Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1272 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Ajieng Nyok Anyang, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, The Honorable Jennifer Miller, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Raya Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), working in conjunction with local law enforcement, completed an investigation that yielded the discovery of 971 pills containing fentanyl (along with the seizure of other illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia), a jury found Ajieng Anyang guilty of three counts: (1) conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (fentanyl), a class “B” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(10) (2024); (2) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (fentanyl), a class “B” felony in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.413 and 124.401(1)(b)(10); and (3) failure to affix a drug tax stamp, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code sections 453B.3 and 453B.12. On appeal, Anyang attacks his convictions that involve possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver under a sufficiency-of-the- evidence challenge. Anyang argues the State failed to prove he constructively possessed the fentanyl pills or intended to deliver them. Accordingly, he contends the evidence cannot support his convictions for possession and delivery of a controlled substance. He further asserts that, if those convictions fail, the tax-stamp count necessarily fails as well. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Anyang had knowledge of and control over the pills and therefore possessed a controlled substance; the quantity and packaging supported a finding of specific intent to deliver; he knew that the substance was fentanyl; and the fentanyl did not have an affixed tax stamp. Because the State, helped by Anyang himself through his recorded statements in the trooper’s vehicle and recovered text messages, produced 2 sufficient evidence that a reasonable factfinder could find Anyang guilty on all counts, we affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On July 12, 2024, Trooper Jacob Waymire of the Iowa State Patrol stopped a black Jeep Cherokee traveling southbound on Interstate 35 for speeding. But the trooper had been lying in wait for the Jeep—the DEA and the Johnston Police Department, working together, had been tracking the vehicle based on a tip that it was involved in illicit drug trade. Law enforcement had earlier received information that Anyang and Anel Kadric Isakovic, the son of the Jeep’s registered owner, would be traveling to Minnesota to purchase “M30s”—counterfeit Oxycodone pills containing fentanyl. Officers had earlier placed a GPS tracker on the Jeep. Anyang was driving with Kadric in the front passenger seat when Trooper Waymire pulled them over. Once stopped, Kadric told the trooper they were coming back from the Mall of America in Minneapolis. Trooper Waymire asked Anyang for his driver’s license, registration, and insurance information. Anyang said he did not have his license, so Trooper Waymire had Anyang sit in his patrol car while he accessed Anyang’s information on his patrol computer. While in the patrol car, Anyang told Trooper Waymire that Kadric had just picked him up in Ames and he had not been at the Mall of America. He also identified himself as “Beget Anyang,” which was his brother’s name. When the computer search showed that Beget’s license was suspended, Anyang admitted he had given the wrong name because there was an active warrant out for his arrest. While Anyang sat in the patrol car, several other officers arrived on the scene, including narcotics officer Detective Jared Love, Trooper David 3 Wonders, and Trooper Wonders’s K-9 companion, James. K-9 James is trained to detect odors of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. Upon arrival of the dog, Kadric was removed from the passenger’s seat and Trooper Wonders walked James around the outside of the Jeep. The dog alerted to the odor of drugs inside the Jeep. Seeing the dog’s alert, Anyang denied any knowledge of drugs or weapons in the vehicle, emphasizing to officers that it was not his vehicle. During the ensuing search, officers placed Kadric in the back seat of Trooper Waymire’s vehicle while Anyang remained in the front seat. The patrol vehicle’s internal cameras recorded the resulting interaction between the two men. The recording captured Anyang telling Kadric multiple times that “Somebody told on us” and stating that he had seen a white truck following them since they crossed into Iowa. The recording also caught Anyang asking Kadric if he had talked to the police and stating, “If you say it’s mine, it’s mine, it’s cool . . . .” A search of the Jeep’s cabin revealed two balls of aluminum foil tucked behind a panel inside the center console. The foil balls contained plastic baggies with numerous blue pills. Two smaller foil balls containing burn marks indicative of drug usage, a lighter, and a “snort straw” were found inside the vehicle’s glove box. Additionally, a black handgun and two glass pipes containing suspected methamphetamine residue were in a compartment under the front passenger seat. Trooper Wonders believed the methamphetamine residue likely accounted for the odor that alerted K-9 James. Officers recovered a total of 971 M30 pills from the Jeep. A sample of the pills was later sent to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation for testing, which returned positive for fentanyl. 4 As part of the investigation, Anyang’s cellphone was seized and searched, which recovered certain text messages sent and received during the relevant timeframe. Detective Love testified at trial about what these text messages meant and how they could be decoded. For instance, an unidentified person texted Anyang stating, “I need blue. Can you come?” Anyang responded, “Yes how many?” The person then asked, “How many can you give me for $100 . . . .” Detective Love testified that “blue” or “blues” is common slang for M30 pills and that, in July 2024, the general price for M30 was around $10 to $15 per pill. He further testified that the average user of M30 pills would keep one to seven pills on their person for personal use, and generally no more than twelve, whereas distribution is often associated with higher quantities and pills packaged separately. Other text messages recovered suggested that Kadric was going to Minnesota to pick-up a “drop” and stopping in Ames to have Anyang go along with him. And evidence from the GPS system confirmed that Kadric had stopped in Ames on his way to Minnesota, likely to pick up Anyang, which conflicted with the version of events that Anyang had given Trooper Waymire that he had been picked up just before the stop. After a jury trial, Anyang was found guilty on all counts. Anyang appeals. II. Standard of Review. “Sufficiency of evidence claims are reviewed for . . . correction of errors at law.” State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012)). In conducting our review, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict “if there is substantial evidence to support the finding.” State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Iowa 2015). In 5 reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict, we consider all the record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Evidence is considered substantial if the State can convince a rational jury “that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). The court will consider “all of the evidence presented at trial, not just evidence that supports the verdict.” State v. Kemp, 688 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2004). III. Analysis. On appeal, Anyang argues that (1) there is insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver because the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the controlled substance or the specific intent to deliver it,1 and (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of failure to possess a tax stamp because the State failed to prove he had possession of the controlled substance. We address both claims in turn. A. Possession of and Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance. Anyang contends the State failed to prove that he had actual or constructive possession of the drugs, or that he had the intent to deliver them. He does not believe his close proximity to the drugs, text messages implicating him, or the incriminating statements he made are circumstances that create a 1 Anyang combines his challenges to his convictions related to the conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance charge and the possession with intent to deliver charge in one section of his appellate brief by indicating both counts required the State prove Anyang’s intent to deliver. The State argues that he forfeited the conspiracy challenge by not directly identifying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim or briefing the issue. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (discussing forfeiture of arguments on appeal). We address the challenge as Anyang framed it in his brief and focus on whether the State produced sufficient evidence to prove intent to deliver. 6 reasonable inference that he knew of the presence of controlled substances and had power to exercise dominion and control over them. For the State to establish possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under Iowa Code section 124.401, it had to prove Anyang (1) knowingly possessed fentanyl, (2) he knew that the substance he possessed was fentanyl, and (3) he possessed the fentanyl with the specific intent to deliver it. See Thomas, 847 N.W.2d at 442. The State may show he had either actual or constructive possession. Id. (noting actual possession can be shown “when the contraband is found on his or her person or when substantial evidence supports a finding it was on his or her person ʻat one time.’” (citation omitted)). Here, the convictions turn on whether Anyang had constructive possession. The doctrine of constructive possession allows the defendant’s possession of contraband to “be inferred based on the location of the contraband and other circumstances.” Id. at 443. For example, possession of contraband may be inferred if the defendant is in exclusive possession of the area in which it was located. If the area is jointly occupied, additional proof of possession is needed. Id.; see also State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Iowa 2013); State v. DeWitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 474–75 (Iowa 2012). Relevant here, “when drugs are found inside a vehicle with multiple occupants . . . the State must point to other circumstances establishing the defendant’s knowledge and control.” State v. Goering, No. 23-1623, 2025 WL 547914, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025). “Whether constructive possession exists ʻturns on the peculiar facts of each case.’” State v. Buckley, No. 25-0073, 2026 WL 221486, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026) (quoting State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 7 2002)). To determine constructive possession when the contraband is in a jointly occupied space, we consider these factors: (1) incriminating statements made by a person; (2) incriminating actions of the person upon the police’s discovery of a controlled substance among or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the person’s fingerprints on the packages containing the controlled substance; and (4) any other circumstances linking the person to the controlled substance. State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 706 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). We must “determine whether all of the facts and circumstances . . . allow a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the drugs’ presence and had control and dominion over the contraband.” State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa 2003). “The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” Id. at 569 (citation omitted). In this case, several factors support a reasonable inference that Anyang knew and exercised control over the drugs. Anyang was driving the Jeep with Kadric in the front passenger seat. Officers found one set of foil balls in the center console, easily accessible to both occupants from their positions. Another set of foil balls was found inside the glovebox, also easily accessible to both occupants. The State argues that a jury could find that, based upon their positions in the Jeep alone, Kadric and Anyang had joint control over the M30 pills. Here, the jury was instructed that possession included sole possession as well as joint possession. See State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (noting an unchallenged instruction is the law of the case for purposes of our review). Although “proximity to the drugs should not be used to infer knowledge” and “is insufficient to prove control and dominion,” there is other evidence in this case that creates a reasonable 8 inference that Anyang knew of the drugs and had control over them. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 572. Returning to the facts, Anyang argues that because the Jeep was not registered to him and his DNA and fingerprints were not on the drugs, the State has failed to prove possession. But the State does not have to prove that Anyang owned the Jeep or that there were fingerprints to successfully establish possession. These are among the different factors to be considered and are for the factfinder to either credit or reject. The evidence in this case showed that the police were monitoring the Jeep prior to this incident based on knowledge that it was going back and forth to Minnesota to buy drugs. Among the evidence discovered was Anyang’s cellphone with incriminating text messages. Detective Love testified at trial that the nature of the conversation in the text messages and the common slang references used suggested that the purpose of the trip was to buy drugs. Specifically, a text message between Kadric and Anyang before the traffic stop showed that Kadric was going to Minnesota for a “drop” and was going to pick up Anyang to go with him. The same day, a GPS tracker showed Kadric stopping in Ames to pick up Anyang on his way to Minnesota, which is consistent with the text messages. The text messages reveal Anyang’s inside knowledge of the plans, cognizance of its illegality, and awareness of the nature and quality of the contraband. And based upon the other text messages, a jury could find that buyers were contacting Anyang about “blue[s],” referring to the M30 pills and inquiring about the cost. These transaction discussions would allow an inference that Anyang was involved in the sale of the drugs. The law enforcement officers testified that the quantity of the M30 pills, the packaging, and the stolen gun in the vehicle supported a finding that the drugs were for distribution, not for personal use. 9 Further, we look at the inconsistent statements that Anyang made to law enforcement. Anyang told Trooper Waymire that Kadric had only picked him up in Ames and that he did not go to Minnesota. He also lied to Trooper Waymire about his name. The jury may infer guilt from a false statement made to an officer. See State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2021). Moreover, Anyang was not informed about the specifics of the search, but on recorded camera in the patrol vehicle, he made incriminating statements to Kadric that a jury could infer established his knowledge and possession of drugs in the Jeep. Anyang contends that while he was not told of what the search uncovered, he still could have seen what was coming out of the vehicle. While that is true, the statements he made to Kadric do not align with someone surprised or upset to learn that drugs were pulled out of a vehicle he was driving. The jury could find that these circumstances provided a reasonable inference that Anyang knew of the presence of the controlled substances, had the power to exercise dominion and control over them, and further had the intent to distribute them. See Buckley, 2026 WL 221486, at *4. We do not interfere with a verdict founded on substantial evidence and because that is what we find here, we affirm the convictions establishing that Anyang knowingly and constructively possessed M30 pills that contained fentanyl with the intent to deliver. B. Failure to Affix Drug Tax Stamp. Iowa Code section 453B.3 states: “A dealer shall not possess, distribute, or offer to sell a taxable substance unless the tax imposed . . . has been paid as evidenced by stamp, label, or other official indicia permanently affixed to the taxable substance.” Here, the drugs found did not have affixed to them a stamp, label, or other indication of payment of the state tax imposed on the substance. The only 10 question was if Anyang knowingly possessed the drugs. Since we find there was sufficient evidence that Anyang constructively possessed the M30 pills, coupled with the undisputed evidence the pills did not have a tax stamp affixed to them, the jury’s verdict related to the failure to affix a tax stamp is supported by the quality of evidence sufficient to convince a rational fact finder Anyang was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Banes, 910 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). We affirm Anyang’s conviction for failure to possess a tax stamp. IV. Conclusion. We affirm Anyang’s convictions because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find he had constructive possession of the controlled substance with the intent to deliver and did so without the required permanently affixed tax stamps. AFFIRMED. 11