In the Interest of A.J., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1318 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of A.J., Minor Child, K.J., Father, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, The Honorable Paul G. Crawford, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, attorney for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Jennie Wilson-Moore of Wilson Law Firm, Conrad, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. In February 2024, the father physically assaulted the mother while she was pregnant with their child. The mother was taken by ambulance to the hospital, and she reported the father kneed her in the stomach, “choked” and punched her, and bit her face. The father was arrested and charged with violation of parole and willful injury causing bodily injury. The father was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. The court entered a no- contact order listing the mother as a protected party and preventing visitation with the child until September 2029.1 Meanwhile, A.J. was born in June 2024. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services became involved with the family due to the mother’s methamphetamine use. The child was placed with the maternal great-grandmother, where he remained throughout these proceedings.2 The district court terminated the father’s parental rights to A.J. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2025).3, 4 The father appeals, claiming the 1 The order listed the mother as a protected party and stated in part, “Any child visitation or contact with [the mother]’s children allowed by any other order is suspended while this No Contact Order is in effect.” 2 The great-grandmother has served as guardian of the mother’s older child with a different father since 2018. 3 Termination of parental rights is permitted under section 232.116(1)(h) upon clear and convincing proof that “(1) [t]he child is three years of age or younger[,] (2) [t]he child has been adjudicated as a child in need of assistance,” (3) the child has been removed from the parent’s custody for at least six of the last twelve months, and (4) the child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. 4 The State and guardian ad litem requested termination of both parents’ parental rights, but the mother’s parental rights were not terminated. As to the mother, the court placed the child in a guardianship with the great-grandmother. The State did not appeal from that determination. 2 department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with A.J. “due to his incarceration status” and his no-contact order. He also contends the district court should have declined to terminate his parental rights because the child was placed in a guardianship with the maternal great-grandmother. We employ the familiar statutory framework analysis on our de novo review of this case. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39–40 (Iowa 2010). But “if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis,” then “we need not address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020). We first turn to the father’s reasonable-efforts challenge. While not a strict substantive requirement for termination, “where the elements of termination require reasonable efforts by [the department], the scope of [the department]’s efforts after removal impacts the burden of proving those elements.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019). “So the State must establish the department made reasonable efforts to provide the parent with reunification services as part of its ultimate proof of a statutory ground when that ground requires such efforts.” In re C.G., No. 23-1234, 2024 WL 260926, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2024). The father argues “[t]his case is distinguishable from cases whereby the parent is in jail and fails to work with available prison programs to address parenting concerns.” The father filed a motion for reasonable efforts in November 2025, in which he requested “choices to take parenting classes, have visits and phone communication.” The State concedes the father preserved error on his claim regarding those services. Nonetheless, his claim is unpersuasive. “[R]easonable-efforts challenges must be related to services that would eliminate the need for removal,” and “[t]he father advances no argument as to how providing him with [the additional services] would have 3 eliminated the need for removal from his custody.” Id. at *2. The father agreed he could not obtain custody of A.J. now or in the foreseeable future. Further, the father testified and introduced evidence of classes he had completed in prison. Even if visitation, phone communication, or additional parenting classes had been allowed, “it would not have had any bearing on the need for continued removal of the child[] from the father’s custody.” See id. The father’s reasonable-efforts argument fails.5 Next, the father claims the court erred in terminating his parental rights because A.J. was placed in a guardianship with the maternal great- grandmother. To establish a guardianship in lieu of termination, the court must in part determine by clear and convincing evidence that “termination of the parent-child relationship would not be in the best interest of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.104(4)(a). On this question, the court found that “[e]ven if the court assumes a father-child relationship exists, termination of that relationship is in the best interest of [A.J.]” The court noted: Safety is paramount. [A.J.] turned two years old in June 2026. Reports in the file describe him as currently nonverbal and literally crying for attention. This can confuse and frustrate any parent. Father has been demonstratively violent towards mother while she was pregnant with [A.J.]. Something caused him to lash out at her with fists, kicks, and bites. 5 We further note that the father cites no authority to support his argument that his participation in “programs . . . offered in the prison” created an obligation for the department to “try to modify the [no-contact order] to permit visits” with the child. Indeed, the father testified he had attempted—unsuccessfully—to modify the no-contact order. See id. (noting “[t]he father makes no effort to explain how he thinks the department could successfully mount a challenge to the criminal no-contact order when he was unable to do so”). 4  This Court will not put a defenseless toddler at risk of a similar future fate from his father. The court therefore declined the father’s permanency request, concluding the child “needs permanency as it respects father.” The child’s best interests always remain the first consideration. In re L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). The father acknowledged he had attempted to contact the mother on several occasions in violation of the no-contact order. The record shows the father also tried to contact the mother through third parties, including a department caseworker. The great- grandmother testified that the mother “has extreme fear” of the father. We conclude that it is in the child’s best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights. While the mother’s rights remain intact under a guardianship, the father does not have a relationship with the child as he has been incarcerated for all A.J.’s life due to violence against the mother while she was pregnant. He admitted to violations of the no-contact order with the mother despite his incarceration. We affirm the denial of this requested permanency option for the father. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 5