Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-WC-01032-COA GHYRON BOUNDS APPELLANT v. WARREN PAVING INC. AND ZURICH APPELLEES AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/08/2025 TRIBUNAL FROM WHICH MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALED: COMMISSION ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTOPHER HEDERI NEYLAND ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: P. SHARKEY BURKE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/17/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ. CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Ghyron Bounds was involved in an accident while in the course and scope of his employment with Warren Paving Inc. Bounds filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission, claiming injuries to his lower back, neck, left shoulder, left upper extremity, right arm, and right upper extremity. An administrative judge found that Bounds suffered a compensable, work-related injury. After review, the Commission reversed and rendered the order, holding that Bounds was not injured and did not suffer aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a result of the wreck. Bounds appealed. We find that the Commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore affirm the Commission’s order. FACTS ¶2. Ghyron Bounds was employed by Warren Paving Inc. as a truck driver. On August 11, 2020, Bounds was driving an 18-wheeler that was “loaded with asphalt[,]” and it was struck from behind by a pick-up truck hauling a trailer. Bounds testified that he “jumped out of his truck” to check on the other driver. Bounds’s truck sustained damage to the lights, mud flap, and the bumper of the truck, but the truck was used to complete the delivery. ¶3. A video captured the inside of the truck at the time of the accident. Bounds was holding his cell phone in his right hand and driving with his left hand. The impact did not cause him to drop his phone. On the seat next to Bounds, there were papers, a water bottle and another phone, all of which slid around very little. Bounds was not wearing a seatbelt, and his body did not move much after impact. ¶4. Bounds reported the accident to his employer and went to the Forrest General Emergency Department, complaining of neck and lower back pain and tingling in his legs and toes. Notably, Bounds’s medical records reflect that on August 8, three days before the accident, Bounds had reported to the emergency department with a complaint of sciatica and lower back pain. Bounds testified that he had been treated for sciatica and chronic lower back pain since around 2006. ¶5. Bounds underwent physical therapy and injections, and he had a permanent spinal cord stimulator implanted for pain management. Bounds received temporary total disability benefits from his employer from September 2020 through February 2023. On October 26, 2022, Bounds was placed at maximum medical improvement with a four-percent whole-body 2 impairment rating and a light-duty work level.1 A functional capacity evaluation revealed that Bounds had “the ability to perform 100% of the physical demands of his job[.]” ¶6. Bounds filed a civil lawsuit against William Farrish, 3 D Mechanical Electrical & Plumbing LLC (“3D”), and John Does # 1-10 in the Jones County Circuit Court. Farrish was employed by 3D and was the individual driving the pickup truck that hit Bounds. A jury ultimately found for the defendants. ¶7. On October 27, 2022, Bounds filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. Bounds claimed injury to his lower back, neck, left shoulder, left upper extremity, right arm, and right upper extremity. In the petition, Bounds asserted that he was terminated prior to reaching maximum medical improvement and that he had permanent work restrictions. Warren Paving and its insurance carrier Zurich American Insurance Company admitted that Bounds was involved in an accident while in the course and scope of his employment but disputed that his alleged disability and medical conditions were related to the accident. Warren Paving averred that Bounds’s “alleged disability [was] due solely to a preexisting condition, disease, or lesion for which they would not be liable, or in the alternative, that such preexisting condition, disease, or lesion is a material contributing factor to the alleged permanent disability for which [they] would be entitled to an apportionment[.]” 1 The evaluation noted that Bounds’s “whole person impairment rating is 1% for Cervical Spine Regional Grid due to his Cervical Disc Degeneration, 1% for Thoracic Spine Regional Grid due to his Thoracic Intervertebral Disc Degeneration, and a 2% on the Lumbar Spine Regional Grid due to the Lumbar Intervertebral Disc Degeneration[,] for a 4% whole body impairment rating.” The evaluation also stated that Bounds “demonstrated the ability to return to full duty work.” 3 ¶8. In August 2023, a hearing was held before an administrative judge (AJ). Prior, the parties stipulated: (1) Bounds was involved in a vehicular accident while engaged in the course and scope of his employment; (2) the relationship of employer and employee existed at the time of the alleged injury; (3) Bounds’s average weekly wage was $847.66; (4) Warren Paving had paid all of Bounds’s medical expenses; and (5) Warren Paving had paid all temporary total disability that would be owed if it was determined Bounds suffered a compensable work injury. The issues to be decided were (1) compensability and causal relation between the accident and Bounds’s medical conditions, and (2) collateral estoppel and/or res judicata related to Bounds’s lawsuit. ¶9. The AJ found that there was sufficient medical evidence to support that Bounds suffered a compensable, work-related injury. Additionally, the AJ found that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied due to the third-party claim raised in circuit court. ¶10. Warren Paving petitioned the full Commission for review of the AJ’s order. The Commission (2-1) reversed and rendered the order of the AJ. The Commission held that “[b]ased on the medical expert testimony,” “Bounds was neither injured nor did he suffer an aggravation of a pre-existing condition in the . . . wreck.” The Commission did not address the second issue related to collateral estoppel “because [it] decided the case on the merits . . . and because [its] findings [were] consistent with the [c]ircuit [c]ourt’s judgment.” Bounds appealed. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11. “The standard of review in workers’ compensation cases is limited.” Thomas v. Int’l 4 Paper Co., 420 So. 3d 334, 337 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). “The Commission is the trier and finder of facts in a compensation claim.” Id. (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Weatherspoon v. Croft Metals Inc., 853 So. 2d 776, 778 (¶6) (Miss. 2003)). “The Commission’s decision will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, or is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Lovett v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., 157 So. 3d 88, 89 (¶7) (Miss. 2015). “The deference granted the Commission by this Court’s standard of review means that this Court cannot set aside a Commission’s decision that is supported by substantial credible evidence, even if conflicting evidence exists and even if this Court may have found the facts otherwise if it were the trier of facts.” Thomas, 420 So. 3d at 337 (¶11) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sheffield v. S.J. Louis Constr. Inc., 285 So. 3d 614, 618 (¶8) (Miss. 2019)). DISCUSSION ¶12. On appeal, Bounds argues that the Commission (I) erred in holding that he did not suffer a compensable work injury and (II) deprived him of an opportunity to present evidence and testimony of disability and impairment. I. Whether the Commission erred in holding that Bounds did not suffer a compensable work injury. ¶13. Bounds first argues that the Commission erred when it found that he did not suffer a compensable work injury. This Court has explained: To establish entitlement to benefits under workers’ compensation law, the claimant bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence each element of the claim of disability. The elements are: (1) an accidental injury, (2) arising out of and in the course of employment, and (3) a causal connection between the injury and the claimed disability. Unless 5 common knowledge is sufficient, medical evidence must prove the existence of the disability and its causal connection to the employment. The evidence used to prove the causation must be credible medical evidence and not mere speculation. Also, the medical evidence must be based upon a reasonable degree of medical probability. City of Jackson v. Sandifer, 125 So. 3d 681, 688 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Medical evidence must prove not only the existence of a disability but also its causal connection to employment.” Myrick v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 358 So. 3d 1109, 1116 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). Additionally, “[w]here there is conflicting medical testimony, the Commission has the responsibility to apply its expertise and determine which evidence is more credible. We will uphold that determination unless it is clearly erroneous.” Washington v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Home, 25 So. 3d 341, 355 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Wesson v. Fred’s Inc., 811 So. 2d 464, 469 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). ¶14. The Workers’ Compensation Law defines injury as an “accidental injury or accidental death arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault which results from an untoward event or events, if contributed to or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner.” Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-3(b) (Rev. 2021). ¶15. The parties stipulated that Bounds was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Bounds, therefore, had to prove that he suffered an injury and that there was a causal connection between the injury and his claimed disability. ¶16. Dr. David Lee, a neurosurgeon who treated Bounds, testified by deposition in November 2022. Dr. Lee testified that at Bounds’s first appointment, he told a nurse 6 practitioner about the accident and that “he had no pain in the neck or low back prior to the accident.” Dr. Lee recommended “a functional test to look for abnormal motion[,]” physical therapy, and injections to help with the pain. Dr. Lee testified that based on the history Bounds provided, Bounds’s treatment was related to his injury. Dr. Lee referred Bounds to Dr. McKellar, a pain management doctor, and Dr. Trussell, a physiatrist. Dr. Lee later recommended a spinal cord stimulator to help with the ongoing pain.2 Dr. Lee testified that based on the history Bounds provided, he related the need for the implant to the accident. When Dr. Lee was asked if the care he provided to Bounds was “reasonable and necessary and related to his injury[,]” Dr. Lee responded, “I think so. Yes.” However, on cross- examination, Dr. Lee opined that he did not know that Bounds had gone to the emergency room for back pain three days before the accident or that Bounds was treated for back pain in 2015. Dr. Lee had not reviewed Bounds’s other medical records or evidence from the accident. ¶17. Dr. Richard Clatterbuck, also a neurosurgeon, testified in Bounds’s civil case. Dr. Clatterbuck reviewed Bounds’s medical records from Dr. Lee; the emergency room records; images and videos from the accident; deposition testimony from the other driver, Bounds’s supervisor who responded to the accident, and Dr. Lee; and medical records from providers who treated Bounds prior to the accident. Dr. Clatterbuck testified that a CT scan taken the day of the accident did not indicate any injury to Bounds. Additionally, MRI scans of 2 After a spinal cord stimulator trial, Bounds reported “60 percent pain relief” and overall better functioning. In May 2022, Dr. Lee implanted the spinal cord stimulator. Following the surgery, Bounds reported “that 80 percent of his pain was gone.” 7 Bounds’s neck and lumbar spine taken a couple of weeks after the accident did not show evidence of any traumatic injury. When looking at the lumbar MRI, Dr. Clatterbuck noted: “It’s a picture consistent with many people in their 50s. It shows, you know, kind of mild to moderate degenerative arthritic changes.” Dr. Clatterbuck testified that “the natural history of this disease is that often when people get symptoms, they can progress and become worse without anything else intervening in that chain of events.” He opined that “[s]pinal cord stimulation is a common treatment for people who have leg pain and back pain . . . from degenerative arthritis[.]” ¶18. Dr. Clatterbuck was asked whether he saw “any evidence in the video that Mr. Bounds was injured in any way from that accident,” and he responded, “I did not.” Dr. Clatterbuck further opined that “the limited video that [he] saw did not imply that [Bounds] had any kind of significant injury immediately after the accident because he seemed to move in a normal fashion.” Dr. Clatterbuck did “not believe [Bounds] sustained a significant injury from the accident” and was of the opinion that the injections and the spinal cord stimulator were treatments for preexisting spinal problems. Further, Dr. Clatterbuck did not believe that Bounds’s degenerative changes were caused by the accident, and he did not believe that the accident aggravated or exacerbated any preexisting condition. ¶19. After our review, we find that the Commission noted that Dr. Lee “never gave an opinion regarding whether the . . . accident caused or aggravated any of Bounds’ conditions[,]” but Dr. Clatterbuck opined that “Bounds did not sustain any significant injury as a result of the accident” and that “neither the degenerative condition in Bounds’ spine nor 8 any other pre-existing condition was aggravated by the . . . accident.” The Commission found, based on this testimony, that “Bounds was neither injured nor did he suffer an aggravation of a pre-existing condition in the . . . wreck.” The Commission additionally noted that “Dr. Clatterbuck’s opinion [was] more persuasive because he had access to and reviewed more relevant evidence than Dr. Lee.” ¶20. The Commission’s determination was not clearly erroneous. The Commission ultimately had “the responsibility to apply its expertise and determine which evidence [was] more credible,” and it found that Dr. Clatterbuck’s opinions were more credible. Washington, 25 So. 3d at 355 (¶33). Dr. Clatterbuck reviewed medical records from prior to and after the accident and testimony from other individuals at the scene of the accident. To the contrary, Dr. Lee was not aware until his deposition—and after he had formed his opinions—of Bounds’s pre-existing complaints of back pain, and he did not have the benefit of reviewing the same evidence as Dr. Clatterbuck. We find that substantial credible evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Dr. Clatterbuck’s opinions were more persuasive than Dr. Lee’s; that Bounds was not injured in the accident; and that the accident did not aggravate a pre-existing condition. II. Whether the Commission deprived Bounds of an opportunity to present evidence of disability and impairment. ¶21. Bounds also argues that the Commission deprived him of the opportunity to provide evidence and testimony of disability and impairment. Bounds asserts that the order “exceeds the scope of a compensability hearing by requiring that Bounds prove ‘impairment’ when the hearing was limited to compensability.” Bounds therefore argues that the case should have 9 been remanded to the AJ for him to present evidence of impairment. ¶22. The Commission did not require Bounds to prove impairment, and the Commission’s order does not make a finding on disability or impairment. Instead, the issues before the Commission were (1) compensability and causal relation and (2) collateral estoppel and/or res judicata. As to the first issue, the Commission ultimately determined that Bounds did not suffer a compensable work-related injury. The Commission heard Bounds’s testimony about his claimed injury, reviewed all the evidence, and then determined that he was not injured in the accident. Bounds was not deprived of the opportunity to present evidence of disability, and we find this issue is without merit. CONCLUSION ¶23. The Commission’s ruling that Bounds was neither injured nor sustained an aggravation of a pre-existing injury in the accident is supported by substantial credible evidence. Therefore, we affirm the order of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. ¶24. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ. McCARTY, J., DISSENTING: ¶25. This case is not about the merits of whether Bounds could prove a causal link between the car wreck and his claimed back injury. It could not be, as that hearing was never held by the administrative judge, so that element had not been established yet. Because the 10 Commission proceeded to make a finding that the claimant failed to prove this connection before the administrative judge ruled on this point or the evidence was fully developed, I respectfully dissent. ¶26. In a workers’ compensation case, the claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) an accidental injury, (2) arising out of and in the course of employment, and (3) a causal connection between the injury and the . . . claimed disability.” Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Loveless, 312 So. 3d 395, 401 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). These are the “essential three elements of a workers’ compensation claim,” and if you fail to prove one, then your claim will be denied. Frito-Lay Inc. v. Leatherwood, 908 So. 2d 175, 179 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). ¶27. The first thing to point out is that only the first two elements were ruled upon by the administrative judge. As the administrative judge put it, Bounds “alleged an injury as a result of the motor vehicle accident while in the course and scope of his employment.” At the hearing, the parties stipulated Bounds was in a wreck “while engaged in the course and scope of his employment with the Employer herein.” ¶28. The parties did not stipulate there was a “causal relation between the . . . vehicular accident” and Bounds’ “alleged medical condition(s).” In other words, element 3 from our standard test. ¶29. The administrative judge ultimately found that Bounds “suffered a compensable, work-related injury as a result of the undisputed motor vehicle accident[.]” But that is where the ruling stops—since the AJ determined that medical treatment benefits “if any . . . shall 11 be decided at a future hearing to determine whether the requested medical treatment and/or indemnity benefits would be reasonable, necessary, and related to the compensable work injury.” (Emphasis added). ¶30. Yet on review, a majority of the Commission determined that Bounds did not prove enough of a connection between his injury and the accident—a decision the majority today finds was supported by substantial evidence. But as Commissioner Harkins pointed out in dissent, this was before Bounds put on his proof of causal connection. As a result, the Commission “conflat[ed] the issues of compensability and disability, thereby prematurely determining the final outcome of this claim which had not been fully adjudicated.” ¶31. In the dissent’s view, this meant the Commission’s ruling was based on an incomplete administrative record and without Bounds being allowed to be heard on all three elements of proof. For review by the Commission is not unlimited, but “limited solely to the issues reflected by the pleadings, requests for admissions, and prehearing statements.” Miss. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Rule 2.6 (emphasis added). ¶32. And we have held the Commission in error when it acts but an “issue was not raised and thus was not before the Commission.” Miss. Mfrs. Ass’n Workers’ Comp. Grp. v. Miss. Workers’ Comp. Grp. Self-Insurer Guar. Ass’n, 281 So. 3d 108, 118 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Rule 2.6 and Cox v. S.B. Thomas Tr., 755 So. 2d 52, 57 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), for the point that “the Commission erred by addressing an issue that was not properly raised in the pleadings or tried by implied consent”). ¶33. The Commission jumped the gun before the proof had been fleshed out or even heard 12 by the administrative judge. As Bounds phrases it on appeal, he was “deprived . . . of the opportunity to present evidence and testimony related to disability and impairment,” and the Commission faulted him for this even though “the hearing was limited to compensability.” ¶34. So in merely reviewing the merits of the Commission’s order, the majority misses the larger point: that Bounds was deprived of his day in court. For that reason, I respectfully dissent. WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION. 13