Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1550 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Washington County, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Terry Lee Yoder Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, The Honorable Crystal S. Cronk, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Nathan M. Peterson of Keegan, Tindal, & Jaeger, PLC, Iowa City, attorney for appellant. Nathan Repp, Washington County Attorney, and Shane McChurch, Assistant Washington County Attorney, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. Terry Yoder appeals the district court finding that two of his dogs, which were kept as a part of his commercial breeding facility, were “threatened” under Iowa Code chapter 717B (2025), asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support they were neglected. Yoder also argues that the district court erred in failing to apply the commercial-establishment provision under section 717B.3(2)(a). Upon our review, we affirm. I. Background Facts & Proceedings After a concerned citizen provided a tip to the Washington County Sheriff’s Office about alleged neglectful conditions at Yoder’s dog breeding facility, law enforcement executed a search warrant at the facility. After investigating the facility, deputies seized and maintained custody of forty- nine living dogs and seventeen deceased dogs. Law enforcement observed several concerning problems on the property including: (1) dog kennels covered in feces and urine and the property smelling of such throughout; (2) many of the dogs had feces in their coats and were missing fur; (3) water bowls were either empty, had murky water and debris floating within, or had frozen surfaces from the cold weather; (4) the food bowls were empty; (5) there was a lack of bedding in the kennels, which manifested in wounds and sores on the dogs; (6) docked tails on the dogs with open wounds at the site of docking; (7) several medications that were expired and covered in dirt and feces; and (8) seventeen deceased bodies of dogs, some with limbs or heads missing. After seizing the dogs, Dr. Millie Cates, a licensed veterinarian, examined seventeen living dogs. Six of them were found to be underweight or thin. All seventeen dogs tested positive for roundworms. Dr. Cates 2 observed scars and scabbing showing that tail wounds were not surgically closed, showing several dogs had undergone improper tail-docking. Washington County filed a petition with the district court contending that the dogs were threatened and requesting disposition under chapter 717B. Before the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated that all but two of the dogs, Rena and Ruby, were threatened under section 717B.1(16). After the hearing and supplemental briefing by the parties, the district court found Rena and Ruby were threatened under section 717B.1(16) and neglected under section 717B.3. Ownership of the dogs was transferred to the County for disposition. The district court imposed dispositional costs to Yoder in the amount of $3,300. Yoder filed a motion to enlarge, requesting findings concerning application of section 717B.3(2) because Yoder was running a commercial establishment. The district court found that, as a commercial establishment, Yoder still did not meet the standard of care as described in section 162.10A(1)(a). Yoder now appeals. II. Analysis We review cases in equity de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. We afford deference to the district court’s witness credibility and fact-finding determinations, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Yoder asserts the County did not provide sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that the dogs were threatened under section 717B.1(16). Because Yoder stipulated to all but two of the animals being threatened, we consider his sufficiency argument to apply only as to Rena and Ruby. 3 An animal is considered “threatened” if it is “abused as provided in section 717B.2, neglected as provided in section 717B.3, or tortured as provided in section 717B.3A.” Iowa Code § 717B.1(16). “A person commits animal abuse when the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acts to inflict injury, serious injury, or death on an animal by force, violence, or poisoning.” Id. § 717B.2(1). Animal torture occurs “if [a] person intentionally or knowingly inflicts on an animal severe and prolonged or repeated physical pain that causes the animal’s serious injury or death.” Id. § 717B.3A. Neglect of an animal occurs when a person who has custody of an animal fails to provide for any of several “conditions for the animals welfare” including access to a reasonably sufficient amount of food, potable water, “[s]anitary conditions free from excessive animal waste,” ventilated shelter, adequate grooming, and veterinary care, resulting in endangerment to the animal’s health or life. Id. § 717B.3(1)(a)–(f ). Yoder challenges each finding of the district court—that there was a lack of sufficient food, potable water, unsanitary conditions, inadequate shelter, and deficient veterinary care. Yoder argues that there was approximately one-hundred pounds of dog food on the property and his employee was preparing to feed the dogs when the warrant was executed. He also points out that no testimony indicated that Ruby and Rena were dehydrated nor was the water present unsafe to drink—the testimony merely showed the water was partially frozen, dirty, or murky. Concerning the unsanitary conditions, Yoder asserts that waste removal was ongoing, and that “no witness quantified what constitutes ʻexcessive waste’ under the statute” or how the conditions endangered the 4 animals’ health or lives. For the claim of inadequate shelter, Yoder argues that each uncovered, outdoor kennel had a “doggy door” leading to indoor shelter, and that a month before the search and seizure, an inspector determined the shelter satisfied applicable standards. Finally, Yoder argues, as per testimony from his veterinarian, Dr. Paul Klopfenstein, that he provided adequate and routine veterinary care, that roundworms are common and do not distress adult dogs, and the pressure sores and improper tail docking did not rise to endangerment. Iowa Code section 717B.3 states that a person commits animal neglect when they “fail to provide the animal with any of the following conditions for the animal’s welfare.” (Emphasis added). Yoder may have persuasive arguments related to some of section 717B.3 requirements, notably the amount of food, as Dr. Cates testified Rena and Ruby were not thin on intake. But the evidence shows the facilities, including the kennels, were covered in feces. Dr. Cates testified that every dog removed, including Ruby and Rena, tested positive for parasitic roundworms, which is primarily caused by ingestion of feces. Further, Dr. Cates testified that Rena suffered from pressure sores attributable to laying on hard concrete or metal bars, indicating inadequate shelter. And Ruby had scabbing on her tail dock, indicating improper veterinary practice. We agree with the district court that the evidence was sufficient to find Yoder neglected the dogs in his care, including Ruby and Rena, and affirm on this issue. Yoder next asserts that the district court erred by not applying the commercial establishment exception under section 717B.3(2), arguing the county failed to prove Yoder did not meet standard-of-care requirements under section 162.10A(1)(a). Section 717B.3(2) states in its relevant portion: 5 2. This section does not apply to any of the following: a. A person issued or renewed an authorization to operate a commercial establishment, or a person acting under the direction or supervision of that person if all of the following apply: (1) The animal, as described in subsection 1, was maintained as part of the commercial establishment’s operation. (2) In providing conditions for the welfare of the animal, as described in subsection 1, the person complied with the standard of care requirements provided in section 162.10A, subsection 1 . . . . The standard of care under section 162.10A requires that a commercial establishment provide “[a]dequate feed, adequate water, housing facilities, sanitary control, or grooming practices,” and veterinary care if failing to do so causes poor health or suffering. Id. § 162.10A(1)(a)(1)–(2). It is undisputed that Yoder was issued a license to operate a commercial establishment, did so, and the dogs were “maintained as part of the establishment’s operation.” Id. at § 717B.3(2)(a)(1). The district court, in ruling on Yoder’s motion to enlarge, found “[t]he conditions in which the animals were found . . . were not shown to meet the standard of care requirements set forth in Iowa Code section 16[2].10A(1)(a). Specifically, the animals did not have adequate feed, adequate water, housing facilities or sanitary control.” We agree.1 As noted above, the dogs in Yoder’s care suffered from unsanitary conditions, lack of adequate veterinary care, and inadequate shelter. See id. § 162.10A(1)(a)(1)–(2). Yoder’s argument that the commercial- establishment exception under section 717B.3(2) shields him from a finding 1 Again, because Yoder stipulated to the finding that all the dogs were threatened except for Ruby and Rena, and also stipulated to the other dogs’ dispositions, we conclude Yoder raises his second issue as to only Ruby and Rena. 6 of neglect is not supported by the record. The district court heard the evidence, made appropriate witness credibility determinations, and by applying statutory factors, found the dogs were neglected. See Myers v. Smith, 208 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Iowa 1973) (reiterating in equity cases, “[w]e give weight to trial court’s findings, but are not bound by them,” and “[i]f the judgment in an equity case is correct, it is our duty to affirm it although the reasons given by trial court may not meet with our approval”). We accordingly affirm on this issue. Lastly, Yoder argues that section 717B.3(2), as applied to commercial establishments, precludes civil seizure unless there is a “showing of abuse or torture as defined in sections 717B.2 and 717B.3A.” Because this assertion was offered for the first time on appeal, and because Yoder cited no authority in support of the claim, we do not address it. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). III. Conclusion For the reasons above, we affirm the findings and judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED. 7