State v. Channel

No. 129,134 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. AMBER CHANNEL, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. The fundamental rule for sentencing is that the person convicted of a crime is sentenced in accordance with the sentencing provisions in effect at the time the crime was committed. 2. To comply with due process requirements, retroactive legislation cannot abolish a vested right. To determine whether a vested right exists, an appellate court considers three factors: (1) the nature of the rights at stake (e.g., procedural, substantive, remedial), (2) how the rights were affected (e.g., were the rights partially or completely abolished by the legislation; was any substantive remedy provided), and (3) the nature and strength of the public interest furthered by the legislation. 3. Applying the 2026 statutory amendment to the Kansas jail credit statute at K.S.A. 21-6615(d) to the defendant in this case does not deprive the defendant of a vested right in violation of due process. 1 4. An ex post facto violation occurs if a defendant is punished for an act that was not criminal at the time they did the act, the punishment has been made more burdensome, or a defense to the crime has been abrogated. To fall within the second prong of the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective and must disadvantage the criminal offender by increasing the punishment for the crime. 5. A fundamental principle in the law is that statutes operate prospectively, while judicial interpretations operate retrospectively. A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction. 6. The 2026 statutory amendment to the Kansas jail credit statute at K.S.A. 21- 6615(d) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, as applied to the defendant in this case. Appeal from Geary District Court; RYAN W. ROSAUER, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed October 9, 2026. Convictions affirmed, sentence vacated, and case remanded with directions. James M. Latta, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Natalie Chalmers, principal assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee. 2 Before WARNER, C.J., MALONE and HILL, JJ. MALONE, J.: Amber Channel appeals her convictions and sentences for various drug crimes including possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Channel claims the district court should have dismissed the possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute count because the State presented insufficient evidence of the culpable mental state of her intent to distribute. Channel also claims she is entitled to additional jail credit for time spent incarcerated pending disposition of this case. The jail credit issue requires our court to consider the retroactive effect of the Kansas Legislature's 2026 amendment to the jail credit statute at K.S.A. 21-6615(d). L. 2026, ch. 62, § 1. We hold the State presented sufficient evidence during its case-in-chief and throughout the trial to support Channel's intent to distribute methamphetamine, so the district court had no duty to dismiss that count. We also hold the Kansas Legislature's 2026 amendment to the jail credit statute at K.S.A. 21-6615(d) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1, as applied to Channel's case. Thus, we affirm Channel's convictions, vacate her sentence and the jail credit order, and remand with directions for the district court to determine Channel's jail credit consistent with the decision in State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 8, 2022, Junction City Police Detective Alvin Babcock watched a person he knew to have an open arrest warrant drive away from a known drug house. Babcock tracked the car to an alleyway where it was parked with other people nearby. Among the group was Channel, who Babcock recognized as having been involved in prior drug dealings. When backup arrived, Babcock arrested the suspect he had followed from the drug house. Babcock called a K-9 unit to sniff the suspect's car and the other cars associated with the group. The dog alerted on Channel's car. 3  A vehicle search of Channel's car uncovered what Babcock called a "meth pipe" with residue and marijuana with rolling paper inside a jacket in the driver's seat. A wallet found in the jacket contained identification and credit cards belonging to Channel. A fanny pack under the driver's seat contained $5,523 cash. The police arrested Channel. They later tested the money through a controlled dog sniff where officers hid the money in a room to see if the dog alerted on the hidden money. The dog found the money. The next day, Babcock reviewed jail house phone calls from Channel's boyfriend, Mekel McAlpine. McAlpine told the person on the other line that Channel had been arrested and had "stuffed some stuff." Babcock obtained a body cavity search warrant and contacted the jail. When confronted with the search warrant, Channel voluntarily removed a baggie from between her legs containing 13.3 grams of methamphetamine. The State charged Channel with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of methamphetamine with no drug tax stamp, possession of methamphetamine, criminal transportation of drug proceeds with an alternative count under a different statutory subsection, and trafficking in contraband in a correctional institution. The State later dismissed the trafficking in contraband count. The record is unclear on how much time Channel was held in custody pending disposition of this case. She was released on bond on February 14, 2022, after spending six days in jail. A few bench warrants were later issued for failure to appear, but those warrants were recalled. On October 23, 2024, Channel failed to appear and the district court issued another bench warrant. That warrant was executed on October 29, 2024. After that point, it appears that Channel remained in custody for the remainder of the case through trial and sentencing, but it appears she also was in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) during some of that time on other cases. The record reflects that Channel was transported from the Topeka Correctional Facility to her sentencing in May 2025. 4  The district court conducted Channel's jury trial in January 2025. Babcock was the State's main witness at trial. He had served on his department's drug task force for 10 years. Based on his training and experience, Babcock thought the large amount of methamphetamine that Channel had hidden was consistent with an intent to distribute and not for personal use. Babcock explained that most drug users buy only what they can afford such as a fraction of a gram at a time. He rarely saw personal users buy in bulk and that 3.5 grams of methamphetamine was the most he had ever seen a user buy. Babcock explained that the large amount of cash found in Channel's car also pointed to distribution. The State also called Nicholas Blake, a K-9 handler, who testified about the use of the drug sniffing dog. Blake testified that the dog was trained on currencies and had never alerted on money that was not associated with drug trafficking. At the close of the State's case, Channel did not move for a judgment of acquittal on any count. Channel testified in her own defense. She elaborated that she was not a "drug seller," but was addicted, homeless, unemployed, and needed help. The State impeached Channel by asking whether she spoke to McAlpine on the phone five days before her arrest to discuss Channel distributing drugs for him. Channel denied doing do. The State recalled Babcock as a rebuttal witness, who recounted listening to jail house phone calls in early February 2022 between Channel and McAlpine where McAlpine gave directions to Channel about distributing methamphetamine. The jury found Channel guilty as charged. On May 8, 2025, the district court granted a durational departure and sentenced Channel to 106 months' imprisonment. The journal entry of judgment lists the controlling sentence as consecutive to the sentences in two other cases. The district court did not address jail credit at the sentencing hearing. The journal entry awarded Channel six days of jail credit from February 8 to February 14, 2022. Channel brings this direct appeal of the district court's judgment. 5  SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Channel first claims the district court erred by not dismissing, on its own motion, the possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute count at the close of the State's case-in-chief because the State had failed to present sufficient evidence of her intent to distribute methamphetamine. Channel did not move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence but argues that the district court should have dismissed the count on its own motion under K.S.A. 22-3419(1). In the alternative, Channel claims that the evidence throughout the trial was insufficient on the possession with intent to distribute count as to the element of her mental state. The State contends that it presented sufficient evidence at trial to support Channel's conviction of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. "When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 723, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). K.S.A. 22-3419(1) states that the court "on motion of a defendant or on its own motion" shall order a judgment of acquittal after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. We need not resolve Channel's assertion that this statute "requires the district court to, sua sponte, enter a judgment of acquittal when there is not sufficient evidence of each element of a charged crime in the State's case-in-chief." Suffice it to say, the State presented sufficient evidence in its case- in-chief to support the intent to distribute. Babcock testified that in his training and experience, which included 10 years on the police drug task force, the large amount of methamphetamine Channel possessed was consistent with being used for distribution and not for personal use. Babcock testified that users "[v]ery, very, rarely" bought bulk quantities of methamphetamine and the largest bulk purchase he had ever seen was 3.5 6 grams—about a quarter of the 13.3 grams in Channel's possession. See State v. Strong, 317 Kan. 197, 206, 527 P.3d 548 (2023) ("[T]he jury may reasonably infer an intent to distribute based on a defendant's possession of a large quantity of narcotics."). Channel also possessed a large sum of cash, $5,523. Babcock testified that fact also pointed to Channel distributing drugs because distributers often carry large sums of money with them. A drug sniffing dog alerted to the cash that Channel possessed. See State v. Davison, 41 Kan. App. 2d 140, 150-51, 202 P.3d 44 (2009) (finding that defendant's possession of $455.83 cash supported the intent to distribute). Channel points to evidence supporting her claim that she was a drug user, not a drug dealer. She testified that she possessed the 13.3 grams of methamphetamine only because she purchased it in bulk to save money. She testified that the $5,523 cash in her car was from unemployment benefits she was saving to find a place to live. And she points out that Babcock conceded at trial that all money, except new money, has some drug odor on it. But in viewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a charge, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and we do not reweigh evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Mendez, 319 Kan. at 723. Channel's alternative claim fails for the same reason. In addition to the above evidence, the State also recalled Babcock as a rebuttal witness, who testified that he reviewed multiple phone calls between Channel and McAlpine in the days before Channel's arrest where McAlpine gave directions to Channel about distributing methamphetamine. Although Channel argues that this evidence was not linked to her activities on the date of her arrest, the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that, at the time of her arrest, she was in the business of methamphetamine distribution and possessed a large quantity of methamphetamine and cash in furtherance of that enterprise. 7  We find the State presented sufficient evidence during its case-in-chief and throughout the trial to support Channel's intent to distribute methamphetamine. Channel does not challenge any other element of the crime. As a result, we conclude the district court did not need to dismiss, on its own motion, the charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute based on insufficient evidence. JAIL CREDIT Channel claims she is entitled to additional jail credit for time spent incarcerated pending disposition of this case, consistent with the holdings in Ervin, 320 Kan. at 311- 12, and State v. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, 537 P.3d 845 (2023), although she has not identified a specific number of days for which she should receive credit. The State argues that Channel should not receive additional jail credit for many reasons we will address in this opinion. Effective July 1, 2026, after the parties had filed their initial briefs, the Kansas Legislature amended the jail credit statute at K.S.A. 21-6615(d), L. 2026, ch. 62, § 1, and expressed that the amendment shall be applied retroactively to all pending cases. The parties filed supplemental briefs to argue the effect of the 2026 amendment on Channel's case, and we will address the arguments in those briefs, as well. Before reaching the merits of the claim, this court must address preservation. Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Gatewood, 321 Kan. 564, 574, 582 P.3d 534 (2026). There are exceptions to this rule: (1) the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court was right for the wrong reason. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). Even when an exception applies, this court's decision to exercise review is prudential. State v. Rhoiney, 314 Kan. 497, 500, 501 P.3d 368 (2021). 8  The State argues that this court should decline prudential review of this claim because the missing facts about jail credit require fact findings. The argument fails where this court need not make an exact jail credit determination itself based on the record. So long as the record presents facts warranting a determination of jail credit consistent with Ervin, this court may remand for the district court to make its own determination of jail credit. See State v. Ivy, 65 Kan. App. 2d 727, 748, 571 P.3d 46, rev. denied 321 Kan. 792 (2025). Thus, we will address Channel's jail credit claim for the first time on appeal because it involves only a question of law on proved or admitted facts and also because consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights. See State v. Brown, 65 Kan. App. 2d 663, 671, 570 P.3d 1278 (2025). The right to jail credit in Kansas is statutory. State v. Theis, 262 Kan. 4, 7, 936 P.2d 710 (1997). Interpretation of a jail-credit statute presents a question of law subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024). Channel committed her crimes on February 8, 2022, and sentencing occurred on May 8, 2025. The record shows that Channel's sentence runs consecutive to the sentences in two other cases. The district court awarded Channel six days of jail credit from February 8 to February 14, 2022. But the record shows that Channel was incarcerated for longer than six days pending the disposition of this case. It appears from the record that Channel was in custody from October 29, 2024, to her sentencing on May 8, 2025, but it appears she also may have been in KDOC custody during some of that time on other cases. The State concedes that "the record suggests that [Channel] was in Geary County jail during more than the six days of jail credit awarded in the journal entry." The effect of Hopkins and Ervin on Channel's case At the time Channel committed her offenses, K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6615(a) required sentencing courts to award jail credit "as an allowance for the time which the 9 defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case." We will refer to this statute as the pre-2024 version of the Kansas jail credit statute. From 1978 until 2023, the Kansas Supreme Court read this statute as only permitting credit for time the defendant spent in custody "solely" on the charge being sentenced. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 309 Kan. 977, 981, 441 P.3d 1041 (2019); State v. Harper, 275 Kan. 888, 890, 69 P.3d 1105 (2003); Campbell v. State, 223 Kan. 528, 530-31, 575 P.2d 524 (1978). Kansas caselaw also was clear that a defendant could not receive duplicative jail credit when serving consecutive sentences in multiple cases. State v. Davis, 312 Kan. 259, 287, 474 P.3d 722 (2020); State v. Lofton, 272 Kan. 216, 217-18, 32 P.3d 711 (2001). The Lofton court stated that "K.S.A. 21-4614 [predecessor to K.S.A. 21-6615] contains no provision for credit in excess of the time an individual is actually incarcerated in jail." 272 Kan. at 217-18. The Davis court was equally clear: "[W]hen consecutive sentences are imposed for multiple crimes the defendant's time in custody can only be awarded against one of the sentences." 312 Kan. at 287. But in October 2023, the Kansas Supreme Court construed our jail credit statute differently in Hopkins. Hopkins spent 572 days in jail awaiting sentencing for two counts of premeditated first-degree murder. At the same time, he was being held in custody on charges in two other pending cases and a probation violation warrant, but the two other cases and the probation violation warrant were all dismissed as part of plea negotiations. Hopkins received concurrent hard 50 sentences for the murder convictions, but he was denied any credit for the 572 days he spent in jail because he was not held in custody solely on the murder charges. As a result, the 572 days Hopkins served in jail pending sentencing were not applied to any case for which he received credit. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged the longstanding precedent establishing that the jail credit statute only permits credit for time the defendant spends in custody solely on the charge being sentenced. But the court decided that K.S.A. 2022 10 Supp. 21-6615(a) "does not say that." Hopkins, 317 Kan. at 656. After discussing several jail credit cases over the years leading to some inconsistent results, the court ruled that Hopkins should receive 572 days of jail credit because that is how many days he spent in jail pending sentencing on the murder convictions. 317 Kan. at 659. The court expressly overruled its contrary holding in Campbell. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, Syl. The Hopkins decision did not address the rulings in Davis and Lofton denying duplicative jail credit for defendants serving consecutive sentences in multiple cases. But in Ervin, the Kansas Supreme Court clarified that K.S.A. 21-6615(a) allows a jail time credit for all time a defendant is incarcerated pending the disposition of a case, regardless of whether the defendant receives credit for some or all of that time against a sentence in another case. 320 Kan. at 311-12. The court ordered the defendant to receive 749 days of credit for all the time he spent in jail awaiting sentencing even though he was already awarded credit for some of the same days in another case for which he received a consecutive sentence. The Ervin court rejected the precedent in Lofton and Davis prohibiting duplicative jail credit in consecutive sentences, finding "confusion caused by the Campbell/Lofton/Davis rule." Ervin, 320 Kan. at 310. In other words, the Ervin court overruled Lofton and Davis even though the court did not expressly say it. This case is Channel's direct appeal from her sentence including the district court's jail credit order. Because Hopkins and Ervin were decided before Channel's sentence has become final, she ordinarily is entitled to receive the benefit of the holdings in those decisions. See State v. McAlister, 310 Kan. 86, 91, 444 P.3d 923 (2019). The State argues that Ervin was wrongly decided but does so for the purpose of "preserv[ing] the . . . arguments for further review." The State acknowledges this court must follow the binding decisions in Hopkins and Ervin. See State v. Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022) (finding this court is duty bound to follow Supreme Court 11 precedent absent an indication the court intends to depart from that precedent). We have no such indication here. See State v. Zongker, 322 Kan. 137, 143, 586 P.3d 769 (2026). The Legislature reacts with amendments to the Kansas jail credit statute. In 2024, the Kansas Legislature amended K.S.A. 21-6615, effective May 23, 2024, to provide that when computing the defendant's sentence, any time that is awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed "shall not be considered time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case." L. 2024, ch. 96, § 7, codified at K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A). But it expressed no intent for the 2024 amendment to be applied retroactively. The State argues that the amendment applies to Channel's case because she was sentenced in May 2025, after the amendment went into effect. "'[T]he fundamental rule for sentencing is that the person convicted of a crime is sentenced in accordance with the sentencing provisions in effect at the time the crime was committed.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 337, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). Channel committed her crimes in February 2022. The State acknowledges our ruling in State v. Mitchell, 66 Kan. App. 2d 196, 207, 579 P.3d 970 (2025), rev. granted 321 Kan. 793 (2026), holding the 2024 amendment applies only to crimes committed on or after its effective date. Because Channel committed her crimes in 2022, the 2024 amendment does not apply. Effective July 1, 2026, the Legislature again amended the jail credit statute through L. 2026, ch. 62, § 1. K.S.A. 21-6615(d)(1) now provides: "(d)(1) When consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant, days spent in custody that are attributable to more than one case shall be credited only once against the aggregated consecutive term. The sentencing court may allocate such days to one case or apportion such days among cases, but the same days shall not be applied more than once to reduce multiple portions of consecutive terms." 12  The new amendment applies broadly to "[a]ll sentences, whether pronounced before, on or after July 1, 2026" and to "any case posture, including, but not limited to, direct appeals . . . ." K.S.A. 21-6615(d)(2)(A) and (B) (amended 2026). Under its express language, the 2026 amendment applies to Channel's direct appeal. Channel argues the 2026 statutory amendment cannot be applied to her case for two reasons. First, she argues that the 2026 amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Second, she argues that the 2026 amendment deprived her of a substantive, vested right. We will address these arguments in reverse order. Does applying the 2026 statutory amendment to Channel deprive her of a vested right? Channel argues that the right to jail credit is a vested right for which the retrospective deprivation would violate her right to due process. The State asserts that Channel has no vested right to jail credit, so retroactive application of the 2026 amendment to the jail credit statute does not violate due process. "To comply with due process requirements, retroactive legislation cannot abolish a vested right." Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446, 452, 264 P.3d 102 (2011). "The term 'vested rights' describes rights that cannot be abolished by retroactive legislation. It is a conclusory term, and the vested rights analysis is inseparable from the ultimate due process inquiry. [Citation omitted.]" 293 Kan. at 460. The Kansas Supreme Court has recognized that "the concept of vested rights is inherently difficult to define and apply." State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 52, 371 P.3d 862 (2016). To determine whether a vested right exists, an appellate court considers three factors: "'(1) the nature of the rights at stake (e.g., procedural, substantive, remedial), (2) how the rights were affected (e.g., were the rights partially or completely abolished by the legislation; was any substitute remedy provided), and (3) the nature and strength of 13 the public interest furthered by the legislation.'" Brennan, 293 Kan. at 460 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 257 Kan. 360, 369, 892 P.2d 497 [1995]); see also White v. State, 308 Kan. 491, 499, 421 P.3d 718 (2018) (relying on same three-part test to determine whether 2016 amendments to K.S.A. 60-1507 violated a party's vested rights). First, Channel argues that the right to jail credit is substantive because it affects a defendant's length of incarceration under a sentence. The State argues that the "calculation" of jail credit under the statute is a procedural right that does not alter the actual sentence imposed. This argument will carry over into our Ex Post Facto analysis, but we agree with Channel that the right to jail credit affects an inmate's length of incarceration under a sentence. As a result, we find that the right to jail credit is substantive in nature, not procedural or remedial. See State v. Roseborough, 263 Kan. 378, 381, 951 P.2d 532 (1997) ("'a statute that defines the length or type of criminal punishment is substantive'"); Mitchell, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 204 (applying the rule in Roseborough to K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615). Second, whether the right to jail credit was totally or partially abolished by the 2026 statutory amendment is a matter of framing. Channel frames the right as a narrower right to duplicative jail credit, which she argues was completely abolished by the 2026 amendment with no substitute remedy provided. But Channel does not explain how criminal defendants ever had a "right" to duplicative jail credit in the first place. The State frames the right more broadly as the overall right to jail credit, which was not completely abolished by the 2026 amendment. The State's interpretation is more reasonable. We reject Channel's attempt to parse the overall right to jail credit into component parts solely for the purpose of this analysis. K.S.A. 21-6615 still exists and provides a longstanding right to jail credit even after the amendment. The statutory right to jail credit was modified, not abolished, by the 2026 amendment. 14  Third, the parties disagree on the nature and strength of the public interest furthered by the 2026 amendment. Channel argues that the public interest is minimal because of the "marginal" number of people who receive the benefit of duplicative jail credit in consecutive cases. The State argues that the 2026 amendment to the jail credit statute is reasonable and just because it ensures that defendants receive only one day of jail credit for each single day in jail. But neither party explains how their view of the nature of the public interest ties into whether the 2026 amendment affects a vested right. No Kansas court has addressed whether jail credit is a vested due process right in the context of deciding whether an amendment to the jail credit statute can be applied retroactively. Our Supreme Court has expressed that the right to jail credit is statutory, so by implication it is neither a constitutional nor an inherent right of criminal defendants. State v. Hopkins, 295 Kan. 579, 581, 285 P.3d 1021 (2012); Theis, 262 Kan. at 7. Ultimately, we side with the State and find that applying the 2026 statutory amendment to Channel does not deprive her of a vested right, in violation of due process. We find the second factor in the analysis to be the most significant. For decades, the Kansas Supreme Court had construed the jail credit statute in a manner that did not allow a defendant to receive duplicative jail credit when serving consecutive sentences in multiple cases. The 2026 amendment expressed the Legislature's intent that duplicative jail credit is not allowed and that the law applied retroactively. The amendment did not eliminate jail credit; it only clarified that a defendant shall not receive duplicative jail credit when serving consecutive sentences in multiple cases—consistent with the legislative mandate for consecutive sentences when an offender commits a new crime while on probation or released on bond in another case. See K.S.A. 21-6606(c) and (d). Channel fails to convince us that she had a "vested right" to receive duplicative jail credit, so the 2026 amendment retroactively eliminating duplicative jail credit did not violate her due process rights. Other states have reached similar conclusions with similar 15 incarceration credits. See, e.g., Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237, 242 (Del. 1998) (finding that good time "is strictly a matter of statute," not vested until the sentence is completed); Norris v. State, 541 A.2d 926, 929 (Me. 1988) (finding that while good time credit affects a prisoner's liberty, it does not "rise to the level of a fundamental right"); Fowler v. Black, 364 S.W.2d 164, 164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (holding the right to good time credit "is not a vested right, but it is merely a conditional gratuity"). Does applying the 2026 statutory amendment to Channel violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution? Channel also argues that the 2026 amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. This issue is separate and distinct from Channel's argument about a vested right to jail credit because the United States Supreme Court has held that "a law need not impair a 'vested right' to violate the ex post facto prohibition." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981). The State responds that no ex post facto violation exists in Channel's case. The State asserts that jail credit is not part of a defendant's sentence and does not change the punishment for the crime but is only used to determine when the sentence begins. An ex post facto violation occurs if a defendant is punished for an act that was not criminal at the time they did the act, the punishment has been made more burdensome, or a defense to the crime has been abrogated. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 216 (1925); State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 276-77, 323 P.3d 829 (2014). The 2026 jail credit amendment implicates the second type of violation. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits in relevant part a statute that imposes additional punishment to that which was prescribed at the time the crime was committed. State v. Davidson, 314 Kan. 88, 90, 495 P.3d 9 (2021) (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). "To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective" and must disadvantage the criminal 16 offender "by . . . increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S. Ct. 891, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997). The parties do not dispute the retrospective nature of the 2026 statutory amendments. Indeed, the statute provides that the amendments apply in part to "[a]ll sentences, whether pronounced before, on or after July 1, 2026." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-6615(d)(2)(A) (amended 2026). It also applies to "any case posture, including, but not limited to, direct appeals . . . ." K.S.A. 21-6615(d)(2)(B) (amended 2026). A law retroactively reducing jail credit implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Weaver, the court found that an amendment to a Florida statute retroactively reducing the rate of gain-time earned for good conduct was ex post facto where "this reduction in gain- time accumulation lengthens the period that someone in petitioner's position must spend in prison." 450 U.S. at 33. Our Supreme Court applied Weaver in Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412-17, 960 P.2d 227 (1998), to conclude that an amended regulation's potential to reduce good time credit was ex post facto because good time credit no longer earned extended "the actual term of . . . punishment." The same logic applies to jail credit where a reduction in jail credit effectively increases a criminal defendant's actual term of punishment by extending their prison stay. For example, if Channel prevails on her jail credit claim and ultimately receives 100 additional days of jail credit, she will be released from prison 100 days earlier than her scheduled release date now. We reject the State's argument that jail credit is not part of the defendant's sentence and is only used to determine when the sentence begins. Lynce states the "central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause are: 'the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.'" 519 U.S. at 441 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30). Channel committed her crimes in 2022, before the Kansas 17 Supreme Court decided Hopkins. When Channel committed her crimes, our Supreme Court construed the jail credit statute in a manner that did not allow a defendant to receive duplicative jail credit when serving consecutive sentences in multiple cases. The State argues that Channel had "fair notice" of her rights under the jail credit statute when she committed her crimes and the retroactive application of the 2026 amendment is not an ex post facto violation because the law against duplicative jail credit is the same now as before Hopkins. While this argument may seem appealing, it does not carry the day. We begin with the fundamental principle in the law that "'statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively.'" Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311, 114 S. Ct. 1510, 128 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1994). "A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction." 511 U.S. at 312-13. When a court of last resort "construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law." 511 U.S. at 313 n.12. Applying this principle to the issue before us now, when the Kansas Supreme Court decided Hopkins and Ervin, it was explaining its understanding of what the jail credit statute was always intended to mean, albeit overruling prior decisions in the process. This fundamental principle affects whether the statutory amendments in reaction to those decisions can be applied retroactively without violating a defendant's rights. State v. Aubuchon, 195 Vt. 571, 90 A.3d 914 (2014), is instructive. The Vermont Legislature amended its statute governing presentence credit for time served, arguably in response to a Vermont Supreme Court decision construing the statute. The defendant wanted the amendment to be applied retroactively to receive additional jail credit in his multiple cases with consecutive sentences. The Vermont Supreme Court ruled against allowing retroactive application. It relied on the language in Rivers, 511 U.S. at 311-13, that when a court of last resort construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant since the date it became law. The court reasoned that the 18 Legislature may amend the statute to say something different, but if it does so, it changes the law; it does not merely state what the law always was. Aubuchon, 195 Vt. at 581-82. The court held that a clarifying enactment by the Legislature cannot be applied retroactively when it contravenes a construction placed on the original statute by the judiciary. 195 Vt. at 581. "Accordingly, a statute intended 'to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law which the legislature considers inaccurate' is given prospective effect only." 195 Vt. at 581-82. The Aubuchon court resolved the case on a statutory construction and retroactivity analysis and did not reach any ex post facto question, though its reasoning speaks directly to the legislative-override dynamic. See also Collins v. State, 568 P.3d 349, 360-66 (Alaska 2025) (holding amendment rejecting judicial interpretation of sentencing statute cannot be applied retroactively without violating ex post facto clause, assuming amendment was substantive); Gully v. State, 658 N.W.2d 114, 118-19 (Iowa 2002) (holding retroactive application of amendment to statute governing enhancements for sexually predatory offenses, in response to supreme court's interpretation of statute, violated prohibition against ex post facto laws). Aubuchon is only persuasive authority, but it cuts against the State's argument that the 2026 amendment to the jail credit statute does not disadvantage a defendant who committed a crime before Hopkins because the law is the same now as before Hopkins. The language in the Kansas jail credit statute has not substantively changed since 1974, until the recent amendments. When the Kansas Supreme Court decided Hopkins and Ervin, it was e