Matter of: R.V., A Youth

10/13/2026 DA 23-0660 Case Number: DA 23-0660 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 244 IN THE MATTER OF: R.V., A Youth. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Fallon, Cause No. DJ 2022-03 Honorable Nickolas C. Murnion, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Anthony P. Reed, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Darcy L. Wassmann, Fallon County Attorney, Baker, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 17, 2026 Decided: October 13, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Chie Justice Cory J. Swanson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Appellant R.V., a youth, appeals the September 20, 2023 Order Revoking Probation and Dispositional Order of the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Youth Court, Fallon County, committing R.V. to the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) until the age of eighteen or sooner released by DOC, with recommended placement at Five County Treatment and Youth Rehabilitation Center in Saint Anthony, Idaho (Five County). We reverse and remand to the District Court. ¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows: Whether the Youth Court exceeded its statutory authority when it sentenced R.V. to DOC until age eighteen pursuant to § 41-5-1513, MCA. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 On May 2, 2021, 11-year-old R.V., 12-year-old J.C., and 14-year-old C.V. snuck out of J.C.’s grandmother’s house in Baker, Montana, at approximately 1:00 a.m. Early that same morning, the girls attempted to steal a vehicle. The owner of the vehicle caught the girls while they were struggling to put the vehicle in gear and yelled at them, causing the girls to flee. The vehicle’s minimum value was $2,075. Officer Strandbakke and Sergeant LaCroix found the girls the following evening and brought them to the Baker Police Department for questioning. R.V. refused to speak to Sergeant LaCroix, but J.C. described the events that had occurred. She described the girls stealing money out of two unlocked cars to pay for fuel and attempting to steal a vehicle which they planned to drive to Riverton, Wyoming, where her accomplices previously resided. After the failed attempt to steal the vehicle, the girls concocted a plan to walk to Plevna where they would steal a 2 different vehicle, drive it to Billings, and pick up R.V.’s cousin who was able to drive. The girls accessed two more vehicles with the intent to steal them but ultimately decided against it. J.C. indicated the girls stole a wallet from one of the vehicles which they later threw in a dumpster, and they were in possession of tobacco and alcohol at the time. ¶4 On December 10, 2021, R.V.’s mother reported her daughters left home without permission, got into a vehicle—later valued at approximately $2,250—and started it, but then fled. On January 11, 2022, the girls stole a lanyard with a car key and door fob from a high school student in the gymnasium. On January 13, 2022, Sergeant LaCroix observed a van spinning its tires on the ice with no driver in the driver’s seat and found C.V. hiding on the outside of the passenger door while the other two girls were in the backseat of the van. Sergeant LaCroix removed the girls from the vehicle, put it in park, and took the key from the ignition. The girls informed him that J.C. was driving the van and they were heading to Riverton to pick up some friends before driving to Denver, Colorado. ¶5 On February 2, 2022, the State petitioned the Youth Court alleging R.V. was a delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender. The Petition alleged eight counts: Count I, Criminal Trespass to Vehicles in violation of § 45-6-202(1), MCA; Count II, Conspiracy to Commit Theft in violation of §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) or (1)(b), and 45-4-102(1), MCA; Count III, Conspiracy to Attempt to Commit Theft in violation of §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) or (b), 45-4-102(1) and -103(1), MCA; Count IV, Criminal Trespass to Property in violation of § 45-6-203(1)(b), MCA; Count V, Possession of Intoxicating Substance in violation of § 45-5-624(1), MCA; Count VI, Conspiracy to Attempt to Commit Theft in violation of §§ 45-6-301(1)(a) or (b), 45-4-102(1) and -103(1), MCA; Count VII, Conspiracy to 3 Commit Theft in violation of §§ 45-6-301(1)(b) or (c), and 45-4-102(1), MCA; and Count VIII, Conspiracy to Commit Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle in violation of §§ 45-6-308(1), and 45-4-102(1), MCA. Count III would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, whereas the remaining counts would constitute misdemeanors. Ultimately, R.V. admitted to all eight charges and was placed in secure detention at Cascade County Youth Services Center. ¶6 On March 19, 2022, R.V. was moved to secure detention at Five County. R.V. was released to her mother on June 2, 2022, and the next day her mother placed her into the Family Stabilization Program at the Ted Lechner Youth Services Center in Billings. She was then transferred to shelter care on July 23, 2022, and was scheduled to be released to her mother on August 19, 2022. ¶7 On August 10, 2022, Probation Officer Leigh Colarchik prepared a Social History and Recommendations for the Youth Court. The report outlined Child Protective Services’ involvement with R.V.’s family due to her mother’s alcoholism and neglect, R.V.’s sporadic school attendance and poor grades, and R.V.’s placement in a group home before she was detained. The report also included a clinical assessment completed by Youth Dynamics where R.V. disclosed that she had been in a stolen vehicle with a gun inside, huffed oven cleaner and other chemicals, run away from home, been held back two years in school, and refused to listen to her mother or other adults. The report concluded with Officer Colarchik’s recommendation that R.V. be declared a delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender and that she be placed on formal probation for eighteen months. On August 23, 2022, the District Court held a disposition hearing where it declared R.V. a 4 delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender. The court placed R.V. on twenty-four months’ probation, with credit for 202 days spent in detention awaiting disposition. ¶8 Over the course of the next year, R.V. was alleged to have violated her probation conditions on at least sixteen different occasions. The violations included: stealing shoes from Scheels, leaving home without permission, stealing her mother’s money, running away from home, getting involved in an altercation where she was stabbed, stealing alcohol, getting intoxicated, consuming marijuana, skipping school, and failing to charge her GPS monitor. ¶9 On August 10, 2023, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Probation based on R.V.’s violations. The next day, the court held a detention hearing where R.V.’s probation officer, Officer Fenner, testified. Officer Fenner explained R.V. was under courtesy supervision by Youth Court Services until they were no longer willing to supervise her due to her violations and noncompliance. Office Fenner further explained she made referrals to several facilities for R.V., but most declined to take her, or could not provide for her specific needs. Officer Fenner testified to allegations that, amid her probation violations, R.V. was expelled from school, witnessed a homicide, and had a gun held to her head. R.V.’s mother also testified during the hearing and stated she could not take R.V. back into her home. The District Court concluded that detention at the Ted Lechner Youth Services Center was appropriate. ¶10 On September 19, 2023, the District Court held a disposition hearing. At this hearing, Officer Fenner recommended the court revoke R.V.’s probation, commit her to DOC until age eighteen or sooner released, and place her at Five County. Officer Fenner 5 noted she did not believe the Youth Court had the option to commit R.V. to DOC until the age of sixteen. R.V.’s counsel expressed disagreement with Officer Fenner, stating the commitment until age eighteen was the maximum possible sentence available and referencing the language in § 41-5-1522, MCA, which limits a youth’s sentence to the maximum an adult could serve for the same offense. R.V.’s counsel then incorrectly stated the maximum sentence for an adult who committed the same felony as R.V. would be five years. R.V.’s counsel argued although R.V. was thirteen, she had already begun serving time, and therefore a sentence until she turned eighteen would exceed the maximum allowed by statute. She then recommended the court sentence R.V. to two years with DOC. The Youth Court found R.V. to be a delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender and committed her to DOC until age eighteen or sooner released by DOC with recommended placement at Five County. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11 We review both interpretation of the Youth Court Act and a youth court’s application de novo for correctness. In re S.M.K.-S.H, 2012 MT 281, ¶ 16, 367 Mont. 176, 290 P.3d 718 (internal citations omitted). “Generally, we review a sentence's legality to determine whether it is within the statutory parameters.” In re K.M.G., 2010 MT 81, ¶ 19, 356 Mont. 91, 229 P.3d 1227 (internal citations omitted; internal quotations omitted). 6  DISCUSSION ¶12 Whether the Youth Court exceeded its statutory authority when it sentenced R.V. to DOC until age eighteen pursuant to § 41-5-1513, MCA. ¶13 R.V. contends the Youth Court predicated her sentence on an incorrect statutory maximum sentence of five years for an adult who committed the same crime under § 41-5-1522(1), MCA, when the correct maximum sentence is three years, and therefore a new sentencing hearing is required. The State asserts R.V. waived her claim that the Youth Court relied upon misinformation because her attorney supplied the court with said information. The State argues further that § 41-5-1522(1), MCA, considers the maximum term an adult could face for all counts, and therefore an adult in R.V.’s position could face ten years and six months of incarceration. ¶14 Before reaching R.V.’s substantive claim regarding the District Court’s reliance on misinformation, it is necessary to address the State’s contention that R.V. waived her claim by providing the misinformation at disposition. “We generally will not review an issue to which a party has failed to object or otherwise preserve for appeal in the district court.” In re K.M.G., ¶ 36. However, this Court may review any criminal sentence that is alleged to be illegal or exceed statutory mandates regardless of whether the defendant objected at sentencing. State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979); State v. Hatfield, 256 Mont. 340, 346-47, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1993) (holding the court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a condition that could have resulted in the defendant being incarcerated longer than the maximum sentence allowed and remanding for resentencing). 7 ¶15 The State cites State v. McLeod for the proposition that the Lenihan exception does not apply where a defendant adopted the misinformation on which the District Court relied at sentencing. State v. McLeod, 2002 MT 348, ¶ 26, 313 Mont. 358, 61 P.3d 126. McLeod differs from the instant case in that it dealt with a factual mistake in a PSI, which the defendant affirmed was accurate, and the sentence imposed by the District Court did not exceed statutory limitations. McLeod, ¶¶ 24-26. Lenihan does not apply in cases where a sentence is objectionable but still falls within statutory parameters. In re K.M.G, ¶¶ 37-39; State v. Nelson, 274 Mont. 11, 20, 906 P.2d 663, 668 (1995) (distinguishing from Lenihan and Hatfield on the basis that the sentence was not illegal because it did not exceed the maximum statutorily authorized sentence). The allegation here is that R.V.’s sentence exceeds the statutory parameters set forth in § 41-5-1522(1), MCA, because she will not reach the age of eighteen within three years, which is the maximum sentence an adult may serve for committing the same offense. Therefore, we review R.V.’s claims under the Lenihan exception. ¶16 R.V. contends the Youth Court issued her an illegal sentence—which exceeds the statutory maximum sentence of three years—pursuant to § 41-5-1522(1), MCA, based on its mistaken belief that the statutory maximum sentence for an adult who committed the same offense was five years. We agree with R.V. on this point. However, both R.V. and the State incorrectly assume § 41-5-1513, MCA, does not give the Youth Court flexibility when sentencing R.V. R.V. asserts § 41-5-1513(1)(b) and (e), MCA, require the court to commit a juvenile to DOC until age eighteen and do not allow placement for a determinate number of years. The State contends the commitment term length based on age of majority 8 rather than a determinate term reflects the purpose of the Youth Court Act by providing non-retributive supervision before a youth can become an adult offender. Neither of these arguments contemplate § 41-5-1513, MCA, in its entirety. We review the entire statute, to construe it correctly: In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. Section 1-2-101, MCA (emphasis added). Accord Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Fulton, 141 Mont. 113, 115, 375 P.2d 312, 313 (1962) (noting “We have many times stated that statutes must be read and considered in their entirety and the legislative intent may not be gained from the wording of any particular section or sentence, but only from a consideration of the whole.”); In re U.A.C., 2022 MT 230, ¶ 13, 410 Mont. 493, 520 P.3d 295 (stating “The rules of statutory construction require this Court to construe several interrelated statutes in a manner which will give effect to each of them.”). Section 41-5-1513, MCA, provides: (1) If a youth is found to be a delinquent youth, the youth court may enter its judgment making one or more of the following dispositions: . . . (b) subject to 41-5-1504, 41-5-1512(1)(o)(i), and 41-5-1522, commit the youth to the department for placement in a correctional facility or other appropriate program as determined by the department and recommend to the department that the youth not be released until the youth reaches 18 years of age. . . . 9 (Emphasis added.) Both parties ignore the opening line of subsection (b) which indicates the following provision is “subject to” § 41-5-1522, MCA. Section 41-5-1522(1), MCA, states, (1) A youth may not be held in a correctional facility for a period of time in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the offense or offenses that brought the youth under the jurisdiction of the youth court. According to the subordinating/superordinating canon of construction, the term “subject to” “shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash[,] but does not necessarily denote a clash of provisions.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 126 (2012). “A dependent phrase that begins with subject to indicates that the main clause it introduces or follows does not derogate from the provision to which it refers.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 126-28. This statute sets forth the appropriate maximum sentence for a youth being sentenced under § 41-5-1513, MCA. Therefore, construing these statutes in a manner in which each has effect, we conclude the youth court may commit a youth for a determinate number of years under § 41-5-1513, MCA, subject to the maximum sentence allowed under § 41-5-1522, MCA. ¶17 In the instant case, R.V. could only be subject to a three-year commitment under § 41-5-1522, MCA. R.V. was originally charged with seven misdemeanors and one felony. The felony charge, Conspiracy to Attempt to Commit Theft, if committed by an adult, violates § 45-6-301(7)(b)(i), MCA (2021), which states, “a person convicted of the offense of theft of property that exceeds $1,500 in value and does not exceed $5,000 in value shall be fined an amount not to exceed $1,500 or be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not 10 to exceed 3 years, or both.” At the disposition hearing, the probation officer assigned to R.V. recommended a commitment to the DOC until the age of eighteen or sooner released and incorrectly advised the court did not have authority to sentence her for a shorter period of time. R.V.’s counsel incorrectly indicated the maximum sentence available for R.V.’s felony theft charge was five years and argued a commitment until age eighteen would exceed that maximum if combined with her original sentence of two years on probation. Relying on this misinformation, the Youth Court sentenced thirteen-year-old R.V. to DOC until the age of eighteen, exceeding the statutory maximum sentence for an adult set forth in § 45-6-301(7)(b)(i), MCA (2021). Therefore, the Youth Court’s sentence was illegal. ¶18 The State does not dispute the three-year sentence if the offense was committed by an adult. But it asserts R.V. misinterprets § 41-5-1522(1), MCA, to limit the amount of time R.V. could spend in a detention facility based solely on the maximum sentence an adult could receive for the felony offense—Count III—when the statute includes the maximum sentence an adult would receive for all offenses combined. R.V. responds § 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA, limits a youth court’s authority to commit a youth to DOC custody for misdemeanors, and she does not meet the statutory requirements to fall under the exception to that limitation. Section 41-5-1513, MCA, provides: (1) If a youth is found to be a delinquent youth, the youth court may enter its judgment making one or more of the following dispositions: . . . (b) subject to 41-5-1504, 41-5-1512(1)(o)(i), and 41-5-1522, commit the youth to the department for placement in a correctional facility or other appropriate program as determined by the department and recommend to the department that the youth not be released until the youth reaches 18 years of 11  age. The court may not place a youth adjudicated to be a delinquent youth in a correctional facility for an act that would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult unless: (i) the youth committed four or more misdemeanors in the prior 12 months; (ii) a psychiatrist or a psychologist licensed by the state or a licensed clinical professional counselor or a licensed clinical social worker has evaluated the youth and recommends placement in a correctional facility; and (iii) the court finds that the youth will present a danger to the public if the youth is not placed in a correctional facility. . . . (e) in the case of a delinquent youth who is determined by the court to be a serious juvenile offender, the judge may specify that the youth be placed in a correctional facility, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), if the judge finds that the placement is necessary for the protection of the public. The court may order the department to notify the court within 5 working days before the proposed release of a youth from a correctional facility. Once a youth is committed to the department for placement in a correctional facility, the department is responsible for determining an appropriate date of release or an alternative placement. (Emphasis added.) R.V. is correct that she does not meet the exception under § 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA, to be placed in a correctional facility for her misdemeanor offenses. The Youth Court did not make the requisite determination under § 41-5-1513(1)(b)(i), MCA, to sentence R.V. for more than three years based on her misdemeanors nor does the record indicate R.V. was adequately evaluated by a professional under § 41-5-1513(1)(b)(ii), MCA. In the original disposition, R.V. was ordered to complete a mental health evaluation and a chemical dependency evaluation. R.V.’s probation officer testified there was an attempt made to evaluate R.V., but the evaluator could not get enough information from R.V. to make a recommendation. 12 ¶19 R.V. also argues that the Youth Court exceeded its statutory authority—which is limited by § 41-5-1513(1)(b)(iii) and (e), MCA—and abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider whether placing R.V. in DOC custody was necessary for the protection of the public and if less restrictive alternatives were available. The State responds R.V. failed to preserve her claim under § 41-5-1513(1)(e), MCA, by advocating for a two-year placement in a correctional facility. ¶20 We encountered similar arguments in In re V.K.B., 2022 MT 94, ¶ 18, 408 Mont. 392, 510 P.3d 66. There, we found that although V.K.B.’s counsel failed to contemporaneously object by asserting § 41-5-1513(1)(e), MCA, at the dispositional hearing, counsel did object to the correctional facility placement and therefore preserved that objection for appeal. In re V.K.B., ¶ 19. Here, R.V.’s counsel objected to term length, but actively recommended R.V. be “sentenced to two years to the Department of Corrections for placement in an appropriate facility . . . .” Therefore, R.V. failed to preserve this claim, and it is an objectionable disposition claim that falls outside the scope of the Lenihan exception. State v. Thibeault, 2021 MT 162, ¶ 10 n.4, 404 Mont. 476, 490 P.3d 105 (stating “unpreserved challenges to sentences or conditions on the basis of non- compliance with affirmative statutory prerequisites or mandates for that type of sentence or condition are not reviewable under the Lenihan exception”). Even if the claim was adequately preserved, there is an abundance of evidence in the record upon which the Youth Court found detention to be necessary for the protection of the public and no less restrictive alternatives to be available. R.V.’s original offenses and probation violations included high risk activities involving alcohol use, drug use, reckless vehicular use, 13 physical altercations, and the use of weapons. Additionally, R.V.’s probation officer searched for other facilities to take R.V., but most declined, or could not adequately provide for her given her level of risk. ¶21 R.V. raises both facial and as applied constitutional challenges to the sentencing scheme used under § 14-5-1513(1)(b), MCA. However, we do not reach these challenges because it is possible to harmonize sentencing provisions to give effect to each and avoid an unconstitutional construction of the statute. State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, ¶ 29, 427 Mont. 64, 585 P.3d 955. ¶22 “In determining the appropriate remedy for an unlawful sentence, we strive for consistency.” State v. Letherman, 2023 MT 196, ¶ 15, 413 Mont. 459, 537 P.3d 862 (internal citations omitted). Our preferred method of sentence correction is to remand for rehearing so the district court can correct its own error. State v. Heafner, 2010 MT 87, ¶ 11, 356 Mont. 128, 231 P.3d 1087. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the Youth Court to sentence R.V. in accordance with the correct statutory maximum of three years from the date of her disposition. CONCLUSION ¶23 Reversed and Remanded. /S/ CORY J. SWANSON We Concur: /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE 14