Columbus City School Dist. v. State

[Cite as Columbus City School Dist. v. State, 2026-Ohio-4047.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT Columbus City School District et al., : Plaintiffs-Appellees/ : Cross-Appellants, : Nos. 25AP-603, v. 25AP-604, : & State of Ohio et al., 25AP-605 : (C.P.C. No. 22CV-67) Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-Appellees, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Catholic School Family et al. : Intervenors-Appellants. : D E C I S I O N Rendered on October 15, 2026 On brief: Weston Hurd, LLP, and Maria Fair; McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman, Mark I. Wallach, and Lawrence R. Acton, for plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants. Argued: Maria Fair and Mark I. Wallach. On brief: [D. Andrew Wilson], Attorney General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Stephen P. Carney, and Elizabeth H. Smith; Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Mark D. Wagoner, David F. Axlerod, and Matthew T. Kemp, for defendants- appellants/cross-appellees. Argued: Stephen P. Carney. On brief: Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Robert G. Schuler, and Christoper J. Weber, for intervenor-appellant, Catholic School Family. On brief: Robinson Law Firm LLC, and Emmett Robinson; Institute for Justice, Keith Neely, and David Hodges, pro hac vice; EdChoice Legal Advocates, Thomas M. Fisher, and Bryan G. Cleveland, pro hac vice; Institute for Justice, and Michael Bindas, pro hac vice, for intervenor-appellant, Christopher Boggs. Argued: Keith Neely. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 2 On brief: Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, and Megan M. Wold, for amici curiae, Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Clinic and Notre Dame Education Law Project, in support of defendants-appellants/cross-appellees. On brief: Legal Aid of Southeast and Central Ohio, Lucy Schwallie, Caitlin DiCresce, and Hannah Wagner, for amicus curiae, Ohio Advocacy and Legal Services Organizations; Disability Rights Ohio, and Kristin Hildebrant, for amicus curiae, Disability Rights Ohio, in support of plaintiffs- appellees/cross-appellants. On brief: Lemmerbrock & Boron, LLC, and Brooks W. Boron, for amicus curiae, Ohio Federation of Teachers; Ohio Education Association, and Kelly Phillips, for amicus curiae, Ohio Education Association, in support of plaintiffs- appellees/cross-appellants. APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas LELAND, J. {¶ 1} In 2005, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Ohio’s Education Choice Scholarship Program (“EdChoice”). 2005 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66 (effective June 30, 2005). As originally established, EdChoice provided a limited number of state taxpayer-funded scholarships available to students to assist them in attending private schools. However, over the last two decades, the General Assembly has significantly broadened EdChoice’s funding and eligibility requirements. In fiscal years 2024 and 2025, for example, EdChoice and the EdChoice Expansion Scholarship Program (“EdChoice Expansion”) cost taxpayers almost $1.4 billion. The programs are now available to virtually all Ohio students, regardless of family income or the quality of local public schools. {¶ 2} In 2022, plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants (“Plaintiffs”), Columbus City School District, Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School District, Richmond Heights Local School District, Lima City School District, Barberton City School District, Dayton City School District, Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding,1 and individual students, M.M., F.D., S.H., C.H. (“Student Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint in 1 According to their complaint, The Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding is a council of governments comprised of public school districts and boards of education from across the state of Ohio, organized pursuant to R.C. Chapter 167. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 3 the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas challenging the constitutionality of EdChoice, including its legislative expansions. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2, which requires the state to “secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools” and prohibits the state from allowing religious or other sectarian groups from exercising exclusive control over public-school funds. Student Plaintiffs also asserted that EdChoice violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Defendant-appellants/cross-appellees include the State of Ohio, Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Ohio Department of Education, and the State of Ohio Board of Education (“State Defendants”); intervenor-defendants, Christopher and Chelasea Boggs, Brian Ellis, Kathryn Sliwinski, Marc Omelsky, Benjamin Highley (“Boggs Intervenors”); and intervenor-defendants, Pamela and Clifton Jemison, Mariam Moussa, Rudie Wright, Paige and Christpher Fay, and Miguell and Yecenia Marquez (“Catholic School Family Intervenors”) (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims, and Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment. {¶ 3} The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, finding, among other things, that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 with regard to three of the five counts asserted in the complaint. Defendants now timely appeal from that ruling. Student Plaintiffs have filed a cross-appeal with regard to Count 5 of the complaint asserting equal protection arguments for which the trial court found in favor of Defendants on summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. An Overview of Ohio’s Voucher Programs {¶ 4} EdChoice, as it exists today, did not emerge overnight. Rather, it evolved over three decades through a series of incremental legislative enactments that expanded eligibility, funding, and participation beyond its original scope. {¶ 5} EdChoice traces its origins to 1995, although it was not yet known by that name. That year, the General Assembly enacted the Pilot Project Scholarship Program for the Cleveland City School District (“the Cleveland Pilot Program”). Am.Sub.H.B. No. 117, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 898; see former R.C. 3313.974 et seq. (effective June 30, 1995). Enacted as part of the state’s biennial budget bill, the Cleveland Pilot Program provided Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 4 scholarships to Cleveland students to attend private schools, including religiously affiliated schools. {¶ 6} From the start, the Cleveland Pilot Program was limited in scope. It applied only to students within the Cleveland Municipal School District (“CMSD”),2 and only private schools located within the district were allowed to participate in the program. See former R.C. 3313.975 and 3313.976(A)(1). Additionally, it primarily targeted low-income families. Id.; former R.C. 3313.976(A)(8). Students from families earning less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level were eligible for scholarships that (1) covered up to 90 percent of private-school tuition and (2) were capped at a maximum scholarship of $2,500. See former R.C. 3313.978(A). Families above that threshold could receive scholarships covering up to 75 percent of tuition, and they were also capped at $2,500. Id. {¶ 7} Next, as an alternative to receiving vouchers to attend private school, students at CMSD were also given the choice to participate in interdistrict open enrollment by attending a public school in a district adjacent to CMSD. See former R.C. 3313.978(A)(1). Importantly, the legislation also required the state superintendent to award “tutorial assistance grants” to students who remained in Cleveland public schools, with the number of grants matching the number of scholarships awarded. Former R.C. 3313.978(B). {¶ 8} The total number of scholarships available each year under the Cleveland Pilot Program was also limited by legislative appropriations, with the program eventually being funded at approximately $5.25 million annually. See former R.C. 3313.975(B). Private-school voucher funds were distributed by the state via check, with the checks made payable to the parents, who were then required to endorse them over to the participating private school. The checks for students enrolling in public schools in adjacent public-school districts were made payable directly to those districts. Former R.C. 3313.979. {¶ 9} The Cleveland Pilot Program did not give private schools that participated in the program unfettered choice in selecting the voucher students they enrolled. Rather, the program had an anti-discrimination policy built into the legislation, which required that all participating private schools agree to enroll students without regard or discrimination based on protected classes such as race, religion, or ethnic background. The anti- 2 The district’s name changed to the Cleveland Metropolitan School District during the 2007 through 2008 school year. See https://signalcleveland.org/timeline-25-years-of-mayoral-control-over-cleveland-public- schools/ (accessed Oct. 12, 2026) [https://perma.cc/923X-R4Z5]. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 5 discrimination policy also required that these private schools agree not to foster, teach, or otherwise advocate against a student, person, or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, or otherwise. See former R.C. 3313.976(A)(1) through (8). {¶ 10} The Cleveland Pilot Program further put constraints on a private school’s ability to selectively choose which students to enroll by requiring that the school first prioritize the continued enrollment of students who were already enrolled at the school in the year preceding the start of the program, and thereafter, before offering any remaining open spaces to new program voucher students. Former R.C. 3313.977(A)(1)(a). Even then, participating private schools had limited discretion over which voucher students to enroll because the law mandated that voucher students be admitted through a process “by lot.”3 See former R.C. 3313.977(A)(1)(c) and (d). {¶ 11} The Cleveland Pilot Program was almost immediately challenged in court. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Ohio in Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 1999- Ohio-77. Opponents argued that the program unconstitutionally supported religious education in violation of the Establishment Clause of the state and federal constitutions, violated Ohio Const. art VI, § 2, which requires the state to “secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools,” and had been enacted in violation of Ohio’s constitutional one- subject rule, which limits legislation to a single subject. The Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had violated the one-subject rule by embedding the Cleveland Pilot Program within the appropriations bill. Before it reached that holding, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the program itself did not violate the Establishment Clause of the state or federal constitutions and found no violation of Ohio Const. art VI, § 2. In finding no violation, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that a voucher program bigger in scope or scale could push against or exceed the boundaries of constitutionality. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated: Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution also states that “[t]he general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system 3 The law did state, however, that “[e]xcept where otherwise prohibited by federal law, a registered private school may elect to admit students of only one gender and may deny admission to any separately educated handicap student.” Former R.C. 3313.977(A)(2)(b). Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 6 of common schools throughout the State.” In DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, this court held that the state has an obligation to establish a “thorough and efficient system of common schools.” It can be argued that implicit within this obligation is a prohibition against the establishment of a system of uncommon (or nonpublic) schools financed by the state. Private schools have existed in this state since before the establishment of public schools. They have in the past provided and continue to provide a valuable alternative to the public system. However, their success should not come at the expense of our public education system or our public school teachers. We fail to see how the School Voucher Program, at the current funding level, undermines the state’s obligation to public education. (Emphasis added.) (Brackets in original.) Goff at ¶ 33-34. As a footnote to this comment the Supreme Court also went the extra step to add: “It is possible that a greatly expanded School Voucher Program or similar program could damage public education. Such a program could be subject to a renewed constitutional challenge.” Id. at fn. 2. {¶ 12} After the Cleveland Pilot Program was invalidated under the one-subject rule, the General Assembly promptly reenacted it as stand-alone legislation. 1999 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282 (effective June 29, 1999). Opponents then refiled their challenge in federal court, asserting only a First Amendment Establishment Clause claim. The case ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the program, concluding that it did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program was neutral with respect to religion and directed state funds to religious schools through the choices of parents, rather than through direct governmental endorsement or allocation. Id. {¶ 13} In June 2005, the General Assembly enacted the original EdChoice. See 126 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66 (2005). Unlike the Cleveland Pilot Program, which was limited to CMSD, EdChoice dramatically expanded the geographic scope of state-funded private- school tuition assistance by making vouchers available to eligible students statewide. Initially, students qualified only if they attended a low-performing public school. See former R.C. 3310.03 (2005). At the time, Ohio used a five-tier academic accountability system: Excellent, Effective, Continuous Improvement, Academic Watch, and Academic Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 7 Emergency. Low-performing public schools were those schools that the Ohio Department of Education4 had rated as “Academic Emergency” for three consecutive years. Id. {¶ 14} Beginning in March 2006, the General Assembly began passing a series of amendments that expanded student eligibility. Specifically, 2006 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 530 (effective June 30, 2006) expanded eligibility for EdChoice funding to students attending schools that had received the higher “Academic Watch” rating for three consecutive years. Then, in December 2006, the General Assembly further broadened eligibility by extending it to students assigned to schools that had been rated either “Academic Watch” or “Academic Emergency” in two out of the preceding three years. Eligibility for the original EdChoice was capped at 14,000 students. Amendments to the law enacted in 2011 expanded this cap to 30,000 students for the 2011 through 2012 school year and 60,000 for the 2012 through 2013 school year. The latter amendment also expanded eligibility for EdChoice to any student attending a district school that had been ranked in the lowest 10 percent of school buildings statewide for the last 2 out of 3 years. {¶ 15} While the 2005 EdChoice legislation and its legislative amendments expanded eligibility for taxpayer-funded private-school vouchers, it differed from the Cleveland Pilot Program in the educational options it funded. Unlike the Cleveland Pilot Program, which created the right for eligible students to transfer to different, better performing public schools and required the state superintendent to provide tutorial grants to eligible students attending struggling public schools, the 2005 EdChoice legislation and its 2006 and 2011 amendments remained a taxpayer-funded private-school voucher program only. {¶ 16} A significant change to EdChoice came in 2013, when the General Assembly enacted what became known as the EdChoice Expansion Scholarship Program. See 2013 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 59 (effective June 30, 2013). EdChoice Expansion created a separate voucher program that was available to all students, regardless of whether the student’s assigned public school was low-performing. See former R.C. 3310.032(A) (2013). Instead, eligibility turned solely on whether the student’s household income fell at or below 4 The department has been called the “Ohio Department of Education and Workforce” since October 2, 2023. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 8 200 percent of the federal income poverty level. Former R.C. 3310.032(A). As a result, students became eligible for EdChoice Expansion vouchers based on income alone.5 {¶ 17} Additionally, like the earlier amendments to EdChoice, the 2013 EdChoice Expansion did not permit the interdistrict transfer of students to other public schools or provide tutorial assistance to students who remained in their assigned public schools. Students attending high-performing schools could receive a voucher, so long as they met the income eligibility requirements. {¶ 18} Legislation enacted between 2015 through 2022 continued to broaden the threshold income levels needed to receive EdChoice Expansion voucher funds, expanding the reach of the program beyond low-income earners to middle-income earners. See 2015 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 70; 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166; 2020 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 89; 2021 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 110; 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 583. {¶ 19} In 2023, the General Assembly enacted 2023 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 33 (effective July 4, 2023), expanding EdChoice Expansion’s taxpayer-funded private-school tuition voucher program even further to make virtually every Ohio student eligible,6 regardless of household income or whether the student attended a low-performing public school (“2023 EdChoice Expansion”). Although the 2023 expansion made the program universal, the value of each voucher remained tied to household income. Students from households earning at or below 450 percent of the federal poverty level qualify for the maximum scholarship—$6,166 annually for kindergarten through 8th grade and $8,408 for grades 9 through 12. See R.C. 3310.08(B)(1). Students with household incomes above that threshold remain eligible for vouchers on a sliding scale. See R.C. 3310.08(B)(2). The wealthiest families in the state are entitled to taxpayer-funded vouchers of $650 per year for students in kindergarten through 8th grade and $950 per year for students in grades 9 through 12. Id. {¶ 20} Like earlier expansions of the voucher program, the 2023 EdChoice Expansion did not create a right for students to transfer between public schools within or 5 The law explicitly disqualified students from EdChoice Expansion if they fell within the eligibility requirements for a different Ohio voucher program—i.e., if they fell within the scope of the original EdChoice by attending a low-performing school or if they attended a school within CMSD. See former R.C. 3310.032(A) (2013). 6 The only students not eligible for the 2023 EdChoice Expansion are those students who qualify for the Cleveland Pilot Program. See R.C. 3310.05. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 9 outside their district, nor did it provide tutorial grants for students who remained in public schools. {¶ 21} Until now, neither the original 2005 EdChoice nor any of the subsequent expansions has been challenged in court. As a result, the last judicial challenge to an Ohio voucher program occurred in Goff, where the Supreme Court considered the Cleveland Pilot Program. Although the Supreme Court held that the program’s limited scope did not violate Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2, it cautioned that a voucher program any larger in size or scale may run afoul of the Ohio Constitution. B. Procedural History of This Case {¶ 22} On January 4, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against State Defendants. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that EdChoice violated the common schools provision of Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2, and the Student Plaintiffs alleged that it violated their right to Equal Protection under Ohio Const. art. I, § 2. {¶ 23} On January 7, 2022, the Boggs Intervenors filed a Civ.R. 24 motion to intervene as defendants in the action. On March 14, 2022, the Catholic School Intervenors also moved to intervene as defendants. In their respective motions, both the Boggs and the Catholic School Family Intervenors asserted that they are parents who receive EdChoice funding to send their children to private schools. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted both motions to intervene, thus permitting both sets of intervenors to participate as defendants in the case. {¶ 24} On May 18, 2022, the State Defendants filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint. In the motion, the State Defendants argued that the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding did not have standing to sue because it is created by statute and, as a statutory creation, has only the powers afforded to it by the General Assembly via statute, which does not include the right to sue. They additionally argued that while the individual school-district plaintiffs are statutorily authorized to sue, they are not authorized to sue on issues regarding state funding. Lastly, and in the alternative, State Defendants argued that none of the Plaintiffs—i.e., the school-district plaintiffs nor the individual-student plaintiffs—has standing to sue because none has Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 10 suffered a direct and concrete injury from students receiving EdChoice funding to attend private schools. {¶ 25} On May 19, 2022, the Boggs and Catholic School Family Intervenors jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Rather than addressing the sufficiency of the pleadings, the motion advanced arguments directed to the merits of the constitutional issues before the trial court. {¶ 26} Before the trial court ruled on the pending motions, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on May 26, 2022. The amended complaint asserted five causes of action. {¶ 27} In Count 1, Plaintiffs alleged that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 by creating one or more systems of “uncommon schools.” Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that EdChoice created this system by diverting funding from public schools to private schools, thereby depleting public-school resources, providing taxpayer funding to private schools without governmental oversight of educational standards for these schools or expenditures, and financing private schools that impose selective or conditional admissions requirements. (Dec. 21, 2023 Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Supp. Compl. Instanter at ¶ 134.) {¶ 28} In Count 2, Plaintiffs alleged that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 by undermining the state’s constitutional obligation to “secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools.” Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2. According to the complaint, the program accomplishes this by underfunding public schools in favor of subsidizing private- school education. Id. at ¶ 147. {¶ 29} In Count 3, Plaintiffs alleged that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 because it promotes segregation by contributing to a significant increase in minority students attending public schools while encouraging the departure of white students to private schools. {¶ 30} In Count 4, Plaintiffs alleged that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 by using public funds to support religious and other sectarian private schools. {¶ 31} Finally, Count 5 asserted claims on behalf of the individual-student plaintiffs, M.M., F.D., C.H., and S.H. They alleged that EdChoice violates their right to equal protection, under Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2, because they receive less per-pupil funding as Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 11 public-school students than they would receive if they accepted EdChoice scholarships to attend private schools. {¶ 32} State Defendants answered the complaint, and the Boggs and Catholic School Family Intervenors refiled their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, State Defendants refiled their motion to dismiss. {¶ 33} The trial court held a hearing on the motions and, on December 16, 2022, the court denied both the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss and the Boggs and Catholic School Family Intervenors’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. {¶ 34} On August 7, 2023, the Boggs and Catholic School Family Intervenors filed a joint motion to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the claims had become moot in light of the changes to EdChoice enacted through 2023 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 33 (effective July 4, 2023). The trial court denied the Boggs and Catholic School Family Intervenors’ motion and granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint instanter to address the amendments to the EdChoice program made by 2023 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 33. {¶ 35} The supplemental complaint asserted the same five claims as the original and amended complaints, with limited revisions to explain how the changes enacted through 2023 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 33 relate to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. {¶ 36} Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all claims. {¶ 37} On June 24, 2025, the trial court issued its decision on the parties’ cross- motions for summary judgment, granting the motions in part and denying them in part. Specifically, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Counts 1, 2, and 4, which alleged violations of Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2, but denied summary judgment to Plaintiffs and granted it as to the Defendants on Count 5, which alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of Ohio Const. art. I, § 2. The trial court further denied both the Plaintiffs’ and the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to Count 3. The trial court declared EdChoice unconstitutional based on its rulings on Counts 1, 2, and 4, enjoined its continued implementation, and stayed the injunction pending appeal to this court. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 12 II. Assignments of Error {¶ 38} State Defendants present the following as trial court error: [I.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs, and in denying it to Defendants, as to their claim that EdChoice scholarships violate the “common system” aspect of Article VI, Section 2 [of the Ohio Constitution], which provides for “a thorough and efficient system of common schools.” (Decision and Entry on the Parties’ Motion for Summary Judgment (June 24, 2025) (“Op.”) at 21.) [II.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs, and in denying it to Defendants, as to their claim that EdChoice scholarships cause underfunding of public schools in violation of the “thorough and efficient” aspect of Article VI, Section 2, which provides for “a thorough and efficient system of common schools.” (Op. at 26.) [III.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs, and in denying it to Defendants, as to their claim that EdChoice scholarships violate Article VI, Section 2’s “religious control” clause, which bars any religious sect from having “any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.” (Op. at 41.) {¶ 39} The Boggs and Catholic School Family Intervenors present the following as trial court error: [I.] The Trial Court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees and denied summary judgment to Defendants/Appellants on Count I of the Supplemental Complaint. [II.] The Trial Court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees and denied summary judgment to Defendants/Appellants on Count II of the Supplemental Complaint. [III.] The Trial Court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees and denied summary judgment Defendants/Appellants on Count IV of the Supplemental Complaint. {¶ 40} The Student Plaintiffs on cross-appeal present the following as trial court error: Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 13 [I.] The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to State Defendants and Intervenors on Count Five of Plaintiffs Appellees’ Supplemental Complaint[.] III. Standard of Review {¶ 41} We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same Civ.R. 56 summary-judgment standard as the trial court. See Hubbell v. Xenia, 2007- Ohio-4839, ¶ 21. “De novo review means the reviewing court independently analyzes the record while giving no deference to the trial court’s decision.” Allen v. Marre, 2026-Ohio- 1186, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.), citing Johnson v. Am. Italian Golf Assn. of Columbus, 2018-Ohio- 2100, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). {¶ 42} Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the party opposing the motion. See Franks v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-1519, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.); see also Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 1996-Ohio-336, ¶ 10. {¶ 43} On summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107, ¶ 17. This burden cannot be satisfied through conclusory assertions; rather, the movant must identify specific evidence of the type permitted under Civ.R. 56(C) affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support its claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 1997-Ohio-259, ¶ 19. If the moving party satisfies this burden, summary judgment is appropriate unless the nonmoving party responds by affidavit, or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. Id.; Vahila at ¶ 19; Civ.R. 56(E). {¶ 44} “A fact is material if it ‘ “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” of the case. ’ ” Oko v. Cleveland Div. of Police, 2021-Ohio-2931, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting Turner v. Turner, 1993-Ohio-176, ¶ 8, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A factual dispute is ‘ “genuine” only if it allows reasonable minds to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Huntington Natl. Bank v. Blount, 2013-Ohio-3128, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), quoting Sysco Food Servs. of Cleveland v. Titan Devs., Inc., 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4762, *7 (9th Dist. Oct. 25, 1995). Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 14 {¶ 45} This court reviews constitutional challenges to state legislation “de novo, . . . with the understanding that duly enacted laws are afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality[.]” Put-In-Bay v. Mathys, 2020-Ohio-4421, ¶ 11, citing Cleveland v. State, 2019-Ohio-3820, ¶ 15; Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 2004-Ohio-357, ¶ 16. In order to “overcome this presumption, the party challenging the law must prove the law unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Further, “[a] party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional on its face or as applied to a particular set of facts.” Harrold v. Collier, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 37. In instances where “statutes are challenged on the ground that they are unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts, the party making the challenge bears the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of a presently existing set of facts that make the statutes unconstitutional and void when applied to those facts.” Id. at ¶ 38, citing Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329 (1944), paragraph four of the syllabus. IV. Discussion {¶ 46} Preliminarily, it is important to observe that while none of the parties have requested a remand (i.e., for trial or settlement) based on unresolved factual disputes, the record reflects multiple factual disagreements. As noted above, Civ.R. 56(C) only permits summary judgment where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The question is whether, as a matter of law, those differences were material. {¶ 47} For the purposes of Civ.R. 56, a material fact is one which would affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Reiss v. Players Guild of Canton, Inc., 2002-Ohio-1589 (5th Dist.). One factual dispute between the parties in this case is how to measure the amount of funding public-school students receive. The Plaintiffs focus on state funding; the Defendants focus on the sum of state, local, and whatever federal funding may or may not have been provided. {¶ 48} The overarching question on appeal is whether EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2. That section of the Ohio Constitution requires the General Assembly to “secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state[.]” Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2. In the first school-funding case to go before the Supreme Court of Ohio after approving the 1851 Constitution, Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287 (1923), the Supreme Court observed that “the sovereign people made it mandatory upon the General Assembly Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 15 to secure not merely a system of common schools, but a system thorough and efficient throughout the state.” Miller at 297-298. While voters may or may not choose to approve local bond levies or income taxes to support their local school districts, there is no constitutional requirement for them to do so. As the Supreme Court stated in Miller, supporting the schools of the state “is a contribution to the public, and not to a local purpose . . . which must be exacted of every citizen.” Id. at 306. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are conclusory. Notably, Defendants elide any analysis of the plain language of the constitution. They also fail to cite a single case, statute, or other constitutional provision that might support their argument that the proper measure of per-pupil funding is total funding. See, e.g., Apr. 29, 2025 Oral Argument on the Cross-Motions for Summ. Jgmt. In contrast, the parties generally agree as to how the state funds public schools. They all cite to the same statutes and refer to “foundation funding.” R.C. 3317.022. {¶ 49} Since the Ohio Constitution only addresses the state’s obligation to secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools—and there is nothing in the constitution requiring local taxpayers to share this burden—this court finds that the parties’ competing funding measures do not create a factual issue requiring a remand for trial. Stated otherwise, the identified funding dispute does not preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. {¶ 50} We therefore turn to the merits. In their respective assignments of error, Defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs’ claims that EdChoice violates Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2. To fully understand the parties’ arguments on appeal, it is necessary first to examine the history and meaning of Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2. A. History and Meaning of Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 {¶ 51} Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 provides: The [G]eneral [A]ssembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state. Nos. 25AP-603, 25AP-604, & 25AP-605 16 {¶ 52} Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2 was adopted as part of the 1851 Constitution in direct response to what has been referred to as the Common Schools Movement. See also State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 28. In Ohio, this movement had the central objective of establishing a free, publicly funded statewide system of education for Ohio students. See id. Indeed, at the time of the amendment’s adoption, and continuing into present day, the term “common schools” has been synonymous with that of a free school, open to educating th