State v. Jordan

[Cite as State v. Jordan, 2026-Ohio-3956.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115473 v. : REGGIE JORDAN, : Defendant-Appellant. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 8, 2026 Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-684719-A Appearances: Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Chloe Robinson and Owen Knapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. Eric M. Levy, for appellant. DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.: On July 25, 2025, a jury found defendant-appellant Reggie Jordan guilty of one count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound with a major drug offender (“MDO”) specification and one count of possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Jordan to an aggregate minimum term of 16 years of imprisonment, with a maximum of 21.5 years. This timely appeal followed. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History A. The Indictment On October 25, 2023, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a seven-count indictment charging Jordan and codefendant Stanley Barrow with a total of seven drug-related offenses: Count 1: trafficking, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), with an MDO specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410(B), as well as forfeiture specifications (fentanyl-related compound — Jordan and Barrow); Count 2: drug possession, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with MDO specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410(B), as well as forfeiture specifications (fentanyl-related compound — Jordan and Barrow); Count 3: trafficking, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), with forfeiture specifications (cocaine — Jordan only); Count 4: trafficking, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), with forfeiture specifications (cocaine — Barrow only); Count 5: drug possession, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specifications (cocaine — Jordan and Barrow); Count 6: tampering with evidence, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) (Jordan and Barrow); and Count 7: possessing criminal tools, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) (Jordan and Barrow). Jordan and Barrow were tried together, and Barrow’s convictions are the subject of a companion appeal, State v. Barrow, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 115482.  B. Factual Background and Motions to Suppress In the midmorning hours of March 14, 2023, Jordan and Barrow were occupying an apartment in North Olmsted, Ohio. A 911 caller lodged a noise complaint regarding the apartment, and North Olmsted police were dispatched to the location. North Olmsted police officers ultimately decided to enter the premises without a warrant based on alleged exigent circumstances. Jordan and Barrow each filed motions to suppress. Jordan filed his motion on May 17, 2024. The State filed its opposition several months later, on September 13, 2024. The State’s opposition brief did not mention a search warrant. The trial court scheduled a suppression hearing and, depending on the outcome, a jury trial for January 28, 2025. That morning, the State noted on the record that it had just received a copy of a search warrant that North Olmsted police had obtained after they had entered and allegedly observed drugs in plain view. The State explained that the “search warrant came into the possession of the State’s Assistant Prosecutor . . . this morning” and that “[s]he immediately turned it over to defense counsel to let them see it.” (Tr. 38.) The State explained that “nobody put two and two together that there was a search warrant done.” (Tr. 38.) It also reported that the warrant affidavit, in addition to the warrant itself, had been turned over to defense counsel. (Tr. 38.) Jordan’s counsel argued that there were “material misrepresentations” in the affidavit when compared to “what’s contained in the police reports.” (Tr. 38- 39.) He also criticized the late disclosure, assigning the blame to North Olmsted police and city prosecutors. The trial court continued the suppression hearing and trial. On February 1, 2025, Jordan filed a motion for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), based on alleged inconsistencies between the warrant affidavit and police reports. According to Jordan’s motion, North Olmsted police had secured the warrant from a Rocky River Municipal Court judge. However, neither the warrant affidavit nor the police reports — indeed, not even the warrant itself — were attached to Jordan’s motion for a Franks hearing. They also were not offered for admission or proffered at the suppression hearing. Those documents, therefore, are not part of the record on appeal. C. The Suppression Hearing The trial court held the suppression hearing on July 11, 2025. The State asserted that there were “clear, exigent circumstances” supporting the warrantless entry. (Tr. 69.) It called a single witness, North Olmsted Patrol Officer Alexander Pickens. Officer Pickens testified to his training as a police officer, which included training in the administration of Narcan for opioid overdoses. He stated that officers are “trained to administer it nasally” and that “we carry it on our person and have it in our cruisers.” (Tr. 79.) Officer Pickens testified that it was principally employed in cases involving fentanyl or heroin and that to his knowledge it does not reverse the effects of an overdose stemming from nonopioid drugs. (Tr. 79.)  At approximately 3:29 a.m. on March 14, 2023, Officer Pickens was working the night shift and responded to a call for a noise complaint at 23303 Lorain Road. The State played two 911 calls at the suppression hearing, as well as several calls between officers and dispatch. Officer Pickens testified that officers knocked on the door to the apartment and identified themselves as police. He stated they “were told to hold on so [they] continued to wait.” Asked to describe the radio call marked as State’s exhibit No. 6, Officer Pickens stated that it referenced the sounds of items being smashed in the apartment, “[s]tomping and screaming for help,” and that one of the occupants had said he was “tripping,” which to him suggested drug use. (Tr. 83-84.)1 The State played State’s exhibit No. 8, another radio call, for the trial court. Officer Pickens testified that the radio call indicated a male inside the apartment had “[r]equested an ambulance.” (Tr. 85.)2 In the recording, dispatch asked whether to send an ambulance, and an officer replied, “Yeah, if you just want to start one.” An officer also described an occupant “[s]mashing the window screen out” in the third-floor apartment. (Tr. 85.) 1 The State identified these as State’s exhibit Nos. 1-9 at the suppression hearing, and those exhibits were admitted without objection at the conclusion of the hearing. The record contains no separate schedule of exhibits for the suppression hearing. Nevertheless, based upon the descriptions in the transcript, the radio call referencing “tripping,” “smashing things,” “stomping,” and “screaming for help — State’s exhibit No. 6 at the suppression hearing — appears to correspond to State’s exhibit No. 221 at trial, which is part of the record. 2 Based on testimony, this radio call appears to correspond to State’s exhibit No. 223 at trial.  Officer Pickens testified that because one of the occupants asked for help and an ambulance, they were concerned “that there was something medical going on.” (Tr. 86.) Officer Pickens stated that the male asked twice for an ambulance. He testified that in such circumstances, officers “advise dispatch of the situation and have them have an ambulance en route. And then we try and figure out what’s going on so that way we can relay it to the medics.” (Tr. 87.) Upon questioning by the trial court, Officer Pickens testified that they requested an ambulance when he heard a male say “Help me. Send an ambulance.” (Tr. 144.) He “relayed that to the dispatch, and they immediately dispatched the ambulance.” (Tr. 144.) Officer Pickens stated that the police continued their attempts to elicit further response from the occupants while they waited approximately 10-15 minutes for the ambulance to arrive. (Tr. 144.) According to Officer Pickens, the loud commotion coming from the apartment stopped abruptly. More specifically, he testified that a “loud thud” followed by silence ultimately triggered the police to force entry into the apartment: A. We continued to knock. We heard noises coming from inside the apartment. And then, after a while, we heard a loud thud. And then we continued to try and get an answer from the apartment, and we heard nothing. Q. And why is that important? A. We believed, at that time, that we would have to go in to make potential life-saving measures and they were, potentially, unconscious. (Tr. 88.)  Officer Pickens stated that it was “[t]he fire department” that “made the determination to enter,” but that “[i]f the fire department wasn’t, [the police] were going to make entry.” (Tr. 89-90.) A couch was blocking the door. After moving it to gain entry, police found Jordan “unconscious covered in white powder in the fetal position on the floor.” (Tr. 89.) They administered Narcan. (Tr. 91.) Officer Pickens testified that they would not have entered the apartment if they had not believed there was a medical emergency. (Tr. 90.) He further identified photographs depicting Jordan on a “stretcher in the back of the ambulance” with “[v]omit and saliva” around his mouth and white powder on his hands and forearms. (Tr. 90-91.) Officer Pickens also identified several exhibits depicting the interior of the apartment. He described a floor with “white powder . . . [r]ight inside the door.” (Tr. 97-98.) He confirmed, based on photos, that the kitchen, which was also “right inside the door,” contained white powder everywhere. (Tr. 98.) The kitchen sink appeared to contain drugs. Officer Pickens testified that he had reason to believe there was more than one person in the apartment. (Tr. 104.) The officers continued to observe suspected narcotics, including on the floor, as they walked through the apartment from the front door, past the kitchen, and into the bathroom. They reached the bathroom and found Barrow, who was likewise unconscious. (Tr. 100-101.) The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that “[t]here’s been uncontroverted testimony and evidence that there was a cry for help.” (Tr. 158.) The trial court found the officers’ decision to summon medical personnel prior to entry “the most telling aspect[.]” (Tr. 158.) It concluded that the police “had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that someone needed help.” (Tr. 159.)3 D. Trial The case proceeded to trial on July 21, 2024. We note at the outset that while the jury returned guilty verdicts on two counts of drug possession, one for a fentanyl-related compound and one for cocaine, it acquitted Jordan of all other charges, including trafficking, tampering with evidence, and possession of criminal tools. For purposes of brevity, therefore, we focus principally on trial testimony and other evidence relevant to issues pertinent to this appeal. At trial, Officer Pickens again testified concerning the circumstances that led police to enter the apartment, where they found Jordan unconscious, in a fetal position, and covered in white powder. Another witness for the State, Detective Majed Abuzahrieh, was employed by the time of trial with the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department. At the time of the incident, however, he had served as a North Olmsted patrol officer for several years. On the night in question, he responded to the Kensington Court Apartments after Officer Pickens had already arrived. While knocking at the door, he heard “[s]creaming, groaning, moaning,” and “other noises.” (Tr. 563.) After 10 to 20 minutes had passed, he “heard . . . a thump of what [he] was immediately able to identify as a human body hitting the floor.” (Tr. 524.) 3 The trial court addressed the Franks issue only briefly, noting at the outset of the suppression hearing that if the officers lawfully entered based upon exigent circumstances, drugs observed in plain view would provide a basis for a search warrant. (Tr. 53.) After the thump or thud, there was silence except for the sound of running water that he had heard upon arrival. In conjunction with members of the North Olmsted Fire Department who had also arrived at the scene, they determined to make entry. Detective Abuzahrieh stated that they suspected there was a medical emergency because after the thud or thump, they were “no longer getting a verbal response.” (Tr. 525.) Upon entry, they observed Jordan on the floor in a fetal position, unresponsive other than thrashing or tensing when touched, and with “white powder on his body.” (Tr. 526.) Detective Abuzahrieh testified that he considered this consistent with opioid usage and overdose. They also observed “white sprinkles” and or “white droplets” on other surfaces (Tr. 525.) Detective Abuzahrieh testified that they handcuffed Jordan for their safety and his own, prior to administering Narcan. He explained that in his experience, the administration of Narcan prompted a response similar to waking someone suddenly from a deep sleep, triggering a “fight or flight” reaction that could prove to be dangerous. (Tr. 528.) Prior to allowing the fire department to enter, officers cleared the apartment to ensure safety, looking for other individuals. He continued through the apartment and found Barrow in the bathtub, “unconscious, passed out, and unresponsive” despite the fact that the shower was running. (Tr. 530-531.) After handcuffing Barrow and moving him to the living room, officers “did a search [for] additional persons in any portion of the apartment that a person would be reasonably located.” (Tr. 531.) Finding no one, they allowed the fire department to enter and provide aid to Jordan and Barrow, including administration of Narcan. Detective Abuzahrieh was present when multiple doses of Narcan were given and testified that Jordan and Barrow “had an immediate response,” including “nasal breathing.” (Tr. 532-533.) They were ultimately transported to the hospital for evaluation. (Tr. 538.) Detective Abuzahrieh testified that in performing the initial sweep of the apartment, they observed “numerous bags of white substances and just other rock-like substances” in the kitchen sink, as well as “numerous baggies” in the residence, all “within plain view.” (Tr. 533-534.) Additional items within plain view included several cell phones, piles of cash, filtered masks, a blender, a pill press, and a scale. There was a couch, a table, and chairs, but no bed. He further described the white substance that was visible: Throughout the apartment there was just a layer of white dust almost throughout the kitchen surfaces. On the floor there were other — I don’t want to say droplets because it didn’t appear to be wet, but a dust that — not dust. It’s hard to describe. White substances or like white droplets on the ground throughout the kitchen. The kitchen table also had like a sheen of white dust all over it. Not to be confused with just regular house dust, but like to me it appeared to be the same substances that we located throughout the apartment. (Tr. 535.) He believed, based on his training and experience, that it was “[c]rack cocaine or coke.” (Tr. 535.) He also testified that the multiple, individual bags of white substances, combined with the referenced paraphernalia such as a pill press and scale, suggested drug trafficking. (Tr. 535.) Detective Abuzahrieh remained in the apartment, and “anything in plain view was photographed and collected.” (Tr. 538.) He identified State’s exhibit Nos. 1 through 102 as the referenced photographs, several of which depicted white substances in baggies or covering various surfaces, including overturned chairs. He testified that none of the closet doors or drawers were “manipulated” by police during the protective sweep. (Tr. 547.) In other words, if a closet door or drawer was depicted as open in a photograph, that is how they had found it at the time. State’s exhibit Nos. 28 and 30 depicted Jordan in an ambulance with “the white substance on his hands, forearms, shoulders, [and] chest,” as well as on his hand and fingernails. (Tr. 545.) State’s exhibit Nos. 31 and 32 depicted the white substance on “his fingernails, palms,” and “fingers,” as well as on his wrist. (Tr. 545.) Detective Abuzahrieh testified that the kitchen sink had been running, and in fact overflowing, when police entered the apartment. They turned off the faucet and allowed it to drain. They were then “left with numerous bags of the substances.” (Tr. 543.) They photographed several items suspected to be drugs, sometimes placing a ruler next to the items. (Tr. 548-549.) The bags were ultimately removed from the sink, and unbagged items left behind were photographed. (Tr. 557-558.) The evidence was collected at the scene, bagged, and transported back to the station to be entered into property management software. Detective Abuzahrieh participated in the collection of evidence. He described the software as “essentially an evidence management entry system.” (Tr. 561.)  On cross-examination, Detective Abuzahrieh conceded that the contents of the plastic baggies found in the kitchen sink, i.e., some of the suspected drugs, were wet. (Tr. 577-578.) He further conceded that whether the white substance was crack cocaine or fentanyl, it would become heavier because of the water. (Tr. 578.) Defense counsel walked him through several images that he conceded depicted bags with visible moisture. While there were no pictures of the sink when it was filled with water, he admitted that water was inside the plastic packages. (Tr. 590.) On redirect, Detective Abuzahrieh testified that the suspected items inside the wet bags were dried prior to being entered into the evidence room and stored: Q. Detective, how were those drugs inside those wet bags collected? A. So those items were collected. Obviously, due to them being wet, they have to be dried out and any moisture removed as per policy and to preserve the evidence. Any wet items cannot be entered into the evidence room or property room without being dried out. So those drugs would have been placed in a brown bag, dried, and then entered. Q. And then submitted for testing; is that correct? A. Correct. So the weight of the items would be the dry weight. (Tr. 591.) The suspected drugs were sent to the Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory for testing on March 20, 2023, and a lab report was issued on May 30, 2023. Forensic scientist Heather Pilch-Cooper testified concerning testing of the collected samples. She was recognized as an expert in the field of drug chemistry without objection and identified State’s exhibit No. 210 as her report pertaining to this case. (Tr. 639, 645.) Evidence bag 001 had been preliminarily identified as suspected crack cocaine. Testing was divided into subparts. Item 001.01 in the report reflected testing of 54 white fragments of suspected drugs. Pilch-Cooper testified that the weight was 140.28 grams and that testing revealed the mixture to contain 4-ANPP and fentanyl, both classified as Schedule II drugs. She testified that 4-ANPP is a “precursor chemical that is used to make fentanyl,” and that fentanyl itself was “a synthetic opioid compound.” (Tr. 650.) Items 001.02 and 001.03 tested positive for illicit drugs as well, including cocaine, 4-ANPP, and fentanyl. Specifically, item 001.02 weighed 0.42 grams and “was found to contain cocaine, 4-ANPP, and fentanyl.” (Tr. 651.) Item 001.03 weighed 30.5 grams and “was found to be cocaine-based.” (Tr. 651.) Additional evidence bags likewise contained substances revealed to be illicit drugs. Pilch-Cooper testified that lab scales were calibrated annually, but also tested daily “before we begin any work” using standard 1-gram, 10-gram, and 50-gram weights. (Tr. 654.) She identified State’s exhibit Nos. 187-209 as photos of the items tested. With respect to the contents of evidence bag 001, she testified that none of the items appeared to be wet and that she “did not have it noted in [her] report that they were damp or wet.” (Tr. 655.) Pilch-Cooper further testified that she could tell from the image that they were not wet because when something is received “that’s damp or wet, there will be stains on the paper or watermarks on the paper showing that these items were wet or damp because the paper absorbs water from them and there is none of that in this photograph.” (Tr. 655-656.) She later reiterated on redirect that “[a]t the time they were tested, there was no indication of water or it would have been noted in [her] report.” (Tr. 673.) She “did not indicate . . . that there was any wetness or dampness in the sample.” (Tr. 676.) The jury found Jordan guilty of one count of drug possession (Count 2 — fentanyl-related compound), a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) with an MDO specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1410(B), as well as certain forfeiture specifications, and one count of drug possession (Count 5 — cocaine), a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), along with certain forfeiture specifications. Jordan was acquitted of all other charges. On July 28, 2025, the trial court sentenced Jordan to a prison term of five years on the MDO specification, to be served prior and consecutive to a minimum term of 11 years up to a maximum of 16 years and 6 months on the underlying drug-possession count. It sentenced Jordan to a prison term of 12 months on the fifth-degree felony drug-possession count, to be served concurrently. Consistent with the indictment, the trial court initially treated Count 5 as a felony of the first degree. Following a limited remand, the designation was corrected to a felony of the fifth degree via a nunc pro tunc journal entry. The 12- month concurrent sentence, however, remained unchanged. This timely appeal followed. II. Assignments of Error Jordan presents six assignments of error for our review:  First Assignment of Error: The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence due to illegal entry into a home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion for a Franks hearing and finding the false statements negated probable cause. Third Assignment of Error: The evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for drug possession in counts two and five and the first degree felony and major drug offender specification enhancements in count two where the state failed to prove all elements of the offense including possession and the actual weight of the controlled substance exclusive of external water weight, violating appellant’s due process rights. Fourth Assignment of Error: The drug possession convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fifth Assignment of Error: The trial court erred by giving incomplete jury instructions regarding the mixture and weight of the controlled substances. Sixth Assignment of Error: The MDO specification in count two was unconstitutional as it required a factual finding by the court, not a jury, and further, as the jury made the finding regarding weight of the contraband the MDO finding violated Ohio law. We find no merit to any of Jordan’s assignments of error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. III. Analysis A. First Assignment of Error In his first assignment of error, Jordan challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that entry into the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 14, Article I, of the Constitution of Ohio. We find no merit to this assignment of error. “An appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Byrd, 2022-Ohio-4635, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “Because the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Thompson, 2020-Ohio-486, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Riedel, 2017-Ohio-8865, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). See also Byrd at ¶ 14, citing State v. Preztak, 2009-Ohio-621, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). We then “independently determine, as a matter of law, whether the applicable legal standard has been satisfied.” State v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-2979, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-496 (8th Dist.). This court has stated: The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 14, Article I, of the Constitution of Ohio, prohibit unreasonable searches of persons and seizure of their property. Evidence obtained by the State in violation of that prohibition must be suppressed from use by the State in its criminal prosecution of the person from whom it was seized. State v. Baker, 2007-Ohio-5450, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). “The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that police officers get a warrant before entering a home without permission.” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 298 (2021). A search conducted in the absence of a warrant “is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014), citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-460 (2011). “When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18, citing Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 (1974). “One important exception” to the warrant requirement “is for exigent circumstances.” Lange at 301. This exception “applies when ‘the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.’” Id., quoting King at 460. “The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle ‘emergenc[ies]’— situations presenting a ‘compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” Lange at 301, quoting Riley at 402. See also State v. Beckwith, 2008-Ohio-2780, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). The United States Supreme Court “has identified several such exigencies. An officer, for example, may ‘enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant[,] to protect an occupant from imminent injury,’ or to ensure his own safety.” (Emphasis added.) Lange at 301, quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). “Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). “‘The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’” Id., quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Moreover, the officers’ “subjective motivation is irrelevant.” Brigham City at 404. “An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (Emphasis in original.) Id., quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). Finally, “the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.” Mincey at 393, citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-510 (1978), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-466 (1971). In Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009), police responded to a call reporting a disturbance and found, inter alia, a damaged pickup truck with blood on the hood and on the clothes within, and also on one of the doors to the house. They were able to see Fisher through a window. They observed that his hand was cut and he was “screaming and throwing things.” Id. at 45. Furthermore, the back door had been locked “and a couch had been placed to block the front door.” Id. Officers knocked, but Fisher refused to answer. When officers asked if he needed medical attention, he “demanded, with accompanying profanity, that the officers go to get a search warrant.” Id. An officer nevertheless made entry. The trial court granted Fisher’s motion to suppress. The United States Supreme Court ultimately held that the warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It concluded that “[a] straightforward application of the emergency aid exception, as in Brigham City, [547 U.S. 398,] dictates that the officer’s entry was reasonable.” Fisher at 48. It rejected the reasoning of the Michigan Court of Appeals, which held that there was insufficient evidence of an emergency justifying a warrantless intrusion: Even a casual review of Brigham City reveals the flaw in this reasoning. Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. The only injury police could confirm in Brigham City was the bloody lip they saw the juvenile inflict upon the adult. Fisher argues that the officers here could not have been motivated by a perceived need to provide medical assistance, since they never summoned emergency medical personnel. This would have no bearing, of course, upon their need to ensure that Fisher was not endangering someone else in the house. Moreover, even if the failure to summon medical personnel conclusively established that [the officer] did not subjectively believe, when he entered the house, that Fisher or someone else was seriously injured (which is doubtful), the test, as we have said, is not what [the officer] believed, but whether there was “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger, Brigham City, supra, at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650; Mincey, supra, at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290. Id. at 49. In the present case, there was uncontroverted testimony that before entering the apartment, North Olmsted police heard an individual say he was “tripping,” that the individual asked for help, and that he requested an ambulance. There also was uncontroverted testimony that unlike in Fisher — and even though subjective belief is irrelevant — North Olmsted police summoned medical aid before entering the dwelling. Indeed, the uncontroverted testimony was that even with medical personnel on the scene, the officers continued to knock and announce themselves. It was not until officers heard a thud or thump, followed by silence, that they decided — in conjunction with medical personnel, no less — to make a warrantless entry. In his argument, Jordan minimizes the thud and ignores the sudden silence. He states that “[a] ‘thud’ is consistent with a mundane household occurrence” such as “dropping an object or moving furniture, not inherently a medical emergency.” (Jordan’s brief at p. 10-11.) The officers’ observation of a thud, however, cannot be divorced from the silence that immediately followed, which itself must be contrasted with the preceding cacophony. This included sounds of screaming and smashing, observations of a window being broken, an occupant’s announcement that they were “tripping,” a cry for help, and even the request for an ambulance. The trial court found the officers’ decision to summon medical personnel prior to entry “the most telling aspect,” driving its ultimate conclusion that police had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that occupants needed emergency assistance. (Tr. 158.) See also Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107, 110 (2026) (Brigham City’s reasonableness standard was satisfied where police had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a homeowner intended to commit suicide and might already have shot himself.)4 We find no error in that conclusion. 4 We agree with the State that the present case is not properly viewed through the lens of a “community caretaking” exception. “In Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 198, 141 S.Ct. 1596, 209 L.Ed.2d 604 (2021),” the Supreme Court “rejected a ‘community caretaking  We also find no error in the trial court’s rejection of an argument that a protective sweep of the apartment was impermissible. Protective sweeps are generally discussed when performed incident to an arrest as described in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). See also State v. Woods, 2026-Ohio-1204, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.) (While Buie was limited to situations incident to an arrest, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that officers may conduct a protective sweep without an arrest in certain circumstances.). In the present case, however, the officers’ actions are better characterized as a continuation of their provision of emergency aid rather than a sweep incident to an arrest. In Mincey, 437 U.S. 385, the Supreme Court authorized “a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims[.]” Id. at 392. In Case, the Supreme Court held that “an emergency-aid entry provides no basis to search the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency while maintaining the officers’ safety.” (Emphasis added.) Case at 117. Furthermore, as discussed above, “the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.” Mincey at 393, citing Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509-510, and Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-466. As the State correctly notes, the testimony established that upon entry, police found Jordan unconscious and covered in white powder, suggesting an rule’ allowing a warrantless home entry even absent a ‘need to render emergency assistance’ to an occupant.” (Emphasis added.) Case at 112. Here, the State offered a straightforward argument that the circumstances, viewed objectively, justified a warrantless entry to render emergency assistance. overdose. This supported an objectively reasonable assessment that a serious medical emergency was occurring. Officer Pickens testified that based on his observations at the scene, he had reason to believe there was more than one person in the apartment. (Tr. 103-104.) Jordan was in no position to discuss who else might be in the apartment, and that potential second person was also a possible overdose victim requiring immediate assistance. The emergency, in other words, was not limited to Jordan. The testimony therefore supported a reasonable belief that more than one individual was in the apartment and required emergency aid. Accordingly, the officers’ movements in an effort to locate other distressed individuals did not exceed the scope of the exigency and were permissible under Mincey. See also Beckwith, 2008-Ohio-2780, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Testimony further established that the direct route to the bathroom, where Barrow was found, went past the kitchen, where suspected drugs were in plain view. Jordan argues that the protective sweep “morphed into a criminal investigation” and resulted in “searching areas not in plain view relative to the alleged medical emergency[.]” (Jordan’s brief at p. 11.) These characterizations are not supported by the record. Indeed, Jordan’s citation to the transcript in support of this proposition consists entirely of the arguments of counsel, not testimony. Jordan’s first assignment of error is overruled.  B. Second Assignment of Error In his second assignment of error, Jordan argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a Franks hearing and by failing to find that purported false statements in the warrant affidavit negated probable cause. As discussed above, Jordan supplemented his motion to suppress with a motion for a hearing pursuant to Franks, 438 U.S. 154. Jordan claimed there were inconsistencies between the warrant affidavit and North Olmsted police reports. According to Jordan’s motion, after the initial entry into the apartment, North Olmsted police secured a search warrant from a Rocky River Municipal Court judge. The motion, however, did not include affidavits or sworn statements supporting a claim of deliberate falsification. “There is . . . a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting [a] search warrant.” Franks at 172. “To successfully attack the veracity of a facially sufficient search warrant affidavit, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant made a false statement, either ‘intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.’” State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 441 (1992), quoting Franks at 155-156. “‘Reckless disregard’ means that the affiant had serious doubts about the truth of an allegation.” State v. McKnight, 2005-Ohio-6046, ¶ 31, citing United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984). “The [defendant’s] attack must be more than