Perez Guzman v. Castro Gaytan
CourtNevada Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket89994
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
KATHERINE DE JESUS PEREZ No. 89994
GUZMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
CAROLINA CASTRO GAYTAN,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict in a tort action.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Tina Talim, Judge.
Appellant Katherine De Jesus Perez Guzman ran a red light and
hit respondent Carolina Castro Gaytan’s vehicle, injuring Gaytan. After a jury
trial, the district court entered judgment for Gaytan. Guzman appeals,
arguing reversal is warranted for a new trial on damages. We disagree and
affirm.
Guzman first argues the district court abused its discretion by
permitting Dr. Hashim Qureshi, a pain management specialist, to give expert
testimony about the reasonableness of Gaytan’s medical bills. We review “a
district court’s decision to allow expert testimony for [an] abuse of discretion.”
Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 498, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008). NRS
50.275 requires an expert witness to meet three requirements: the
qualification requirement, the assistance requirement, and the limited scope
requirement. See id. at 498-99, 189 P.3d at 650-51 (describing the
requirements for expert witness testimony). Guzman primarily challenges the
qualification requirement, arguing that because Dr. Qureshi has no training,
experience, or expertise in medical billing, Dr. Qureshi was unqualified to
testify about the reasonableness of Gaytan’s medical bills. Although we have
observed that a witness with specialized training in medical billing may be
qualified to offer expert testimony concerning the reasonableness of medical
charges, we have not required a witness to have such specialized training to
qualify as an expert in this area. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brill, 139 Nev. 558, 559,
539 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2023), as corrected (Dec. 29, 2023) (“While an appropriate
expert can testify as to the reasonableness of the amount of damages, we hold
that expert testimony is not required when other evidence demonstrates
reasonableness.”).
Dr. Qureshi testified he is involved in setting the billing rates for
his office, a process which includes reassessing rates by looking at the rates of
other practices to determine whether those rates are comparable. Dr. Qureshi
further testified he has reviewed hundreds of records from other patients and
believed Gaytan’s medical charges fell within the range of rates charged for
the same procedure in the greater Las Vegas area. Although Guzman argues
Dr. Qureshi’s methods are unreliable because he did not produce the records
he used as a basis of comparison, we agree with the district court that Dr.
Qureshi’s testimony could nonetheless assist the jury in determining the key
issue of the reasonableness of Gaytan’s medical bills, thus satisfying the
assistance requirement. Further, although Dr. Qureshi opined about bills from
different types of providers such as chiropractors and pharmacies, Dr.
Qureshi’s testimony about his familiarity with such charges support the
district court’s determination that Dr. Qureshi satisfied the limited scope
requirement. Finally, as to the qualification requirement, the district court
found that, because Dr. Qureshi had “shown that his testimony regarding
medical billing would be based on specialized knowledge” due to having
reviewed hundreds of records, Dr. Qureshi was qualified to testify as an expert
on the costs of medical billing. Because the qualification requirement may be
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met by practical experience, see Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 499, 189 P.3d at 651,
we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr.
Qureshi to testify about the reasonableness of Gaytan’s medical bills.
Second, Guzman argues the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Gaytan to publish, but not admit into evidence, a video demonstrating
a medical procedure, which included the words “nerve impingement” when
Gaytan did not suffer from nerve impingement. Because Guzman did not
object to this video during trial, we review for plain error. See Mclellan v. State,
124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008) (explaining that we review a
district court’s decision to admit evidence for plain error when the complaining
party does not object to the evidence at trial). “[P]lain error requires a party to
show that no other reasonable explanation for the verdict exists.” Lioce v.
Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 19, 174 P.3d 970, 981-82 (2008) (citation modified)).
The subject video depicts a medical procedure known as a
transforaminal epidural steroid injection (TESI) and shows a needle being
inserted at the site of a “nerve impingement.” The video was described as an
animation of the type of procedure Gaytan underwent. Dr. Qureshi explained
that TESI injections can be diagnostic or therapeutic and that, when
therapeutic, they may need to be repeated. Dr. Qureshi testified Gaytan had
a total of three TESI injections. Dr. Qureshi noted that Gaytan may need
additional TESI injections to keep her pain under control, as the injured area
will continue to break down over time. No doctor testified that Gaytan had
nerve impingement, and Guzman cross-examined Dr. Qureshi and another
doctor Gaytan called as a witness, who both testified Gaytan had spinal cord
impingement and/or nerve irritation. Guzman’s counsel reminded the jury
during closing argument that Gaytan had not been diagnosed with nerve
impingement despite the term being included in the TESI animation video.
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Considering Gaytan’s injuries, the evidence at trial, the testimony of Gaytan’s
doctors, and the fact the animation video was not admitted as substantive
evidence, we cannot conclude that the reference to nerve impingement in the
video was the only reasonable explanation for the jury’s verdict in Gaytan’s
favor. Thus, there is no plain error based on the TESI demonstrative video.
Finally, to the extent Guzman contends reversal is warranted due
to cumulative error, there is no error to cumulate. Based on the foregoing, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Bell, J.
Stiglich, J. Cadish, J.
cc: Hon. Tina Talim, District Judge
De Castroverde Law Group
Dennett Winspear, LLP
Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC/Las Vegas
Israel Kunin, Settlement Judge
Eighth District Court Clerk
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