Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0909 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Diana Lynn Becker Abeyta, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Paul D. Scott, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ David V. Newkirk and Christine E. Branstad of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Chicchelly, J., and Vogel, S.J. Opinion by Tabor, C.J. 1 TABOR, Chief Judge. Diana Becker Abeyta appeals her prison sentences for involuntary manslaughter and financial exploitation of a dependent adult (both enhanced because she was a habitual offender). The district court imposed consecutive terms for an indeterminate sentence of thirty years with a mandatory minimum of six years. Becker Abeyta asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider all relevant factors, not stating reasons for imposing a prison sentence for her financial exploitation conviction, and providing an inadequate justification for the consecutive sentences. Finding no abuse of discretion or error in the sentencing procedure, we affirm. I. Facts and Prior Proceedings R.C. was a seventy-three-year-old dependent man. Becker Abeyta was R.C.’s caregiver. She lived in his Ankeny home from July 2022 through April 2023. On April 21, medics responded to a 911 call from R.C.’s home. What they encountered was “devastating.” He had bedsores on his back and his buttocks, or open ulcers. He was stuck to the bed sheet underneath him. He was sunken into the mattress, which was starting to form up around his body, and he had a full dirty diaper on. The medic indicated that [R.C.] was filthy, and he clearly had not been bathed in some time. When the medics lifted R.C. from his bed to take him to the hospital, “his skin was stuck to the bed sheets.” After R.C. went to the hospital, a social worker with the Department of Health and Human Services and a detective from the Polk County Sheriff’s Office investigated the situation. R.C. was in the hospital for eight days before he died on April 29. The medical examiner performed an autopsy and reported that “the cause of death was a lung infection resulting from neglect by his caregiver.” 2 R.C. underwent a lung transplant ten years before his death. As a transplant recipient, he was prescribed medication. But he had not been receiving it. “There were several unopened bubble packs of medication that were prescribed due to his lung transplants and other health conditions. These unopened packages amounted to several months of medication.” Becker Abeyta admitted “there were multiple days where he did not take his medication” but she denied withholding the drugs, “it was just times that he didn’t take it.” And the State accused Becker Abeyta of using her position as R.C.’s caregiver to take advantage of him financially. But defense counsel argued that Becker Abeyta was spending R.C.’s money on his care: [ J]ust with regard to the financial allegations, [R.C.] had $720 a month coming in. His mortgage was $1,600. Ms. Becker Abeyta was putting her own money in and paying for everything together, so this isn’t a situation where she was just running off with his money. The bills were getting paid. The bills were more than he had coming in. But the prosecutor told the court that the investigation established that R.C.’s ex-wife paid his mortgage. The prosecutor also recounted that before his death, R.C. was interviewed by a social worker. R.C. told her that Becker Abeyta “brought an attorney to the home to have him sign a new will.” The will made Becker Abeyta’s friend the executor of his estate and the recipient of his property. Although R.C. “didn’t really know” the friend, R.C. trusted him “because [Becker Abeyta] said he was a good person.” The State charged Becker Abeyta with neglect of a dependent person, a class “C” felony; financial exploitation of an older individual, a class “D” felony; dependent adult abuse by financial exploitation, a class “D” felony; and murder in the second degree, a class “B” felony. 3 In a plea agreement with the State, Becker Abeyta entered Alford pleas1 to two class “D” felonies: financial exploitation of a dependent adult and involuntary manslaughter. She pleaded guilty as a habitual offender. The district court sentenced Becker Abeyta to fifteen years in prison for each conviction. Both cases carried a mandatory minimum of three years. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total term not to exceed thirty years and with a mandatory minimum of six years. II. Scope and Standard of Review We review sentences for correction of errors at law. State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022). “We will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). III. Analysis Becker Abeyta asserts the district court abused its direction by (1) not considering “all appropriate factors” in deciding her involuntary manslaughter sentence; (2) only discussing her involuntary manslaughter conviction and not her conviction for financial exploitation when choosing a prison sentence; (3) not providing an adequate explanation when it imposed consecutive sentences. 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (permitting a defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt by acknowledging strong evidence of guilt and “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent[ing] to the imposition of a prison sentence” based on that evidence). 4 A. Consideration of Relevant Sentencing Factors Courts “should weigh and consider all pertinent matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant’s age, character and propensities and chances of his reform.” State v. Cupples, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 1967). Becker Abeyta argues that “the record as a whole indicates the court based its sentencing decision primarily—if not entirely—on the nature and circumstances of the offense, and this determination was made before the hearing took place.” We disagree. The record shows that the court based its decision on more than just the nature and circumstances of the offense. The court noted Becker Abeyta’s “lengthy and extensive” criminal history. The court then said: “your age would suggest that recidivism was not an issue, but this stuff occurred at an age where it shouldn’t occur in the first place, where you should know better.” Becker Abeyta contends the court did not consider her mental health and medical concerns. But the court did weigh those factors. The court asked defense counsel if Becker Abeyta had a mental-health diagnosis. Defense counsel stated that she “does have a prior medical diagnosis” and spoke about the medications she had been taking while incarcerated. But when asked about a diagnosis for conditions other than depression and anxiety, defense counsel said, “[T]here isn’t a clear diagnosis.” The court also asked about Becker Abeyta’s other health concerns, inquiring whether she had a diagnosis for “early onset dementia.” Defense counsel said her client did not have a diagnosis from a neurologist or primary care physician. But counsel said the uncertainty was “just another reason . . . why I would ask to allow Ms. Becker Abeyta probation, but with [the] condition that she follow up on 5 getting appropriate diagnoses and following any treatment.” So, the record shows the court considered Becker Abeyta’s medical conditions to the best of its ability with information available to it. Becker Abeyta argues the court’s discussion about her desire to be evaluated for dementia shows “its sentencing decision was already made.” The relevant portion of the record reads: Here is what my problem is with that, if I was inclined to sentence her to a term of incarceration, but if she had some, you know, Alzheimer’s or some other form of dementia, well, maybe I’ve got a good excuse here or reason for some of this neglect, but if I just go out on a wing and a prayer and it comes back and says, well, yeah, there is no diagnosis, then my original thoughts on sentencing—I’m not saying that’s what I’m going to do, I’m just saying, I can’t turn around and go, you know what, now that we don’t have a diagnosis, come on back in here, it is time to be resentenced. The State reads that passage as the court “explaining to Abeyta’s attorney the difficulty in trying to consider such a factor without an actual diagnosis.” We agree with that interpretation. The court did not reveal a predetermined sentence. Rather, it was trying to ensure that it had accurate information before making its sentencing decision. Reading the entire record, we find the court considered all appropriate factors in sentencing Becker Abeyta for involuntary manslaughter. B. Reasons for Imposing a Prison Sentence Becker Abeyta next argues the court did not adequately state its reason for sentencing her to prison for financial exploitation. While we agree the court could have been more precise about addressing the financial exploitation conviction during the hearing, we disagree that the court did not adequately state its basis for the sentence imposed. 6 Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2)(g) provides: “The court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” This rule “ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal actions” and it “affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing court.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014). The court complied with this rule by applying common reasons for imposing a prison sentence for both offenses. As the State asserts, Becker Abeyta’s “acts of financial exploitation stemmed from her role as R.C.’s caregiver. Abeyta took R.C.’s money, but then neglected his care, and this neglect resulted in his death.” Because her crimes were closely related, the sentencing court reasonably considered them together. The court’s combined discussion does not prevent Becker Abeyta from understanding the consequences of her actions, nor does it prevent us from reviewing the court’s exercise of discretion. C. Reasons for Consecutive Sentences Becker Abeyta also asserts the district court did not provide adequate explanation for the consecutive sentences. Both at the sentencing hearing and in the written sentencing order, the district court said it was running the sentences consecutively based upon “the separate and serious nature of the offenses.”2 2 Becker Abeyta notes that the district court also checked a box on the written sentencing order stating that it ordered consecutive sentences to give the defendant the maximum incentive to comply with probation. As the State contends, that check appears to be a scrivener’s error, because the court did not order probation. And when a 7 Becker Abeyta contends that this “one-size-fits-all form” language did not qualify as “a thoughtful reason” to “justify consecutive sentences.” But the court’s reference to the serious nature of her separate offenses was minimally adequate to satisfy rule 2.23(2)(g). See State v. Ganaway, No. 17- 0975, 2018 WL 2246847, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (finding no abuse of discretion when sentencing order cited “the separate and serious nature of the offenses” as the reason for consecutive terms). The State asked the court to impose consecutive sentences because Becker Abeyta “was R.C.’s caretaker, and [he] wasn’t getting taken care of, to the point that it caused his death, and at the same time, she was spending his money.” The court accepted the State’s recommendation, noting that the neglect “went on for a long, long time” and “the facts and circumstances surrounding this offense are nothing short of horrific.” We recognize that the sentencing court could have given a more pinpointed explanation for the consecutive sentences. See State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa 2016) (encouraging sentencing courts to “give more detailed reasons for a sentence specific to the individual defendant and crimes”). But we find the reason given allows us to review the exercise of discretion, and we cannot say the reasons demonstrate an abuse of the court’s discretion. AFFIRMED. discrepancy arises between the oral pronouncement and the written order, the oral pronouncement controls. See State v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1995). 8