Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1715 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Matter of the Estate of Thomas L. Weinman, Deceased. and In the Matter of the Estate of Diann L. Weinman, Deceased. Summer Stewart, Alicia Hill, Cinnamon Weigel and Ashley Burris, Appellants. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Katie Ranes, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Elissa M. Hodges and Kevin J. Schulting of Hodges Law, PLC, Ankeny, and Bradley M. Strouse and Luke M. Zahari of Redfern, Mason, Larsen & Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, attorneys for appellants. Jennifer Lindberg and Abigail Hillers of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross & Baskerville, P.L.C, Des Moines, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Langholz, J., and Vogel, S.J. Opinion by Vogel, S.J. 1 VOGEL, Senior Judge. Intervenors in the estates of Thomas Weinman and Diann Weinman appeal the probate court’s order denying their petition to remove the executor, contending that the court failed to comply with the statutory procedure for removal under Iowa Code section 633.65 (2025). Because the Intervenors failed to specifically allege how the executor had mismanaged the estates or failed to perform a lawful duty, the court’s denial of the Intervenors’ petition to remove the executor without hearing was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Thomas Weinman and Diann Weinman, a married couple with no children, executed separate wills in May 2010. Thomas died in January 2025, survived by Diann, who died a few weeks later. Thomas’s will provided that the residue of his estate would be distributed to Diann if she survived him. Because Thomas predeceased her, the residue of his estate would be distributed according to the terms of Diann’s will. Her will provided that the residue of her estate would be distributed to a family trust. The residual beneficiaries of the family trust named in Diann’s will were six charitable organizations. Shortly after Diann’s death, the probate court appointed Arnold D. Brown Jr., a friend of Thomas and Diann, as the executor of both of their estates. 1 On March 12, four of the couple’s nieces and grandnieces— Summer Stewart, Alicia Hill, Cinnamon Weigel, and Ashley Burris (“the 1 Thomas’s will nominated Diann as the executor and Brown as the successor executor of his estate. Diann’s will nominated Thomas as the executor and another friend who predeceased the couple as the successor executor of her estate. 2 Intervenors”)—filed a motion to intervene in the estates, which the probate court granted. On April 22, the Intervenors filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to determine “heirship and the distributions of assets.” They also requested that the assets of the estates be preserved and that the court order mediation between the Intervenors and the named beneficiaries. On May 12, the court granted the petition, ordering the requested mediation and freezing the estates’ assets. Although mediation was scheduled, not all of the charitable beneficiaries attended. Mediation was at a standstill. On June 27, the Intervenors filed a petition to remove the executor. In their removal petition, the Intervenors alleged that Brown “is objectively unqualified to act as Executor and has clearly mismanaged the Estates,” and that Brown and the estates’ attorneys “have failed to provide sufficient notice to interested parties and have failed to mediate in good faith in violation of” the probate court’s orders. Brown filed an answer responding to these allegations and stating that the estates’ assets had been frozen pursuant to the court’s order and no distributions had been made. Three of the charitable beneficiaries named in Diann’s will also resisted the Intervenors’ petition to remove Brown as the executor. Others did not file any response. In an August 2025 order on pending motions, the probate court denied the Intervenors’ petition to remove the executor without hearing. The Intervenors filed a motion to reconsider, enlarge, and amend that ruling under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), which the court also denied. The Intervenors appeal. II. Standard of Review. “Actions for the removal of a fiduciary are triable as actions in equity,” and we review such actions de novo. In re Est. of Lovell, 344 N.W.2d 576, 577 3 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); see Iowa Code § 633.33; Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. Even so, the “district court is allowed to exercise a large discretion in determining whether to remove an executor.” In re Est. of Rutter, 633 N.W.2d 740, 749 (Iowa 2001) (cleaned up). “Accordingly, we will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion unless it has been abused.” Id. III. Analysis. The grounds for removing an executor are set forth by statute. Iowa Code section 633.65 provides: “When any fiduciary is, or becomes, disqualified under sections 633.63 and 633.64, has mismanaged the estate, failed to perform any duty imposed by law, or by any lawful order of court, or ceases to be a resident of the state, then the court may remove the fiduciary.” The procedure for such a removal is also set forth by statute: “The court may upon its own motion, and shall upon the filing of a verified petition by any person interested in the estate, . . . order the fiduciary to appear and show cause why the fiduciary should not be removed. Any such petition shall specify the grounds of complaint.” Iowa Code § 633.65. “To secure statutory removal the procedure must be followed.” In re Est. of Heller, 401 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). “The burden to prove conduct sufficient for removal of the executor is upon the person seeking removal.” Rutter, 633 N.W.2d at 749. The Intervenors argue that the probate court failed to comply with the procedure under section 633.65 by denying their petition to remove the executor without first holding a hearing on the matter. They contend that the “plain language” of the statute “affords the district court no discretion to decide whether to set a hearing on a petition to remove.” See Iowa Code § 633.65 (“The court . . . shall upon the filing of a verified petition by any person interested in the estate, . . . order the fiduciary to appear and show 4 cause why the fiduciary should not be removed.” (emphasis added)); id. § 4.1(30)(a) (“The word ‘shall’ imposes a duty.”). They insist that they “satisfied all three statutory elements” entitling them to a hearing because “(1) Alicia Hill is an interested person who (2) filed a verified petition that (3) sought removal of the Executor of the Estates.” The Intervenors therefore request that we reverse the probate court’s ruling denying their petition “and remand for a hearing consistent with section 633.65.” The trouble with the Intervenors’ reading of the statute is that it ignores the additional requirement—in the next sentence—that “[a]ny such petition shall specify the grounds of complaint.” See Iowa Code § 633.65 (providing grounds for removal “[w]hen any fiduciary . . . has mismanaged the estate, failed to perform any duty imposed by law, or by any lawful order of court, or ceases to be a resident of the state” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the petition must not only be filed and verified by a person interested in the estate, but it must also make a threshold showing that there are sufficient grounds for removal before a hearing on the petition is required. See Lovell, 344 N.W.2d at 577–78 (finding that a “hearing on the petition . . . was warranted” where the petition “specif[ied] alleged grounds of mismanagement by the executor” in handling estate and inheritance taxes); see also In re Est. of Arduser, 283 N.W. 879, 880–81 (Iowa 1939) (finding that the “allegations of the application for removal,” including specific allegations that the executor allowed mishandling of the insolvent estate’s assets, “were sufficient to warrant at least a hearing upon said application”). Here, as grounds for removal, the Intervenors alleged that Brown “is objectively unqualified to act as Executor and has clearly mismanaged the Estates,” and that Brown and the estates’ attorneys “have failed to provide sufficient notice to interested parties and have failed to mediate in good faith 5 in violation of” the probate court’s orders. But beyond these blanket assertions, the petition contained no specific allegations that the executor mishandled the estates’ assets, engaged in self-dealing, or committed other misconduct that could warrant removal. See Iowa Code § 633.65 (setting forth statutory grounds for removal); In re Est. of Kemp, No. 13-0747, 2014 WL 1714471, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014) (explaining that a “conflict of interest or evidence that the fiduciary is using his or her position for personal advantage may also serve as grounds of removal” and concluding that removal was warranted where the executor “materially mismanaged the estate and engaged in self-dealing” (citations omitted)). For each assertion made by the Intervenors, Brown provided the probate court with specific denials and detailed explanations of the probate proceedings to date. This included affirming the court’s earlier action of freezing all assets and noting no distributions had been made. Moreover, as Brown points out on appeal, “[s]everal of the allegations made against the Executor related to behavior of the charitable beneficiaries, whose behavior the Executor does not control or direct.” Only the court could order the beneficiaries to participate in mediation, and the court did so. It was some of the beneficiaries’ failure to attend the scheduled mediation, not the executor’s. Therefore, the court found that “[d]espite the alleged ‘deficiencies’ of the first attempted mediation, . . . a reasonable attempt to comply with the Court’s prior order for mediation was made.” On this record, and with the declaratory judgment action still pending, the probate court acted within its broad discretion by reviewing the Intervenors’ allegations against Brown together with Brown’s responses and determining that the removal petition was facially insufficient to warrant a hearing for Brown to “show cause why [he] should not be removed” as the 6 executor. Iowa Code § 633.65; see Rutter, 633 N.W.2d at 749. Had the court instead granted the petition and removed Brown without a show-cause hearing, that would have been an abuse of discretion. See Heller, 401 N.W.2d at 609 (“The court may not remove an administrator on grounds that the interest[s] of the estate require it, without complying with statutory procedure.”); see also Lovell, 344 N.W.2d at 577–79 (discussing due process rights of fiduciaries in removal proceedings); In re Est. of Mann, 225 N.W. 261, 263 (Iowa 1929) (holding a probate court cannot summarily remove an executor during a hearing on other estate-administration matters). But that is not what happened here. Without sufficient allegations that the executor “mismanaged the estate, failed to perform any duty imposed by law, or by any lawful order of court,” as required by Iowa Code section 633.65, and with no distributions having been made and all assets frozen, we conclude that the probate court’s denial of the Intervenors’ petition to remove the executor without hearing was not an abuse of discretion. IV. Conclusion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the probate court’s order denying the Intervenors’ petition to remove the executor. AFFIRMED. Greer, P.J., concurs; Langholz, J., dissents. 7 LANGHOLZ, Judge (dissenting). Like the majority, I see little evidence currently in the record suggesting that the district court should remove the executor. So if the court had held a hearing before denying the intervenors’ petition to remove the executor on a similar evidentiary record, I would have no trouble affirming that decision. But the court did not hold a hearing on the petition. And the verified petition’s allegations state grounds that, if true, could support removal. So following the text of the statute and the governing cases, I would reverse the district court and remand for it to hold the required hearing. Removal of an executor or other fiduciary under the Iowa Probate Code is governed by Iowa Code section 633.65 (2025).2 That statute grants the district court discretionary authority to remove the fiduciary for an enumerated list of grounds. See Iowa Code § 633.65. It also gives the court discretion to initiate removal “upon its own motion.” Id. And it gives the court one mandate: “The court . . . shall upon the filing of a verified petition by any person interested in the estate, . . . order the fiduciary to appear and show cause why the fiduciary should not be removed.” Id. 2 This statute has a pedigree going back to Iowa’s first code, in which it simply said: “The court for good cause may remove an executor.” Iowa Code § 1306 (1851). The essential structure of the statute—enumerated grounds for removal, a required verified petition, and a mandatory order for the executor to appear—goes back to at least 1873. See Iowa Code §§ 2496–2503 (1873). And the current text of the statute—applying uniformly to all fiduciaries for the first time—was enacted with the rest of the Iowa Probate Code in 1963. See 1963 Iowa Acts ch. 326, § 65. The only changes since were technical edits by the code editor in 1985 to replace three masculine pronouns. See 1982 Iowa Acts ch. 1217, § 1 (directing the code editor to “edit the Code in order that words which designate one gender will be changed to reflect both genders when the provisions of law apply to persons of both genders”). Contrast Iowa Code § 633.65 (1983), with Iowa Code § 633.65 (1985). 8 While the statute does not use the word “hearing,” our supreme court has interpreted it to require one “upon the filing of a verified petition.” Id.; see In re Est. of Donlon, 206 N.W. 674, 679 (Iowa 1926) (agreeing that it “is, no doubt, true” that the “statute contemplates a hearing upon a petition” and that “the court should hear evidence in such proceedings” while still holding that the court was not deprived of jurisdiction to remove the executor when it held a hearing without taking testimony, but other evidence was before the court and the executor chose not to attend the hearing); In re Est. of Bagnola, 154 N.W. 461, 463–64 (Iowa 1915) (holding that “removal should not have been ordered upon” a hearing where “no witnesses were sworn, or other testimony adduced under sanction of an oath” and “the petition to remove was treated as being of some evidentiary value” and “there was discussion by the court and counsel, and statements by counsel, which the court treated as a species of professional statement” because “[r]emoval requires cause shown after due hearing” but declining to vacate the order since “a reversal could effect nothing except to settle who shall pay costs”(cleaned up)). This is because “[t]he petition itself is not evidence,” but rather “in the nature of a pleading merely.” Bagnola, 154 N.W. at 463. It also follows from the statute’s text—the mandatory order for “the fiduciary to appear and show cause why the fiduciary should not be removed” necessarily implies that the fiduciary must then appear before the court at an evidentiary hearing where the fiduciary can show by testimony or other evidence that removal is inappropriate. Iowa Code § 633.65. The hearing is not just for the benefit of the fiduciary as the executor contends. After all, it is the petitioners’ burden to prove grounds for removal. See In re Est. of Smith, 271 N.W. 888, 890–91 (Iowa 1937). And since the petition is a pleading—not evidence, see Bagnola, 154 N.W. at 463—the petitioners have not yet had a chance to meet their burden by only filing mere 9 allegations. So just as a fiduciary has a due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before being removed, see In re Est. of Lovell, 344 N.W.2d 576, 577–78 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983), persons “interested in the estate” have a right to be heard on a facially valid claim that a fiduciary should be removed. Iowa Code § 633.65; cf. In re Est. of Adams, 599 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Iowa 1999) (reversing district court order that summarily resolved a different probate dispute without first holding a hearing as a violation of procedural due process, reasoning that “[d]ue process has two fundamental requirements: notice and opportunity to be heard”). Don’t forget too that the interests of those petitioning for removal will not always be merely financial—this statute applies not just to the fiduciaries of estates but also to all guardians for adults, conservators, and trustees of certain trusts. See Iowa Code § 633.3(19) (defining “fiduciary”); id. § 633.10(3)(b) (excluding minor guardianships under Iowa Code chapter 232D). And so, the supreme court reversed a district court’s dismissal of a removal petition without first giving the petitioner “an opportunity to be heard thereon,” when the petition’s allegations stated potential grounds for removal under the statute. See In re Est. of Arduser, 283 N.W. 879, 880–81 (Iowa 1939). After highlighting the “wide discretion” that the court would have in making the ultimate removal decision and some specific limitations that might apply to preclude removal under the petitioner’s asserted grounds, the court emphasized: “When the evidence has been introduced, it may be that all the complaints will be satisfactorily explained, so that the court, in its discretion, will be fully warranted in overruling” the petition. Id. at 881. But even so, the court held “that the allegations therein contained are sufficient to compel the trial court to afford [the petitioner] an opportunity to be heard.” Id.; see also id. (“The allegations of the application for removal as amended, above reviewed, were sufficient to warrant at least a 10 hearing upon said application.”). 3 And without giving the district court’s ruling any deference, the supreme court thus held that it was “erroneous” and reversed. Arduser, 283 N.W. at 881. While the fiduciary in Arduser asked the court to dismiss the petition without a hearing,4 I see no reason that the same rule would not govern here, where the district court decided on its own—despite both the petitioners and the executor asking for a hearing—to deny the petition without taking evidence at a hearing. Either way, a verified petition is being dismissed without the petitioners having an opportunity to present evidence at a hearing. So just as in Arduser, we must consider the entire petition, accepting all the allegations as true, and decide whether those allegations state potential statutory grounds for removal. See Arduser, 283 N.W. at 880–81. The nine-page, fifty-three-paragraph verified removal petition is not always easy to follow. But we need not parse every allegation against all the statutory grounds for removal because one of those grounds is “fail[ing] to perform any duty imposed . . . by any lawful order of court.” Iowa Code § 633.65. And the petition alleges that the executor should be removed under this ground because he “explicitly failed to perform the duties imposed on 3 Our court’s decision in Lovell might be read to hold, relying partially on Arduser, that because a petition for removal of a fiduciary is “not the commencement of a suit on a separate cause of action,” it is “not subject to a motion to dismiss” at all. Lovell, 344 N.W.2d at 578. But I see nothing in Arduser suggesting that dismissal would not be proper for a petition that fails to allege any proper statutory ground. See Arduser, 283 N.W. at 880–81. Ultimately, it is unnecessary to resolve that issue here because this petition does allege a proper statutory ground for removal. 4 Technically, the fiduciary filed a “demurrer,” the equivalent procedure at the time to a present-day motion to dismiss. See Arduser, 283 N.W. at 880; Bales v. Iowa State Hwy. Comm’n, 86 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1957) (“Under our procedure a motion to dismiss serves the function of a demurrer.”). 11 him pursuant to the May 12th Order” of the court. The petition specifies two ways in which he failed to perform his duties under the order. First, it alleges that he “fail[ed] to comply with the May 12th Order relative to . . . the preservation of the Decedents’ assets.” 5 Specifically, it alleges that “in its May 12th Order, the Court directed [the executor] and the attorneys for the Estate to preserve the assets of the Decedents’ by depositing any funds already distributed into the client trust account for the Estates’ attorneys.” It also alleges “[u]pon information and belief, no assets were deposited to said client trust account.” And it alleges “the attorneys for the Estate have failed to respond to questions regarding what action, if any, the Executor has taken with respect to the Order.” Second, the petition alleges that the executor “fail[ed] to comply with the May 12th Order relative to the June Mediation.” 6 According to the petition, the “Executor failed to mediate in good faith” as required by the court order. The petition devotes five pages and twenty-five paragraphs of specific allegations detailing the facts supporting this allegation, but the petition summarizes those allegations as falling into five general categories: 5 As relevant on this point, that order required “that there shall be a preservation of the Decedents’ assets until a determination for the proper distribution of the Decedents’ assets has been made by further Order of the Court” and “that all assets of the Decedents already distributed shall be placed in the estate attorney’s IOLTA account pending further Order of the Court.” 6 As most relevant here, that order required the parties “to participate in mediation . . . on or before June 30, 2025,” ordered that “[t]he parties shall mediate in good faith,” and warned that “[f ]ailure to attend mediation may lead to sanctions” and that it might assess attorney or mediation fees “against the Estate; the personal representative, individually; or any beneficiary, individually; if this matter is not resolved by the parties.” 12 a. the failure to provide sufficient information and notice [of the mediation] to the parties; b. the initial delay and reluctance in scheduling mediation and coordinating the logistics thereof; c. the Executor’s failure to actually participate in mediation; d. interference by the Executor with the parties while mediation was held open in an attempt to negatively impact the outcome of the mediation and to protect the Executor’s personal interests; and, e. the lack of genuine intent on behalf of the Executor to settle. As an example of the more detailed factual allegations also included in the petition, on the executor’s alleged failure to participate in the mediation as required by the court order, the petition alleged: Upon information and belief, [the executor] was not personally present and did not participate for a majority of the June Mediation. At best, [the executor] was only personally present at the close of the June Mediation when the mediator had determined that all of the necessary parties were not in attendance and that all of the necessary parties lacked sufficient information to make informed decisions with respect to the issues set for mediation. The petition’s allegations state potential grounds for removal under the statute, so I would hold that they are “sufficient to warrant at least a hearing,” and reverse the court’s dismissal as legal error. Arduser, 283 N.W. at 881. In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority highlights that section 633.65 also expressly requires that any verified petition for removal “shall specify the grounds of complaint.” Iowa Code § 633.65. I am not convinced that this mandate requires much, if any, more than typical notice pleading—so that a fiduciary has fair notice of what conduct to be prepared to defend when heard by the court at the required hearing. But regardless, this petition goes well beyond “blanket assertions”—it specifically details 13 many allegations, including those I have highlighted here. To be sure, they may not be as egregious as some other grounds for removal. They may prove to be without any evidentiary support. Or the district court may decide to exercise its wide discretion to decide that removal is not warranted even though the proven facts could support one or more grounds for removal. But none of that permits the district court to deny the petition without a hearing. The majority also relies on the executor’s “denials and detailed explanations of the probate proceedings to date” in response to “each assertion made” in the petition, including the executor’s explanation that the “probate assets have been frozen, and no distributions have been made.” But these statements in his answer are not evidence any more than the verified petition.7 And when reviewing the denial of the petition without a hearing, we are constrained to considering only the petition and assuming that all its factual allegations are true. See Arduser, 283 N.W. at 880. For the same reason, we cannot give weight to the finding in the district court’s ruling deciding not to order further mediation—in the same order it denied the removal petition—that “[d]espite the alleged ‘deficiencies’ of the first attempted mediation, the Court finds that a reasonable attempt to comply with the Court’s prior order for mediation was made.” Whatever the propriety of treating the papers as evidence for ruling on that separate issue, the court could not do so in ruling on this removal petition. See Bagnola, 154 N.W. at 463. I understand the district court’s effort to manage this contentious case and the added strain that requiring a hearing may place on our limited judicial 7 Indeed, the executor’s answer arguably has even less claim to evidentiary value because unlike the verified petition—which was declared to be true under penalty of perjury by one of the intervenors—it was only signed by the executor’s attorneys. 14 resources—especially for Polk County probate proceedings, like this one. But we must follow the text of the statute and the binding supreme court precedent interpreting it. Plus, the legislature knows how to draft a fiduciary- removal statute that gives the court more discretion whether to hold a hearing—it did so in 2019 for the statute governing removal of guardians for minors. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 56, § 26 (codified at Iowa Code § 232D.502). That it did not do so here in section 633.65 for other fiduciaries—and indeed has essentially left this mandatory hearing structure in place for over 150 years—is all the more reason we should enforce the mandates of this statute as written. Compare Iowa Code § 633.65, with Iowa Code §§ 2496–2503 (1873); see also State v. Lind, 37 N.W.3d 23, 35–37 (Iowa 2026) (comparing textual differences between similar statutes, including the legislature’s recent amendment choices when interpreting a statute). What’s more, despite all these years for fiduciary-removal disputes to arise under the statute, I have found no case—and none has been cited to us—in which an appellate court affirmed a district court’s denial of a petition based on the petition’s failure to state grounds for removal without first holding a hearing.8 As best as I can tell, that’s because the only time such a ruling was appealed, the supreme court reversed. See Arduser, 283 N.W. at 880–81. Because I see no defect in the verified petition here that justifies this case becoming the first in which we affirm a district court’s dismissal without a hearing, I respectfully dissent. 8 The only case that comes even close is our unpublished opinion in In re Est. of Frye, No. 10-0778, 2011 WL 238424 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2011). There, the parties essentially filed dueling motions for summary judgment on a removal petition, the court granted the executor’s motion and dismissed the petition without reaching its merits, and we affirmed under the “unusual circumstances.” See id. at *2–4. But the petitioners were not arguing for an evidentiary hearing. Id. And no party here filed for summary judgment. 15