State of Iowa v. Zachary Scott Vulich
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledOctober 7, 2026
Docket25-0670
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0670
Filed October 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Zachary Scott Vulich,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County,
The Honorable Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell,
attorney for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.
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BADDING, Judge.
“[E]ven a registered sex offender is allowed to have friends.” That was
Zachary Vulich’s defense at his jury trial on four counts of failing to comply
with the sex offender registry and one count of child endangerment for
knowingly having control of or unsupervised access to a minor. The State
alleged that Vulich violated the registry requirements by, among other things,
residing with his girlfriend at an unregistered address that was within 2,000
feet of two child care facilities. Vulich argued that he was just a visitor at his
girlfriend’s home, where her fifteen-year-old son also lived.
The jury found Vulich guilty as charged. Vulich appeals, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of the convictions. Upon
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, see State v.
Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022), we find sufficient evidence to
affirm the convictions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
As a convicted sex offender for an offense against a minor, Zachary
Vulich was obligated to comply with the sex offender registry requirements
in Iowa Code chapter 692A (2024). Those requirements included registering
his residence and any internet identifiers with the county sheriff. Vulich was
also prohibited from residing within 2,000 feet of a child care facility and
from living with a minor who was not his biological child or stepchild.
In the fall of 2024, Vulich had only one registered address: his home in
Leland. But at the end of October, Deputy Todd Spooner—the designated
sex offender registry deputy for Winnebago County—received a report that
Vulich was living at an unregistered address in Forest City. The home at that
address was occupied by Vulich’s girlfriend, Danielle Barnett; her two
children, an eighteen-year-old daughter and fifteen-year-old C.S.; and
2
Vulich’s sister and her husband. There were two child care facilities less than
2,000 feet from the home.
Deputy Spooner asked police officers in Forest City to monitor
Barnett’s address and document Vulich’s presence there. They reported
seeing Vulich’s truck parked at the house throughout November—during the
day, overnight, and in the early morning. Deputy Spooner installed a camera
on a telephone pole to record Vulich’s movements in mid-November. The
camera showed Vulich coming and going from the house at all hours. A
neighbor who lived across the alley testified that she saw Vulich “[a]lmost
every day.” And a bus driver who transported C.S. to school testified that
every time he picked C.S. up in November, Vulich walked him out of the
house to the school’s van. Deputy Spooner also learned that the utilities for
the home were in Vulich’s name. And law enforcement discovered that
Vulich had an unregistered online account on Quora—“a question/answer
based social media type platform.” The account was created in 2019 and last
active in 2023.
Vulich was arrested towards the end of November. Police executed a
search warrant and found some of Vulich’s belongings in Barnett’s bedroom.
Those belongings included Vulich’s watch, a receipt with his name on it, a
pair of men’s socks in a dresser drawer, and an open package of men’s
underwear that matched what Vulich was wearing when he was arrested.
Vulich’s dog was also in the home, and his trailer was in the backyard. Despite
these signs of Vulich’s presence, Barnett denied that Vulich lived with her or
slept at her house. She explained that Vulich’s truck was often there because
he was either fixing things for her or hanging out, playing games and watching
movies. Barnett maintained that the boxers in her bedroom belonged to C.S.
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and that Vulich had given her the dog. And she said the utility bill was in
Vulich’s name because she had a past-due account with the city.
The State charged Vulich with violating the sex offender registry for
his failure to register the Forest City house as a residence and for residing
within 2,000 feet of two child care facilities. He was also charged with a
registry violation for the Quora account and with child endangerment for
having control over or unsupervised access to C.S. After a two-day trial, the
jury found Vulich guilty of each charge. Vulich appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction “for the correction of errors at law, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State.” State v. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d 203, 207
(Iowa 2025). “This includes making legitimate inferences and presumptions
that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” State
v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611, 615 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). “Our review is highly
deferential to the jury’s verdict, and we affirm the jury’s verdict when the
verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Sievers, 20 N.W.3d at 207
(cleaned up). Evidence is substantial when “it can convince a rational jury
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation
omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Residence Violations
Vulich claims that the State failed to prove the residency element for
his three registry convictions. For the count involving Vulich’s failure to
register the address in Forest City, the jury was instructed the State had to
prove that Vulich “knowingly failed to register or notify” the sheriff about
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“his new or changed address and/or . . . temporary lodging within five days.”
The instructions for the other two counts required the State to prove that
Vulich “resided within 2,000 feet of the real property comprising a school or
child care facility.” The jury was instructed that “residence” meant
each dwelling or other place where a sex offender resides, sleeps, or
habitually lives, or will reside, sleep, or habitually live, including a shelter
or group home. If a sex offender does not reside, sleep, or habitually live in
a fixed place, “residence” means a description of the locations where the
offender is stationed regularly, including any mobile or transitory living
quarters. “Residence” shall be construed to refer to the places where a sex
offender resides, sleeps, habitually lives, or is stationed with regularity,
regardless of whether the offender declares or characterizes such place as
the residence of the offender.
See Iowa Code § 692A.101(24) (defining “residence”).
Vulich argues the “State’s evidence that he ʻspent time’ at a Forest
City residence did not show anything more than brief or occasional visits.”
But in the State’s view, the jury “accept[ed] the more logical conclusion—
Vulich was living with his girlfriend.” We agree with the State.
The record shows that Vulich’s “visits” to the home were neither brief
nor occasional.1 A neighbor who lived across the alley testified that she saw
Vulich there “[a]lmost every day.” Vulich told her that he was getting a
divorce and that he moved his truck at night because he did not want his wife
to know where he was staying. Because she went to bed early, the neighbor
1
Because of this conclusion, Vulich’s argument that “[t]here was no evidence that
he was informed or understood” that “occasionally visit[ing] his girlfriend’s home . . .
triggered a duty to register either a new residence or a temporary lodging” fails. Cf. State
v. Adams, No. 09–1499, 2010 WL 3894440, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2010) (finding
there was “no evidence” in a “very limited, two-page, agreed-upon record” that the
defendant had been “informed of the duty to register within five days of changing
residence”).
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testified that she did not know whether Vulich was there overnight. But
Forest City police officers who were patrolling the house confirmed that he
was, as did footage from the pole camera. One officer noted the truck was
there on November 7 at 1:38 a.m., 3:09 a.m., 5:02 a.m., and again at 8:55 p.m.
On November 8, the officer saw the truck at 2:10 a.m., 5:02 a.m., and 6:37
a.m. He also saw the truck on November 14 at 9:58 p.m. and again on
November 16 at 1:13 a.m. Another officer documented that the truck was at
the house on November 21 at 2:19 a.m., 3:59 a.m., and 6:32 a.m.
Despite this evidence, Vulich contends that he did not establish a
residence in Forest City because he “maintained his primary, registered
residence in Leland,” and he did not have a key to Barnett’s house or receive
mail there. On the first point, the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that
“a sex offender may have more than one residence that needs to be registered
with the local county sheriff.” State v. Uranga, 31 N.W.3d 358, 366
(Iowa 2026). That is true “regardless of whether the offender declares or
characterizes such place as the residence of the offender.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.101(24). As for Vulich’s second point, our statute provides that a sex
offender can “habitually live” at a “place other than a mailing address or
primary address.” Iowa Code § 692A.101(13) (defining “habitually lives”).
While Vulich may not have had a key to the Forest City house, he came and
went as he pleased.
Although Barnett and her children denied that Vulich lived with them
or slept at their house—maintaining that he was instead there fixing things,
playing games, or watching movies—the jury was free to reject that
testimony. See State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (“It is . . .
for the jury to decide which evidence to accept or reject.”). The jury was also
free to reject Barnett’s explanations for the items that were found at her
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house, including Vulich’s watch, socks, underwear, and receipt in her
bedroom, along with his dog and trailer. “It is not our place to resolve
conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to
determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such
matters are for the jury.” Id. (cleaned up).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Vulich resided at the
unregistered Forest City address. See State v. Youmans, No. 14-1305, 2015
WL 7019012, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015) (finding sufficient evidence
that a sex offender established a second residence from neighbors’
observations of him regularly staying at his girlfriend’s house and performing
everyday tasks there).
B. Child Endangerment
Vulich next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him
of child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(2), which prohibits a
person who is required to register for a sex offense against a minor from
knowingly having “control of a minor” or “unsupervised access to a minor.”
Vulich argues the State “presented no proof that [he] ever assumed
responsibility for [a] child’s welfare, provided care, or exercised disciplinary
authority.” Without evidence “of a custodial or supervisory relationship,”
Vulich contends “the State failed to establish a required element of the
offense.” We disagree.
Vulich’s argument ignores that section 726.6(2) can be violated by a
sex offender who “knowingly has unsupervised access to a minor.” As
discussed above, Vulich was in the same home as C.S. at all hours, including
overnight. While Barnett and her children insisted that an adult was always
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present, the jury did not have to accept that testimony. See Brimmer, 983
N.W.2d at 256. In fact, Barnett acknowledged that she did not follow Vulich
around the house and that “[t]here wasn’t an adult in every room.” A rational
trier of fact could legitimately infer from this evidence that Vulich had
unsupervised access to C.S.
There was also sufficient evidence that Vulich had control of C.S. See
State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 234–35 (Iowa 2001) (defining “control” as
used in Iowa Code section 726.6(1) as “exercis[ing] authority or dominating
influence over” another or “the state of having restricting or governing
power over someone” (citations omitted)). The child’s bus driver testified
that every time he picked C.S. up in November, Vulich walked him out to the
school’s van. No other adult was present. The driver testified that when C.S.
was late one morning, he knocked on the door and Vulich answered, telling
the driver, “[W]e overslept, don’t get all over me or I will go before the school
board.” The driver saw no one else inside the home. He testified that on a
different morning, Vulich told C.S. where to sit in the van. He also testified
about an incident when the child was locked out of the house. The driver
called Vulich, who told him that it was okay to leave C.S. there. We agree with
the State that “[a] reasonable jury could find that Vulich—who was bringing
C.S. out to the van, telling him where to sit, giving permission for him to be
left unattended, and threatening school board action on his behalf—had
control of him.”
C. Internet Identifier
As part of his registry duties, Vulich had to provide all “relevant
information” and any changes in that information to the sheriff.
Chapter 692A lists twenty-one categories of relevant information. See Iowa
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Code § 692A.101(23)(a). One of those categories requires the disclosure of
“internet identifiers,” which is defined as
an electronic mail address, instant message address or identifier, or any
other designation or moniker used for self-identification during internet
communication or posting, including all designations used for the purpose
of routing or self-identification in internet communications or postings.
Id. § 692A.101(15).
Vulich does not dispute that the Quora account falls within this
category of relevant information. Instead, he contends the State failed to
prove the account belonged to him, arguing “the superficial fact that the
username contained his name” does not “establish authorship or use.” But
the State’s proof was not limited to the username for the account. The profile
picture on the account was a photo of Vulich. And the last comment on the
account, which stated that it was “added by Zach Vulich” in April 2023,
talked about Vulich being pulled over for a traffic offense. Deputy Spooner
verified that Vulich was the subject of a traffic stop about two weeks before
that post. The jury was entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence to reach
its verdict. See Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at 256 (recognizing that “circumstantial
evidence is as probative as direct evidence”). And these circumstances
support a rational inference that the Quora account belonged to Vulich.
Beyond ownership of the account, Vulich also argues that the “record
contains no indication that he received instruction or written notice advising
that old, inactive, or informational accounts such as Quora must be
registered.” He contends the statute requires proof that he “knowingly failed
to comply, not merely that an account bearing his name existed somewhere
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online.” While Vulich is correct that knowledge is a necessary element of the
offense,2 he is wrong about what the record shows.
Deputy Spooner testified that every time he met with Vulich—four
times a year—they reviewed his internet registration requirements, which
included email, social media, and gaming accounts. Vulich had registered five
or six of those accounts with the sheriff. Deputy Spooner testified that at each
check-in, he gave Vulich a packet with “every rule” that he had to follow.
Based on this evidence, we conclude the State met its burden of proof on the
knowledge element. See State v. Widner, No. 21-0627, 2022 WL 1486505,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022) (finding the evidence supported a
determination that the defendant “knew, or at least reasonably should have
known, about the registration requirement from the times he was presented
the documentation containing the statutory requirements his registration
status entailed”); State v. Krugle, No. 02-0083, 2002 WL 31883017, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002) (finding evidence of defendant’s “prior
registrations” was “sufficient to establish that he knew of his obligations
under chapter 692A”).
AFFIRMED.
2
The jury was instructed without objection that to find Vulich guilty of this count,
the State had to prove that he “knowingly failed to register or notify” the sheriff “of his
new or changed internet identifier (social media account with Quora) within five days.”
See Iowa Code § 692A.111(1) (“[A] violation occurs when a sex offender knows or
reasonably should know of the duty to fulfill a requirement specified in this chapter as
referenced in the offense charged.”).
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