, DENNIS P. MULVIHILL, & PETER D. TRASKA, Attorneys for Appellants JONATHAN E. ROACH & SAMANTHA BAGLEY, Attorneys for Appellees HUFFMAN, J. {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, John Doe (a minor) and his parents Taneisha Lindsay and Robert Tootle, individually and as next friends of John Doe, appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing for failure to state a claim in their tort claim for negligent supervision, their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim of a denial of a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim of a denial of bodily integrity against school principal Celeste Hoerner in her individual and supervisory capacity. They also appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Dayton Public School District (DPS) based on municipal liability for failure to state a claim. According to appellants, Doe was injured on the first day of school by Darrick Sorrells, a paraprofessional employed by DPS and supervised by Hoerner. {¶ 2} Because appellants were only required to provide notice of their claims to Hoerner and DPS at the pleading stage, we agree with appellants that appellants had made sufficient factual allegations to survive a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter will be remanded to the trial court. I. Background Facts and Procedural History {¶ 3} In August 2023, Doe, a nonverbal three-year-old boy on the autism spectrum, went to school for the first time at Rosa Parks Early Learning Center (RPELC) in DPS, where 2 Hoerner was the principal. Doe had an individualized education plan (IEP), which provided that he needed assistance with toileting and often eloped from caregivers. {¶ 4} On August 21, the first day of school, Doe was under the care of Sorrells, who worked at RPELC as a paraprofessional helping teachers in the classroom. Sorrells was assisting Doe in the restroom, and Doe ran away from him. Sorrells went after Doe, struck him on the side of his head, knocked him to the floor, and carried him upside down and by his feet back to the classroom. The same day, Hoerner and Doe’s classroom teacher met personally with Doe’s parents to inform them of the incident. At some point, unbeknownst to appellants, the incident was reported to Montgomery County Children’s Services, who advised appellants to obtain video footage of the incident. {¶ 5} Appellants filed an initial complaint and then an amended complaint against DPS, Sorrells, Hoerner, Jane and John Doe Employees, and the Ohio Department of Medicaid, asserting the following causes of actions: 1) acts and omissions excepting individual defendants from immunity against all defendants; 2) assault and battery against Sorrells; 3) deprivation of constitutionally protected rights under color of law against all defendants; 4) loss of consortium with respect to Taneisha Lindsay, Doe’s mother, against all defendants; 5) loss of consortium with respect to Robert Tootle, Doe’s father, against all defendants; 6) intentional infliction of emotional distress on Doe’s behalf against all defendants; and 7) subrogation claims with regard to the Ohio Department of Medicaid. {¶ 6} In their complaint, appellants alleged that Sorrells was unfit and incompetent to be charged with the physical custody of a young, developmentally disabled child like Doe. They claimed that DPS had been required to ensure the physical safety and well-being of students who attended its schools. They further alleged that: Hoerner and Jane and John Doe Employees had recklessly or wantonly placed Doe in Sorrells’s care despite that 3 Sorrells was incapable of meeting Doe’s needs; Sorrells had been incapable of meeting the requirements of a paraprofessional as described in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51; he had been temperamentally, cognitively, and in other ways patently unfit and incompetent to be charged with the physical custody of a young, mentally disabled child; appellees should have known that Sorrells presented a known or knowable danger to young children; and Doe was injured by Sorrells’s actions. Appellants also alleged that Hoerner and Jane and John Doe employees had acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, and in a wanton or reckless manner when they deliberately concealed the extent to which Doe had suffered at the hands of Sorrells in direct violation of Ohio’s mandatory reporting statute and that Doe had suffered physical and emotional injuries. They claimed that DPS, Sorrells, Hoerner, and Jane and John Doe Employees had had a duty to exercise care, custody, and control over the students to whom they delivered special education and they had failed to do so. The claims against Sorrells, Hoerner, and Jane and John Doe Employees were brought against them in their official capacities as DPS employees and in their individual capacities. Sorrells had also been criminally charged for his actions against Doe; according to appellants, he initially pleaded that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him and was unable to participate in his own defense, which appellants suggested demonstrated his own mental limitations. . {¶ 7} DPS, Hoerner, and Jane and John Doe Employees filed a motion to dismiss Doe’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim, asserting that they were immune under R.C. 2744, in both their official and individual capacities, with respect to Doe’s state law claims. They also argued that appellants had failed to plead sufficient facts to support their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against DPS related to political subdivision liability under Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and against Hoerner in her supervisory capacity 4 (qualified immunity). {¶ 8} The allegations in appellants’ first cause of action were difficult to discern, but the trial court determined that they asserted two state law claims against Hoerner in her individual capacity: 1) a tort claim for negligent supervision of Sorrells; and 2) a negligence claim based on her breach of a duty to inform Doe’s parents regarding the nature and extent of the incident so that they could seek prompt medical attention for him. {¶ 9} The trial court dismissed appellants’ first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action under state law against all defendants, including Hoerner, in their official capacities due to their political subdivision tort immunity under R.C. 2744. The court found DPS, Sorrells, and Hoerner were entitled to the broad immunity afforded by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and that no exception to their immunity in their official capacities under R.C. 2744.02(B) applied. The trial court further found that, Hoerner, in her individual capacity, was entitled to dismissal of the negligent supervision claim, presumably based on individual employee immunity, but it found that appellants’ claims for negligence (first cause of action), loss of consortium (fourth and fifth causes of action), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (sixth cause of action) survived the dismiss to motion. The court noted that appellants had sufficiently alleged that Hoerner deliberately concealed the truth from Doe’s parents of what Doe had suffered at the hands of Sorrells and had violated her duty under Ohio’s mandatory reporting statute (negligence claim). The trial court also dismissed appellants’ claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on a deprivation of Doe’s right to a free, appropriate public education under the IDEA and their claims for relief against Hoerner, individually, based on Hoerner’s conduct in hiring, training, and supervising Sorrells. Finally, regarding its 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, the trial court concluded that appellants had failed to state a claim for political subdivision liability against DPS under Monell. 5  {¶ 10} The trial court denied appellees’ motion to dismiss appellants’ 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Hoerner, individually, for violations of Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be secure in his person and Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures based on Hoerner’s conduct in withholding the extent of the incident’s seriousness, intentionally obscuring the likelihood of physical injury to Doe, and actively concealing the existence of video evidence of the incident. {¶ 11} Appellants now appeal the trial court’s dismissal of 1) their claim for negligent supervision against Hoerner, and (2) their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against DPS (as a municipality) and against Hoerner (individually as a supervisor) for a) the deprivation of Doe’s right to bodily integrity while under the care of Sorrells, who was unqualified to be a paraprofessional in charge of multiple special needs children at the same time, and b) deprivation of Doe’s right to free appropriate public education (FAPE) as required by the IDEA and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51. They allege that, based on Hoerner’s conduct in hiring, training, and supervising Sorrells, Hoerner ignored or disregarded the requirements of federal law and the Ohio Administrative Code specifying the qualifications of a paraprofessional working with special needs children and recklessly placed Sorrells independently in charge of multiple special needs children despite his known limitations. {¶ 12} Appellants also complain that DPS denied their public records requests prior to this action and that their claims were dismissed prematurely, particularly when they could not know the full extent of DPS’s or Hoerner’s history with Sorrells, how many other times such an incident had occurred, how many other times DPS’s personnel covered for Sorrells, or the precise circumstances around DPS’s and Hoerner’s choices to “certify” Sorrells as a paraprofessional despite his known deficiencies. II. Assignments of Error 6  {¶ 13} Appellants state the following four assignments of error: Contrary to the language of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), the trial court incorrectly grafted a requirement that the appellees must have had knowledge of a “propensity for violence” on Defendant Sorrells’s part onto the statutory standards for liability. The trial court should have recognized that allegations that the appellees certified Defendant Sorrells as a paraprofessional recklessly, wantonly, or in bad faith state a claim under Ohio law. The trial court incorrectly analyzed appellants claims that the appellees violated both Ohio and federal law by recklessly ignoring State and federal certification requirements as sounding in “negligent supervision.” The trial court should have recognized that allegations that the appellees recklessly placed Defendant Sorrells as the sole paraprofessional caring for multiple special needs children at once state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. {¶ 14} We find that appellants’ assignments of error, however, appear to relate to two broad arguments: 1) Ohio law recognizes actions in tort against employees of political subdivisions for conduct that is reckless, wanton, in bad faith, or with malicious purpose; and 2) appellees’ conduct gave rise to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for denial of federally protected rights. Their first two assignments of error appear to pertain to the first of these arguments, and the last two relate to the second. {¶ 15} Although we find appellants’ assignments of error difficult to discern, we conclude that the errors relate to two issues: 1) the trial court’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of their claim for negligent supervision against Hoerner based on her immunity in her individual 7 capacity under R.C. 2744; and 2) the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against DPS (as a municipality) and against Hoerner (individually) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Based on this conclusion, we will combine their arguments into two assignments of error as set forth below. Standard of Review {¶ 16} Civ.R. 12(B)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), a motion to dismiss should only be sustained if it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. York v. Ohio St. Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). A motion to dismiss is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit. See State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548 (1992). {¶ 17} When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all factual allegations must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988); Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1997). “[T]he movant may not rely on allegations or evidence outside the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson at 548. In other words, in order to sustain a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the trial court must find beyond doubt from the allegations in the pleadings, without resort to any extraneous material, that there is no set of facts which could conceivably be proved by the plaintiff that would allow the case to be submitted to a jury. “A court cannot dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) merely because it doubts the plaintiff will prevail.” Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., 92 Ohio App.3d 232, 234 (1st Dist.1994). {¶ 18} We conduct a de novo review of trial court decisions that grant or deny a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Student Doe v. Adkins, 2021-Ohio-3389, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), citing 8 Alexander Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Village of Albany, 2017-Ohio-8704, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.); see, e.g., Menorah Park Ctr. for Senior Living v. Rolston, 2020-Ohio-6658, citing Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-4193. Accordingly, we afford “no deference to the trial court’s decision”; instead, we independently review it. Id., citing Struckman v. Bd. of Edn. of Teays Valley Local School Dist., 2017-Ohio-1177, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). A. First Assignment of Error 1. IDEA, Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51, and FAPE {¶ 19} In support of their arguments, appellants reference several provisions related to the IDEA and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51. To provide context, we will discuss those here. IDEA {¶ 20} The IDEA is a federal law that ensures children with disabilities receive a FAPE across the United States. The IDEA governs how states provide early intervention, special education, and services to children with disabilities. It “offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a ‘free appropriate public education’ (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE.” Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580 U.S. 154 (2017). The IDEA’s core guarantee is a FAPE. Id. at 157, citing 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). {¶ 21} An eligible child “acquires a ‘substantive right’ to such an education once a State accepts the IDEA’s financial assistance.” Id. at 158, citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010 (1984). Under the IDEA, an individualized education program (IEP) “serves as the ‘primary vehicle’ for providing each child with the promised FAPE.” Id., citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988); see 20 U.S.C. 1414(d). “[T]he IEP spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child’s ‘educational needs.’” Id., citing 20 U.S.C. 9 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb), (d)(1)(B). {¶ 22} If a dispute arises between parents and school representatives, the IDEA establishes the following formal resolution procedures: To begin, a dissatisfied parent may file a complaint as to any matter concerning the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational agency (as state law provides). See § 1415(b)(6). That pleading generally triggers a “[p]reliminary meeting” involving the contending parties, § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i); at their option, the parties may instead (or also) pursue a full-fledged mediation process, see § 1415(e). Assuming their impasse continues, the matter proceeds to a “due process hearing” before an impartial hearing officer. § 1415(f)(1)(A); see § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). Any decision of the officer granting substantive relief must be “based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE].” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency. See § 1415(g). Finally, a parent unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. See § 1415(i)(2)(A). Id. at 159. {¶ 23} Generally, a plaintiff must exhaust the IDEA’s procedures before filing an action under the American with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws. Fry, 580 U.S. at 165, citing 20 U.S.C.A. 1415(l). The only relief available under the IDEA relates to denial of a FAPE. Id. In determining whether a civil suit seeks relief for a denial of a FAPE, “a court should look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. 10  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51 and FAPE {¶ 24} Chapter 3301-51 of the Ohio Administrative Code sets forth Ohio’s specific operating standards, which translate the IDEA mandates into actionable rules for local school districts and educational agencies and govern the education of students with special needs. “The purpose of Chapter 3301-51 of the Administrative Code is to ensure that all children with disabilities residing in Ohio between the ages of three and twenty-one years, inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school, have available to them a free appropriate public education (FAPE), as provided by Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, as amended by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA) at 20 U.S.C. 1400, related federal regulations at 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Chapter 3323. of the Revised Code, the provisions of this chapter of the Administrative Code, and applicable state policies, procedures, and guidelines issued by the superintendent of public instruction.” Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51- 01(A). {¶ 25} The Code requires that (a) children with disabilities have available to them FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (b) the rights of children with disabilities and their parents are protected. Ohio Adm.Code 3301- 51-01(A)(1)(a) and (b). The child’s school district of residence is responsible for ensuring that the requirements for making FAPE available are met for every eligible child in its jurisdiction. Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-01(A)(2)(a). Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-07 outlines Ohio-specific procedures for creating, reviewing, and managing IEPs in compliance with federal standards. Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-05 establishes parental rights, notice requirements, and dispute resolution processes mandated under federal law. 11  {¶ 26} The Code also permits Ohio school districts to utilize paraprofessionals in the classroom. In general, a paraprofessional is a school support staff member who works under the direction of a licensed teacher to help classrooms run smoothly. Under the Code, “‘[p]araprofessional services’ include services provided by educational agency employees who are adequately trained to assist in the provision of special education to children with disabilities. Paraprofessionals work under the supervision of teachers, intervention specialists, and/or related service providers. Other titles used to identify these service providers include teacher assistants, educational aides, school psychology aides, occupational therapy assistants, physical therapist assistants, and job coaches.” Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-01(B)(47). {¶ 27} The delivery of services as required by the IDEA are described in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-09. Under that rule, the roles of preschool and school-age service providers are set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-09(G), which states: (1) The educational agency will assign early childhood, and school-age intervention specialists, and/or related service providers to meet the unique educational needs of each child with a disability. The school-age service provider may provide indirect or direct services in one or any combination of instructional groupings, including large group, small group, individual instruction, or parent and teacher training and consultation. (2) The educational agency will ensure early childhood and school-age intervention specialists, and/or related service providers: (a) Serve children with disabilities to assure a free appropriate public education and may serve children without disabilities where needs for services are identified; 12  (b) Support regular education teachers in serving and/or consulting about children with and without disabilities so that the regular education personnel, in partnership with the special education service providers and related service personnel, can implement a child’s individualized education program in the least restrictive environment; (c) Assist in organizing and facilitating supplemental supports provided within the regular classroom; (d) Design parent involvement activities; and (e) Implement educational interventions and specially designed instruction which means adapting, as appropriate, to the needs of the eligible child, the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction: (i) To address the unique needs of the child that result from the child’s disability; and (ii) To ensure access to the general curriculum so that the child can meet the educational standards adopted by the state board of education that apply to all children. (3) The educational agency will ensure services of paraprofessionals and related service assistants are supervised in accordance with Ohio law. {¶ 28} The Code also provides that the educational agency must ensure that all personnel necessary to carry out the purposes of IDEA are employed and appropriately and adequately prepared and trained, including that those personnel have the knowledge and skills to serve children with disabilities. Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-09(H)(1). Personnel are also expected to have appropriate certification or licensure as defined by Chapter 3301-24 of the Ohio Administrative Code. Id. 13  {¶ 29} The Code further states that paraprofessionals are to have certain qualifications that: (a) Are consistent with state-approved or state-recognized certification, licensing, registration, or other comparable provisions that apply to the professional discipline in which those personnel are providing special education or related services; and (b) Ensure that related services personnel who deliver services in their discipline or profession: (i) Meet the provisions of paragraph (H)(2)(a) of this rule; and (ii) Have not had certification or licensure obligations waived on an emergency, temporary, or provisional basis; and (iii) Allow paraprofessionals and assistants who are appropriately trained and supervised, in accordance with state law, regulation, or written policy, in meeting the provisions of this rule, to be used to assist in the provision of special education and related services under this rule to children with disabilities. (a) Paraprofessionals providing services to children with disabilities will hold an educational aide permit or associate license and meets [sic] the provisions under paragraph (I) of rule 3301-24-05 of the Administrative Code. Any educational agency that employs a paraprofessional will have written policies and procedures outlining: (i) Criteria for staff selection; (ii) A planned sequence of continuing education and 14  annual training opportunities to enable the paraprofessional to continue to develop the knowledge and skills that are specific to the students with whom the paraprofessional works, including following lesson plans, implementing follow-up instructional procedures and activities, supporting effective classroom organization and behavior management, and working effectively with teachers and as part of an instructional team; (iii) A process for direct continuing supervision by one or more licensed teachers or service providers and evaluation of the services of such personnel; and (iv) A job description of the role and function of a paraprofessional. Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51-09(H)(2). 2. Immunity as an Individual Employee under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act {¶ 30} Political subdivision immunity is outlined in the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act in Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code, which sets forth rules for when local governments and their employees can or cannot be sued for injury, death, or property damage. Public school districts are political subdivisions performing a governmental function by providing public education. R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(c) and (F). Public school principals are considered employees of a political subdivision under R.C. 2744.01(B). {¶ 31} R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) governs a political subdivision employee’s individual immunity. Under that provision, individuals working for a public school district start with a broad presumption of tort immunity from individual civil lawsuits when performing their job 15 duties. This protection applies as long as they are employees acting within the scope of their employment. A plaintiff, however, can overcome an employee’s presumptive immunity. In those circumstances, a plaintiff can hold the employee personally liable by proving that at least one of three exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) applies: (a) the employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities; (b) the employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or (c) civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by another specific section of the Revised Code. {¶ 32} In other words, “Ohio law generally provides political subdivisions and their employees with immunity from lawsuits and liability.” Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2021-Ohio-4096, ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). However, that immunity is not absolute, as “Ohio law permits plaintiffs to sue and hold liable employees of a political subdivision if the employees’ acts or omissions in the course and scope of their employment were wanton or reckless.” Id., citing R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). {¶ 33} “Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson v. Massillon, 2012-Ohio-5711, ¶ 34, citing Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 104-105 (1990), adopting 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 500, at 587 (1965); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1298-1299 (8th Ed.2004) (explaining that reckless conduct is characterized by a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and a conscious disregard of or indifference to the risk, but the actor does not desire harm). Recklessness requires a showing that “the actor knew his or her conduct ‘in all probability’ would result in injury” and 16 is a rigorous threshold to meet. Wyatt v. Springfield, 2024-Ohio-3334, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), citing McDonald v. Lacy, 2018-Ohio-2753, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). {¶ 34} Wanton misconduct, on the other hand, is “the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.” Anderson at ¶ 33, citing Hawkins v. Ivy, 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 117-118 (1977); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1613-1614 (8th Ed.2004) (explaining that one acting in a wanton manner is aware of the risk of the conduct but is not trying to avoid it and is indifferent to whether harm results). “‘Human error’ might mean negligence, but it does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.” Whitley v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 2010-Ohio-356, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.); see also Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St. 3d 351, 357 (1994) (“mere negligence in [officer’s] official duties should not give rise to personal liability”). {¶ 35} Whether a political subdivision employee may invoke statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 generally presents a question of law. See Nease v. Med. College Hosp., 64 Ohio St.3d 396, 400 (1992), quoting Roe v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Human Servs., 53 Ohio App.3d 120, 126 (1st Dist.1988) (citations omitted) (“‘Whether immunity may be invoked is a purely legal issue, properly determined by the court prior to trial, and preferably on a motion for summary judgment’”); Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292 (1992); accord Williams v. Glouster, 2012-Ohio-1283, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.); Long v. Hanging Rock, 2011- Ohio-5137, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.). Whether a political subdivision employee acted in a wanton or reckless manner, however, is generally a question of fact. Cannavino v. Rock Ohio Caesars Cleveland, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-380, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.); Long at ¶ 17, citing Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-6208; Fabrey, 70 Ohio St.3d at 356. {¶ 36} We note that “the affirmative defense of immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 17 may be the basis of a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Student Doe, 2021-Ohio-3389, at ¶ 20, quoting Para v. Jackson, 2021-Ohio-1188, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment [or a motion to dismiss].” Student Doe at ¶ 18, quoting Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018-Ohio-2121, ¶ 12, citing Conley at 292. “A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss on the basis of political-subdivision immunity only when the complaint bears ‘conclusive evidence that the action is barred by the defense.’” Id. at ¶ 20, citing Plush v. Cincinnati, 2020-Ohio-6713, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting Bucey v. Carlisle, 2010-Ohio-2262, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). Consequently, “unless the pleadings obviously or conclusively establish the affirmative defense,” a trial court may not dismiss the complaint. Id., quoting Steele v. City of Cincinnati, 2019-Ohio-4853, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). We “conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s determination regarding political-subdivision immunity.” Id. at ¶ 18, citing Wright v. Village of Williamsport, 2019-Ohio-2682, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). 3. Notice Pleading {¶ 37} Ohio is a notice-pleading state. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Horn, 2015-Ohio- 1484, ¶ 13. Generally, a plaintiff is not required to plead the operative facts of his or her case with particularity, except in very narrow circumstances, such as fraud. York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145. Thus, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief” is typically sufficient. Civ.R. 8(A). {¶ 38} In cases where a government employee’s reckless or wanton behavior is at issue, “these general pleading rules still apply.” Maternal Grandmother, 2021-Ohio-4096, at ¶ 11, citing see Civ.R 9(B) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”). Accordingly, “when a complaint invokes the exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), notice pleading suffices 18 and the plaintiff may not be held to a heightened pleading standard or expected to plead the factual circumstances surrounding an allegation of wanton or reckless behavior with particularity.” Id., citing Parmertor v. Chardon Local Schools, 2016-Ohio-761, ¶ 49-51 (11th Dist.); Thompson v. Buckeye Joint Vocational School Dist., 2016-Ohio-2804, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.); see also York at 144-145. 4. Negligent Supervision {¶ 39} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their tort claim for negligent supervision against Hoerner based on her individual immunity under R.C. 2744. They assert that Ohio law recognizes actions in tort against employees of political subdivisions for conduct that is reckless, wanton, in bad faith, or with malicious purpose. They argue that contrary to the language of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), the trial court incorrectly “grafted a requirement” that Hoerner have knowledge of Sorrells’s “propensity for violence” in order for her to be liable. They also contend that the trial court should have recognized that their allegations—namely that Hoerner recklessly, wantonly, or in bad faith “certified” Sorrells as a paraprofessional—stated a claim under Ohio law. {¶ 40} At the outset, we note that appellants repeatedly argue that Hoerner recklessly or wantonly “credentialed” Sorrells and “certified” him as competent to work as a paraprofessional. In support of their argument, they point to the requirements in the Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51 relating to paraprofessionals and the personnel qualifications of those working with children with disabilities. They contend that, when individual officers or employees ignore the paraprofessional requirements set out in the Ohio Administrative Code recklessly, wantonly, in bad faith, or with a malicious purpose, they are subject to liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), that the Ohio Administrative Code prescribes how the education agency officers and employees are required to implement the IDEA, and that R.C. 19 2744 prescribes the rules for liability. {¶ 41} We want to emphasize that R.C. 2744 governs liability related to tort claims. While it is unclear in this context why appellants point to those administrative code requirements, we observe that there is no cognizable tort claim in Ohio for a violation of the IDEA or for negligently credentialing or certifying a school paraprofessional under Ohio Adm.Code 3301-51. {¶ 42} We surmise, however, that perhaps appellants are now arguing that they asserted a claim for general negligence and that 1) a duty arose under the Ohio Administrative Code requiring Hoerner to ensure that Sorrells had the necessary qualifications to serve as a paraprofessional and that he was appropriately and adequately prepared and trained, and 2) Hoerner breached that duty based on her knowledge of Sorrells’s inability to carry out his job responsibilities. However, a violation of an administrative rule does not constitute negligence per se. Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 2009- Ohio-2495, ¶ 20; Chambers v. St. Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 568 (1998). While it may b