In the Interest of M.L.B., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0139 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of M.L.B., Minor Child, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Susan Cox, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Heidi Miller, Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney for appellant minor child. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. A juvenile appeals from a delinquency adjudication. He argues the district court committed an abuse of discretion in the rejection of his request for the entry of a consent decree. Upon our de novo review, we affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings In August of 2025, fourteen-year-old M.L.B. was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by law enforcement. His brother was driving the car. Detecting an odor of marijuana, the officers removed the occupants from the vehicle and an officer observed a firearm in M.L.B.’s pocket. Upon a search of his person, the officers recovered the firearm, which was loaded, a black face mask, two THC vapes, and a large amount of cash. That same month, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging M.L.B. had committed delinquent acts of carrying weapons as an ineligible person in violation of Iowa Code section 724.8B (2025) and inhalation in violation of sections 204.14A.1(c) and 204.14A.2. This was M.L.B.’s first involvement with juvenile court services. While M.L.B. was initially placed in detention, he was later released to a detention alternative program under certain conditions, including cooperation with the alternative program, random drug testing, house arrest, and a prohibition against the possession of illegal drugs. M.L.B. was also not permitted to be in the vicinity of weapons. In October, the State and M.L.B. reached a plea agreement wherein M.L.B. would enter an Alford admission to carrying weapons as an ineligible person, with count two of the delinquency petition to be dismissed. The parties jointly requested the court to withhold adjudication. The district 2 court accepted the plea after a factual basis was established, withheld adjudication, and scheduled a dispositional hearing for January 2026. But before the dispositional hearing, M.L.B.’s juvenile court officer requested M.L.B. be returned to detention due to probationary violations, including illegally driving a car, testing positive for THC on four occasions in a one-month period, and having access to a firearm in the family home.1 At the time of the dispositional hearing, M.L.B. remained in detention. Juvenile court services filed a predispositional report. While both the State and M.L.B. agreed with a consent decree being entered, the district court rejected that request, adjudicated M.L.B. delinquent, and ordered him into placement. M.L.B. appeals. II. Standard of Review We generally review court rulings in juvenile proceedings de novo. But the standard of review of the decision on whether a consent decree is granted is de novo “to the extent of examining all the evidence to determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion.” In re J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Iowa 1998). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court decision is based “on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” In re B.A., 737 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Iowa 2007). III. Analysis M.L.B.’s appeal is limited to a single issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to grant a consent decree? 1 M.L.B.’s brother was arrested on a warrant. When approaching the house, an officer saw M.L.B.’s brother holding an AK 47 rifle. M.L.B. was inside the home. 3  We begin with a generalized statement concerning these types of cases. Juvenile delinquency hearings are special proceedings that provide an alternative to the criminal prosecution of children where the best interest of the child is the objective. In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1996); In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Iowa 2013). The relevant statutory provision for our review is Iowa Code section 232.46. This section provides that at any time after the filing of a petition and prior to entry of an order of adjudication under section 232.47, the court may suspend the proceedings on motion of the county attorney or the child’s counsel, enter a consent decree, and continue the case under terms and conditions established by the court. Iowa Code § 232.46(1). A consent decree provides a way for juvenile “proceedings to be suspended short of an adjudication of delinquency.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 2013). It is “essentially a bipartite arrangement between the juvenile court and the allegedly delinquent child that is memorialized in a court order (hence the term ʻconsent decree’).” Id. A consent decree is often compared to the adult equivalent of a deferred judgment. We highlight the similarities between the two. Both involve a period of probation under which the juvenile or defendant must comply with certain terms and conditions for a specified period. See Iowa Code §§ 232.46(1)(a), 907.3(1). Under the statutory procedure for a consent decree, if the juvenile complies, the original petition may not be reinstated and the child “shall not be proceeded against in any court for a delinquent act alleged in the petition.” Id. § 232.46(5), (6). Pursuant to the deferred judgment procedures under section 907.3(1)(c), “[u]pon fulfillment of the conditions of probation . . . the defendant shall be discharged without entry of judgment.” With both a 4 deferred judgment and a consent decree, “if the individual fulfills the requisite terms and conditions, a judgment is not entered and there are no adverse ramifications to his or her criminal or juvenile record.” J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d at 735. And we note that the burden is on the juvenile to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the appropriateness of this diversionary option. Id. at 740; In re Matzen, 305 N.W.2d 479, 481–82 (Iowa 1981). On appeal, M.L.B. appears to place the weight of his abuse of discretion argument on two points: that the parties agreed that a consent decree should be granted, and that the evidence supported the entry of a consent decree. We address each argument in turn. A. Parties Agreement for Entry of Consent Decree We can dispose of the first point with little discussion. Our supreme court has determined section 232.46 “provides a juvenile judge with discretion to sustain or deny a motion to suspend the juvenile proceedings, for the purpose of entering a consent decree, up to the point in time when an order of adjudication of delinquency . . . is actually entered.” In re Rousselow, 341 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Iowa 1983); see also J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d at 740 (finding no abuse of discretion when granting the juvenile’s motion for a consent decree). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter a consent decree, despite the parties’ agreement to the same. B. Evidence Warranting the Entry of a Consent Decree M.L.B. argues that the district court erred in denying the entry of a consent decree given his young age, he was forthcoming about his use of 5 marijuana, he did not receive any new delinquency charges since the filing of the delinquency petition, a lack of offered services after the filing of the petition, and that the district court punished him for the presence of a firearm in the family home. In the oral ruling made from the bench following the dispositional hearing, the court expressed concern for the juvenile’s safety, adjudicated M.L.B. delinquent, and ordered him into placement from detention, stating in part: This is occurring first because of the nature of the underlying offense; that you had a loaded Glock in your front pocket that was recovered by law enforcement. That is extremely dangerous to you and to the community. Second, you have provided inconsistent statements about how the gun was provided to you. Initially, and this is contained within the predisposition report, you told the juvenile court officer that the gun was not yours; later, you said you obtained it from a friend for one thousand dollars, that you didn’t obtain the firearm for any specific reason but that you thought that the firearm was cool and you liked it. So there’s inconsistent information and really not taking accountability regarding the potential lethality of the offense. Third, this is not the first concerning actions regarding a firearm. The predispositional report notes that you previously received an out-of- school suspension because you had an app on your phone that had an image of a gun and you were pointing it at other people during passing at school and that you had . . . an out-of-school suspension November 1st, 2022. That is extremely concerning regarding public safety and your subsequent delinquent act. [Fourth], there has been a repeated pattern of willfully violating court orders in the IMPACT release program. They have included using drugs, admittedly using drugs; failing to participate in your required schooling, which was pretty basic, requiring you to log in and attend your virtual school, that you did not do that; that not only with your poor attendance you are not completing work, not attending a GOAT club on 6  Wednesdays, and also [the virtual public school] advised your juvenile court officer on October 1st, 2025, that you were not attending the weekly check-in with her on Tuesdays. Also[,] IMPACT noted that on September 30th of [2025] you violated their conditions by sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle, that you admitted to driving the vehicle. You’re 14 years old and don’t have a valid driver’s license, so that again shows a pattern of being unable or unwilling to comply with court directives, the IMPACT program, and ongoing delinquency; that your violation of the IMPACT program and subsequent detention were based on ongoing delinquency concerns, repeated failures to comply with basic court expectations and safety requirements, including admittedly consuming marijuana after the initial charge and release on IMPACT services. These factors are extremely concerning to the court . . . . I want to reinforce that you are not being punished for your brothers’ history or criminality. This is based on public safety and the opportunities that have previously been provided to you for services that were not followed through on, even in a basic matter. You are worthy of being safe; so are others that are around you. On our review of the record, given the seriousness of the offense and the lack of follow through with terms of the court and juvenile court services, we conclude the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion. We, like the district court, conclude that M.L.B. did not meet his burden to establish good cause for the entry of a consent decree. AFFIRMED. 7