Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 24-1367 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Tanner Doial Wickam, Applicant–Appellant, v. State of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Coleman McAllister, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Alexander Smith of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 1 AHLERS, Judge. This is an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of Tanner Wickam’s second postconviction-relief (PCR) application. In the underlying criminal case, Wickam pleaded guilty to willful injury (a class “C” felony) and agreed to be sent to prison for a term not to exceed ten years. In doing so, Wickam stated under oath that no one had made any threats to get him to plead guilty. In return for Wickam’s guilty plea, the State dismissed other charges that carried up to twenty-two and one-half years of additional incarceration. In his first PCR action, Wickam claimed his guilty plea was not voluntary because he only entered the guilty plea after the father of one of the victims threatened to sexually abuse Wickam’s mother and kill his brother if Wickam did not go to prison. At the first PCR trial, Wickam presented evidence in the form of an affidavit from the victim’s father in which the father denied making any threats. The district court concluded that Wickam’s assertions were not credible, and the father’s affidavit was corroborated by a police report and the fact that Wickam did not inform his attorney or the judge who took his guilty plea of the alleged threats. The court dismissed the first PCR action accordingly, and our court affirmed on appeal. Wickam v. State, No. 22-0220, 2023 WL 2152620, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2023). While his first PCR case was on appeal, Wickam filed this second PCR action. In his second application for PCR, Wickam contends his first PCR counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) failing to present evidence of a recording of a 911 call made during the interaction in which Wickam contends the victim’s father threatened him; and (2) presenting the victim’s father’s version of events via an affidavit rather than calling him as a witness. In 2 support of his claims, Wickam presented the recording of the 911 call and deposition testimony of the victim’s father. In other words, he presented the evidence at his second PCR trial that he contends his first PCR counsel should have presented at the first PCR trial. He contends this evidence established that his first PCR counsel was ineffective and had he not been ineffective, Wickam would have prevailed in the first PCR action and his guilty plea would have been set aside. Following the second PCR trial, the district court analyzed the evidence, including the recording of the 911 call and the deposition testimony of the victim’s father, and found “[t]hey contain no smoking gun.” It noted that the recording revealed no threats and the victim’s father continued to deny making the threats Wickam claimed he made. The court denied Wickam’s second PCR application, and Wickam appeals. While we generally review PCR appeals for corrections of errors at law, when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is made, we review de novo. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). A PCR applicant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that (1) counsel breached a duty and (2) prejudiced resulted. Id. at 866. The district court provided a thorough written analysis detailing why it found that Wickam failed to meet his burden to prove that his first PCR counsel breached an essential duty or that Wickam was prejudiced as a result. Following our de novo review, we agree with the district court’s analysis, reasoning, and conclusions. We also conclude that a full opinion would not augment or clarify existing case law, so we affirm by memorandum opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(d), (e). AFFIRMED. 3