Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0060 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In re the Marriage of Leah Marie Moravec and Cody Zeke Moravec Upon the Petition of Leah Marie Moravec, Petitioner–Appellee, And Concerning Cody Zeke Moravec, Respondent–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Joseph Seidlin, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Payton C. Kitterman and Stephen C. Humke of Miller & Evans PLC, Des Moines, attorneys for appellant. Jon Garner and Suzane L. Woollums of Hartung Schroeder Law Firm, Des Moines, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, C.J. 1 TABOR, Chief Judge. Who is responsible for repaying the “lot loan” secured by Leah and Cody Moravec during their marriage? That debate drives this appeal from the district court’s dismissal of Cody’s contempt action against Leah. Cody contends that Leah must repay that home equity loan because it was used to purchase the empty lot that she was awarded in their dissolution decree. Leah counters that the “lot loan” is a mortgage debt obligation on the marital residence that Cody received in the decree. The district court sided with Leah, finding she had no duty to refinance, to remove Cody’s name, or to make monthly payments on that loan. We agree with that interpretation of the decree and affirm.1 I. Facts and Prior Proceedings Leah and Cody divorced in May 2024. The divorce decree adopted their signed stipulation, which addressed both child custody and the division of property. That property division included two parcels of real estate: the marital home and a nearby vacant lot. The stipulation awarded the marital residence to Cody “free and clear of any interest on the part of Leah,” and Cody was “solely responsible for the mortgage, utilities, taxes, maintenance, upkeep, other debts and/or obligations thereon.” The stipulation also directed Cody to “hold Leah harmless from any and all liability arising therefrom.” The stipulation continued: “Cody shall sell, refinance or otherwise remove Leah’s name from the debts and obligations on [the marital home] within ninety (90) days 1 Although Cody originally petitioned for writ of certiorari, “[w]hen an application for contempt is dismissed, a direct appeal is permitted.” State v. Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Iowa 1992). The supreme court chose to treat Cody’s petition for writ of certiorari as a notice of appeal and transferred the case to us. 2 of the entry of a Decree by the court adopting this Stipulation in full.” Leah was directed to execute a quitclaim deed conveying her interest in the marital home to Cody. The provision awarding the vacant lot to Leah had mirror-image language. Leah was “solely responsible for the mortgage, utilities, taxes, maintenance, upkeep, other debts and/or obligations thereon.” The stipulation directed her to “hold Cody harmless from any and all liability arising therefrom.” And she was to “sell, refinance or otherwise remove Cody’s name from the debts and obligations on [the vacant lot] within ninety (90) days of the entry of a Decree by the court adopting this Stipulation in full.” The court directed Cody to execute a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the vacant lot to Leah. Four months after the court entered the decree, Cody applied for a rule to show cause why Leah should not be held in contempt of court.2 He alleged that Leah “willfully and intentionally refused to refinance or otherwise remove [his] name from the debt and obligations on the vacant lot within ninety (90) days of the entry of the Decree.” Cody also asserted that Leah “refused to make the monthly payments associated with the debt on the Lot.” In resistance, Leah contended that Cody was responsible for the “lot loan.” To support her position, she explained: 2 One month earlier, Leah sought to hold Cody in contempt for (1) trying to unilaterally change the children’s preschool, (2) refusing to pay his share of the tuition for their current preschool, (3) failing to refinance a vehicle, and (4) failing to turn over certain personal property from the marital home. The court dismissed the first and fourth counts of Leah’s application. For the second and third counts, the court found that any violation was not willful. Leah does not challenge those rulings in this appeal. 3 The evidence presented to the court clearly established that at the time the Stipulation was adopted by the court, there were two loans/mortgages on the marital residence. The first was the loan used to purchase the property and was secured by a first mortgage on the marital residence. The second was a home equity loan obtained by the parties in 2020 to purchase a vacant lot across the street from the home and to pay off substantial credit card debt incurred by Cody at the time. This home equity loan was secured by a second mortgage on the marital residence. After a hearing, the district court decided that the “plain language” of the stipulated provisions “clearly place the responsibility for paying a mortgage on the property to the person receiving it.” The court emphasized: “The lot loan is a mortgage debt on the residence. It is not a mortgage debt on the lot.” The court dismissed Cody’s application. He appeals. II. Scope and Standard of Review We generally review dissolution proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of Morris, 810 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Iowa 2012). But we review contempt rulings for correction of errors at law. In re Marriage of Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1995). And when a party contests the district court’s reading of the language in the decree, we also review the district court’s interpretation for legal error. See In re Marriage of Ginsberg, 750 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 2008). When reviewing contempt actions, we will not “lightly reverse[]” the district court’s decision. In re Marriage of Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). Cody, as the party applying for the rule to show cause, had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Leah had a duty to obey a court order and willfully failed to perform the duty. See In re Marriage of Jacobo, 526 N.W.2d 859, 866 (Iowa 1995). 4 III. Analysis of Contempt Ruling Leah’s alleged contempt hinges on how we interpret the stipulation incorporated into the decree. In this situation, we construe the decree like any other written instrument. In re Marriage of Lawson, 409 N.W.2d 181, 182 (Iowa 1987). In construing the decree, we give effect to “every word, if possible, to give the [decree] as a whole a consistent, effective and reasonable meaning.” Id. at 182–83. “Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as that which is expressed.” Id. at 182 (citation omitted). The determinative factor is the intent of the court granting the decree, as can be gathered from the document’s four corners. Anderson, 451 N.W.2d at 191. “The intent of the parties . . . is irrelevant without a showing their intent was shared with the judge entering the decree that adopted their stipulation.” Morris, 810 N.W.2d at 886 n.2. The district court may not determine the meaning or ambiguity of the stipulation without first considering: (1) the decree as a whole and (2) any extrinsic evidence offered by the parties as to the decree’s meaning. See U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Bittner, 986 N.W.2d 840, 848 (Iowa 2023). If the terms of the stipulation are unambiguous, parol evidence may not be considered as contradicting the decree “under the facade of interpreting it.” Id. Cody contends the language of the decree adopted from the parties’ stipulation was “not unambiguous or explicit in awarding responsibility for the Lot Loan.” Given that alleged ambiguity, he insists the district court should have relied on two pieces of extrinsic evidence when deciphering the parties’ intent. First, he asserts “the parties’ common reference to the loan as the Lot Loan is instructive.” Second, he points out that in their respective financial affidavits, both parties listed the lot loan of $110,482 as an encumbrance on the vacant lot. In his view, “Leah’s Financial Affidavit is an 5 illuminating piece of extrinsic evidence to understand the meaning of the language in the Stipulation.” From there, he maintains that the parties “clearly considered the Lot Loan as a liability arising from the purchase of the vacant lot.” Leah disagrees that the stipulation was ambiguous and argues that we should “look no further than the plain language contained within it when interpreting and enforcing its provisions.” She focuses on two words to counter Cody’s claim of ambiguity: thereon and therefrom. The decree awards her the vacant lot and holds her “solely responsible for the mortgage, utilities, taxes, maintenance, upkeep, other debts and/or obligations thereon” and requires her to hold Cody harmless from any and all liability arising “therefrom.” She maintains that the inclusion of those adverbs establishes that she is only responsible for debts on the vacant lot, which did not exist at the time of the stipulation. Cody is not convinced by Leah’s linguistic argument. He replies that the stipulation used the singular term “mortgage” for the property awards to both parties when Leah asserts that he is responsible for two mortgages and she is responsible for none. Leah also speaks to the parties’ financial affidavits. She acknowledges mistakenly listing the home equity loan as a debt against the vacant lot in her September 2023 affidavit. But she asserts that she corrected that error in April 2024 when answering Cody’s discovery requests. Her answer explained that she and Cody took out a second mortgage on their marital home “to buy an open lot located across the street.” The answer further noted that the home equity loan was for $122,770, the lot cost $90,000, and the remaining loan amount—about $32,770—was used to pay off Cody’s credit card debt. As Leah notes, that information was evident to the parties when they entered their stipulation in May 2024. Leah then points to Cody’s 6 testimony at the contempt hearing recognizing that the second mortgage used for purchasing the lot was a loan “taken out against [their] home.” After reviewing the decree as a whole and the parties’ extrinsic evidence, the district court declined to rewrite the plain language contained in the stipulation. The court found no ambiguity in the language awarding the lot to Leah and the mortgage debt to Cody. The court reasoned: “If the parties or the court intended otherwise, the decree could easily have specifically assigned responsibility for the lot loan to Leah. It did not. Cody is responsible for the lot loan.” We find no legal error in the district court’s interpretation of the decree. True, “extrinsic evidence may be received to aid a court in interpretation of writings.” Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Iowa 1974). But such evidence is limited to showing “what is meant by what is said” in the instrument. Id. By contrast, Cody is asking for the extrinsic evidence about the “Lot Loan” to show “the language means something different than what is said” in the decree. See id. As the district court decided, the plain language of the decree held Cody responsible for debts and obligations on the residence. We are unpersuaded by his argument that the reference to “mortgage” rather than “mortgages” created an ambiguity. The court was correct in dismissing Cody’s contempt application. IV. Appellate Attorney Fees Both Leah and Cody ask for appellate attorney fees. Generally, no claim exists for attorney fees, absent a statutory or contractual provision allowing an award. In re Marriage of McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d 322, 332 (Iowa 2004). Attorney fees may be taxed against a party held in contempt of a dissolution decree. Iowa Code § 598.24 (2024). But section 598.24 does not 7 provide attorney fees for defending against an unsuccessful contempt action. Id.; In re Marriage of Ersland, No. 13-1232, 2014 WL 667676, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014). Thus, the parties shall be responsible for their own attorney fees on appeal. The costs of this appeal are taxed to Cody. AFFIRMED. 8