Full Opinion

No. 128,618 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS BETZAIDA SUAREZ-CIRINO, Appellant, v. MENARD, INC., PRAETORIAN INSURANCE CO., and XL INSURANCE AMERICA, INC., Appellees. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. Under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq., an employer may seek to permanently terminate future medical benefits awarded to a claimant. K.S.A. 44-510k(a). This statute presumes the claimant no longer needs medical care for their injury if the claimant has not received medical treatment from an authorized medical provider within two years from the date of the award of workers compensation benefits or two years from the date the claimant last received medical treatment from an authorized healthcare provider. K.S.A. 44-510k(a)(3). 2. The two-year period for invoking the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 44- 510k(a)(3) begins to run no earlier than the date of the award of future medical benefits. This two-year period then restarts every time a claimant receives authorized medical treatment after the date of the award. 1 Appeal from Workers Compensation Board. Oral argument held July 21, 2026. Opinion filed October 23, 2026. Reversed and remanded with directions. Roger Fincher, of Law Office of Roger Fincher, of Topeka, for appellant. Megan L. Townsley and William L. Townsley III, of Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, L.L.C., of Wichita, for appellees. Before CLINE, P.J., PICKERING, J., and KEVIN M. SMITH, District Judge, assigned. CLINE, J.: In this appeal, we are called upon to interpret the presumption in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3), which shifts the burden of proof when an employer applies to permanently terminate an award of future medical benefits in a workers compensation case. This statute presumes the claimant no longer needs medical care for their injury if the claimant has not received medical treatment from an authorized medical provider within two years from the date of the award of workers compensation benefits or two years from the date the claimant last received medical treatment from an authorized healthcare provider. This presumption may be overcome by competent medical evidence. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3). Betzaida Suarez-Cirino's employer sought to permanently terminate her right to future medical benefits after more than two years had passed since she received authorized medical treatment, but less than two years had passed since she was awarded future medical benefits. The Workers Compensation Board (the Board) applied the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3), found Suarez-Cirino did not overcome it, and permanently terminated her right to future medical benefits. Suarez-Cirino claims the Board misinterpreted K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) when making the decision to permanently terminate her benefits. She contends the statutory presumption did not apply because less than two years had elapsed since her 2 future medical benefits were awarded. According to her, the deadline in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) begins to run on the date of the award for future medical benefits and restarts every time a claimant receives authorized medical treatment after that date. Otherwise, like the situation here, the deadline could run before the award is even made. After applying various canons of statutory interpretation, we find the Board misinterpreted K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) and unduly shortened the deadline that triggers the presumption. Because Suarez-Cirino was awarded future medical benefits, the presumption would not apply in her case until, at the earliest, two years after the date of that award. We therefore reverse the Board's decision to terminate Suarez-Cirino's future medical benefits and remand for reconsideration of whether Suarez-Cirino's employer is entitled to termination of Suarez-Cirino's future medical benefits without applying the statutory presumption. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In February 2014, Suarez-Cirino injured her left shoulder while scanning heavy items as a cashier at Menards. She reported the incident to Menards and was compensated for both the time off work and the treatments received for her left shoulder. After almost a year of physical therapy and pain management, she had surgery to repair her torn rotator cuff. Following surgery, Suarez-Cirino returned to work on light duty, and was reassigned to an inventory position that required her to count and record quantities of products. This position required her to reach top shelves and shuffle products around, and in December 2015 she ended up overusing her right arm, resulting in injury to that shoulder. Suarez-Cirino then sought treatment for the right shoulder with the same doctor who had treated her left shoulder. After he opined that the right shoulder injury was also a work injury, Suarez-Cirino was scheduled for surgery on it in 2016. The surgery, 3 however, was postponed due to Menards' request that Suarez-Cirino obtain a second opinion about the causation of the right shoulder injury. In May 2017, the doctor referred by Menards concluded that the right shoulder injury stemmed from preexisting conditions, so Menards denied workers compensation benefits for Suarez-Cirino's right shoulder injury. In late 2017, after the denial of compensation by Menards, Suarez-Cirino filed an application for preliminary hearing with the Division of Workers Compensation. With contrary opinions on the causation of Suarez-Cirino's right shoulder problems, the administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered an independent medical examination (IME). The ALJ held the preliminary hearing on April 3, 2019, and found—based on the IME and Suarez-Cirino's medical records—that her right shoulder injury was compensable. The ALJ authorized future medical treatment, including surgery. The ALJ issued regular hearing findings on September 2, 2022, and ultimately held "the greater weight of the medical evidence establishes that Suarez-Cirino suffered her right shoulder injuries as a direct and natural consequence of her left shoulder injuries" and thus "has established her entitlement to future medical treatment." After the award, Suarez-Cirino continued to manage her pain with medication but did not receive any specific treatment for her shoulders. As a result, 17 months after the award, Menards applied to terminate post-award medical benefits on February 19, 2024, because Suarez-Cirino had not received authorized treatment in over two years. Suarez- Cirino then spoke with one of the doctors who had evaluated her previously, and that doctor determined she was still in need of medical treatment for her right shoulder. She applied for approval of post-award treatment on July 15, 2024, based on her doctor's report. 4 The ALJ held one hearing on both sides' applications on September 10, 2024. The ALJ determined that because Suarez-Cirino did not seek or receive authorized medical benefits for more than seven years, she failed to overcome the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) that she is no longer in need of medical treatment. It thus determined that Menards was entitled to a termination of the future medical benefits previously ordered. Suarez-Cirino appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ's findings. Suarez-Cirino petitioned for judicial review of this decision. REVIEW OF SUAREZ-CIRINO'S APPELLATE CHALLENGE Suarez-Cirino challenges the Board's interpretation of the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) and contends that Menards was not entitled to the benefit of this presumption. She claims the presumption would not apply to terminate medical benefits until two years from the date of the award or two years from the last authorized medical treatment post-award, whichever is later. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework A final order of the Board is subject to review under the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. K.S.A. 44-556(a). Relief may be granted if the Board erroneously interpreted or applied the law. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4). Kansas courts give no deference to administrative agencies' interpretations of statutory language. See Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 296 Kan. 552, 559, 293 P.3d 723 (2013) (no deference given to agencies' interpretations of their own regulations). Rather, the interpretation of a statute is a legal question over which our 5 review is unlimited. In re Tax Appeal of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 57 Kan. App. 2d 723, 726, 460 P.3d 377 (2020). When construing statutes, we seek to determine the Legislature's purpose or goals in enacting the law—often called legislative intent. Courts are bound by that intent, and we strive to honor it so that laws are applied consistently with the objectives the Legislature meant to achieve. See State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022) ("The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the Legislature's intent governs if we can ascertain that intent."). Courts follow a well-established process in determining legislative intent. Since the strongest evidence is the language chosen by the Legislature to express its intent, we start there, giving common words their ordinary meaning. If the statute's words are clear and unambiguous, we need not look further to determine their meaning. On the other hand, if the statute's language is not self-explanatory, we turn to default rules or assumptions about how the Legislature expresses statutory meaning for assistance. These rules, called "canons of construction," assume the way the Legislature uses language, grammar, punctuation, and sentence structure in drafting statutes is purposeful. See Brannon, Canons of Construction: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research Service (May 9, 2025). We also assume the Legislature did not intend absurd results or to enact meaningless legislation, so we strive to give statutes a reasonable construction. State v. Gomez, 320 Kan. 3, 15, 561 P.3d 908 (2025); State v. Le, 260 Kan. 845, Syl. ¶ 4, 926 P.2d 638 (1996). And we attempt to reconcile different provisions in a statute to bring them into a workable harmony if possible. State v. Strong, 317 Kan. 197, 203, 527 P.3d 548 (2023). Before 2011, there was no statutory provision in the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq., allowing an employer to terminate future medical benefits of an injured worker once the claim had been finally resolved. But in 6 2011, the Legislature amended K.S.A. 44-510k(a) to allow an employer to apply to terminate or modify authorized medical treatment. To successfully terminate these benefits, the ALJ must find "that no further medical care is required, the injury which was the subject of the underlying award is not the prevailing factor in the need for further medical care, or that the care requested is not necessary to cure or relieve the effects of such injury." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(2). The Legislature also added the following subsection to K.S.A. 44-510k(a) in 2011: "(3) If the claimant has not received medical treatment, as defined in subsection (e) of K.S.A. 44-510h, and amendments thereto, from an authorized health care provider within two years from the date of the award or two years from the date the claimant last received medical treatment from an authorized health care provider, the employer shall be permitted to make application under this section for permanent termination of future medical benefits. In such case, there shall be a presumption that no further medical care is needed as a result of the underlying injury. The presumption may be overcome by competent medical evidence." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-510k(a). At the same time, the Legislature limited a claimant's right to receive an award of future medical benefits by amending K.S.A. 44-525(a) to require claimants to prove it is more probable than not that future medical treatment will be required as a result of the work-related injury before an award of future medical benefits could be made. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-525(a). In Clayton v. University of Kansas Hosp. Auth., 53 Kan. App. 2d 376, 377, 388 P.3d 187 (2017), this court examined K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) to determine the type of evidence required to overcome the presumption. But the question of when the presumption applies—that is, when the two years of inactivity countdown begins—is a question of first impression. And, because we find the statute is ambiguous about how the two deadlines interact, we must employ canons of statutory construction to determine the Legislature's intent. State v. Evans, 322 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 1, 584 P.3d 646 (2026) ("But if the 7 statute's wording is ambiguous, courts will consult canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity."). When the statutory time frame begins depends on the circumstances. Menards contends the presumption in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) applies because Suarez-Cirino had not received authorized medical treatment for over seven years when it applied to terminate her future medical benefits. It says the two deadlines in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) are standalone and so long as a claimant meets one of them, the presumption applies. And it claims that allowing the deadline to begin when the award is entered ignores the language in the statute that says the two-year deadline can begin when treatment was last provided. Both the ALJ and the Board interpreted the statute the same way as Menards. Suarez-Cirino, on the other hand, takes a more wholistic view of the statute. According to her, the statutory deadline begins to run on the date of the award for future medical benefits and restarts every time a claimant receives medical treatment after the date of the award. She points out that this interpretation gives meaning to both deadlines in the statute. She claims the interpretation adopted by the ALJ and the Board would render the first triggering circumstance—a claimant going two years without treatment from the date of the award—meaningless in cases where a claimant did not receive medical treatment less than two years before the date of the award. And it would create unreasonable or absurd results because the deadline in those cases would run before the date of the award. Suarez-Cirino has a point—and this case exemplifies the absurdity of the Board's interpretation of the deadline. Suarez-Cirino was awarded future medical benefits for her right shoulder on September 2, 2022. But she received her last authorized medical treatment on July 14, 2017. Under the Board's interpretation of the statute, the two-year 8 deadline in Suarez-Cirino's case would have run before she was even awarded future medical benefits. If this were true, it would be difficult to see why she was awarded future medical benefits in the first place. Both parties recognize that we cannot interpret statutes in a way that renders any portion meaningless, yet Suarez-Cirino's interpretation is the only one that is faithful to this edict. If the two-year deadline begins to run at the date of the award and restarts each time treatment is received, then both deadlines have meaning. This interpretation also acknowledges the order in which the deadlines appear in the statute. That is, the first deadline listed is the one that runs from the date of the award, so presumably that is the first one that applies. Then, if a claimant has received medical treatment after the date of the award, the second deadline would come into play. In addition to interpreting statutes reasonably and giving effect to every provision, we must, where possible, read the statute's provisions together to make them consistent and workable. Along these lines, we note that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(1) provides that an application for termination or modification of medical treatment can only be filed after the entry of an award of future medical benefits. Thus, construing the deadline in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) as not having run until, at the earliest, two years after the date of the award is consistent with the deadline in subsection (a)(1). It seems unreasonable to allow the deadline to run before the award but delay the employer's ability to enforce that deadline until after the award is made. Another problem with the Board's interpretation of the statute is that the presumption would apply immediately after the award, if the claimant had not received medical treatment in the two years before the award. It makes no sense to measure a claimant's burden of proof one way at the hearing on whether to award future medical benefits, then, the very next day, effectively increase that burden through imposition of the statutory presumption. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-525(a) (requiring claimant to prove 9 it is more probable than not that future medical treatment will be required as a result of work-related injury); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) (applying presumption that no future medical care is needed after two-year deadline passes). Not only does this seem judicially inefficient, but it would allow an employer to circumvent the appeal process for challenging an award of future medical benefits. That is, in cases where a claimant has not received medical treatment in the two years before the award, an employer would simply apply to terminate the award of future medical benefits rather than appealing the decision to award those benefits because it would be more difficult for a claimant to show they were entitled to keep their future medical benefits than to show they were entitled to them in the first place. Menards' conduct is also consistent with Suarez-Cirino's interpretation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) (and the one we adopt here). Menards did not apply to terminate her future medical benefits until 17 months after those benefits were awarded, even though more than seven years had passed since Suarez-Cirino received medical treatment. If the deadline for application of the presumption had run more than five years before the award of future medical benefits, then why wait almost two years after the date of the award to seek to terminate those benefits? While this fact is not dispositive, it tends to show a practical construction that is in line with Suarez-Cirino's interpretation. Although not stated in these terms, our court has previously interpreted K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510k(a)(3) in this manner. For example, in Clayton, the injured worker (Clayton) was last evaluated by a doctor on March 5, 2012. The parties settled Clayton's workers compensation claim and an ALJ approved the settlement at a hearing on May 30, 2013, leaving future medical treatment open. On June 15, 2015, Clayton's employer applied to terminate Clayton's future medical benefits. The ALJ found the statutory presumption applied because Clayton had not sought additional medical treatment in the two years after the settlement hearing and found Clayton overcame that presumption by presenting competent medical evidence that medical treatment was still needed. The 10 Board affirmed this decision. Clayton's employer appealed this decision, challenging the sufficiency of Clayton's evidence showing she needed future medical treatment. While we reversed the Board's decision regarding the type of evidence needed to overcome the presumption, we agreed the presumption applied because Clayton did not receive medical treatment resulting from her work-related injury within two years from the date of the settlement hearing. 53 Kan. App. 2d at 383. Although more than two years had passed since Clayton had received medical treatment, we applied the deadline from the date of the settlement hearing where her future medical benefits were awarded, not the date she had last received medical treatment before her future medical benefits were awarded. For these reasons, we find the Board erred in applying the statutory presumption to Menards' application to terminate Suarez-Cirino's future medical benefits because it incorrectly relied on the length of time since Suarez-Cirino had received medical treatment instead of the length of time since she was awarded benefits for future medical treatment. And because the decision to terminate Suarez-Cirino's future medical benefits was based on the application of this presumption, we must reverse that decision and remand the matter for consideration of whether those benefits should be terminated without applying the presumption. Because we are reversing the Board's decision based on its mistaken interpretation of the statutory presumption, we need not address Suarez-Cirino's remaining issues on appeal. Reversed and remanded with directions. 11