Singleton v. McNabb
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1021
JudgeJudge Christopher Freeman
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1021
Filed 18 November 2026
Vance County, No. 19CVS001102-900
KAREN JEAN SINGLETON, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID CLINTON MCNABB, M.D. and RALEIGH ORTHOPAEDIC CLINIC, P.A.,
Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 27 September 2024 and 23 January
2025 by Judge John M. Dunlow in Vance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 24 March 2026.
Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence & Butler, LLP, by Steven C. Lawrence and
Charles R. Smith, for plaintiff-appellant.
Hall Booth Smith, PC, by Elizabeth P. McCullough, Kelsey Heino, and Noelle
K. Demeny, for defendants-appellees.
FREEMAN, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the trial courtâs 23 January 2025 order dismissing
plaintiffâs complaint with prejudice and 27 September 2024 order denying plaintiffâs
motion to amend her complaint. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
by dismissing her claim based on a discovery violation and by denying her motion to
SINGLETON V. MCNABB
Opinion of the Court
amend her complaint by improperly considering evidence outside of the pleadings.
After careful review, we affirm the trial courtâs orders.
I. Factual and Procedural History
This is plaintiffâs third appeal in this matter and plaintiffâs first appeal of a
final judgment. See Singleton v. McNabb, No. 21-764, slip op. at 8 (N.C. Ct. App. May
17, 2022) (âSingleton Iâ) (unpublished) (dismissing as interlocutory); Singleton v.
McNabb, No. 21-764, slip op. at 8 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2024) (âSingleton IIâ)
(unpublished) (affirming the trial courtâs order imposing discovery sanctions).
Accordingly, we adopt the previous factual and procedural history:
On 14 February 2020, following the entry of an Order
extending the statute of limitations, Ms. Singleton
[(âplaintiffâ)] filed a Complaint against David Clinton
McNabb, M.D. and Raleigh Orthopaedic Clinic, P.A.
(collectively âdefendantsâ). The Complaint alleges that Dr.
McNabb failed to perform adequate leg length analysis and
measurements of [plaintiffâs] right leg before Dr. McNabb
performed a total replacement of [plaintiffâs] right hip. Dr.
McNabbâs alleged error resulted in him making [plaintiffâs]
leg too long, which required him to repair the leg length
during surgery and resulted in damage to the femoral and
sciatic nerve. Following surgery, [plaintiff] experienced a
total lack of feeling in her right leg for a period of time, lack
of feeling and function in the lower right leg for many
months, and excruciating pain and spasms in her hip area
and throughout her right leg. [Plaintiff] required
substantial physical therapy and use of a wheelchair.
[plaintiffâs C]omplaint alleges negligence on the part of
[defendants].
Defendants filed an Answer on 2 June 2020, denying
negligence and liability and asserting numerous defenses.
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Opinion of the Court
On 11 March 2021, the trial court entered a Second
Amended Consent Discovery Scheduling Order. The
Scheduling Order, among other things, ordered that
[plaintiff] shall provide medical records requested by
defendants in written discovery on or before 15 March
2021. The Scheduling Order stated that Dr. McNabbâs
deposition may be requested by [plaintiff] after she
produced the required medical records.
Dr. McNabbâs deposition was scheduled for 11 June 2021.
Defendants allege that during the deposition[, plaintiff]
produced two x-rays which had not been produced before.
[Plaintiff] claimed these x-rays were of her leg and
contained marking[s] and notes for purpose of
measurement made by Dr. McNabb. Once these x-rays
were produced, Dr. McNabbâs counsel stopped the
deposition, went to a separate room to consult with Dr.
McNabb following which they terminated the deposition.
Following the deposition defendants filed a Motion for
Sanctions and Motion to Dismiss.
On 17 August 2021, [plaintiff] filed a Motion to Compel and
Response to [d]efendantsâ Motion and Amended Motion for
Sanctions and Motion to Dismiss. [Plaintiff] asked the trial
court to compel Dr. McNabb to complete his deposition.
The motions came on for hearing on 18 August 2021.
Following the hearing, the trial court entered an Order on
8 September 2021 imposing sanctions pursuant to North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2), assessing costs
to [plaintiff], compelling [plaintiff] to produce certain
discovery materials, and dismissing defendantsâ Motion to
Dismiss. [Plaintiff] filed Notice of Appeal on 5 October
2021.
Singleton I, slip op. at 2â4. We dismissed the first matter as interlocutory. Id. at 8.
After her injuries, including while the appellate matter was pending, plaintiff kept
three journals detailing her pain and daily schedule.
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Opinion of the Court
Subsequently, on 18 October 2022, the trial court entered
its Order on Attorneyâs Fees and Costs for Discovery
Violations. The trial court assessed a total amount of
attorney fees against Plaintiff of $11,147.75 and costs of
$505.65. The trial court ordered these fees paid within
thirty days of a final judgment in this case. On 10
November 2022, Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal from both
the 8 September 2021 Order Imposing Discovery Sanctions
and the 18 October 2022 Order on Attorneyâs Fees and
Costs for Discovery Violations.
Singleton II, slip op. at 4. We affirmed the trial courtâs Order on Attorneyâs Fees and
Costs for Discovery Violations, holding that plaintiff âfailed to show the trial court
erred in concluding plaintiff violated the discovery orders in this caseâ and that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 7.
While the interlocutory matters were pending before this Court, the underlying
matter proceeded.1 The trial court held a motions hearing on 16 August 2024,
denying plaintiffâs previous motions to compel, for leave to amend, for permission to
file counter or cross claims, for request for defendantsâ admissions, and for a
protective order regarding plaintiffâs journals. The trial court ordered that plaintiff
comply with production of her journals or be subject to further discovery sanctions,
including involuntary dismissal. Subject to plaintiffâs compliance with production,
the trial court denied defendantsâ motion to dismiss.
1 On 28 October 2024, defendants moved to dismiss the second appeal or, in the alternative, moved to
stay the proceedings. Counsel for plaintiff contacted the Trial Court Coordinator on 1 November 2024
to confirm plaintiffâs second appeal automatically stayed the underlying proceedings. Nevertheless,
the trial court entered an Order as to Jurisdiction on 18 November 2024, concluding as a matter of
law, plaintiffâs appeal was interlocutory and did not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction, and
ordering the trial court retain jurisdiction over the matter and that the matter proceed with litigation.
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Opinion of the Court
The trial court entered an Order on In-Camera Review on 30 September 2024,
classifying plaintiffâs journals as discoverable and compelled the Clerk of Superior
Court to provide a copy of the journals to defendants.
On 12 December 2024, plaintiff responded to defendantsâ Third Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, objecting to twenty-five
of the thirty-four interrogatories, and alleging that defendants were âattempting to
weaponize discovery and [make] misrepresentations of fact in violation of Rule 11 of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.â In response, defendants moved to
compel plaintiffâs discovery responses.
Plaintiff submitted a supplemental affidavit to support her objections, stating
that she would ânot waiv[e her] rights to privacy or objections to the production of
[her] private journals or diaries.â Defendants moved to strike plaintiffâs
supplemental affidavit, alleging it was neither timely nor based on plaintiffâs personal
knowledge.
The trial court held a subsequent motions hearing on 10 January 2025,
addressing defendantsâ outstanding motions to execute, to dismiss, for sanctions, and
to strike. The trial court granted all outstanding motions in defendantsâ favor and
ordered plaintiffâs claim be dismissed.
II. Jurisdiction
Though neither party raised the issue, we must first determine if the notice of
appeal and amended notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction.
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Opinion of the Court
âParties permitted by law to appeal from a judgment or order must do so by
filing an appropriate notice of appeal.â Stephenson v. Bartlett, 177 N.C. App. 239, 240
(2006). âIn order to confer jurisdiction on the stateâs appellate courts, appellants of
lower court orders must comply with the requirements of Rule 3 of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure.â Id. at 241 (quoting Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 156
(2000)). âThe provisions of Rule 3 are jurisdictional, and failure to follow the
requirements thereof requires dismissal of an appeal.â Id. (quoting Abels v. Renfro
Corp., 126 N.C. App. 800, 802 (1997)). Rule 3 requires that the notice of appeal âshall
designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which
appeal is taken.â N.C. R. App. P. 3(d).
However, âa mistake in designating the judgment . . . should not result in loss
of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly
inferred from the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake.â Stephenson
v. Bartlett, 177 N.C. App. 239, 241 (2006) (quoting Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C.
App. 153, 156â57 (1990)).
Here, on 18 February 2025, plaintiff entered written notice of appeal,
appealing from the following:
1. Order entered January 23, 2025, dismissing Plaintiffâs
claims with prejudice;
2. Order entered on August 27, 2024 ruling inter alia:
a. Denying Plaintiffâs Motion to Amend;
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b. Denying Plaintiffâs Motion for Sanctions against
Defendants for improperly terminating Defendant
McNabbâs deposition;
c. Denying Plaintiffâs request to reconvene
Defendant McNabbâs deposition; [and]
d. Denying Plaintiffâs Motion for a Protective
Order[.]
On 4 September 2025, plaintiff filed an amended Notice of Appeal to correct August
to September. Because the amended notice of appeal was not timely under Rule 3,
we must determine if the original notice of appeal is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
In the 27 September 2024 order, the court, inter alia, denied plaintiffâs motion
to compel, denied plaintiffâs request for sanctions against defendants for termination
of the deposition, denied plaintiffâs request to reconvene Dr. McNabbâs deposition,
denied plaintiffâs motion for leave to amend, denied as moot defendantsâ motion for
permission to file counter claim/cross claim, denied plaintiffâs oral motion to request
that her first request for admissions to ROC and her second request for admissions
to Dr. McNabb be deemed admitted, denied defendantâs motions for recusal of
plaintiffâs counsel, denied plaintiffâs motion for protective order, and denied
defendantâs motion to dismiss.
Because the notice of appeal detailed four specific denials the trial court made
in the 27 September 2024 order, the intent to appeal from that order can be easily
inferred from that notice. It would be unreasonable to think the appellee would be
misled by the incorrect month on the notice of appeal. Thus, under Von Ramm, we
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Opinion of the Court
will consider assignments of error from the 27 September 2024 order.
Lastly, because the 23 January 2025 order dismissing plaintiffâs claims with
prejudice is a final judgment of a superior court, we have jurisdiction over plaintiffâs
appeal. N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2025).
III. Standards of Review
â[O]rders regarding discovery matters are within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be upset on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.â
Miller v. Forsyth Memâl Hosp., Inc., 174 N.C. App. 619, 620 (2005) (quoting Windman
v. Britthaven, Inc., 173 N.C. App. 630, 632 (2005)). Similarly, we review a trial courtâs
decision to deny a motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Cunningham v.
Riley, 169 N.C. App. 600, 603 (2005). âAn abuse of discretion is a decision manifestly
unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.â Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547 (1998).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendantsâ motion to
dismiss and by denying plaintiffâs motion for leave to amend her complaint.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that the record does not support the notion that plaintiff
had failed to produce all journals in her possession, that the trial court âfailed to
reasonably interpretâ the 8 September 2024 order, and that any failure to produce
was owed to good faith objection or practical limitations.
Defendantsâ contend that plaintiff repeatedly failed to produce her journals
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despite being ordered to do so by both the trial court and this Court. Defendants also
argue that plaintiffâs motion for leave to amend was futile.
A. Motion to Dismiss
If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the trial court may
make an order dismissing the action. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(c) (2025).
âBefore a court imposes severe sanctions, such as dismissing an action with prejudice,
âit must consider less severe sanctions.â â Dunhill Holdings, LLC v. Lindberg, 282
N.C. App. 36, 85 (2022) (quoting Hursey v. Homes by Design, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 175,
179 (1995)). âThe trial court is not required to impose lesser sanctions, but only to
consider lesser sanctions.â Global Furniture, Inc. v. Proctor, 165 N.C. App. 229, 233
(2004) (second emphasis added); see also Badillo v. Cunningham, 177 N.C. App. 732,
735 (2006) (stating the trial court is not required to list and specifically reject each
possible lesser sanctions prior to determining that dismissal is appropriate).
Here, the trial court dismissed the action after plaintiff had refused to submit
âallâ her journals to the trial court for in camera inspection. The record shows that
the trial court considered lesser discovery sanctions prior to dismissing the action,
specifically by assessing a total amount of attorney fees against plaintiff of $11,147.75
and costs of $505.65. Singleton II, slip op. at 4. The record also shows that plaintiff
repeatedly failed to comply with ordered discovery requirements, even after this
Court affirmed the 8 September 2024 Order. These considerations, standing alone,
are sufficient to uphold the trial courtâs sanction of dismissal. See Proctor, 165 N.C.
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App. at 232.
Regarding plaintiffâs argument of good faith objection, we find nothing in the
record to support plaintiffâs inability to produce the required medical records.
Plaintiffâs failures to comply with the 8 September 2024 Order âwere due to [her] own
conduct and circumstances within [her] control.â See Lindberg, 282 N.C. App. at 64.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action for
plaintiffâs repeated failures to comply with discovery mandates.
B. Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for leave
because it improperly considered evidence outside the pleadings. Plaintiff further
argues that her motion for leave should have been granted because the new
allegations formed the basis for claims of fraud and obstruction that were
âinextricably relatedâ to her underlying claim for medical negligence. In response,
defendants argue that plaintiffâs contention that the trial court considered evidence
outside the pleadings is disingenuous and any proposed claims were futile.
Defendants also assert that plaintiffâs motion is now moot.
We agree with defendants and hold that plaintiffâs motion is now moot.
However, even if the motion were not moot, we would still affirm the trial courtâs
denial of plaintiffâs motion pursuant to Miller.
If a party moves for leave to amend, âleave shall be freely given when justice
so requires.â N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (2025). However, a trial court may deny a
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motion pursuant to the Foman factors. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 60 N.C. App.
40, 43 (1982) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). These Foman factors
include whether the amendment: (1) would cause undue delay, (2) is the product of
bad faith or dilatory tactics, (3) would cause undue prejudice, (4) would be futile, or
(5) would represent a repeated failure to cure defects of previous amendments. Id.
(citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). The trial court may also deny a motion for leave if
the facts alleged in the proposed amendment fail to state a claim for relief. Smith v.
McRary, 306 N.C. 664, 666 (1982).
Here, plaintiff first argues that the trial court improperly considered evidence
outside of the pleadings when denying leave. Plaintiff relies on Stanback v. Stanback,
where our Supreme Court stated that a âRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is indeed converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment when
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.â 297
N.C. 181, 205 (1979). However, this reliance is misplaced because Stanback refers to
the conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion hearing to a Rule 56 motion hearing, not the
conversion of a Rule 15 hearing to a Rule 56 hearing. Id.
Instead, when a trial court rules on a motion for leave to amend, it must
consider the Foman factors. Miller, 60 N.C. App. at 43. We reject plaintiffâs argument
that the trial courtâs consideration of facts outside the pleadings converted the
hearing from one on a motion for leave to amend to one on summary judgment.
Next, plaintiff attempts to establish claims of fraud and obstruction by
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claiming that defendants destroyed the physical copies of plaintiffâs x-rays. Plaintiff
argues that the trial courtâs denial of leave infringes on her âsubstantial right to avoid
separate trials on the same issues and creates the possibility of inconsistent verdicts
on factual issues.â We reject this argument.
Plaintiffâs decision not to move for leave to amend prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations, combined with the two interlocutory appeals, help show a
continued effort of plaintiff to delay litigation in this matter. The trial courtâs denial
of leave was proper.
V. Conclusion
The trial court did not err by dismissing the action and by denying plaintiffâs
motion for leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.
Judges TYSON and COLLINS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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