E.K.W. v. Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services, by Andrea Sanders and Z.R.O.K., A Minor By and Through His Next Friend Andrea Sanders and Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-SA-00926-SCT E.K.W. v. PRENTISS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES, BY ANDREA SANDERS AND Z.R.O.K., A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND ANDREA SANDERS AND MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/26/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BRADLEY D. TENNISON TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CALLAGHAN B. MASON JESSE D. HUSKE HILARY PRICE MOSS KIMBERLY GOLDEN GORE COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PRENTISS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JESSE D. HUSKE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: BRIAN WARDLAW JOSE B. SIMO LINDSEY E. LAZINSKY CALLAGHAN B. MASON KRISTI D. KENNEDY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/15/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE KING, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BRANNING, JJ. GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. E.K.W. (Emily)1 appeals the youth court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and the 1 For privacy purposes, we use initials and/or fictitious names for the natural mother, the natural father, the natural maternal grandmother, and the minor child. chancellor’s termination of her parental rights. We find no error and affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Emily was born September 10, 1992. In 2012, an order appointing conservator was filed appointing Emily’s mother, Lisa, as Emily’s conservator. The order found that “due to [her] mental incapacity, [Emily] [wa]s incapable of managing her person and estate, including [her] financial affairs, and it [wa]s necessary for a suitable person to be appointed as [her] [c]onservator[.]”2 According to Emily, she did not need a conservator, but she felt that her mother did not trust her. Emily explained that at the time of the conservatorship, she had moved out of her mother’s house and in with a boyfriend and was helping the boyfriend with his niece, and her mother felt that Emily was being used. As a result, Lisa petitioned to be Emily’s conservator so that she could receive Emily’s social security check and could control her money.3 The conservatorship provided Lisa authority over Emily’s person and property, and it was never terminated by the court. ¶3. Emily got married in 2018 but later divorced. At some point Emily began a relationship with Carter King. In December 2022, Z.R.O.K. (Zane) was born. Emily is Zane’s natural mother, and Carter is Zane’s natural father. Emily and Carter have three other children; two were born before Zane in 2020 and 2021, and one was born after Zane in 2 The medical records attached to the petition for appointment of conservator reflect that Emily had been diagnosed with attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder and depressive disorder not otherwise specified (NOS). 3 Emily’s social security check was directed to Lisa, and Lisa would give money to Emily. Emily stopped receiving a social security check when she got married in 2018. 2 2024.4 ¶4. In January 2023, the Prentiss County Department of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) received a report regarding the safety and well-being of Zane. An in-home-service case was opened, and a safety plan was attempted but not agreed to by the parties. As a result, in February 2023, an emergency-custody order was entered by the Prentiss County Youth Court removing Zane from Emily and Carter’s custody and placing Zane in CPS custody. Zane was later placed in a foster home. ¶5. A family-service plan was implemented for Emily in an effort to reunify her with Zane. Under the reunification-service plan, Emily was to obtain housing, submit to random drug tests, and undergo a psychological evaluation. ¶6. CPS filed a petition in the youth court and alleged that Zane was a neglected child. An adjudication hearing was held by the youth court on April 4, 2023. Emily and Carter were both present at the adjudication hearing. Despite CPS’s knowledge of the conservatorship,5 Lisa, Emily’s conservator, was not served with process and did not appear at the adjudication hearing. Neither Emily nor Carter disputed the allegations in the petition, and Zane was adjudicated a neglected child. A disposition order was also entered by the youth court and ordered that custody of Zane remain with CPS. The youth court found that 4 Emily and Carter’s two older children are currently in the custody of Emily’s mother, Lisa, and an in-home-service case is currently open on Emily and Carter’s youngest child. 5 The shelter-hearing summary report dated February 9, 2023, confirms CPS’s knowledge of the conservatorship. 3 CPS had undertaken reasonable efforts to reunify Zane with his parents, but such efforts were unsuccessful, that Zane shall remain in CPS custody, that the permanency plan of reunification with a parent or primary caretaker was adopted for Zane, that the concurrent plan of custody with a relative was adopted for Zane, and that CPS was to make reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan of reunification with a parent or primary caretaker for Zane. No appeal of the adjudication or disposition orders was filed. ¶7. A permanency-review hearing was held by the youth court in August 2024. The hearing report noted that Emily and Lisa were present at the hearing but that Carter was incarcerated on a felony charge of possession of methamphetamine. The youth court entered a permanency order finding that “reasonable efforts to diligently assist the parent(s) toward reunification over a reasonable period of time” had been made “but that the parent(s) ha[d] failed to substantially comply with the service plan.” The youth court further found “that the permanency plan of reunification with a parent or primary caretaker adopted on 04/04/2023 [wa]s no longer appropriate and not in the best interest of [Zane] [and] that the permanency plan of adoption [wa]s appropriate and in the best interest of [Zane].” ¶8. CPS filed a petition for termination of parental rights against Emily and Carter in the Prentiss County Chancery Court.6 A guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed to protect Zane’s interests in the termination-of-parental-rights action. The GAL later filed a report and 6 Prentiss County does not have a county court. Thus, the Prentiss County Chancery Court “has original exclusive jurisdiction over all termination of parental rights proceedings[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-105(1) (Supp. 2026). 4 recommendation. ¶9. Carter executed a “surrender of child and written voluntary release of parental rights” regarding Zane. The chancellor accepted Carter’s surrender and voluntary release of his parental rights to Zane, and Carter’s parental rights as to Zane were terminated. ¶10. A hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights was conducted over the course of two days, February 21, 2025, and March 21, 2025. At the close of CPS’s case-in- chief, Emily moved for an involuntary dismissal arguing, among other things, that because her conservator, Lisa, was not served with process and did not appear at the adjudication hearing in the youth court, the youth court lacked jurisdiction over Emily, and “all actions thereafter must fail because of [a lack of] jurisdiction and [a] violation of her constitutional rights.” The chancellor declined to rule on Emily’s motion at that time and deferred ruling until the conclusion of the hearing. ¶11. Multiple witnesses testified at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, including two CPS representatives, the GAL, Zane’s foster mother, and Emily.7 By order entered June 26, 2025, the chancellor denied Emily’s motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that neither Emily nor Lisa were actively operating under the order of conservatorship, that the conservatorship had terminated upon Emily’s reaching the age of majority, and that the argument was waived due to both Emily’s and Lisa’s appearances and participation in the 7 Lisa was served with process for the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, but she did not testify. 5 youth-court proceedings and the fact that neither appealed the adjudication order. The chancellor further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Emily’s parental rights was in Zane’s best interests, and the chancellor terminated Emily’s parental rights to Zane. ¶12. Emily timely appealed. On appeal, Emily argues that the youth court lacked personal jurisdiction due to the failure to serve her conservator and that the chancellor erred by terminating her parental rights. DISCUSSION Jurisdiction ¶13. Emily’s first two assignments of error challenge the validity of the youth court’s adjudication order and the youth court’s jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.” In re Int. of M.I., 85 So. 3d 856, 857 (Miss. 2012) (citing K.M.K. v. S.L.M. ex rel. J.H., 775 So. 2d 115, 117 (Miss. 2000)). I. Whether the adjudication order is void for a lack of service of process and personal jurisdiction. ¶14. The youth court’s adjudication order adjudicated Zane a neglected child. Emily argues the adjudication order is void due to the lack of service of process on her conservator, Lisa. She claims, “given the known conservatorship, due process required service upon the conservator.” But before we address whether service of process was required on Lisa as conservator, we must first determine whether the conservatorship was in place at the time of the adjudication hearing. 6  A. Conservatorship ¶15. The conservatorship was granted in 2012 giving Lisa authority over Emily’s person and property. Under Mississippi Code Section 93-13-251 (Rev. 2004), the statute in effect at the time the conservatorship was established, “[a] conservator for the management of property may be appointed by the chancery court of the county of the residence of any person who ‘by reason of advanced age, physical incapacity, or mental weakness is incapable of managing his own estate.’” Butler v. Brantley (In re Conservatorship of Brantley), 865 So. 2d 1126, 1132 (Miss. 2004) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-251 (Rev. 1994)). “Additionally, ‘if the court deems it advisable,’ the conservator may have charge and custody of the person as well as the property.” Id. (quoting § 93-13-251). Importantly, “a conservatorship can be terminated only if the person is restored in mind and body.” Id. (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-265 (Rev. 1994)). “[T]he procedure for [the] restoration shall be on petition for appropriate hearing by the court and decree thereof.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-265 (Rev. 2004). ¶16. Here, no evidence was presented that the conservatorship was ever terminated under Section 93-13-265. Indeed, no evidence was adduced that a petition was filed or that the court determined Emily had been “restored in mind and body.” Id. (citing § 93-13-265). ¶17. In 2020, the Mississippi Guardianship and Conservatorship Act was created by the Legislature to govern guardianships and conservatorships in Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-101 (Rev. 2021). The Act “applies to all guardianship and conservatorship 7 proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 2020[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-125(a) (Rev. 2021). “[A]ll guardianship and conservatorship proceedings commenced before January 1, 2020,” are also included in the Act “unless the court, in its discretion, determines that the superseded law should apply.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-125(b) (Rev. 2021). “An act done before January 1, 2020, is not affected by [the Act].” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20- 125(c) (Rev. 2021). ¶18. The Act defines an adult as “an individual at least twenty-one (21) years of age or an emancipated individual under twenty-one (21) years of age.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20- 102(a) (Rev. 2021). A minor is defined as “an unemancipated individual under twenty-one (21) years of age.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-102(m) (Rev. 2021). Notably, under the Act, “[a] conservatorship must be terminated when the minor becomes an adult, becomes emancipated, or dies[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-430(1) (Rev. 2021). “[B]ut a conservatorship may continue into adulthood when the court finds the ward qualifies for conservatorship as an adult[.]” Id. ¶19. No evidence was presented showing that the court found that Emily “qualifie[d] for conservatorship as an adult.” Id. CPS argues that under Section 93-20-430(1), Emily’s conservatorship terminated in September 2013 when Emily became an adult and was therefore not in effect at the time of the adjudication hearing in April 2023.8 We disagree. 8 At the time of the adjudication hearing in April 2023, Emily was an emancipated adult. Emily had turned twenty-one years old on September 10, 2013, had gotten married in 2018, and later divorced. She had had three children, including Zane, was employed off and 8 While a conservatorship “must be terminated when the minor becomes an adult, becomes emancipated, or dies,” nothing in the Act suggests that the termination occurs automatically. Id. Instead, Section 93-20-430 requires an order of termination. See Miss. Code Ann. § 93- 20-430(5) (Rev. 2021) (“On presentation of prima facie evidence for termination of a conservatorship, the court must order termination unless it is proven that a basis for appointment of a conservator under Section 93-20-401 exists.”); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 93-20-430(9) (Rev. 2021) (“On termination of a conservatorship other than by reason of the death of the ward, . . . [t]he order of termination must direct the conservator to file a final report and petition for discharge on approval by the court of the final report.”). No evidence of a final order terminating the conservatorship and discharging Lisa as Emily’s conservator has been presented. ¶20. Emily’s conservatorship was never terminated under Section 93-13-265 or Section 93- 20-430. Thus, the conservatorship was still in place at the time of the adjudication hearing. B. Personal Jurisdiction ¶21. Having found the conservatorship was in effect at the time of the adjudication hearing, we must now determine whether the youth court had jurisdiction over Emily. “The existence of personal jurisdiction depends upon reasonable notice to the defendant.” Mansour v. Charmax Indus., 680 So. 2d 852, 854 (Miss. 1996) (citing Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317, 320 (Miss. 1987)). “A trial court can acquire jurisdiction over an individual through service on from 2016 to 2022, and had independently applied for and received food stamps in 2023. 9 of process.” Id. (citing Aldridge v. First Nat’l Bank, 165 Miss. 1, 14, 144 So. 469, 470 (1932)). ¶22. Under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-501, When a petition has been filed and the date of hearing has been set by the youth court, the judge or his designee shall order the clerk of the youth court to issue a summons to the following to appear personally at such hearing: (a) The child named in the petition; (b) The person or persons who have custody or control of the child; (c) The parent or guardian of the child if such parent or guardian does not have custody of the child; (d) The Department of Child Protection Services in child welfare matters; and (e) Any other person whom the court deems necessary. Miss. Code Ann. 43-21-501 (Rev. 2023). “Service of summons must conform to the Uniform Rules of Youth Court Practice.” Miss. Code Ann.§ 43-21-505 (Rev. 2021). ¶23. Uniform Rule of Youth Court Practice 22 provides in part as follows: (a) Adjudication hearings. (1) Persons summoned. When a petition has been filed and the date of hearing has been set by the youth court, the judge or the judge’s designee shall order the clerk of the youth court to issue a summons to the following to appear personally at such hearing: the child named in the petition; the person or persons who have custody or control of the child; the parent or guardian of the child if such parent or guardian does not have custody of the child; and any other person whom the court deems necessary. U.R.Y.C.P. 22(a)(1). 10 ¶24. Neither Section 43-21-501 nor Rule 22 addresses service of process on a parent who is under a conservatorship. “[W]here ‘the controlling statutes are silent as to a procedure, the [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure] govern.’” Miss. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs. v. Youth Ct. of Warren Cnty. (In re Int. of L.T.), 335 So. 3d 599, 601 n.3 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting M.R.C.P. 81 advisory comm. n.). Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2)(B), service shall be made “upon a . . . person who by reason of advanced age, physical incapacity or mental weakness is incapable of managing his own estate by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to such person and by delivering copies to his . . . conservator (of either the person or the estate)[.]” M.R.C.P. 4(d)(2)(B). ¶25. Here, Emily appears to have been served with process because she and Carter were present at the adjudication hearing. It is undisputed, however, that Lisa, as Emily’s conservator, was not served with process as required under Rule 4(d)(2)(B). ¶26. “[A] trial court can [also] acquire jurisdiction over the person through his appearance.” Mansour, 680 So. 2d at 854 (citing State ex rel. Moak v. Moore, 373 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Miss. 1979)). “More specifically, ‘[o]ne waives process and service . . . upon making a general appearance.’” Ridgeway v. Hooker, 240 So. 3d 1202, 1208 (Miss. 2018) (quoting Isom v. Jernigan, 840 So. 2d 104, 107 (Miss. 2003)). Regarding youth-court proceedings, under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-507(2) (Rev. 2023), “[a] party other than the child may waive service of summons . . . by voluntary appearance at the hearing[.]” The record reflects that Emily appeared at and participated in the adjudication hearing. Lisa, on 11 the other hand, did not. ¶27. But although Lisa did not appear at the adjudication hearing, the record shows that she did appear and participate in all other youth-court proceedings. Emily lives with Lisa, and she was living with Lisa when Zane was removed from her custody. CPS made contact with Lisa on April 12, 2023, eight days after the adjudication hearing. Lisa, along with Emily, agreed to and participated in CPS’s walkthroughs of Lisa’s residence, and Lisa, on at least one occasion, attended and participated in Emily’s visitation with Zane. ¶28. Additionally, as the chancellor noted, “[t]he [y]outh [c]ourt records presented as evidence indicated there was an Order Granting Motion to Continue an Existing Hearing entered on June 7, 2024. This order shows that not only was [Emily] present but her mother, [Lisa], was also present and represented by [counsel].”9 Importantly, the June 7 youth-court order refers to a motion filed in the youth court by “[Lisa], purported conservator for [Emily]”10 that was “dissolved.”11 The June 7 order ordered Lisa’s counsel to “make inquiry as to the [c]onservatorship of [Emily] and [to] remedy any issues therein as soon as possible.” The order also ordered CPS to schedule IQ testing for Emily as soon as possible.12 Thus, 9 Emily and Lisa were represented by separate counsel. 10 The fact that Lisa, in her motion filed in the youth court, referred to herself as Emily’s “purported” conservator indicates confusion over the conservatorship’s existence. 11 The motion was not included in the record before the chancellor or this Court. 12 Emily underwent an IQ test in September 2024 that revealed an IQ score of 98, “which is considered within normal limits.” The examiner found that “from an intellectual standpoint, [Emily] is capable of caring for her children” and that “[c]ognitively speaking, 12 there is no doubt that everyone involved, i.e., the youth court, CPS, Emily, Emily’s counsel, Lisa, and Lisa’s counsel, was aware of the conservatorship and the associated issues. Yet at no time did Lisa or Emily object to or challenge the adjudication order or the youth court’s jurisdiction, i.e., the failure to serve Lisa for the adjudication hearing. Instead, Lisa and Emily continued to appear and participate in the youth-court proceedings. Indeed, youth- court records show that Lisa and Emily appeared at the permanency hearing on August 14, 2024. ¶29. The chancellor found “[Emily]’s argument that her constitutional rights were violated due to insufficient process or insufficiency of process” was waived. We agree. The record clearly reflects Emily’s appearance at and participation in all youth-court proceedings. The record further reflects Lisa’s knowledge of and participation in Emily’s child-neglect case with CPS. Moreover, the youth court’s June 7 order confirms Lisa’s appearance at, participation in, and knowledge of the youth-court proceedings. Yet despite Lisa’s contact with CPS as early as April 12, 2023, her cooperation and participation in CPS’s efforts for reunification with Zane, her appearance at the June 7, 2024 hearing that confirmed a previously filed and resolved motion on her behalf, and her appearance at the August 2024 permanency hearing, neither Lisa nor Emily objected to or challenged the youth court’s adjudication order or jurisdiction. Even when the youth court specifically questioned the conservatorship and ordered Lisa’s counsel to “remedy any issues,” neither Lisa nor Emily she is functioning well.” 13 objected to or challenged the adjudication order or the youth court’s jurisdiction, i.e., the fact that Lisa, as Emily’s conservator, was not served with process for the adjudication hearing. At the permanency hearing, at which Emily and Lisa were present, Zane’s permanency plan was revised from reunification to adoption. Again, there was no objection to or appeal from this ruling or any other ruling of the youth-court, including Zane’s adjudication of neglect. As the chancellor correctly stated, “should [Emily] or [Lisa] have disagreed with the [youth- court’s] ruling, their options were to request a rehearing or file a petition for an interlocutory appeal. The record is void of any such action by either.” Instead, despite both Lisa’s and Emily’s representation by counsel in the youth court, Emily waited almost two years until the termination-of-parental-rights hearing on February 21, 2025, at the close of CPS’s case-in- chief, after the adjudication order had been admitted into evidence with no objection, to challenge the adjudication order and the lack of service of process on Lisa. And notably, the attorney who represented Lisa in the youth court later represented Emily at the termination- of-parental-rights hearing. In other words, despite Lisa’s and her counsel’s knowledge of the “purported conservatorship” and the lack of service of process on Lisa for the adjudication hearing, neither Lisa nor Emily objected to, moved to set aside, or appealed the adjudication order based on a lack of service of process on Lisa. Instead, Emily waited until her conservator’s then-counsel was representing her at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing to finally object to the adjudication order. ¶30. In Clark v. Tippah County Department of Child Protection Services, the mother 14 argued that “the youth court held the adjudication hearing and disposition hearing without providing [her] proper notice, thereby violating her due process rights.” Clark v. Tippah Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs., 369 So. 3d 76, 81 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating: Although Clark testified that her summons listed the wrong location for the adjudication and disposition hearings, she failed to make any objection to the validity of the youth court adjudication and disposition orders or raise any jurisdictional issues at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. She also failed to object to these orders being admitted into evidence. . . . Because Clark failed to challenge the validity of these orders at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing or object to these orders being entered into evidence, this issue was not preserved and is waived on appeal. In re B.A.H., 225 So. 3d 1220, 1239 (¶ 62) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Waiver aside, the record also reflects that Clark has not appealed the youth court’s adjudication and disposition orders, nor has she “challenge[d] the validity of the order based on defective process by moving to set it aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).” J.P. v. L.S., 290 So. 3d 345, 371 (¶ 84) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Clark also failed to raise any jurisdictional challenges with respect to the youth court’s adjudication and disposition orders, either in youth court or before the chancery court. Id. “Accordingly, [Clark] has waived [her] right to challenge the validity of the adjudicatory order for lack of proper process, or the chancery court’s purported reliance on that order, because [s]he has since appeared generally in these proceedings.” Id. at (¶ 85). Accordingly, we find that Clark’s due process rights were not violated by the chancellor’s admitting the adjudication and disposition orders into evidence at the termination hearing. Clark, 369 So. 3d at 81-82 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). ¶31. Here, as in Clark, “[Emily] has not appealed the youth court’s adjudication and disposition orders, nor has she ‘challenge[d] the validity of the order based on defective process by moving to set it aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction under Mississippi 15 Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).’” Id. at 82 (second alteration in original) (quoting J.P., 290 So. 3d at 371). While Emily did move for an involuntary dismissal based on “a problem with procedural due process” that “require[d] the conservator get[] served,” at no time did Emily (or Lisa) appeal the adjudication order or move to set aside the order. And although Emily challenged the adjudication order at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, she failed to object to the order being entered into evidence. Id. Additionally, like Clark, Emily and Lisa appeared at and participated in the youth-court proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the chancellor was correct in finding that “[Emily]’s argument that her constitutional rights were violated due to insufficient process or insufficiency of process” was waived. ¶32. As previously noted, “[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction depends upon reasonable notice to the defendant.” Mansour, 680 So. 2d at 854 (citing Noble, 502 So. 2d at 320). Here, as the record reflects, Emily and Lisa, as Emily’s conservator, had reasonable notice of the youth-court proceedings, including the youth court’s adjudication of neglect. Emily’s and Lisa’s appearances at and participation in the youth-court proceedings provided the youth court personal jurisdiction over Emily. Id. (citing Moore, 373 So. 2d at 1012). Despite both Emily’s and Lisa’s appearances at and participation in the youth-court proceedings, neither objected to, moved to set aside, or appealed the adjudication order or any other youth-court order. Thus, as the chancellor noted, any issue regarding the legal validity of the adjudication order is now waived. II. Whether the chancellor erred by declining to determine the legal validity of the adjudication order before addressing termination 16  of parental rights. ¶33. Mississippi Code Section 93-15-115 (Rev. 2021) establishes threshold conditions that must exist before parental rights may be terminated. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-115. One of those conditions includes that “[t]he child has been adjudicated abused or neglected.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-115(a) (Rev. 2021). Emily argues the chancellor erred “by declining to determine the legal validity of [the] adjudication order before finding [Section] 93-15-115(a) satisfied.” We disagree. The adjudication order was offered and admitted into evidence at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing with no objection by Emily. And while the chancellor declined to rule on Emily’s ore tenus motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of CPS’s case-in-chief, the chancellor did address and rule on the motion in his opinion and judgment before addressing and ruling on the termination-of-parental-rights issue. Indeed, the chancellor provided written findings as to Emily’s motion, her constitutional- rights-violation argument, and her conservatorship. It was only after the chancellor had denied Emily’s motion that the chancellor addressed and considered the termination of Emily’s parental rights. ¶34. Emily further argues the chancellor “concluded it could not examine the validity of the adjudication order . . . and declined any collateral attack on the validity of the [order].” But the record clearly contradicts Emily’s argument. ¶35. The record reflects that the chancellor did, in fact, allow Emily to attack the validity of the adjudication order. At the hearing, Emily’s attorney questioned the CPS supervisor 17 regarding her knowledge of the conservatorship and whether Lisa was served with process before the adjudication hearing. Moreover, the record reflects that Emily’s attorney argued that the adjudication order was invalid and even moved for an involuntary dismissal on that ground. ¶36. Additionally, at no time did the chancellor state that he could not examine the validity of the adjudication order, as Emily suggests. Instead, the chancellor, after hearing all evidence, found “that Emily’s argument that her constitutional rights were violated due to insufficient process or insufficiency of process” was waived. Termination of Parental Rights ¶37. Emily’s remaining issues all challenge the chancellor’s findings that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of her parental rights. ¶38. Mississippi Code Section 93-15-119 (Rev. 2021) sets forth the following grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights: (1) A court hearing a petition under this chapter may terminate the parental rights of a parent when, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence: (a)(i) That the parent has engaged in conduct constituting abandonment or desertion of the child, as defined in Section 93-15-103, or is mentally, morally, or otherwise unfit to raise the child, which shall be established by showing past or present conduct of the parent that demonstrates a substantial risk of compromising or endangering the child’s safety and welfare; and (ii) That termination of the parent’s parental rights is appropriate because reunification between the parent and child 18  is not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency outcome; or (b) That a parent has committed against the other parent a sexual act that is unlawful under Section 97-3-65 or 97-3-95, or under a similar law of another state, territory, possession or Native American tribe where the offense occurred, and that the child was conceived as a result of the unlawful sexual act. A criminal conviction of the unlawful sexual act is not required to terminate the offending parent’s parental rights under this paragraph (b). (2) An allegation of desertion may be fully rebutted by proof that the parent, in accordance with the parent’s means and knowledge of the mother’s pregnancy or the child’s birth, either: (a) Provided financial support, including, but not limited to, the payment of consistent support to the mother during her pregnancy, contributions to the payment of the medical expenses of the pregnancy and birth, and contributions of consistent support of the child after birth; frequently and consistently visited the child after birth; and is now willing and able to assume legal and physical care of the child; or (b) Was willing to provide financial support and to make visitations with the child, but reasonable attempts to do so were thwarted by the mother or her agents, and that the parent is now willing and able to assume legal and physical care of the child. (3) The court shall inquire as to the military status of an absent parent before conducting an evidentiary hearing under this section. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-119 (Rev. 2021). ¶39. Additionally, under Mississippi Code Section 93-15-121 (Supp. 2026): Any of the following, if established by clear and convincing evidence, may be grounds for termination of the parent’s parental rights if reunification between the parent and child is not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency outcome: 19  (a) The parent has been medically diagnosed by a qualified mental health professional with a severe mental illness or deficiency that is unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time and which, based upon expert testimony or an established pattern of behavior, prevents the parent, despite reasonable accommodations, from providing minimally acceptable care for the child; (b) The parent has been medically diagnosed by a qualified health professional with an extreme physical incapacitation that is unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time and which, based upon expert testimony or an established pattern of behavior, prevents the parent, despite reasonable accommodations, from providing minimally acceptable care for the child; (c) The parent is suffering from habitual alcoholism or other drug addiction and has failed to successfully complete alcohol or drug treatment; (d) The parent is unwilling to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care for the child; reasonably necessary medical care does not include recommended or optional vaccinations against childhood or any other disease; (e) The parent has failed to exercise reasonable visitation or communication with the child; (f) The parent’s abusive or neglectful conduct has caused, at least in part, an extreme and deep-seated antipathy by the child toward the parent, or some other substantial erosion of the relationship between the parent and the child; (g) The parent has committed an abusive act for which reasonable efforts to maintain the children in the home would not be required under Section 43-21-603, or a series of physically, mentally, or emotionally abusive incidents, against the child or another child, whether related by consanguinity or affinity or not, making future contacts between the parent and 20 child undesirable; or (h)(i) The parent has been convicted of any of the following offenses against any child: 1. Rape of a child under Section 97-3-65; 2. Sexual battery of a child under Section 97-3-95(c); 3. Touching a child for lustful purposes under Section 97-5-23; 4. Exploitation of a child under Sections 97-5-31 through 97-5-37; 5. Felonious abuse or battery of a child under Section 97-5-39(2); 6. Carnal knowledge of a step or adopted child or a child of a cohabitating partner under Section 97-5-41; or 7. Human trafficking of a child under Section 97-3-54.1; or (ii) The parent has been convicted of: 1. Murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent; 2. Aiding, abetting, attempting, conspiring or soliciting to commit murder or voluntary manslaughter of the child or another child of the parent; or 3. A felony assault that results in the serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent. 21 Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-121 (Supp. 2026). ¶40. “[O]nly one of the enumerated grounds [in Section 93-15-119 or -121] need[s] to be satisfied in order to justify terminating a natural parent’s rights.” J.J.B. v. Monroe Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs. ex rel. Davenport, 400 So. 3d 403, 409 (Miss. 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting W.A.S. v. A.L.G., 949 So. 2d 31, 35 (Miss. 2007)). “We review the chancellor’s termination decision under the ‘clearly erroneous/manifest error standard.’” Id. at 408 (citing G.Q.A. v. Harrison Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 771 So. 2d 331, 335 (Miss. 2000)). “If there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s findings, we will not disturb them, even though ‘we might have found otherwise as an original matter.’” Id. (quoting G.Q.A., 771 So. 2d at 335). III. Parental Unfitness ¶41. The chancellor found “that [Emily] ha[d] been diagnosed with a mental illness or deficiency that [wa]s unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time and which, based upon expert testimony or an established pattern of behavior, prevents her, despite reasonable accommodations, from providing minimally acceptable care for the child as set forth in [Section] 93-15-121(a).” Emily argues insufficient evidence was presented to support the chancellor’s findings. We agree. ¶42. The chancellor relied on a psy