Wilson v. Durrani

[Cite as Wilson v. Durrani, 2026-Ohio-2279.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO CAROL WILSON, : APPEAL NO. C-250102 TRIAL NO. A-1706419 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., : and : CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE : TECHNOLOGIES, : Defendants-Appellants. : MICHAEL CRAIL, : APPEAL NO. C-250192 TRIAL NO. A-1706529 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., : and : CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE : TECHNOLOGIES, : Defendants-Appellants. : DAVID SMITH, : APPEAL NO. C-250193 TRIAL NO. A-1706433 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., : and : CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE : TECHNOLOGIES, : Defendants-Appellants. : This cause was heard upon the appeals, the records, the briefs, and arguments. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for these appeals, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27. To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/17/2026 per order of the court. By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Wilson v. Durrani, 2026-Ohio-2279.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO CAROL WILSON, : APPEAL NO. C-250102 TRIAL NO. A-1706419 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., : and : CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE : TECHNOLOGIES, : Defendants-Appellants. : MICHAEL CRAIL, : APPEAL NO. C-250192 TRIAL NO. A-1706529 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., : and : CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE : TECHNOLOGIES, : Defendants-Appellants. : DAVID SMITH : APPEAL NO. C-250193 TRIAL NO. A-1706433 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : OPINION ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D., :  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS and : CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE : TECHNOLOGIES, : Defendants-Appellants. : Civil Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed and Cause Remanded Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 17, 2026 Statman Harris LLC, Alan Statman, and Benjamin M. Maraan, II, for Plaintiffs- Appellees, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Annie M. McClellan, Philip D. Williamson, Aaron M. Herzig, and Russell S. Sayre, for Defendants-Appellants. [Cite as Wilson v. Durrani, 2026-Ohio-2279.] KINSLEY, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Defendants-appellants Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., and the Center for Advanced Spine Technologies, Inc. (together “Durrani”) appeal the judgments of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas following jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs- appellees Carol Wilson, Michael Crail, and David Smith (together “the plaintiffs”).1 The plaintiffs sued Durrani for negligence and other torts after he performed what they alleged were medically unnecessary back surgeries. The jury sided with the plaintiffs on their negligence claims—and with Wilson on additional claims—and awarded each of them substantial monetary damages. {¶2} On appeal, Durrani raises ten assignments of error and a number of separate legal issues. One of those issues questions whether the plaintiffs’ cases were properly tried together under Civ.R. 42(A). We have previously permitted the joinder of actions against Durrani for trial where the plaintiffs received the same or similar surgeries or premised their claims on common legal theories. See, e.g., Puckett- Morrissette v. Durrani, 2026-Ohio-1444, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.); Jones v. Durrani, 2024- Ohio-1776, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). These cases, however, challenge the limits of our precedent. The plaintiffs here did not receive the same or similar surgeries—at least not in the way our prior cases have contemplated. And the jury’s differing verdicts undercut the idea that their cases presented a common question of law. {¶3} We therefore take a fresh look at our Civ.R. 42 precedent as it applies to the plaintiffs’ cases here. Doing so reveals that the plaintiffs’ cases were improperly joined for trial, because no common question of fact or law could be resolved with a single answer by the jury. We accordingly reverse the judgments of the trial court and 1 We sua sponte consolidate these separate appeals into a single opinion and judgment.  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS remand the plaintiffs’ cases to the trial court for individual trials. Background {¶4} In 2017, Crail, Wilson, and Smith individually sued Durrani after he performed spinal surgeries on them. Each of their complaints included claims for battery, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and lack of informed consent. The plaintiffs’ complaints rested on a common narrative about Durrani’s conduct: he had recommended and performed invasive surgeries that were not supported by their medical images. {¶5} The plaintiffs are three of hundreds of people who have advanced similar claims against Durrani. Frustrated by the lack of progress in bringing their claims to trial, in 2020, the plaintiffs and others who were suing Durrani filed a motion for group trials. Relying on our decision in Siuda v. Howard, 2002-Ohio-2292 (1st Dist.), they proposed that the trial court consolidate cases against Durrani for trial based on certain perceived commonalities. Attached to their motion for group trials was a document entitled “group trials in suggested priority list with commonality of facts and/or injury.” This document suggested trying cases in which the patients had received surgeries on the C1/C2 levels of their spines first, followed by patients whose surgeries involved screws near the aorta. Other proposed criteria included the patient’s age, the presence of retrograde ejaculation, whether the patient’s insurance company had denied coverage for the procedure, whether the patient had left the informed consent form blank, and whether Durrani was late in dictating his operative notes. {¶6} Following the priority list was a document entitled “potential group trials.” This document listed the names of individuals with pending cases against Durrani who could be grouped together for trial based on their injuries, surgeries, 6  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS ages, or other factors. In some instances, there were more than 20 or 30 individuals in a proposed group. Finally, the group-trial motions included a document entitled “cases ready for trial.” Curiously, Wilson, Crail, and Smith were entirely omitted from the “potential group trials” list and the list of cases ready to be tried. {¶7} On September 3, 2020, over Durrani’s objection, the trial court granted the motion for group trials in principle. But it limited the method of consolidation to two- or three-plaintiff trials. In doing so, it noted that the individuals suing Durrani had proposed including up to ten plaintiffs’ claims in a single trial. It rejected the idea of including that many cases at once but did not explain why. Instead, it merely observed that “Plaintiffs advance a number of reasons for group trials, some of which the Court should not and will not consider.” It did not identify what those reasons were. {¶8} The trial court’s September 3, 2020 order required counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for Durrani to submit a proposed trial schedule with groups of two plaintiffs to be tried from January to February 2021 and groups of three plaintiffs to be tried from March to December 2021. It indicated that the proposed groupings were required to comply with Civ.R. 42. {¶9} The record does not reflect that any proposed grouping was submitted in these specific plaintiffs’ cases by the parties’ attorney as required by the trial court’s September 3, 2020 order. We therefore have no procedural understanding as to why Wilson’s, Crail’s, and Smith’s cases were selected to be tried together. That confusion is compounded by the fact that the plaintiffs’ cases were omitted from the lists attached to the group-trials motion. {¶10} Nonetheless, on January 4, 2023, the trial court docketed a “seventh 7  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS revised joint trial schedule sequence” in the plaintiffs’ cases.2 That document reflected that the plaintiffs’ cases would be joined for a joint jury trial to begin on October 30, 2023. {¶11} On October 23, 2023, Durrani filed a memorandum in opposition to the consolidation of the plaintiffs’ cases for trial. In it, he highlighted that the trial court had failed to identify the common question of law or fact that connected the plaintiffs’ cases. {¶12} The trial court took up Durrani’s opposition at the start of the October 30, 2023 trial. It inquired whether Durrani’s expert witnesses would be testifying about all three plaintiffs’ cases. Durrani’s attorney indicated that they would. The trial court then ruled as follows: Given the fact that the witnesses are all the same, and the surgeries are similar, the Court at this time feels that consolidation, while the rule does not provide for automatic consolidation, it’s left up to judicial discretion, and my feeling at this time is that it’s – they should be consolidated, especially considering the Court has over 400 cases pending against Dr. Durrani, and one at a time we will never get them concluded. Trial {¶13} The plaintiffs’ joint jury trial began on October 30, 2023 and lasted ten days. {¶14} Crail testified first. Crail initially saw Durrani in 2011 for problems with his cervical spine. In October of 2011, Durrani performed an anterior cervical 2 The record does not contain any of the six prior joint trial schedule sequences. 8  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS discectomy at the C3/C4, C4/C5, and C7/T1 levels of Crail’s spine. Following the surgery, Crail experienced severe pain that could not be controlled by pain medication. His condition had not improved by his two-week post-operative appointment. A course of physical therapy after surgery was essentially ineffective. {¶15} Nine months later, in March of 2012, Crail again sought care from Durrani for a popping left knee. Durrani initially recommended injections, but when Crail did not improve, Durrani offered a second spine surgery to repair the nerve. Crail agreed, and Durrani performed a bilateral lumbar hemilaminectomy at the L4/L5 level in July of 2012. Crail again experienced post-operative difficulties following his second surgery. He developed temperature sensitivity, the tops of his feet burned, and he felt stabbing pain. Crail also suffered problems with sexual function. {¶16} To address Crail’s ongoing medical issues, his primary-care physician referred him to another doctor for pain management. Crail eventually opted for a spinal cord stimulator to manage his pain, which he still relied on at the time of his testimony. {¶17} Crail testified that, following his surgeries with Durrani, he was unable to perform many of the activities he could do before. As an example, he distanced himself from his grandchildren because they would jump on him and exacerbate his pain. He started taking antidepressants to deal with the emotional impact of his condition. It was not until 2022 or 2023, well after Durrani operated, that he started to experience some relief. {¶18} Smith testified at trial via Zoom from an inpatient addiction rehabilitation center. Smith had developed a chemical dependency to pain medication following his surgery with Durrani. Unlike Crail, who had seen Durrani for two operations, Smith underwent a single surgery—a lumbar laminectomy, foraminotomy, 9  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS and decompression—in February of 2012. Smith had been a brick mason for about 26 years, and his career left him with chronic lower-back pain. {¶19} Durrani recommended fusion surgery the first time he examined Smith, telling Smith he would be wheelchair-bound without surgical intervention. But that was not the surgery Durrani ultimately performed. {¶20} Following the operation, Smith was in so much pain that he was afraid to move. He treated the pain with narcotics, including Percocet. Eventually Smith developed a dependency to pain medication, leading to his inpatient stay at an out-of- state rehabilitation center. At the time of his testimony, Smith had not had a pill in five months. But he had lost his job, his fiancée, and his health insurance. He was receiving Social Security disability payments as a result of his condition. {¶21} Wilson also testified by Zoom. She developed severe back pain after receiving an epidural during the birth of her second child by emergency c-section. Wilson first saw Durrani in 2009. He recommended surgery during her second visit, although she could not remember what kind. She had an understanding that he was going to “fix” her. {¶22} In December 2010, Durrani performed a lumbar fusion at the L4/L5 level on Wilson. Following her surgery, Wilson was still in pain, became depressed, and felt worse than before. Durrani ultimately recommended a second surgery—an L5/S1 fusion and foraminotomy—which Wilson had in December of 2011. Following that surgery, Wilson was still not better. {¶23} So in March 2012, Durrani sent Wilson for another MRI. He then recommended a third surgery, although Wilson was unclear as to why. In June of 2012, Durrani performed a hemilaminectomy and foraminotomy at the L3/L4 and L5/S1 levels. Wilson needed a fourth surgery to remove a tube from her hand. 10  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS {¶24} When Wilson saw Durrani in August of 2012, after her third spine surgery and fourth surgery overall, she was still in pain. Durrani suggested a fourth spine surgery. Fearing something was wrong, she refused. {¶25} After leaving Durrani’s care, Wilson received a referral from her family doctor to see a different physician, Dr. Cohen at the Mayfield Clinic. Dr. Cohen documented Wilson’s chronic back pain and likely nerve damage. He referred her to another doctor for ongoing pain management. {¶26} Wilson testified that Durrani’s surgeries had left a lasting, negative mark on her life. She explained that, as a result of her successive surgeries, she could no longer do what she used to. She described her experience as a significant medical trauma. She required ongoing pain management and was the sole caregiver to her two children. {¶27} After testifying themselves, the plaintiffs called three expert witnesses: Dr. Stephen Bloomfield, Dr. Keith Wilkey, and Dr. Ranjiv Saini. {¶28} Dr. Bloomfield, a neurosurgeon, offered his expert opinion that surgery was contraindicated in Crail’s and Wilson’s cases. Regarding Crail, Dr. Bloomfield testified that he was not a good surgical candidate and that his discomfort would have been best addressed by a pain management center. Using Crail’s radiological images as exhibits, Dr. Bloomfield explained that the surgeries Durrani performed were both medically unnecessary and unreasonable because Durrani had misinterpreted the images. Dr. Bloomfield further opined that Durrani misrepresented the need for surgery to Crail by exaggerating the radiological findings. As a result, Dr. Bloomfield concluded that Crail could not have offered appropriate informed consent, because Durrani had not accurately advised Crail of the results of his MRIs. In Dr. Bloomfield’s opinion, Durrani caused acute, chronic, and permanent damage to Crail’s spine by 11  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS operating unnecessarily. {¶29} As to Wilson, Dr. Bloomfield’s review of her MRI revealed no evidence of any condition that would cause back pain other than discogenic disease. He accordingly believed that Durrani exaggerated the findings of her radiological images to justify his recommendations for surgery. Similar to his opinion of Crail’s case, Dr. Bloomfield concluded that Wilson could not validly offer informed consent to surgeries she did not need. Dr. Bloomfield also determined that Durrani’s surgeries caused permanent changes to Wilson’s spine, particularly at the site of the fusion. {¶30} Dr. Wilkey, an orthopedic surgeon and the medical director of spine and neurosurgery at United Health Care, testified that surgery was medically unnecessary in all of the plaintiffs’ cases. As to Smith, Dr. Wilkey opined that Durrani negligently misrepresented his medical images to induce him to undergo an unnecessary surgery. As a result, according to Dr. Wilkey, Smith could not provide informed consent. Dr. Wilkey was especially concerned because Durrani’s operative notes indicated that he discussed the risks and benefits of surgery with Smith in the operating room. This was far too late in the process to allow Smith to weigh whether he consented to the procedure. Dr. Wilkey also believed that Durrani created lasting damage to Smith. Reviewing Smith’s radiological images with the jury, Dr. Wilkey explained that Smith suffered from radicular pain after the procedure that he did not have before. {¶31} Dr. Wilkey’s opinion as to Crail was that Durrani had repeatedly lied about the severity of his findings and that Crail’s surgeries were medically unnecessary. Dr. Wilkey also took issue with Crail’s ability to provide informed consent, since his approval for the surgeries rested on false information. Dr. Wilkey also opined that Durrani left Crail worse off after surgery. Following his procedures, Crail developed new thigh pain and suffered from a damaged nerve root. 12  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS {¶32} Dr. Wilkey further testified that Wilson experienced permanent damage as a result of her surgeries with Durrani. She had developed scar tissue around her nerves that would likely cause lifelong pain. Dr. Wilkey opined that Durrani had incorrectly diagnosed Wilson, causing her to undergo medically unnecessary surgeries. {¶33} Dr. Ranjiv Saini, M.D., a board certified neuroradiologist, reviewed all three plaintiffs’ MRIs, x-rays, surgical notes, and medical files. {¶34} In Crail’s case, Dr. Saini testified that Durrani had exaggerated, misrepresented, and fabricated his findings. Durrani had diagnosed Crail with disc herniation at the C6/C7 level, as well as other problems at the C4/C5 level, but Dr. Saini found no evidence of these conditions in Crail’s radiological imaging. Durrani also falsely diagnosed Crail with lumbar foraminal stenosis, a diagnosis he could not make without an MRI, which Crail had not had. Like Dr. Wilkey, Dr. Saini took issue with the fact that Durrani had obtained informed consent in the operating room. Dr. Saini also highlighted problems with Durrani’s operative notes, which were vague and prepared far too late. {¶35} Dr. Saini echoed his opinion that Durrani exaggerated and fabricated his findings in Wilson’s case. After reviewing Wilson’s radiological images, Dr. Saini opined that her surgeries were medically unnecessary, given that she had only minimal degenerative changes in her spine. Dr. Saini disputed Durrani’s diagnosis of discogenic disease with foraminal stenosis, noting that the radiologist who originally reviewed Wilson’s images found no evidence of disc herniation. {¶36} Regarding Smith, Dr. Saini also opined that surgery was medically unnecessary and that Durrani had exaggerated his findings. Durrani diagnosed Smith with slippage of the L5/S1 disc based on an x-ray, but according to Dr. Saini, this 13  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS condition required a CT scan or MRI to diagnose. Dr. Saini also disputed Durrani’s determination that Smith suffered from central spine stenosis based on his review of Smith’s medical images. {¶37} Following the presentation of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Durrani presented an expert of his own, Dr. Patrick McCormick, a neurosurgeon.3 Regarding Wilson, Dr. McCormick opined that the surgeries performed by Durrani were medically appropriate and within the standard of care. He reviewed Wilson’s radiological images and believed she suffered from degenerative changes at the L5/S1 level that would benefit from surgery. Dr. McCormick expressed that Wilson provided sufficient informed consent for her surgeries. {¶38} Regarding Crail, Dr. McCormick also believed that surgery was a reasonable recommendation, as Crail suffered from cervical radiculopathy and a herniated disc. Having reviewed Crail’s medical imaging, he opined that Durrani performed the surgeries with the care and skill of a reasonable surgeon. {¶39} Regarding Smith, Dr. McCormick opined that Durrani’s surgical recommendation was reasonable, because Smith suffered from L5/S1 radiculopathy and degenerative changes that could be treated operatively. The Verdicts {¶40} The jury issued its verdicts on November 14, 2023. {¶41} In Wilson’s case, seven of eight jurors found Durrani liable for negligence, and six of eight jurors found him liable for battery, lack of informed consent, and fraudulent misrepresentation. The jury awarded Wilson a total of 3 In closing arguments, the parties’ counsel indicated that Dr. Derk Purcell also testified on Durrani’s behalf. Dr. Purcell’s testimony was not transcribed and does not appear in the record. We are unsure why not. As the appellant, Durrani bears the burden of ensuring that the record on appeal is complete. See App.R. 9(B)(1). 14  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS $801,085.41 in damages—$81,085.41 in past medical expenses, $240,000 in future medical expenses, and $480,000 in noneconomic damages.4 {¶42} In Crail’s case, the same seven of eight jurors who found Durrani liable for negligence in Wilson’s case also found Durrani liable for negligence against Crail. But the jury unanimously found in favor of Durrani on Crail’s claims for battery, lack of informed consent, and fraudulent misrepresentation. For Durrani’s negligence, the jury awarded Crail a total of $934,703.10 in damages—$74,703.10 in past medical expenses, $150,000 in future medical expenses, and $710,000 in noneconomic damages.5 In reaching its damages determination, the jury concluded that Crail suffered a permanent physical deformity as a result of Durrani’s negligence. {¶43} In Smith’s case, six of eight jurors found Durrani liable for negligence, but the unanimous jury rejected the remainder of Smith’s claims against Durrani. Smith was awarded a total of $1,628,756.70 in damages—$13,756.70 in past medical expenses, $280,000 in future medical expenses, and $1,335,000 in noneconomic damages.6 {¶44} The jury declined to impose punitive damages or to award attorney fees in all three cases.7 {¶45} Following the jury’s verdicts, Durrani moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) or, in the alternative, a new trial, in part due to his contention that the trial court improperly consolidated the plaintiffs’ cases for trial. The trial court denied the motion, finding the joint trial to have been proper under Civ.R. 42(A). It based its determination on three key observations. First, the trial 4 The trial court later reduced Wilson’s noneconomic damages to $350,000, as required by R.C. 2323.43(A)(2). 5 The trial court reduced Crail’s noneconomic damages to $500,000. 6 The trial court reduced Smith’s noneconomic damages to $350,000. 7 The parties later stipulated that each plaintiff was entitled to an award of $75,000 in attorney fees. 15  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS court held that “there was sufficient commonality of issues and parties to warrant the consolidation of these cases.” It did not explain whether by “issues and parties” it meant that the plaintiffs’ cases raised a common question of law or fact as required by Civ.R. 42(A) or instead satisfied some other standard. Second, it noted that all of the parties’ expert witnesses offered testimony for and against each of the plaintiffs, “saving time and money in the presentation of evidence.” Third, it noted that the jury was able to parse through the three plaintiffs’ cases individually, because it allocated a different damage award to each plaintiff. {¶46} Durrani appealed. Analysis {¶47} On appeal, Durrani raises ten assignments of error. The first is that the trial court erred in joining the plaintiffs’ cases for trial. We agree. And because we do, the remainder of Durrani’s arguments on appeal are moot. A. Joint Trials {¶48} Our analysis of when cases may be joined for trial begins with Civ.R. 42(A). That rule permits actions to be tried together if they involve “a common question of law or fact.” Civ.R. 42(A). It sets no obvious limit on the number of cases that may be consolidated. Rather, if “actions before the court” satisfy the commonality standard, the trial court may join them for trial purposes. (Emphasis added.) Id. {¶49} This court has considered the propriety of joint trials in a number of appeals involving Durrani. See, e.g., Jones, 2024-Ohio-1776 (1st Dist.); Courtney v. Durrani, 2025-Ohio-2335 (1st Dist.). Prior to these cases, there was very little precedent in Ohio defining the meaning of Civ.R. 42(A)’s common-question standard. In the absence of that guidance, nearly all courts that have upheld consolidation under Civ.R. 42(A) have done so without expressly holding that a common question of law 16  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS or a common question of fact binds the cases, much less identifying what that common question might be. See, e.g., In re Cletus P. & Mary A. McCauley Irrevocable Trust, 2014-Ohio-5123, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.) (affirming consolidation where cases presented a “commonality of issues”); Clemente v. Gardner, 2003-Ohio-6017, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.) (finding no abuse of discretion in consolidation because the same witnesses, evidence, and documents were presented in the consolidated cases). This court followed suit in the prior Durrani appeals, upholding joint trials without specially naming what specific common question of law or fact supported the trial court’s ruling. {¶50} Civ.R. 42(A) undoubtedly vests the trial court with discretion to consolidate matters for trial, with an eye to avoiding unnecessary costs or delay. See Dir. of Hwys. v. Kleines, 38 Ohio St.2d 317, 318 (1974). But a trial court cannot join cases that have no common question, even if doing so might be expedient. Id. at 320. {¶51} In this regard, Civ.R. 42(A) establishes a two-step inquiry in determining when cases may be consolidated. First, the trial court must determine whether the actions being joined present a common question of law or fact. This inquiry falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Waterman v. Kitrick, 60 Ohio App.3d 7, 14 (10th Dist. 1990). Second, if two or more actions present a common question, then the trial court may consolidate the actions. See Civ.R. 42(A) (indicating that consolidation is discretionary, even where actions present a common question of law or fact). In doing so, the trial court may consider the practicalities of consolidation, including whether the cases involve the same parties or witnesses, and weigh the risk of undue prejudice resulting from trying multiple cases to a single fact- finder. See, e.g., Holiday v. Progressive Ins. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85792, *2 (D.Utah May 4, 2021) (describing second step of two-step consolidation inquiry under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42). 17  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS {¶52} The threshold question under Civ.R. 42(A) is therefore whether the actions present a common question of law or fact. Before a trial court considers, at step two whether consolidation under Civ.R. 42 is efficient, it must first determine whether the matters present a common question of law or fact. So what exactly is a common question? 1. Common Question of Law {¶53} In determining what the term “common question of law” means, longstanding rules of statutory construction tell us to look first at the meaning of the term itself. See Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 316 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. Thus, “[i]n statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.” Food Marketing Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 436 (2019). Where the words in a rule or statue yield a clear meaning, courts must stop there. Id.; Jacobson v. Kaforey, 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 8 (“[Courts] do not have the authority to dig deeper than the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute under the guise of either statutory interpretation or liberal construction.”). Consideration of a law’s purpose, function, or history is therefore improper when a term is capable of application on its own. See id. {¶54} In examining the meaning of the term “common question of law,” the phrase has never been defined in the context of Civ.R. 42(A). But that does not mean the term is without meaning. More than 50 years ago, in Kleines, the Ohio Supreme Court defined a common question of law as an “issue[] of law requiring judicial 18  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS interpretation which [is] common to all” parties.8 Kleines, 38 Ohio St.2d at 320. This explanation implies that a common question of law must be one for the court, rather than the jury. It also suggests that the issue of law must be resolved in common for all parties. But no court since Kleines has been so specific in its treatment of what the phrase “common question of law” means. {¶55} In the absence of more specific authority, Ohio’s class action rule provides a helpful analogy. Like Civ.R. 42(A), Civ.R. 23(A), which governs class actions, also relies on the existence of common questions of law or fact to justify class certification. A term used repeatedly throughout a rule is presumed to have the same meaning, absent some indication that the drafter intended a different message. See State ex rel. Daniels v. Hinkston, 2025-Ohio-3058, ¶ 50 (1st Dist.). We have no evidence that the common-question standard means something different in Civ.R. 23(A) than it means in Civ.R. 42(A), and so we find case law expanding upon its meaning in the class action context to be informative here.9 {¶56} With regard to class actions, courts have determined that the “common 8 Kleines concerned the consolidation of four different cases brought by the highway director against various landowners to appropriate their land for the creation of a new roadway. Kleines at syllabus. The landowners were related by blood or marriage. Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. Without describing the legal standards for appropriation under R.C. Ch. 5519, the Court concluded that no legal question could be resolved in common for all property owners and reversed the trial court’s consolidation order as improper. Id. at 320. 9 It is true that claims resolved by way of a class action under Civ.R. 23(A) lose their individual nature, while claims resolved by way of consolidation under Civ.R. 42(A) do not. See, e.g., Gates v. Berger, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5175, *7-8 (10th Dist. Nov. 21, 1996). But we do not see this difference in procedure as a reason to give the phrases different meaning across the two rules. For one thing, the purpose of the rule is irrelevant to our interpretation when the text itself provides clear answers. See Jacobson, 2016-Ohio-8434, at ¶ 8. For another, commonality is not the only criteria that defines a class. Before individual claims may be consolidated for purposes of judgment under Civ.R. 23(A), the plaintiffs must establish that the class is sufficiently numerous that joining all members of the class in one suit is impracticable, that the named plaintiffs are representative of the class members, and that the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. See Civ.R. 23(A)(1)-(4). To the extent the rules serve different functions, these heightened criteria already protect against improper class certification. The fact that it is more difficult to certify a class than to consolidate individual actions mitigates against the need to interpret the common-question term differently across the two rules. 19  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS question of law” standard is satisfied when there is a common liability issue. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Ohio Savs. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 77 (1998). This inquiry focuses on the basis for a defendant’s liability and whether it is in common across the proposed class. Grant v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 2003-Ohio-2826, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). Variations in individual damages will not destroy commonality so long as the basis for liability is the same across class members. Ayers v. KCI Technologies, Inc., 2019-Ohio-3614, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). On the other hand, the mere existence of a common question about the defendant’s liability is insufficient to support class certification. Barrow v. New Miami, 2016-Ohio-340, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.). Rather, the claims must have the potential to generate common answers that resolve the litigation. Id. {¶57} Combining Kleines and Civ.R. 23(A)—both sources of Ohio law—yields a number of observations about Civ.R. 42(A)’s common-question-of-law standard. First, the question of law must be one that can be resolved at once for all parties to the litigation, rather than piecemeal. Kleines, 38 Ohio St.2d at 320. Second, the question must relate to the defendant’s liability. Hamilton at 77. Third, the answer to the question must be in common, or uniform, across the consolidated cases. Barrow at ¶ 28. {¶58} Our conclusion that Civ.R. 42(A) requires a single, common answer to the defendant’s liability across consolidated cases is buttressed by case law construing the federal corollary to Ohio’s consolidation rule. Like Ohio, the federal courts also permit cases to be joined for trial when they present a common question of law or fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a)(1). And in this context, federal courts have long concluded that “the plain meaning of this phrase indicates that a common question is one that must be answered identically in each case in which it is presented.” Habitat Edn. Ctr., Inc. v. Kimball, 250 F.R.D. 390, 394 (E.D. Wisc. 2008). Therefore, to determine whether 20  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS cases present a common question of law, a trial court must identify the elements of the relevant causes of action and evaluate which elements, if any, submit to common answers. Neri v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 122 F.4th 239, 246-247 (6th Cir. 2024). There is no common question of law where a decision-maker can answer “yes” in some cases and “no” in others. Id. at 247. Similarly, there is no common question if the plaintiffs must use different pieces of evidence to answer the question. Id. {¶59} We accordingly hold that, to satisfy Civ.R. 42(A)’s common-question- of-law requirement, cases joined for trial must present at least one question about the defendant’s liability that is capable of being resolved with one answer. {¶60} We recognize that this holding may seem in tension with our precedent indicating that cases against Durrani present a common question of law when they raise “the same theory of malpractice and/or fraud.” See Jones, 2024-Ohio-1776, at ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). This statement implies, without directly saying so, that merely advancing a similar basis for liability is sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement of Civ.R. 42(A). The rule is not incorrect,