John Tighe v. Tighe Landscape Design, Inc.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
DocketA-0915-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0915-24
JOHN TIGHE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
TIGHE LANDSCAPE DESIGN,
INC.,
Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________
Argued October 6, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Bergman.
On appeal from the Division of Workers'
Compensation, Department of Labor and Workforce
Development, Claim Petition Nos. 2016-32938 and
2022-29756.
Richard N. Schibell argued the cause for appellant
(Schibell Law, LLC, attorneys; Richard N. Schibell, of
counsel and on the brief).
Keeley McDonald argued the cause for respondent
(AmTrust North America, attorneys; Keeley
McDonald, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this workers' compensation case, petitioner John Tighe appeals from an
October 18, 2024 order dismissing his amended claim with prejudice. Tighe, a
landscaper, attempted to reopen a workers' compensation claim related to an
injury he sustained dating back to October 27, 2015. We affirm.
I.
Factual Background
By way of background, Tighe was injured while working for respondent
Tighe Landscape Design, Inc., owned by his brother. Tighe was injured after
unloading boulders for use on a job site, falling from a truck bed, and landing
on the rocks. On November 6, 2015, he underwent an MRI. On November 20,
2015, Tighe had right shoulder surgery, followed by physical therapy.
Eventually, Tighe's physician determined that further treatment would not
improve his symptoms. On November 22, 2016, Tighe was discharged from
care.
Procedural History
On December 21, 2016, Tighe filed a workers' compensation claim
alleging permanent injury to his dominant right shoulder requiring extensive
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arthroscopic surgery. The parties disputed the extent and permanency of Tighe's
disability.
On May 4, 2018, Tighe testified at a hearing he experienced difficulty
using his right hand, felt a "rip" in his shoulder when he moved certain fingers,
had pain, and difficulty sleeping. Tighe claimed he was unable to return to work
for respondent and had not looked for other work.
On July 27, 2018, the judge of compensation approved a settlement
between the parties. They agreed Tighe sustained a 31% partial total disability
related to:
1. Post-traumatic right shoulder strain and sprain; 2.
Posttraumatic tear of the rotator cuff including
supraspinatus, infraspinatus, teres minor and
subscapularis of the right shoulder; 3. Biceps tendon
tear with fraying of the biceps tendon; 4. [stricken]; 5.
Status post arthroscopy with rotator cuff repair to the
right shoulder, 11/20/15; 6. Status post subacromial
decompression to the right shoulder, 11/20/15.
Tighe was awarded 186 weeks of disability payment, totaling $71,063.16, and
respondent agreed to pay all authorized medical bills. The entire award was
paid as of June 15, 2020.
Reopener Claim
On August 14, 2020, Tighe, through counsel, filed a reopener claim for
review or modification of the previous settlement. Tighe, then sixty-five years
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old, attested that his "[p]ain has increased in frequency, duration and intensity"
and sought treatment. According to respondent, Tighe failed to engage in
discovery, leading it to file a motion to compel responses to interrogatories on
October 21, 2020, followed by a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution on
July 21, 2021. These motion papers are not contained in the record.
On January 20, 2022, Tighe was evaluated by Lawrence Barr, D.O., at
respondent's request. Barr reported:
At the present time, the examinee complains of right
shoulder pain. He has pins and needles in the last three
fingers of his right hand which has been there since the
occurrence. He has trouble with lifting, overhead
motion, pushing and pulling. The pain is worse with
lifting. When he is sleeping, he has to change his
position frequently. He gets pins and needles in the
right arm.
Based on his assessment, Barr concluded that Tighe was experiencing "right
shoulder pain . . . ongoing since 2015," and that further testing or treatment
would not have any benefit.
On February 16, 2022, Tighe was evaluated by his own expert, Michael
Pensak, M.D. Pensak reported that he was evaluating Tighe for "ongoing issues
with his right shoulder" based on a primary complaint of "[r]ight shoulder pain
and right upper extremity weakness and numbness and tingling in the
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extremity." Pensak also noted that Tighe was experiencing "paresthesia in the
index finger and long finger."1
Pensak opined that Tighe's ongoing symptoms were "due to the accident"
and recommended that he receive physical therapy "to work on right shoulder
range of motion and ongoing strengthening as well as manual muscle massage
and modalities to the cervical spine region." Pensak also stated that Tighe "does
seem to be suffering a derivative injury[,] which is a right carpal tunnel
syndrome, which is likely exacerbated from [his] nighttime discomfort and
inability to sleep comfortably." Pensak recommended Tighe "be fitted with a
nighttime wrist gauntlet and be evaluated by a [b]oard-certified hand surgeon."
Pensak added that, "[s]hould [Tighe] fail to gain relief from use of a nighttime
orthosis, an EMG 2 and nerve conduction study of the right upper extremity
1
"Paresthesia is the medical term for a tingling, burning, pricking or prickling,
skin-crawling, itching, 'pins and needles,' or numbness on or just underneath the
skin." See https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/symptoms/24932-paresthesia
[https://perma.cc/MQ2C-BENB]" (last visited October 23, 2026).
2
"'EMG' is short for electromyogram, a tracing made with an electromyograph.
An electromyograph is an instrument that 'converts the electrical activity
associated with functioning skeletal muscle into a visual record or into sound '
and can be used to diagnose neuromuscular disorders." Thomas v. Astrue, 769
F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Merriam-Webster's
Medical Dictionary (2007)).
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would be warranted to rule out compression neuropathy and look for cervical
radiculopathy, cubital tunnel and/or carpal tunnel syndrome."
First Amended Application
On March 4, 2022, Tighe filed his first amended application for review
and modification, alleging: "Pain has increased in frequency, duration and
intensity. Treatment is sought; Derivative right carpal tunnel syndrome." On
June 2, 2022, Tighe filed a motion for medical treatment and/or temporary
benefits, relying on Pensak's report. In the accompanying certification, Tighe
stated: "[m]y condition has deteriorated and I am now experiencing increased
pain and discomfort and am in need of additional treatment." Specifically, he
requested "physical therapy to work on right shoulder range of motion and
ongoing strengthening as well as manual muscle massage and modalities to the
cervical spine; nighttime wrist gauntlet" as well as "possible EMG and nerve
conduction study of the right upper extremity" and referral to a "board-certified
hand surgeon." Respondent opposed Tighe's motion for medical treatment
asserting that any derivative carpal tunnel claim is time-barred.
On July 14, 2022, Barr issued a supplemental report. Barr explained that
he had since reviewed Tighe's medical records, including Pensak's report, and
his prior conclusion that Tighe would not benefit from further treatment was
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unchanged. Barr also opined that Tighe's "current numbness and tingling
symptoms do not correlate with carpal tunnel" and were not "related to the
original work occurrence."
On August 23, 2022, the parties appeared before the judge of
compensation, who was provided with Tighe's medical records and reports.
Tighe testified that, since his previous testimony in 2018, his condition had
worsened, and he was in more pain. Tighe explained that he also experienced
pain and numbness in the fingers of his right hand, which had materialized "after
the operation," but was "getting worse over time."
On October 25, 2022, the judge ordered respondents to authorize an EMG.
Tighe underwent the test around the same time. Edward Gallagher, M.D.,
performed the EMG and rendered the following impressions: "1. Mild right C7
radiculopathy,[3] almost certainly causing his chief complaint. 2. Mild to
moderate right [carpal tunnel syndrome], occasionally symptomatic, but not
causing his chief complaint."
3
"[R]adiculopathy[] is an inflammatory disorder of the spinal nerve roots."
Davidson v. Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 172 n.2 (2007) (quoting Stedman's Medical
Dictionary 1622 (28th ed. 2006)).
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Second Amended Application and Occupational Injury Application
On December 6, 2022, Tighe filed a second amended application for
review and modification, alleging: "Pain has increased in frequency, duration
and intensity. Treatment is sought; Derivative right carpal tunnel syndrome;
Cervical spine." The same day, Tighe filed a new claim. He alleged "an
occupational injury to [his] cervical spine from excessive and repetitive use from
1981 through 2015" (the occupational claim). The second amended application
is not contained in the record.
On December 15, 2022, Tighe was evaluated by Matthew Tormenti, M.D.,
regarding "neck pain radiating into the right arm" and "pain in [two] fingers on
his right hand." Tormenti recommended an MRI of the cervical spine and
physical therapy to treat Tighe's neck. On June 23, 2023, Tighe filed a new
motion for temporary and/or medical benefits, including physical therapy and
for an MRI of the cervical spine.
On July 14, 2023, respondent filed opposition and a cross-motion to
dismiss for failure to sustain the burden of proof and because the claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent argued Tighe failed to show a
"material worsening of the compensable conditions pled in his reopener" or a
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"causal connection" to support his occupational claim. Tighe did not file
opposition to respondent's cross-motion.
On November 28, 2023, the judge heard Tormenti's testimony. Based on
his physical examination, Tormenti testified Tighe was experiencing restriction
in the extension of his cervical spine, resulting in "an inability to look all the
way up to the ceiling." Tormenti opined that despite Tighe's reports of
numbness and tingling in his hands, tests showed normal sensation in the hands
but some "subtle" weakness in the right arm.
Tormenti explained that the results of Tighe's earlier EMG "correlate[d]
with the results of his physical examination," but without more information, he
could not "comment on whether there is any shoulder pathology contributing."
Initially, Tormenti testified he could not opine whether Tighe's conditions were
"simple age-appropriate degenerative changes." But Tormenti later agreed he
"unequivocally believe[d] that the symptoms . . . are causally related to the
October 15 accident." Tormenti recommended Tighe undergo an MRI, which
would reveal any compression of the right C7 nerve root and the cause of such
compression, which would determine what medical intervention should follow.
Following Tormenti's testimony, respondent opted not to produce its
medical expert, and the record was closed. The judge ordered the parties to
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submit trial summation briefs by January 9, 2024. Tighe did not submit a brief
but respondent did.
The Judge of Compensation's Decision
Based on the judge's review of the testimony and the records, she found
that Tighe had been experiencing radicular symptoms since the accident and
subsequent surgery in 2015, and had only ever attributed the symptoms to those
events. The judge observed that Tighe had repeatedly recounted symptoms the
same way from 2016 onward, including during his medical examinations, and
had "described a 'material worsening' of his symptoms on only two occasions;
first, when he was led by his attorney" at the August 23, 2022 hearing, and "then,
almost a year later, in the June 23, 2023 certification" accompanying his motion
for treatment. Finding consistent complaints to medical providers more credible
than the statements made in litigation, the judge determined, as a matter of fact,
that Tighe's "radicular complaints have essentially remained the same since they
first manifested."
As to the occupational claim, the judge determined that, because Tighe
"never related his radicular symptoms to his occupational duties," he failed to
meet the burden of proving a causal connection necessary to sustain his
occupational claim under N.J.S.A. 34:15-34. The judge held that since Tighe's
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radicular symptoms first manifested in 2015, his occupational claim was barred
by the statute of limitations.
As to the amended injury claim, the judge ruled that, because Tighe had
not shown an increase in incapacity, he could not reopen the claim under
N.J.S.A. 34:15-27. The judge observed that Tighe, who had been experiencing
radicular symptoms since 2015, could have moved to add those symptoms to his
claim within two years of their emergence, but had not done so. The judge
concluded:
[Tighe] has, not only missed the [s]tatute of
[l]imitations for including his cervical spine, his right
upper extremity, his carpal tunnel syndrome and/or his
cervical or right-sided radiculopathy, but he has also
failed to sustain his burden of proving a worsening of
his right shoulder condition as well as all those
conditions which are now suspected of producing his
radicular symptoms. 4
This appeal followed. Tighe argues that his motion for medical treatment was
"surreptious[ly] sua sponte ex post facto" converted to a trial on permanency
that violated his due process rights. Tighe contends the only issue before the
judge was his motion and that the necessary "pre-trial" conference and discovery
4
The judge's opinion did not specifically deny or dismiss the motion for medical
treatment. Tighe's notice of appeal does not include this motion. Therefore, we
decline to address it in our opinion.
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procedures were not followed, warranting reversal and reinstatement of his
reopener and occupational claims.
II.
In a workers' compensation case, our review is generally "limited to
whether the findings made could have been reached on sufficient credible
evidence present in the record . . . with due regard also to the agency's expertise ."
McGory v. SLS Landscaping, 463 N.J. Super. 437, 452 (App. Div. 2020)
(quoting Hersh v. County of Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 242 (2014)). The judge of
compensation's factual findings are entitled to deference and "should not be
reversed unless they are 'manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with
competent relevant and reasonable credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice.'" Ibid. (quoting Perez v. Monmouth Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super.
275, 282 (App. Div. 1994)). "Yet, the judge's 'interpretation of the law and the
legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference.'" Id. at 543 (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm.
of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
"A judge of compensation 'is not strictly bound by rules of evidence and
procedure but must respect and insure due process and fundamental rights of
litigants.'" Ibid. (quoting Waters v. Island Transp. Corp., 229 N.J. Super. 541,
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547 (App. Div. 1989)). The notion of due process is not "fixed" but rather
"flexible," and "depends on the particular circumstances." Ibid. (quoting Doe v.
Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)). "Fundamentally, due process requires an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Ibid.
The Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -147,
compensates employees for personal injuries caused "by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment . . . ." Recovery under the WCA is "the
exclusive remedy for an employee who sustains an injury in an accident that
arises out of and in the course of employment." McDaniel v. Man Wai Lee, 419
N.J. Super. 482, 490 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Ahammed v. Logandro, 394 N.J.
Super. 179, 190 (App. Div. 2007)). The WCA "provide[s] a method of
compensation for the injury or death of an employee, irrespective of the fault of
the employer or contributory negligence and assumption of risk of the
employee." Harris v. Branin Transp., Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 38, 46 (App. Div.
1998).
After a compensation award has been issued, an injured employee may
seek additional medical treatment and benefits when the incapacity caused by
an injury increases. N.J.S.A. 34:15-27, however, places a limit on when such
claims must be filed. The statute provides in relevant part:
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Upon the application of any party, a formal award,
determination, judgment, or order approving settlement
may be reviewed within two years from the date when
the injured person last received a payment on the
ground that the incapacity of the injured employee has
subsequently increased.
[N.J.S.A. 34:15-27.]
We have held that "[t]he two[-]year time limit mandated by N.J.S.A.
34:15-27 for submitting an application for review or modification is a
jurisdictional requirement." Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 324, 327
(App. Div. 2003). "The Workers' Compensation Court is an administrative
court, not a constitutional court. Its jurisdiction is limited to that granted by the
Legislature and therefore 'cannot be inflated by consent, waiver, estoppel or
judicial inclination.'" Id. at 327 (quoting Riccioni v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 26 N.J.
Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1953)).
III.
Tighe argues the only issue before the judge was his motion, that "no one
was aware" she was contemplating dismissal, and he was given no "opportunity
to defend." Tighe maintains he was still seeking medical treatment, and
permanency would be impossible to prove. According to Tighe, the judge
misapplied the holding in Yeomans v. Jersey City, 27 N.J. 496 (1958), and
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Brandt-Shaw v. Sands Hotel & Casino, 282 N.J. Super. 106 (App. Div. 1995),
resulting in plain error and the wrongful dismissal of his claims.
Tighe mischaracterizes the record. Here, the judge did not address the
issue of permanency. Rather, she addressed the threshold jurisdictional
questions necessary for the case to proceed. The record shows the judge
examined the timeline of Tighe's case and the description of his symptoms. Th e
judge concluded he met neither of the requirements to reopen his claim under
N.J.S.A. 24:1-27, and that his claim would otherwise fall outside the statute of
limitations. Because these discrete jurisdictional prerequisites were not met, the
judge dismissed the claims rather than proceed to a trial on the merits.
Tighe's argument that the "sole issue" before the court was his entitlement
to additional medical treatment is belied by the record. Respondent filed a cross-
motion to dismiss Tighe's reopener claim arguing he failed to sustain his burden
of proof and his claim was outside the statute of limitations. Respondent also
submitted a post-hearing brief, as reflected in the judge's dismissal order. The
judge determined Tighe's reopener claim was "time-barred," and he failed to
demonstrate "a material worsening of the compensable condition(s) plead in his
reopener."
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In light of the judge's reasoning, we reject Tighe's argument that she
conducted a "rogue analysis" untethered to the proceedings. Instead, the judge
rendered a decision on respondent's motion, which was filed several months
prior to the final hearing.
For the same reason, Tighe's contention that the proceeding was "even
more grievous than trial by ambush," leaving him with "no awareness of what
[was] about to take place" and no "opportunity to defend," is unavailing. The
record shows Tighe was on notice as to the jurisdictional defenses that the judge
addressed and declined to respond to them. As stated, Tighe did not oppose
respondent's motion to dismiss and failed to submit a post-hearing brief. Indeed,
Tighe does not address these facts in his merits brief.
Moreover, Tighe testified on his own behalf, offered testimony from a
medical expert, and submitted documentation from other experts. Respondent
did not present any witnesses. Therefore, the judge's decision was based entirely
on Tighe's testimony and evidence.
Tighe avers the MRI—which was the subject of the request for medical
treatment—weighed against dismissal while his motion for treatment was
pending. In support of his contention, Tighe relies on our Court's holding in
Ramos v. M & F Fashions, 154 N.J. 583, 596 (1998), and our decision in Panko
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v. Grimes, 40 N.J. Super. 588, 595 (App. Div. 1956). However, those cases
specifically addressed instances where an initial permanency determination was
made prematurely or based on stale data; the courts had established jurisdiction,
assessed liability, and the value of the claims.
Here, in contrast, the judge properly focused on whether Tighe's condition
had worsened in the years since the accident such that he was eligible to reopen
the claim. This straightforward critical inquiry bears no resemblance to the
inquiries in Ramos and Panko. For example, in Ramos, our Court stressed in
the time immediately following an accident, a petitioner's condition is likely still
evolving, making it impossible to reliably determine its scope and nature.
Ramos, 154 N.J. at 596-98. In this case, the judge was not confronted with this
scenario. Saliently, Tighe has not cited any authority to support his argument
that the judge was required to address his motions seeking medical tre atment
before she determined whether the reopener claim was viable under the statute.
We are satisfied the judge did not conduct an unannounced trial on the
issue of permanency but appropriately made jurisdictional findings in light of
respondent's motion to dismiss. Tighe's due process rights were not violated.
Therefore, we reject his argument.
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IV.
Tighe next argues the judge's substantive analysis of the reopener claim
was flawed. First, Tighe maintains the judge erred in holding that, in order to
be eligible for reopener, a condition must have been "pled in the original claim"
rather than simply be "causally related to the original accident." Second, Tighe
contends the judge erroneously applied the statute of limitations applicable to
occupational claims, N.J.S.A. 34:15-34, rather than the statutes of limitations
applicable to traumatic injury claims, N.J.S.A. 34:15-51, and reopener claims,
N.J.S.A. 34:15-27. Properly construed, Tighe contends the statutes of
limitations do not bar his claims.
A.
Statute of Limitations
Except in the case of certain exceptions not relevant here, workers'
compensation claims must be submitted
within two years after the date on which the accident
occurred, or in case an agreement for compensation has
been made between the employer and the claimant, then
within two years after the failure of the employer to
make payment pursuant to the terms of such agreement;
or in case a part of the compensation has been paid by
the employer, then within two years after the last
payment of compensation.
[N.J.S.A. 34:15-51.]
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In contrast, claims based on "compensable occupational disease" must be filed
"within [two] years after the date on which the claimant first knew the nature of
the disability and its relation to the employment." N.J.S.A. 34:15-34.
As stated, if "a formal award, determination, judgment, or order approving
settlement" already exists, it "may be reviewed within two years from the date
when the injured person last received a payment on the ground that the
incapacity of the injured employee has subsequently increased." N.J.S.A. 34:15-
27.
"The fact that a different bodily unit or function is implicated in the
increased overall disability from that involved in the earlier award does not
derogate from the appropriateness of" a reopener. Svec v. Westfield Motor Sales
Co., 110 N.J. Super. 225, 228 (App. Div. 1970). In Yeomans, the petitioner
prevailed upon a workers' compensation claim based on injuries to his "back,
chest, stomach and right arm." Yeomans, 27 N.J. at 503. In the subsequent
months, he filed a reopener, alleging heart issues stemming from the same work
incident. Id. at 504. Our Supreme Court held that, "where the petitioner can
show that his [or her] increased incapacity is casually related to the same
accident upon which the initial award was founded," he [or she] may seek relief
under N.J.S.A. 34:15-27. Id. at 508. The Court emphasized:
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Nor is the petitioner prejudiced by the fact that the
initial award was predicated upon a back injury, while
his present claim is founded upon a heart condition. It
is only essential that the petitioner show a subsequent
increase in the extent of his incapacity arising from, and
causally connected with, the same trauma complained
of in his original petition.
[Id. at 509.]
In this case, the judge observed that "both [Tighe's] original claim petition
and his award of permanent partial disability were solely for the right shoulder ."
The judge also found that Tighe had been reporting radicular pain and weakness
at approximately the same level since the accident. She then addressed "the
circumstances under which a claimant can add 'new' injuries" to a reopener
claim. The judge analyzed Yeomans and our Court's holding that "so long as
the alleged increase in disability is attributable to a condition plead in the
original claim, [Tighe] did not have to receive an award for that condition."
The judge concluded that "[Tighe] cannot amend his reopener claim to
include conditions not contemplated in his original claim" and explained:
[Tighe] would have had to amend his original claim
petition by adding either the radicular symptoms in
general, the cervical spine, the right upper extremity or
the cervical or right-sided radiculopathy in order to
seek an increase in his original award due to a
worsening of those conditions. Our statute requires that
his radicular complaints had to be plead within two
years of the date that [Tighe] knew or should have
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known that those complaints were related to his work-
accident. In other words, at the latest, [Tighe] had two
years from the date he was discharged from treatment
for his work accident to amend his claim petition to
include his radicular complaints.
The judge concluded Tighe "not only missed the [s]tatute of [l]imitations" but
also failed to demonstrate "a worsening" of his conditions, each of which
warranted dismissal.
B.
Reopener Motions
The judge's pronouncement that reopeners are only available where "the
alleged increase in disability is attributable to a condition plead in the original
claim" is contrary to binding precedent. Yeomans, 27 N.J. at 509 (holding "it is
only essential that the petitioner show a subsequent increase in the extent of his
incapacity arising from, and causally connected with, the same trauma
complained of in his original petition."). Thus, the conclusion that "[Tighe]
cannot amend his reopener claim to include conditions not contemplated in his
original claim" was incorrect. Similarly, the assertion that Tighe's claim should
have been filed within two years of the date he "knew or should have known that
those complaints were related to his work-accident" lacks support. As Tighe
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points out, this standard appears to be derived from the section of the statute
relevant to occupational injury claims, N.J.S.A. 34:15-34.
Based on precedent, a spinal or nervous system injury related to Tighe's
2015 accident would be the proper subject of a reopener motion. And, such a
motion would be timely so long as it was filed "within two years from the date
when the injured person last received a payment." N.J.S.A. 34:15-27. Here,
Tighe submitted the reopener claim on August 14, 2020, approximately two
months after respondent's final payment. The reopener was therefore timely .
In addition to the two-year time limit, N.J.S.A. 34:15-27 also strictly
limits reopener motions to cases in which "the incapacity of the injured
employee has subsequently increased." As our Court explained, an initial
workers' compensation award "is conclusive as to all questions of law and fact
comprehended by that determination, including the nature and extent of the then
existing disability." Yeomans, 27 N.J. at 508. The doctrine of res judicata
prevents the relitigation of those claims. Ibid.; see also Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs.
Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 606 (2015) (explaining that "when a controversy between
parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer open to relitigation "
(quoting Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 33 N.J. 428, 425
(1960))). In so doing, the doctrine "serves the purpose of providing "'finality
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and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication;
reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts,
confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness.'" Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 606
(quoting First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marin, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352
(2007)).
However, in instances where a petitioner's condition has worsened
following the initial determination, a reopener claim presents a new questi on
that could not have been addressed at the prior proceedings, rendering res
judicata inapplicable. Yeomans, 27 N.J. at 508. Therefore, "a subsequent
change in the extent of incapacity is the sine qua non to the exercise of the
Division's continuing jurisdiction." Ibid.
The judge found Tighe's "radicular complaints"—the complaints relating
to potential nerve issues between his cervical spine and right arm—"have
essentially remained the same since they first manifested" shortly after his
surgery in 2015. The judge reviewed Tighe's own descriptions of his symptoms
in detail, from his report that the symptoms first manifested in 2015, then his
description of numbness, tingling, "radiating symptom . . . in the right upper
extremity," pain resulting in difficulty sleeping, and similar symptoms on
several occasions in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2022, including during his August
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23, 2022, testimony. On each occasion, the judge observed, Tighe described his
symptoms in similar terms; only when prompted by his counsel did Tighe
describe a material "worsening" in his condition. The judge found the consistent
descriptions Tighe gave over the years to be more credible than the statements
he gave for the purpose of litigation. Consequently, the judge held that the
record did not evince a worsening of Tighe's condition.
As previously noted, a workers' compensation judge's fact-finding should
not be reversed unless they are "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with
competent relevant and reasonable credible evidence as to offend the interests
of justice." McGory, 463 N.J. Super. at 452 (quoting Perez, 278 N.J. Super. at
282). In the matter under review, Tighe has not argued the court's holding was
unsupported by the record before it. Indeed, at the November 28, 2023, hearing,
Tighe's attorney stipulated that his radiculopathy was present in 2017—prior to
the initial settlement. Tormenti, Tighe's expert witness, likewise testified, "[i]t
appears that these symptoms started after the accident and have been persi stent
throughout." When asked why the cervical spine issue was not diagnosed
earlier, Tormenti did not testify that the disease had progressed over time.
Instead, he suggested that Tighe's shoulder injury had simply masked the
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spinal/nervous issue, further suggesting that the symptoms had remained
constant.
While Tighe did testify at the August 23, 2022, hearing that his symptoms
had "worsened," his description of those symptoms was largely consistent with
the description he gave at the May 4, 2018, hearing. For example, in 2018,
Tighe described significant pain and numbness in his fingers along with
difficulty moving and lifting. In 2022, he described the same condition.
The parties have not provided all of the documents on appeal referenced
by the judge in her review. However, based on the record provided, we are
convinced the judge's finding was not "manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with competent relevant and reasonable credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." McGory, 463 N.J. Super. at 452 (quoting Perez,
278 N.J. Super. at 282). That finding—that Tighe did not demonstrate a
worsening in his condition—is therefore entitled to deference. Because that
finding is based on substantial credible evidence in the record and provided
alternative grounds for dismissal, dismissal of the reopener claim was warranted
on this basis.
Because a worsening in Tighe's condition is "the sine qua non to the
exercise of the Division's continuing jurisdiction" over previously settled cases,
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Yeomans, 27 N.J. at 508, the judge could not entertain a reopener claim that
lacked that element. Thus, we conclude the judge did not err in dismissing it for
failure to demonstrate a worsening in condition as required by N.J.S.A. 34:15 -
27.
Affirmed.
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