Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2024-CT-01157-SCT TORRIE CAMPBELL KNIGHT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF LINDA CAMPBELL, DECEASED, ON BEHALF OF ALL WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF LINDA FAY CAMPBELL, TORRIE CAMPBELL, INDIVIDUALLY, BRIDGETT GILL MASSEY, AND DAVIE FRENCH v. JEFFERY GLOVER, MD. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/22/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBRA H. GIBBS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: WHITMAN B. JOHNSON, III WILLIAM R. RUFFIN JOHN ERNEST WADE, JR. TRHESA BARKSDALE PATTERSON TAMMYE CAMPBELL BROWN SENICA MANUEL TUBWELL ROBERT LANE BOBO JAMES W. NOBLES, JR. CECIL MAISON HEIDELBERG MARY REEVES ARTHUR COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JAMES W. NOBLES, JR. WILLIAM R. RUFFIN ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CECIL MAISON HEIDELBERG TRHESA BARKSDALE PATTERSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED - 11/12/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: EN BANC. GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In this certiorari case, we must determine whether the wrongful-death complaint filed by Torrie Campbell Knight, Administratrix of the Estate of Linda Campbell, deceased, on behalf of all wrongful-death beneficiaries of Linda Fay Campbell, Torrie Campbell, individually, Bridgett Gill Massey, and Davie French, adequately pled a separate personal- injury-survival claim. Because the wrongful-death complaint was brought under the wrongful-death statute, sought damages based on Linda Fay Campbell’s wrongful death, and did not include a separate personal-injury claim under the survival statute, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Dr. Jeffery Glover. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. In July 2014, Campbell had surgery at St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital to remove a tumor from one of her kidneys. During the procedure, Dr. Guillermo Tanaka unknowingly perforated Campbell’s colon. ¶3. On September 23, 2014, Dr. Glover performed surgery to treat Campbell’s perforated colon. Approximately two weeks later, on October 8, 2014, Campbell was readmitted to St. 2 Dominic, where imaging revealed a surgical sponge had been left in Campbell’s abdomen during the September 23 surgery. Dr. Glover performed a second surgery to remove the surgical sponge. Campbell v. Glover et al. ¶4. Campbell filed a medical-negligence personal-injury lawsuit against Dr. Tanaka, Dr. Glover, and St. Dominic on November 10, 2016. Campbell, however, died in March 2017, while the suit was pending. ¶5. Campbell’s attorneys filed a suggestion of death in April 2017,1 asserting: Pursuant to Section 15-1-69 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Plaintiff’s attorneys give Notice of the Death of Linda Fay Campbell. Intention is that within one year from the date of her Death on the 14th Day of March, A.D., 2017 at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, an Amended Complaint will be filed by her Estate and her wrongful death beneficiaries pursuant to the rights and legal remedies provided by § 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code of 1972. ¶6. Approximately eight months later, in December 2017, Campbell’s daughter Torrie Campbell Knight filed, on behalf of Campbell’s wrongful-death beneficiaries, a motion to substitute parties under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25. The motion stated in part: 1 The suggestion of death as well as other pleadings filed in the medical-negligence personal-injury suit are not included in the record on appeal. But as the Court of Appeals has held, we can take judicial notice of court records filed on the Mississippi Electronic Courts (MEC) system that are “readily available via MEC and cannot reasonably be disputed.” Jackson v. State, 394 So. 3d 420, 432 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Teal v. Jones, 222 So. 3d 1052, 1058 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). 3 Pursuant to Section 15-1-69 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Notice of the Death of Linda Fay Campbell was served on the Defendants on April 28th, 2017. Pursuant to Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, the claims for damages to Linda Fay Campbell as alleged in the Complaint filed in this cause, flowed to her wrongful death beneficiaries . . . . That the claims for damages to Linda Fay Campbell should be revived pursuant to Rule 25 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries be substituted as Parties in the place of Linda Fay Campbell, Deceased. Wherefore, T[o]rri[e] Campbell Knight, Moves the Court to enter an Order allowing the revival of this action, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and allow the substitution of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Linda Fay Campbell, Deceased as the parties plaintiff in this cause, and to allow the cause to proceed. ¶7. In response to Knight’s motion to substitute parties, Dr. Tanaka and St. Dominic moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the motion to substitute was not filed within ninety days after the suggestion of death as required under Rule 25 and that the claims were barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Dr. Glover joined the motion to dismiss. ¶8. Campbell’s attorneys conceded that the motion to substitute parties was not timely filed and voluntarily moved to dismiss the medical-negligence personal-injury suit without prejudice under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Counsel asserted that Campbell’s estate had been opened and that an order allowing the filing of a wrongful-death suit had been entered. ¶9. In July 2018, the trial court entered an agreed judgment of dismissal with prejudice as to Dr. Tanaka. According to the agreed judgment, Knight “made known to the [c]ourt 4 that . . . there was no negligent action on behalf of Dr. Tanaka after a full and complete review of the records[.]” ¶10. One month later, on August 16, 2018, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 25. The order “preserv[e]d all viable claims of [Campbell’s] wrongful death beneficiaries . . . and defenses of all Defendants to said claims.” Knight v. Glover et al. ¶11. On March 9, 2018, before the dismissal of Campbell v. Glover et al., Knight filed a new complaint against Dr. Tanaka, Dr. Glover, and St. Dominic. By agreement, Dr. Tanaka was later dismissed with prejudice. ¶12. The complaint was filed by “Knight, individually and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries [of] . . . Campbell.” The complaint alleged an “action . . . for wrongful death proximately” caused by the medical negligence of Dr. Tanaka, Dr. Glover, and St. Dominic. It further alleged that Campbell had “endured many hours of pain, suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and suffered the permanent loss of 1-2 feet of her small bowel as a direct and proximate cause of [Defendants’] negligence,” that she had “incurred medical expenses . . . of at least $80,000,” and that “all of said damages were proximately caused by . . . [Defendants’] negligence.” The complaint demanded judgment against the Defendants “[p]ursuant to [the wrongful-death statute,] § 11-7-13.” ¶13. The parties conducted discovery for several years. By agreement, St. Dominic was dismissed with prejudice. The only remaining Defendant, Dr. Glover, filed a motion for 5 summary judgment in December 2023. In his motion, Dr. Glover argued that Knight failed to offer any expert testimony that the retained sponge caused Campbell’s death2 and that his treatment of Campbell did not breach the standard of care. ¶14. In response to Dr. Glover’s motion, “Knight conceded that no act or omission by [Dr.] Glover proximately caused Campbell’s death.” Knight v. Glover, No. 2024-CA-01157-COA, 2026 WL 935315, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2026) (footnote omitted). However, citing the wrongful death statute (Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2019)), the survival statute (Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-233 (Rev. 2021)), the savings statute (Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-69), and Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg Inc. v. Richardson, 909 So. 2d 1066 (Miss. 2005), Knight argued that Campbell’s estate and her “wrongful death beneficiaries” or “survivors” could pursue “survival claims” for the personal injuries Campbell suffered and medical expenses Campbell incurred during Campbell’s lifetime. Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *5 (footnotes omitted). ¶15. “In rebuttal, [Dr.] Glover argued that Knight’s ‘personal injury’ claims were barred because those claims were dismissed in Campbell v. Glover when Campbell’s estate was not substituted as the plaintiff within ninety days following the suggestion of death, as required by Rule 25.” Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *5. “Glover further argued that the present suit filed by Knight was a ‘wrongful death suit,’ not a suit for Campbell’s ‘personal injury’ claims or ‘survival’ claims.” Id. 2 According to Knight’s expert, Campbell recovered from the October 8, 2014 surgery and “ha[d] done well and had no long standing issues from [the] surgical procedure.” 6 ¶16. The trial court found that Knight’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, stating, “[t]he instant lawsuit seeks to reinstate . . . Campbell’s personal injury lawsuit, well past the statute of limitations. The [c]ourt finds that the wrongful death statute cannot be used to accomplish[] something that had already expired.” The trial court granted Dr. Glover’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against him with prejudice. Knight filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Knight timely appealed, and the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals. ¶17. “On appeal, Knight again concede[d] that there [wa]s no evidence that any act or omission by [Dr.] Glover caused Campbell’s death.” Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *6. Knight argued, however, “that, read together, the wrongful death statute, the survival statute, the savings statute, and other statutes [allowed] her—as the administratrix of Campbell’s estate—to bring a ‘survival’ claim for personal injuries that Campbell sustained during her lifetime.” Id. Dr. Glover, on the other hand, argued “that [Knight’s] complaint asserted only a wrongful death claim, not a ‘survival’ or ‘personal injury’ claim.” Id. “[Dr.] Glover also argue[d] that ‘even assuming arguendo’ that Knight’s complaint included a survival or personal injury claim, that claim [wa]s now barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. ¶18. The Court of Appeals found that “Knight’s complaint adequately pled a survival claim[.]” Id. at *8. The court stated that “[u]nder Richardson, we are required to ‘allow[] the pain and suffering element, which was specifically pleaded in the original complaint in the case . . . , to remain viable’ despite the complaint’s failure to cite the survival statutes or 7 more clearly or distinctly set out a separate survival claim.” Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *7 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Richardson, 909 So. 2d at 1072). ¶19. The Court of Appeals further found “that Knight’s survival claim [wa]s not barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. The court explained: There is no dispute that Campbell’s original medical malpractice action was “duly commenced within the time allowed,” i.e., within the two-year statute of limitations. Moreover, when that action was dismissed pursuant to Rule 25, the action was “abated” or “otherwise avoided or defeated” by Campbell’s “death.” Therefore, under [S]ection 15-1-69, Campbell’s estate had one year following the dismissal of Campbell’s complaint to commence “a new action for the same cause” of action. Knight filed her complaint in this case within one year of the dismissal of Campbell v. Glover. Accordingly, Knight’s complaint was timely under [S]ection 15-1-69. Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *8 (citation omitted). ¶20. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court “erred by granting [Dr.] Glover’s motion for summary judgment.” Id. It reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. Dr. Glover filed a motion for rehearing, which the Court of Appeals denied. ¶21. Dr. Glover then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. In his petition, Dr. Glover argued that Knight’s wrongful-death complaint did not plead a personal-injury-survival claim, stating, “[t]he [Court of Appeals] overlooked [Knight’s] admissions and inconsistent positions, misapplied precedent, and erroneously read into the wrongful death complaint a claim that had been abandoned.” Dr. Glover further argued that any personal-injury-survival claim was time barred. We granted the petition. 8 STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶22. “We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and will view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party].’” Thomas v. Boyd Biloxi LLC, 360 So. 3d 204, 209 (Miss. 2023) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Renner v. Retzer Res., Inc., 236 So. 3d 810, 814 (Miss. 2017)). “Summary judgment ‘shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c)). DISCUSSION ¶23. As the Court of Appeals properly noted: [I]t is “clear” that it is “proper” for an “estate administrator to assert both a wrongful death action and a survival action” in the same complaint. [England v. England (In re Est. of England)], 846 So. 2d 1060, 1069 (¶ 29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). That is a safe and prudent course of action because such a complaint will permit the deceased’s wrongful death beneficiaries to recover if the proof shows that a defendant’s tortious conduct caused the deceased’s death and, in the alternative, will permit the estate to recover if the proof shows that a defendant’s tortious conduct did not cause the death but did cause personal injuries and damages during the deceased’s lifetime. Id. Knight filed the instant complaint in her capacity as the administratrix of Campbell’s estate. The question remains, however, whether Knight’s complaint pled a survival claim or only a wrongful death claim. Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *6. ¶24. Knight’s complaint filed March 9, 2018, provided in part as follows: This cause of action is for wrongful death proximately resulting from 9 [m]edical [n]egligence in the Defendants’ care and treatment of Linda Fay Campbell, now deceased. .... This action is brought against the Defendants for all damages which Linda Fay Campbell and her wrongful death beneficiaries are entitled to recover pursuant to Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code of 1972. . . . Plaintiffs here are the Estate and the wrongful death beneficiaries of Linda Fay Campbell, who, by virtue of § 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, were and are vested with a new cause of action for her death. This action is timely and is filed within one year following her death, so that pursuant to the provisions of § 15-1-69 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 (savings statute) this action is timely. .... Wherefore, pursuant to § 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries of Linda Fay Campbell, demands judgment against the Defendants in dollar amounts to be fixed by the Jury, together with post judgment interest at the legal rate, and all costs of court. (Emphasis added.) ¶25. “The complaint expressly states that it is brought under the authority of the wrongful death statute. The complaint also clearly alleges that Dr. Glover’s medical negligence caused Campbell’s death.” Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *9 (Emfinger, J., dissenting). ¶26. “An action for wrongful death includes the decedent’s ‘survival-type’ claims, such as claims for his or her personal injury, property damage, and medical and funeral expenses, and the wrongful-death claimants’ so called ‘wrongful-death’ claims, such as loss of consortium, society, and companionship.” Clark Sand Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 60 So. 3d 149, 161 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So. 2d 142, 148-49 (Miss. 2008)). “When the same 10 wrongful conduct causes both personal injury and death, at the instant of death, the recovery for the personal injury is embraced by the ‘one suit’ for wrongful death and is not actionable by the estate under the survival statute.” In re Est. of England, 846 So. 2d at 1068 (citing Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs. v. Stewart, 135 Miss. 331, 347, 100 So. 12, 14 (1924); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2002)). ¶27. “Thus, it is definite that, if [Dr. Glover’s negligence] proximately caused [Campbell]’s death, any damages for [Campbell]’s personal injuries from [Dr. Glover] must be recovered in an action for wrongful death, and could not be recovered by the estate under the survival statute.” Id. “On the other hand, it is definite that if [Dr. Glover’s negligence] did not proximately cause [Campbell]’s death, there could be no recovery for the heirs under the wrongful death statute.” Id. (citing Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So. 2d 839, 843 (Miss. 1996); Berryhill v. Nichols, 171 Miss. 769, 774, 158 So. 470, 471 (1935)). ¶28. Here, expert testimony shows that the retained surgical sponge did not cause Campbell’s death, and Knight concedes that Campbell’s death was not caused by the retained surgical sponge. “Because [Knight] conceded that any negligence by Dr. Glover did not cause Campbell’s death, there can be no recovery under the wrongful death statute.” Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *10. ¶29. Knight, however, argues that she can pursue survival claims for Campbell’s personal injuries and medical expenses. But as the dissent correctly acknowledged, [A] conscious decision was made to pursue all claims in a new wrongful death complaint based upon the allegation that the medical negligence caused 11 Campbell’s death. [Campbell’s response to St. Dominic’s] motion [to dismiss] filed on August 14, 2018, in the original action, five months after the [wrongful-death] complaint was filed, explains clearly that the present action was brought solely under the authority of the wrongful death statute. Id. at *11 (emphasis added). Indeed, in the August 14, 2018 response, which was filed in the original medical negligence personal injury suit, Campbell asserted: Here, Plaintiff, Linda Campbell died on March 14, 2017. Her wrongful death beneficiaries sought to substitute themselves as parties to this suit. . . . However, Rule 25 provides that if the Motion for Substitution of Parties is not filed within 90 days from the filing of the suggestion of death, the case is dismissed without prejudice. .... [A]ll claims for the wrongful death survive under § 11-7-13 and may be filed by the Administratrix on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries of Linda Campbell. . . . The Administratrix chose to file a wrongful death suit in another action, based on § 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code of 1972. .... While the survival claim may be barred as to the pain, suffering, mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life of the Deceased, Linda Campbell, the cause of action for her wrongful death is not. .... While the Court may dismiss this [personal injury] cause without prejudice because of the lack of substitution of parties, the dismissal without prejudice does not extinguish the wrongful death claims vested in the children of Linda Campbell, as recognized by the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute and the case law applicable from the Mississippi Supreme Court. (Emphasis added.) Notably, the agreed order of dismissal in Campbell v. Glover “preserv[ed] all viable claims of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Linda Campbell.” 12 (Emphasis added.) ¶30. Years later, only after discovery showed that Campbell’s death was not caused by the retained surgical sponge did Knight change course and claim for the first time that the wrongful-death complaint included personal-injury-survival claims. But as previously discussed, the wrongful-death complaint asserted a wrongful-death claim, and the demand for judgment was solely under the wrongful-death statute. Again, the complaint provided that “[t]his cause of action is for wrongful death” and demanded judgment “for all damages . . . pursuant to § 11-7-13[.]” Moreover, the wrongful-death complaint specifically stated that the original personal injury lawsuit had been dismissed without prejudice and that Knight was bringing a “new cause of action for [Campbell’s] death.” While we agree with Knight that “[p]leadings are allowed to seek relief in the alternative setting forth different claims for relief,” Knight’s wrongful-death complaint did not do that. ¶31. In support of her argument that she can pursue survival claims for Campbell’s personal injuries and medical expenses, Knight relies on Richardson v. Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg, Inc. (Richardson I), 807 So. 2d 1244 (Miss. 2002), and Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg, Inc. v. Richardson (Richardson II), 909 So. 2d 1066 (Miss. 2005). ¶32. In Richardson I, “Linda Richardson, the daughter of Vivian Wheeless, filed a personal injury and wrongful death action against Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg, Inc., now known as Wesley Health Center, alleging that Wheeless died as a result of Wesley Health Center’s negligent failure to provide adequate care.” Richardson I, 807 So. 2d at 13 1245. “[N]o estate had been opened at the time the suit was commenced.” Richardson II, 909 So. 2d at 1067. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wesley Health Center due to a lack of competent evidence that the hospital’s alleged negligence caused Wheeless’s death. Richardson I, 807 So. 2d at 1248. Richardson appealed. Id. at 1245. ¶33. On appeal, the Court agreed that “the [trial] court did not err in granting summary judgment for Wesley [Health Center] on the charge of causing [Wheeless’s] wrongful death.” Id. at 1248. But the Court disagreed that the personal-injury claim should be dismissed, stating: Though the survival statute is not specifically cited in the complaint, the pleadings in this case delineate two specific causes of action and are sufficient under our system of notice pleadings. We hold that Richardson demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial on her separate cause of action for Wheeless’s pain and suffering. Therefore, the [trial] court erred in granting summary judgment as to that claim. Id. at 1247. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a jury trial regarding Wheeless’s pain and suffering. Id. at 1248. ¶34. On remand, Wesley Health Center filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and argued that because an estate had not been opened for Wheeless, the real party in interest was not a party to the action. Richardson II, 909 So. 2d at 1068. The trial court granted Wesley [Health Center]’s motion to dismiss . . . on the grounds that since all wrongful death claims had been dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by this Court and that the wrongful death beneficiaries were not the proper parties to advance a survival action inasmuch as no estate had ever been opened, there was no claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. 14 ¶35. Richardson then opened an estate for Wheeless and filed an amended complaint on behalf of the estate and the wrongful-death heirs. Id. at 1068-69. The amended complaint alleged a survival claim. Id. at 1069. The trial court allowed Richardson to proceed on her amended complaint and survival claim, and we affirmed on interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1069- 70. The Court reiterated that “[t]hough the survival statute is not specifically cited in the [original] complaint, the pleadings in this case delineate two specific causes of action and are sufficient under our system of notice pleadings.” Id. at 1071 (quoting Richardson I, 807 So. 2d 1247). ¶36. Here, unlike in Richardson I, the complaint does not “delineate two specific causes of action” and allege alternatively that the medical negligence “caused pain and suffering, even if that negligence was not determined to be the ultimate cause of death.” Richardson I, 807 So. 2d at 1247. And unlike in Richardson II, the complaint does not allege a survival claim. Richardson II, 909 So. 2d at 1069. Instead, Knight’s wrongful-death complaint was pled under the wrongful-death statute and was based on Campbell’s alleged wrongful death. Again, the complaint was “brought against the Defendants for all damages which . . . Campbell and her wrongful death beneficiaries are entitled to recover pursuant to Section 11-7-13” and demanded judgment against the Defendants “pursuant to [Section] 11-7-13[.]” ¶37. In Wilks, “the heirs of Anderson Smith filed a complaint, pursuant to [Section] 11-7-13, asserting that Pall Mall cigarettes, manufactured and distributed by the American Tobacco Company . . . , were unreasonably dangerous, resulting in the wrongful death of 15 Smith, who smoked Pall Malls for approximately forty-five years.” Wilks, 680 So. 2d at 840. ¶38. “Th[e] trial boiled down to a dispute over [Smith]’s cause of death.” Id. at 842. The “[p]laintiffs claimed that Smith died from smoking related illnesses. The American Tobacco Company maintained that Smith died as the result of a pulmonary embolism caused by a lifetime of complications suffered during treatment for gonorrhea.” Id. ¶39. The jury found that Smith’s death “was not proximately caused or contributed to by his lung cancer or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.” Id. As a result, “the trial court entered judgment for [the American Tobacco Company.]” Id. “On appeal, the plaintiffs [argued] that even though the jury may have found Smith’s death unrelated to smoking, the heirs were entitled to recover damages associated with Smith’s lung cancer and other smoking related illnesses suffered during his lifetime.” Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued “that they [we]re at least entitled to recover damages for injuries suffered by Smith during his lifetime which were related to smoking [American Tobacco Company]’s cigarettes such as medical bills and the pain and suffering associated with his lung cancer.” Id. ¶40. The Court disagreed, stating, “[t]he [p]laintiffs pursued their cause of action exclusively under Mississippi’s wrongful death statute[.]” Id. And while “[t]he survival statute permitted a cause of action for personal injury suffered by Smith during his lifetime[,]” “the heirs failed to alternatively base their cause of action on the survival statute at any point in time during this litigation.” Id. at 843. Instead, the “complaint and trial proceeded exclusively under the wrongful death statute. [American Tobacco Company] 16 cannot be blamed for the heirs’ failure to alternatively pursue a cause of action for personal injury under Mississippi’s survival statute.” Id. ¶41. Here, Campbell’s personal injury action was voluntarily dismissed, and Knight filed “a new cause of action for [Campbell’s] death.” As in Wilks, Knight “pursued [her] cause of action exclusively under Mississippi’s wrongful death statute,” id. at 842, and “failed to alternatively base [her] cause of action on the survival statute[.]” Id. at 843. As in Wilks, Dr. Glover “cannot be blamed for the heirs’ failure to alternatively pursue a cause of action for personal injury under Mississippi’s survival statute.” Id. ¶42. Knight argues that the wrongful-death complaint sufficiently “included pre-death personal injury survival claims, permitted to be expressed by notice pleadings pursuant to [Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(a).” We disagree. ¶43. Under Rule 8(a), A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and, (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. M.R.C.P. 8(a). Although the complaint alleged pain and suffering and medical expenses, it did not include “a demand for judgment for” such claims. Id. Instead, as discussed, the wrongful-death complaint asserted only a wrongful-death claim and demanded judgment 17 under the wrongful-death statute. Again, the complaint specifically stated that “[t]his cause of action [wa]s for [the] wrongful death . . . of . . . Campbell” and that the cause of action “[wa]s brought . . . pursuant to Section 11-7-13[.]” And the complaint demanded judgment “pursuant to [Section] 11-7-13[.]” Moreover, the complaint specifically noted that the original personal-injury lawsuit had been dismissed, that the instant lawsuit was a “new cause of action for [Campbell’s] death,” and that Dr. Glover’s negligence caused Campbell’s death. ¶44. Knight further argues that “[t]he allegations of the [wrongful-death] [c]omplaint, coupled with the Notice of Claim Letter [attached to the wrongful-death complaint], gave Dr. Glover sufficient notice of the claims lodged against him.” But neither the wrongful-death complaint nor the notice-of-claim letter allege survival claims or reference the survival statute. And as previously noted, pleadings filed in the original personal-injury suit, before that original suit was dismissed, confirm that Knight “chose to file a wrongful death suit . . . based on [the wrongful-death statute,] § 11-7-13.” In those pleadings, Knight acknowledged that “[w]hile the [c]ourt may dismiss [the original personal-injury] cause without prejudice because of the lack of substitution of parties, the dismissal without prejudice d[id] not extinguish the wrongful death claims” and that “[w]hile the survival claim may be barred . . . , the cause of action for . . . wrongful death [wa]s not.” ¶45. Despite Knight’s argument, “[j]ust because years after the filing of the [wrongful- death] complaint [Knight’s] expert determined that Campbell’s death was not caused by medical negligence, a separate [personal-injury] claim for medical negligence, which had 18 been voluntarily dismissed by the estate, was not magically resurrected and grafted into the wrongful death complaint.” Knight, 2026 WL 935315, at *8. ¶46. Knight’s wrongful-death complaint failed to adequately plead a personal-injury- survival claim. Here, no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, and Dr. Glover is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Dr. Glover is appropriate.3 Thomas, 360 So. 3d at 209 (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c)). CONCLUSION ¶47. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Glover.4 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Glover is reinstated and affirmed. ¶48. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE, SULLIVAN, BRANNING, WILSON AND TOLLISON, JJ., CONCUR. 3 Because we find Knight failed to adequately plead a personal-injury-survival claim, we decline to address Dr. Glover’s alternative claim, i.e., whether the survival claim is time barred. 4 “[A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court if the correct result is reached, even if the trial court reached the result for a different reason.” Davis v. City of Jackson, 240 So. 3d 381, 384 (Miss. 2018) (citing Richardson II, 909 So. 2d at 1070). 19