Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1751 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Douglas Robert Farni, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, The Honorable Stephen A. Owen, Judge. _______________ REVERSED AND REMANDED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., Langholz, J., and Mullins, S.J. Opinion by Chicchelly, P.J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Presiding Judge. Douglas Robert Farni appeals the amount of a restitution order imposed after he pled guilty to operating while intoxicated, first offense. On appeal, he argues the district court erred by ordering him to pay $1,513 in restitution. Upon our review, we reverse the restitution order and remand to the district court to modify the amount awarded to $62, which reflects the amount of personal property damaged by Farni’s criminal conduct. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On June 29, 2025, Farni was driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. While doing so, Farni crashed into and totaled a neighbor’s vehicle. The State charged Farni with operating while intoxicated, first offense, a serious misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2025). Farni later pled guilty to the offense charged. While the parties agreed that Farni would be responsible for restitution, they disputed the amount. The disputed restitution amount concerns the value of the totaled vehicle. Farni’s insurance offered the neighbor $25,238.60 to settle the matter, which she accepted. The neighbor then used the settlement amount to purchase a replacement vehicle for $27,892. The vehicle cost $26,000, and the remaining $1,892 came from various fees related to the purchase.1 The Iowa Department of Transportation later refunded $441 from the totaled vehicle’s registration fee. With that refund in mind, the State sought 1 These fees consisted of a $180 documentary fee, a $1,310 fee for new registration, a $40 title fee, a $327 license fee, a $20 lien filing fee, and a $15 electronic registration and titling fee. 2 restitution for the remaining $1,451 balance from the fees, along with $62 for personal property damaged in the collision. Thus, at the restitution hearing, the State sought a total of $1,513 in restitution damages for the fees and damaged personal property. On the other hand, Farni asserted that the amount of restitution should be limited to $62 for the damaged personal property. After considering the parties’ arguments, along with the neighbor’s testimony and the State’s exhibits, the district court ordered Farni to pay $1,513 in restitution. In doing so, the district court stated: [The] question of insurance is considered by the Court. The case law I believe would indicate that [the neighbor] would be entitled to restitution regardless of whether insurance covered her losses or not, in whole or whether she even chose to make a claim. She is entitled to be made whole. She did not go out and purchase a vehicle because she wanted to. She was required to replace the vehicle that Mr. Farni destroyed through his criminal behavior. [The neighbor] was driving a vehicle, which the title shows to have been worth more than $50,000, but had to settle now for a vehicle worth somewhere around $25,000. [Farni’s] insurance . . . covered the vehicle and nothing more. But for Mr. Farni’s criminal behavior, [she] would not have had to incur the additional expenses of replacing the vehicle that Mr. Farni destroyed. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Farni shall pay victim restitution . . . in the amount of $1,513. This represents the losses she incurred in this matter. Farni now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the district court’s restitution order for correction of errors at law.” State v. Roache, 920 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Iowa 2018). “In reviewing a restitution order ‘we determine whether the court’s findings lack 3 substantial evidentiary support, or whether the court has not properly applied the law.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2013)). “Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Id. (quoting State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001)). DISCUSSION By pleading guilty to operating while intoxicated, Farni is required to pay restitution damages. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(a) (“[T]he court shall order a defendant convicted of or receiving a deferred judgment for a violation of this section to make restitution for damages resulting directly from the violation, to the victim, pursuant to chapter 910.”). A victim is “a person who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the offender’s criminal activities.” Id. § 910.1(11). Pecuniary damages are all damages to the extent not paid by an insurer on an insurance claim by the victim, which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event, except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium. Id. § 910.1(6). Farni argues that his neighbor is entitled only to the lost market value of the totaled vehicle and not the fees associated with the purchase of the replacement vehicle. The State concedes that Farni preserved his challenge to the restitution order, but argues he did not preserve error on whether damages in addition to lost market value are recoverable in restitution. While Farni did not explicitly refer to lost market value in his argument before the district court, he did argue that the fees were outside the scope of liability for his actions and would not be recoverable in a civil action. Thus, we find Farni preserved error. See In re Det. of Anderson, 895 N.W.2d 131, 138 4 (Iowa 2017) (“The underlying requirement of error preservation is to give opposing counsel notice of the argument and opportunity to be heard on the issue. However, our error preservation rules were not designed to be hypertechnical.” (internal citation omitted)); Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 2006) (“Error preservation does not turn . . . on the thoroughness of counsel’s research and briefing so long as the nature of the error has been timely brought to the attention of the district court.”), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016). Turning to the merits of Farni’s argument, “The law in Iowa governing damages to automobiles is well settled . . . .” Hawkeye Motors, Inc. v. McDowell, 541 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). And “restitution to a victim depend[s] on what the victim could obtain in a civil action against the defendant.” State v. Paxton, 674 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa 2004). Farni relies on Long v. McAllister, in support of his argument that his neighbor would be limited to lost market value damages in a civil action against Farni. See 319 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1982). In Long, the supreme court held that in a civil action: When the motor vehicle is totally destroyed or the reasonable cost of repair exceeds the difference in reasonable market value before and after the injury, the measure of damages is the lost market value plus the reasonable value of the use of the vehicle for the time reasonably required to obtain a replacement. Id. at 261. 5 The State presented no direct evidence of the value of the vehicle at the time it was totaled.2 Rather, the insurance company’s settlement offer for $25,238.60 is the closest evidence in the record as to what the value of the vehicle was at the time of Farni’s criminal act. Thus, we rely on that number as the market value of the vehicle at the time it was totaled. See In re T.L., No. 19-0770, 2020 WL 1879587, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (holding the amount of the insurance company’s payment was evidence of the insurer’s determination of the vehicle’s value and relying on that amount). Because the neighbor received $25,238.60 through the insurance company, insurance covered the lost market value of her totaled vehicle.3 The State argues that while the insurance settlement allowed the neighbor to buy a replacement vehicle, it did not cover the fees associated with the purchase. The State correctly notes that the primary purpose of a restitution order is to make the victim whole. State v. Dubois, 888 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Iowa 2016); see also Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d at 165 (“Any damages that are causally related to the criminal activities may be included in the restitution order.”). But again, restitution depends on what a victim could recover in a civil action against the defendant. Paxton, 674 N.W.2d at 108. The State asserts that the damages for the totaled vehicle and the fees are separate categories of damages. But the supreme court has declined to allow a party to recover damages related to automobiles that do not fall under 2 While the district court noted in the restitution order that the title of the totaled vehicle showed its value exceeded $50,000, this appears to be the price of the vehicle at the time it was purchased, not at the time it was totaled. 3 Under Long, the neighbor also could have recovered damages for “the reasonable value of the use of the vehicle for the time reasonably required to obtain a replacement.” 319 N.W.2d at 261. The neighbor testified at the restitution hearing that she rented a vehicle before buying the replacement vehicle, but the rental was covered by insurance. 6 the rule in Long. See Papenheim v. Lovell, 530 N.W.2d 668, 673–74 (Iowa 1995) (en banc). And under Long, the neighbor would not recover the fees in a civil action against Farni because she was compensated for the lost market value of the totaled vehicle through the insurance settlement. As the district court and the State note, the neighbor did not buy the replacement vehicle because she wanted to but because she had to due to Farni’s criminal act. She used the insurance settlement to purchase a replacement vehicle. But that vehicle and the fees incurred in buying it exceeded the market value of the totaled vehicle. Thus, because the neighbor could not recover the fees in a civil action against Farni, they cannot be assessed as restitution. See Iowa Code § 910.1(6); Long, 319 N.W.2d at 261; T.L., 2020 WL 1879587, at *3 (“At the end of the day, the victim is only entitled to the lost market value.”). Therefore, we hold that the district court erred by including the fees incurred in buying the replacement vehicle in its restitution order.4 CONCLUSION In sum, Farni’s criminal act totaled a vehicle. The owner used the funds from the insurance settlement to buy a replacement vehicle that, along with the purchasing fees, exceeded the market value of her totaled vehicle. Because Iowa law does not permit recovery of such fees in a civil action, the district court erred in including them in the restitution order. On remand, the district court shall modify the restitution order to $62, which reflects the personal property damage caused by Farni’s criminal conduct. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 4 Because of our holding, we need not address the argument as to whether the restitution order was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 7