Bryant v. Dept. of Mental Health

[Cite as Bryant v. Dept. of Mental Health, 2026-Ohio-3687.] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO KRISTIN BRYANT Case No. 2024-00648JD Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck v. DECISION OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, et al. Defendants {¶1} On May 8, 2026, defendants, Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare Hospital (Twin Valley) (collectively, ODMHAS), filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56.1 Plaintiff, Kristin Bryant (Bryant), filed a response in opposition to defendants’ motion. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion. Pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D), defendants’ motion for summary judgment is now fully briefed and is before the court for a non-oral hearing. For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion. Factual Background {¶2} This case arises from plaintiff’s allegations that, as a result of negligence on the part of ODMHAS, she was attacked and injured by patients at Twin Valley on three separate occasions while she was involuntarily hospitalized there. Plaintiff further alleges that ODMHAS violated her rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. {¶3} In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment should be entered in their favor. 1 Since the filing of this lawsuit, Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services’ name changed to the Ohio Department of Behavioral Health, and Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare Hospital’s name changed to Central Ohio Behavioral Healthcare. However, for purposes on this litigation, the court will refer to the parties by the names contained within the case caption. Case No. 2024-00648JD -2- DECISION Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim fails since ODMHAS lacked notice of any threats of imminent physical harm toward plaintiff as necessary under R.C. 2305.51 to establish liability for harm caused by another patient. Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails because the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional claims. In support, defendant filed: (1) the affidavit of Jeff Doner (Doner), with accompanying exhibits; (2) the affidavit of Lacey LeMaster (LeMaster), with accompanying exhibits; (3) the affidavit of Vanessa Minor (Minor); (4) the affidavit of Jason Weaver (Weaver), with accompanying exhibits2; and (5) the deposition of Kristin Bryant, with accompanying exhibits, which has been filed under seal pursuant to court order.3 {¶4} In response, plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial specifically related to the foreseeability of the attacks. Plaintiff did not submit any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence in support of her opposition, instead relying on her own deposition testimony. Plaintiff further argues that defendants’ evidence is insufficient to warrant summary judgment. {¶5} In reply, defendants assert that plaintiff’s argument regarding the foreseeability of the attacks relies on non-binding and conflicting case law. Defendants further contend that plaintiff’s proposed foreseeability theory fails as a matter of law 2 Upon review, the court notes that although Officer Weaver’s affidavit bears the apparent signature of a notary, it does not contain a notary seal or stamp. Accordingly, while the purported affidavit does not fully conform with Civ.R. 56(C), the court will nevertheless consider it in the absence of any objection by plaintiff, particularly where plaintiff also cites to Officer Weaver’s affidavit within her response. See Kraczek v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2025-Ohio-2607, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing State ex rel. V Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 473 (1998) (“If an opposing party fails to object to the admissibility of evidence under Civ.R. 56, the court may but need not consider such evidence when it determines whether summary judgment is appropriate.”); see also United States Bank N.A. v. Aguilar-Crow, 2016-Ohio-5391, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.) (“In general, no evidence or stipulation may be considered in ruling on a summary judgment motion except as stated in Civ.R. 56. . . .There is an exception where the non-movant fails to object to the movant’s summary judgment evidence, in which case consideration of unsworn and unauthenticated exhibits is within the trial court’s discretion.”). 3 On June 4, 2026, defendants filed a notice of filing the Signature Statement from Spectrum Court Reporting Service regarding plaintiff’s Civ.R. 30(E) right to review her transcribed deposition transcript. Such documentation states that the time allowed for review of the transcript has expired, and the deponent has not signed the transcript. Case No. 2024-00648JD -3- DECISION because it effectively advances a claim for psychiatric malpractice, which would require supporting expert testimony that plaintiff has not provided. {¶6} The relevant pleadings and evidence submitted, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, show the following: {¶7} The ODMHAS “exists to provide high-quality mental health and addiction prevention, treatment, and recovery” to all Ohioans. (Affidavit of Lacey LeMaster, ¶ 5.) The Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services operates Twin Valley, which “provides integrated mental and substance abuse disorder treatment for adults with serious mental illness.” (Id.) Bryant was a patient at Twin Valley on different occasions and alleges that defendants failed to protect her from three separate altercations with other patients at Twin Valley during her hospitalizations in January and March 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 9, 16-17.) {¶8} On January 31, 2023, Bryant was involuntarily hospitalized at Twin Valley after allegedly going nine consecutive days without sleep due to complications from prescribed medication, resulting in a manic episode. (Deposition of Kristin Bryant, 31:19- 32:15, 34:23-35:4, 44:10-45:22; see also Complaint at ¶ 6-7.) Bryant was discharged on February 13, 2023, but was hospitalized again on February 22, 2023. (Complaint at ¶ 11-12.) During her hospitalization, Bryant lodged multiple grievances against Twin Valley and expressed frustration regarding her involuntary commitment. (Bryant Dep. at 67:12- 68:8.) The present matter, however, concerns three separate altercations involving Bryant and other patients during her two hospitalizations at Twin Valley.4 (Complaint at ¶ 9, 16-17.) The evidence reflects that Patients A, B, and C were all different individuals. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 9.) The incidents between Bryant and the respective patients are described below: January 31, 2023 Incident (Patients A and B) {¶9} On January 31, 2023, Bryant was assaulted by two patients at Twin Valley, identified as Patients A and B, prompting an investigation by Twin Valley police. (Id. at ¶ 4 Due to confidentiality and privacy concerns, the identities of the individuals responsible for the attacks have been anonymized and will be referred to as Patients A, B, and C. Case No. 2024-00648JD -4- DECISION 7, Ex. A.) Bryant testified that she was sitting in the unit dayroom while heavily medicated when several women began insulting her. (Bryant Dep. at 51:5-52:8.) Bryant stated that she was then attacked from behind by an unidentified individual who jumped on her back. (Id. at 52:9-53:3.) At the time, Bryant did not know who attacked her or why. (Id. at 53:4- 5; 54:9-19.) {¶10} According to an incident report and subsequent investigation, Bryant stated that Patient A struck her from behind and then jumped onto her back. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 7, Ex. A, Bates No. ODMHAS_000755.) Another patient involved in the incident, Patient B, admitted to slapping Bryant in the face after Bryant allegedly made comments criticizing Patient B’s parenting. (Id.) A Twin Valley employee who attempted to intervene was also struck in the face during the altercation. (Id. at Bates No. ODMHAS_000753.) The investigation ultimately deemed the cause of the incident inconclusive. (Id.) Evidence further reflects that neither defendants nor their staff had received notice of any explicit or imminent threat towards Bryant by either Patient A or Patient B. (Id. at ¶ 10, 12; Affidavit of Vanessa Minor, ¶ 4, 6.) Additionally, Bryant did not submit written safety complaints or exhibit behaviors that would have caused staff to believe she feared for her safety in relation to Patients A or B. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 11, 13; Minor Aff. at ¶ 5, 7.) Bryant states that she saw one of the patients from this attack again, and there were no further incidents between the two. (Bryant Dep. at 55:20-56:4.) Bryant did not testify that she reported to ODMHAS staff any explicit threats indicating imminent harm from Patients A or B before the attack occurred. (See generally, id.) March 13, 2023 Incident (Patient C) {¶11} Following Bryant’s first stay at Twin Valley, police transported her to the Mount Carmel East emergency room on February 22, 2023, and then she returned to Twin Valley. (Bryant Dep. at 85:21-87:1, 88:3-6, 89:18-90:16.) According to Bryant, she met Patient C during the first day of her second stay at Twin Valley. (Id. at 97:17-23.) Bryant testified that she interacted with Patient C every day and she thought Patient C was “very interesting” and “funny.” (Id. at 97:24-98:22.) Bryant stated that Patient C was not at Twin Valley during her first hospitalization. (Id. at 99:11-14.) Bryant testified that Case No. 2024-00648JD -5- DECISION she believed Patient C had a tendency for physically assaulting white female patients because she either saw it or heard about it. (Id. at 99:21-100:7.) {¶12} Bryant, who is white, described her interactions with Patient C as generally normal, although Bryant testified that Patient C expressed hostility toward white women. (Id. at 101:6-12.) According to Bryant’s testimony, Bryant and Patient C had communicated without issue prior to the incidents, as Bryant intended for Patient C to serve as the named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit that Bryant, who is an attorney, was planning against defendants. (Id. at 148:4-7, 162:3-23; see also Ex. E, Bryant Dep.) {¶13} On the evening before the incident, Bryant testified, she and Patient C had no issues and “actually did well that night.” (Id. at 115:14-22.) While Bryant was working on a puzzle in the dayroom with another patient, Patient C appeared agitated, walked past the table, and swept the puzzle from the table. (Id. at 116:10-117:16.) Bryant did not react, and the two had no further interactions that evening. (Id. at 117:17-118:24.) {¶14} The next morning at the end of breakfast, Bryant proceeded to turn in her tray. (Id. at 119:6-14.) Bryant stated that she did not notice anything unusual about Patient C. (Id. at 120:8-14.) Bryant testified that while returning her tray, Patient C grabbed her by the hair and yanked her in multiple directions. (Id. at 121:16-24.) Bryant further testified that another patient pulled Patient C off of her, and in the end, Bryant had two “giant bald spots” in the back of her hair. (Id. at 122:1-5.) {¶15} Doner, who is a registered nurse employed by Twin Valley, filled out an incident report. (Affidavit of Jeff Doner, ¶ 2-4, Ex. B; see also Ex. C, Bryant Dep.) According to the incident report, Patient C attacked Bryant and pulled the hair from the back of her head. (Doner Aff. at ¶ 4, Ex. B, Bates No. ODMHAS_000730- ODMHAS_000731; Ex. C, Bryant Dep.) Nursing staff responded to the incident and broke it up. (Id.) A Twin Valley police officer, Jason Weaver, investigated and conducted an interview with Bryant and Patient C thereafter. (Affidavit of Jason Weaver, ¶ 2, 4-6, Ex. B.) According to Weaver’s report, Patient C attacked Bryant because Bryant made racist comments towards her that upset her. (Id. at ¶ 6, Ex. B, Bates No. ODMHAS_000840.) The report further reflects that Bryant informed Weaver that she understood why Patient C attacked her as she had made a racist comment toward Patient C. (Id. at Bates No. ODMHAS_000734.) Bryant specifically informed Weaver that “her mouth passed a Case No. 2024-00648JD -6- DECISION check, her ass could not cash.” (Id.; see also Bryant Dep. at 125:7-127:2.) When asked to give details on the comments, Weaver stated that Bryant “explained it was in regards to white supremacy and people knowing their place.” (Weaver Aff. at ¶ 6, Ex. B, Bates No. ODMHAS_000734.) The investigation concluded that Bryant’s racist comments provoked Patient C and contributed to Patient C becoming aggressive and attacking Bryant. (Id. at Bates No. ODMHAS_000731; see also Doner Aff., ¶ 4, Ex. B, Bates No. ODMHAS_000731; LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 8, Ex. B, Bates No. ODMHAS_000731.) {¶16} Evidence further reflects that neither defendants nor their staff had received notice of any explicit or imminent threat towards Bryant by Patient C. (Doner Aff. at ¶ 6, 8; LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 10, 12.) Additionally, Bryant did not submit written safety complaints or exhibit behaviors that would have caused staff to believe she feared for her safety in relation to Patient C. (Doner Aff. at ¶ 7, 9; LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 11, 13.) {¶17} Although Bryant believed that Patient C was targeting her because of Patient C’s hostility toward white women and accusations that Bryant was racist, Bryant could not identify any specific threats made to her by Patient C. (Bryant Dep. at 106:9-107:3.) Instead, Bryant suggested that she felt targeted because Patient C had not yet attacked her, and that once Patient C attacked someone, she would get it “out of her system,” causing that person to no longer be a target. (Id.) Although Bryant indicated that Patient C was becoming increasingly aggressive with her, and Bryant felt like Patient C was paying more attention to her than other patients, Bryant did not testify that she informed ODMHAS or their staff of these concerns. (Id. at 107:15-24.) While plaintiff did testify that she submitted written complaints to ODMHAS, she did not testify that the complaints contained any explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm towards her, nor could she state with certainty what the alleged complaints specifically contained. (Id. at 133:17-136:17; see generally, id.) Defendants’ staff testified by way of affidavit that they did not receive any written complaints regarding Bryant’s safety, and no safety complaints were submitted to the court as evidence. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 11; Minor Aff. at ¶ 5; Doner Aff. at ¶ 7.) {¶18} When Bryant was asked whether she ever reported any of the potentially threatening behavior to Twin Valley staff or that she felt unsafe or targeted by Patient C, Bryant instead responded: “[t]hey’re sitting right there. I didn’t need to report it to them, Case No. 2024-00648JD -7- DECISION they’re standing right there. They’re sitting right there. They have ears. Yeah, they would tell her to calm down and then they just start laughing.” (Bryant Dep. at 109:1-9.) Bryant also testified, however, that staff “rarely paid attention,” making it difficult to determine how much staff actually observed. (Id. at 17:18-20.) March 14, 2023 Incident (Patient C) {¶19} On March 14, 2023, while Officer Weaver was conducting his police investigation into the previous day’s altercation between Bryant and Patient C, Bryant was involved in another altercation with Patient C after her interview with Officer Weaver concluded. (Complaint at ¶ 17; see also Weaver Aff. at ¶ 7, Ex. C.) In his report, Weaver stated that he witnessed the exchange between Bryant and Patient C and observed Patient C attempt to physically strike Bryant, but that he intervened and “blocked the physical aggression,” preventing Patient C from contacting Bryant. (Id. at Bates No. ODMHAS_000741.) Weaver further reported that no injuries resulted from the incident and that there were no criminal concerns at that time. (Id. at Bates No. ODMHAS_000739, ODMHAS_000741.) {¶20} Bryant’s account of the events that afternoon differs from Weaver’s account. (Bryant Dep. at 142:2-12.) Following the initial altercation between Bryant and Patient C, both individuals remained in the same unit. (Id. at 128:15-18.) According to Bryant, the day after the initial incident, Weaver was interviewing her regarding the prior day’s altercation. (Id. at 128:2-14.) Bryant claims that, when Weaver opened the door for her to leave the interview, Patient C “promptly came running up” and punched her in the face. (Id. at 127:18-20, 128:9-14.) Although Bryant acknowledges that Weaver attempted to block Patient C, she maintains that Patient C “still landed the punch.” (Id. at 142:14-15.) Bryant further testified that she does not believe Weaver was being untruthful but instead believes he had a “poor vantage point” from which to observe the alleged punch. (Id. at 144:22-145:7.) {¶21} The evidence reflects that neither defendants nor their staff had received notice of any explicit or imminent threat towards Bryant by Patient C. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 10, 12.) Additionally, Bryant did not submit written safety complaints or exhibit behaviors Case No. 2024-00648JD -8- DECISION that would have caused staff to believe she feared for her safety in relation to Patient C. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 11, 13.) {¶22} As a result of the foregoing incidents, Bryant contends that defendants failed to take reasonable measures to ensure her safety. (Complaint at ¶ 13-24.) Bryant further alleges that defendants violated her rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Standard of Review {¶23} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C): Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor. “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St. 3d 280, 292 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293. “The moving party, however, cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule with a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the moving party must specifically point to evidence of a type listed in Civ.R. 56(C), affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no Case No. 2024-00648JD -9- DECISION evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims.” Mercer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013-Ohio-5607, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Dresher at 293; Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429 (1997). {¶24} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E): When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Civ.R. 56, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine triable issue.” State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996). Law & Analysis {¶25} Defendants argue that they cannot be held liable for the assaults involving Patients A, B, and C because no threat of imminent physical harm to plaintiff was communicated to them, as required to overcome the immunity provided by R.C. 2305.51(B). Plaintiff maintains that a genuine issue of material fact remains, asserting that defendants have failed to establish that the assaults were not foreseeable. Specifically, plaintiff argues that defendants’ affidavits are “devoid of any testimony regarding the mental status, behavioral history, violent propensities, prior assaults, or risk assessments” of the patients involved. Plaintiff further contends that the evidence demonstrates that defendants knew or should have known of Patient C’s dangerous propensities and argues that the relevant inquiry is whether the assaults were foreseeable. In reply, defendants assert that plaintiff improperly focuses on foreseeability while disregarding the absence of any communicated threat of imminent violence, which defendants argue is the prerequisite for liability under R.C. 2305.51(B). Case No. 2024-00648JD -10- DECISION {¶26} “R.C. 5122.29(B)(2) provides that a patient in a mental-health institution has a right to reasonable protection from the violent conduct of others.” Campbell v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 2006-Ohio-1192, ¶ 11. But, R.C. 5122.34(B) “expressly states that a mental-health institution will not be liable for harm that results from failing to protect a patient from another patient unless the injured patient establishes liability under R.C. 2305.51.” Id. at ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “when a patient of a mental-health institution is assaulted or battered by another patient, the institution may be held liable for harm that results only if the injured patient establishes liability under R.C. 2305.51.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 15; see also Davis v. Diley Ridge Med. Ctr., 2025-Ohio-1940, ¶ 13-14 (10th Dist.) (“R.C. 2305.51(B) confers immunity in certain situations to a ‘mental health professional or mental health organization’ regarding the actions of ‘a mental health client or patient’ toward others . . . .”). {¶27} R.C. 2305.51(B) provides, in pertinent part: A . . . mental health organization may be held liable in damages in a civil action . . . for serious physical harm . . . resulting from failing to predict, warn of, or take precautions to provide protection from the violent behavior of a mental health client or patient, only if the client or patient or a knowledgeable person has communicated to the . . . organization an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm to . . . one or more clearly identifiable potential victims, the professional or organization has reason to believe that the client or patient has the intent and ability to carry out the threat, and the professional or organization fails to take one or more of the following actions in a timely manner. . . . (Emphasis added.) {¶28} “The General Assembly has made R.C. 2305.51 the exclusive means by which a mental-health patient may establish liability for harm caused by another patient, notwithstanding the duty to protect patients imposed by R.C. 5122.29(B)(2).” Campbell at ¶ 19. Thus, ODMHAS is afforded immunity under R.C. 2305.51 absent an exception, and “[t]he sole exception to the immunity provided by [R.C. 2305.51] is if the patient or a ‘knowledgeable person’ directly communicates to the mental health organization or mental health professional an explicit threat against clearly identifiable persons. Ohio Case No. 2024-00648JD -11- DECISION courts have defined an ‘explicit threat’ as being a threat against the particular individual who subsequently was injured.” Green v. Logan Cty., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19444, *17 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 13, 2008), citing Stewart v. N. Coast Ctr., 2006-Ohio-2392, ¶ 57 (11th Dist.); see also Campbell at ¶ 16; Cogswell v. Brook, 2004-Ohio-5639, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.). {¶29} The court further recognizes that the controlling decision in Campbell substantially limits the standard common-law negligence principles through its interpretation and application of R.C. 2305.51(B). Specifically, the Campbell court explicitly rejected the notion that a patient’s known propensity for violence, standing alone, is sufficient to impose liability, affirming judgment in favor of the mental health institution even though the assailant had physically attacked and injured another patient just the day before. Campbell, 2006-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 2, 13, 15-16. Because no explicit threat of imminent harm toward the Campbell plaintiff had been communicated to the mental health institution, liability could not attach. Id. Thus, while foreseeability is ordinarily a component of a common-law negligence analysis, the General Assembly substantially limited the liability of mental health institutions through the enactment of R.C. 2305.51(B), which imposes liability only under narrowly defined circumstances involving the communication of an explicit threat. Id. at ¶ 13, 15-16. {¶30} Therefore, upon review, the evidence demonstrates that no explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm against plaintiff was communicated to ODMHAS nor their employees prior to any of the attacks. Regarding the attack by Patients A and B on January 31, 2023, the evidence demonstrates that it occurred without warning, as plaintiff testified that she did not know who attacked her or why they did so at the time of the incident. (Bryant Dep. at 53:4-5; 54:9-19.) Moreover, the sworn affidavits of ODMHAS staff assigned to the unit where plaintiff resided at the time of the incident establish that neither they nor any other ODMHAS staff member received notice of an explicit or imminent threat directed toward plaintiff by either Patient A or Patient B. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 6, 10, 12; Minor Aff. at ¶ 3, 4, 6.) The evidence further reflects that plaintiff neither submitted written safety complaints nor exhibited behaviors that would have caused staff to believe she feared for her safety with respect to Patients A or B. (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 11, 13; Minor Aff. at ¶ 5, 7.) Plaintiff failed to refute the proffered evidence by pointing to any countervailing evidence nor did plaintiff testify that an explicit Case No. 2024-00648JD -12- DECISION or imminent threat against her was communicated to ODMHAS or their staff prior to the attack. (See generally, Bryant Dep.) {¶31} Likewise, with respect to the initial attack by Patient C on March 13, 2023, the undisputed evidence establishes that ODMHAS did not have notice of any explicit or imminent threat towards plaintiff by Patient C. The sworn affidavits of ODMHAS staff assigned to the unit where plaintiff resided at the time of the incident establish that neither they nor any other ODMHAS staff member received notice of an explicit or imminent threat directed toward plaintiff by Patient C. (Doner Aff. at ¶ 3, 6, 8; LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 6, 10, 12.) The evidence further reflects that plaintiff neither submitted written safety complaints nor exhibited behaviors that would have caused staff to believe she feared for her safety with respect to Patient C. (Doner Aff. at ¶ 7, 9; LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 11, 13.) {¶32} Moreover, the evidence reflects that plaintiff and Patient C interacted without incident prior to the attack. In fact, plaintiff testified that she and Patient C were collaborating on a class-action matter against defendants, with Patient C serving as the lead plaintiff. (Bryant Dep. at 162:3-23; see also Ex. E, Bryant Dep.) Additionally, the evidence suggests that the altercation was not preplanned but rather arose after plaintiff made a racially charged comment toward Patient C. (Weaver Aff. at ¶ 6, Ex. B; Doner Aff. at ¶ 4, Ex. B; LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 8, Ex. B.) Although plaintiff testified that she believed Patient C harbored hostility toward white women, she was unable to identify any specific threat made by Patient C towards plaintiff prior to the incident. (Bryant Dep. at 106:9- 107:24.) Finally, plaintiff failed to produce any evidence nor did she testify that any explicit or imminent threat against her was communicated to ODMHAS or their staff before the attack occurred. (See generally, Bryant Dep.) {¶33} Regarding the second attack by Patient C, plaintiff has also failed to present evidence or testify that any such threat of a subsequent attack had been communicated to defendants or their staff, while defendants have presented evidence that neither they nor their staff were aware of any explicit threat of imminent harm posed by Patient C or that any such threat had been communicated to them prior to the alleged assault. Campbell, 2006-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 15-16; (LeMaster Aff. at ¶ 6, 10-13; see generally, Bryant Dep.) Although the court recognizes that, in the context of a traditional common-law negligence claim, Patient C’s prior attack could ordinarily give rise to a genuine issue of Case No. 2024-00648JD -13- DECISION material fact because foreseeability is an essential element of such a claim, the court is constrained by the plain language of R.C. 2305.51(B) and the interpretation adopted in Campbell. As previously discussed, the Campbell court expressly rejected reliance on foreseeability related to a patient’s propensity for violence as a basis for liability. Campbell, 2006-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 2, 13, 15-16; see, e.g., Stewart, 2006-Ohio-2392, ¶ 53, 64-65 (11th Dist.) (upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment under R.C. 2305.51 where the plaintiff’s expert stated that the decedent’s attack was foreseeable but did not assert that an explicit threat of imminent and serious physical harm to the decedent by the attacker had been communicated to the defendant, as required to impose liability under the statute). {¶34} Accordingly, based on the facts presented and the controlling precedent, the court concludes that Patient C’s assault on Bryant the previous day does not constitute a communicated explicit threat of imminent serious physical harm against her within the meaning of R.C. 2305.51(B). Id. Thus, the undisputed evidence establishes that there was not an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm toward plaintiff communicated to defendants or their staff with respect to either the initial or subsequent attacks by Patient C. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law under R.C. 2305.51(B). {¶35} Nonetheless, plaintiff argues in her response that there exists a question of material fact as to whether the attacks were reasonably foreseeable, and that summary judgment is therefore improper. However, plaintiff’s argument that a material issue of fact exists because there are questions as to whether the conduct of Patients A, B, and C was reasonably foreseeable is unpersuasive. In support of her position, plaintiff relies solely on the recent Second District Court of Appeals’ decision in Helton v. Kettering Med. Ctr., 2026-Ohio-1476 (2d Dist.), arguing that a mental health institution may be held liable for injuries inflicted by one patient upon another where the violent conduct was reasonably foreseeable. But, plaintiff’s reliance on Helton is misplaced. {¶36} As defendants discuss in their reply, Helton is merely persuasive authority, whereas Campbell constitutes binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Ohio. In Campbell, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the state because there was “[n]o evidence . . . that an explicit threat of an attack was communicated to the Case No. 2024-00648JD -14- DECISION hospital.” Campbell, 2006-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 13, 15-16. The Supreme Court’s holding reflects a strict application and interpretation of R.C. 2305.51(B), requiring proof of a communicated explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm to overcome immunity before liability may be imposed upon a mental health institution. (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also Green, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19444 at *18 (“Plaintiff’s negligence claim must be pleaded in such a way as to overcome the immunity conferred by [R.C. 2305.51].”). {¶37} Tellingly, plaintiff’s opposition fails to address, much less distinguish, Campbell or any of the subsequent authorities cited by defendants applying the same statutory framework. Instead, plaintiff relies exclusively on Helton, a nonbinding appellate decision that does not alter the Supreme Court’s controlling interpretation of R.C. 2305.51(B). {¶38} Accordingly, plaintiff’s contention that her claim “depends upon facts concerning the assailant patients’ known mental condition, prior assaults upon other patients, disciplinary history, monitoring requirements and the extent of DBH’s knowledge of such conduct”, and that defendant “has presented no admissible evidence addressing any of these critical issues” is without merit. (Response, p. 6.) Under R.C. 2305.51(B), the dispositive inquiry is not whether defendants knew of circumstances suggesting a propensity for violence, but whether an explicit threat against plaintiff was communicated to staff. As discussed above, the Campbell court explicitly rejected the foreseeability argument that is typical of a common-law negligence claim. Campbell, 2006-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 2, 13, 15-16. Notably, the foreseeability reasoning advanced by plaintiff, and apparently that of the Helton court, is more closely aligned with Justice Pfeifer’s dissent than with the majority opinion. As Justice Pfeifer observed in his dissent in Campbell, the statute effectively shields the state from liability arising from patient-on-patient attacks in the absence of such an explicit and communicated threat. Id. at ¶ 27 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Justice Pfeifer would have remanded the matter for application of traditional negligence principles, including duty, breach, proximate cause, and foreseeability. Id. at ¶ 27 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). However, as the majority held, because no explicit threat of imminent harm toward the Campbell plaintiff had been communicated to the mental health institution, liability could not attach. Id. at ¶ 13, 15-16. Case No. 2024-00648JD -15- DECISION {¶39} In sum, this court is obligated to follow Campbell as controlling authority. Helton is not binding, and its procedural and factual distinctions offer no compelling reason to depart from the Supreme Court’s clear guidance. Under Campbell, the dispositive inquiry is whether an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm was communicated to defendants or their staff as contemplated by R.C. 2305.51(B) to overcome the immunity conferred by the statute. Because undisputed evidence establishes that no such explicit threat was communicated to defendants or their staff before the attacks by Patients A and B or C, plaintiff’s claims arising from those incidents fail as a matter of law. Campbell at ¶ 16 (“No evidence indicates that an explicit threat of an attack was communicated to the hospital. In fact, [plaintiff] acknowledged that Patient A did not warn of an attack. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted for the medical center on [plaintiff’s] R.C. 5122.29(B)(2) claim.”). {¶40} Accordingly, construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiff’s favor, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Defendants satisfied their initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C) by presenting evidence that no one communicated to them or their staff any explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm toward plaintiff. Plaintiff, in turn, failed to meet her reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to produce evidence that an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm toward plaintiff was communicated to defendants or their staff with respect to the attacks by Patients A and B or C. Reasonable minds can therefore only conclude that plaintiff cannot prevail on her negligence claim that has been substantially limited by statute under R.C. 2305.51(B). {¶41} Defendants also argue that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s constitutional claims premised upon the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff maintains that she is not raising any constitutional claims, and that references to the Constitution in her complaint are made in passing. Notwithstanding, it is well-settled that the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction over constitutional claims against the state. Jackson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-1518, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, the Court of Claims has no subject-matter jurisdiction over alleged violations of claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or alleged violations of constitutional rights.”); Cotten v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-2619, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), quoting Case No. 2024-00648JD -16- DECISION Guillory v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2008-Ohio-2299, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) (“it is ‘well- established that the Court of Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over alleged violations of constitutional rights and claims arising under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code.’”). Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff asserts any claims that are premised upon violations of the Ohio or United States constitutions, or can be construed as such, they must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Conclusion {¶42} Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s negligence claim. Insofar as p