Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1691 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Katherine Thrasher, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Bryce Chapman, Respondent–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, The Honorable Adria Kester, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS _______________ John D. Jacobsen (argued) of Jacobsen, Johnson & Wiezorek, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant. Justin D. Riem (argued) of Arenson Hofmeyer, P.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Sandy, J. 1 SANDY, Judge. Bryce Chapman appeals the district court’s modification of the custodial decree concerning his child with Katherine Thrasher. Bryce raises four issues on appeal: (1) the court’s permission for Katherine to homeschool the child rather than attend the school district agreed to in their stipulated custody decree; (2) the court’s reduction of Bryce’s visitation time (and correspondingly, the child support set in accordance thereto); (3) the court’s strict application of the child support guidelines which he argues should have imputed some income to Katherine; and (4) the court’s attorney fee award. After our de novo review, we reverse the schooling modification and the change in visitation but affirm the attorney fee award. Additionally, we affirm the court’s income determination for Katherine but remand the child support issue for recalculation given the restoration of the original visitation schedule. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Bryce and Katherine were never married, but they are the parents of one child, T.E.C.W., born in 2019. The two stipulated to a custody arrangement in September 2021. That agreement was adopted by the district court and incorporated into the court’s original custody decree. At the time, Katherine lived in Belle Plaine, Iowa, and Bryce lived in Mt. Vernon, Iowa. Per the stipulation, the parties had joint legal custody and Katherine had physical care of the child. The parents agreed to the following visitation schedule: Regular Care Schedule. The parties shall have care of the child on a two- week schedule. During week 1, Bryce shall have care of the child from Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. until Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. and from Friday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday at 5:00 p.m. On the second week of the rotation, Bryce shall have care of the child from Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. until Thursday at 9:00 a.m. Katherine shall have the child in her care at all other times. 2 Summer. Each party shall be entitled to exercise parenting time with the child for two (2) separate consecutive seven-day periods during the summer months of June, July and August. The parties agreed to make exchanges at a gas station in Atkins. The gas station selected for the exchanges was approximately thirty minutes from Katherine’s home in Belle Plaine. The stipulation also contemplated the child’s school district when he became old enough to enroll: School District. Once the minor child becomes eligible to be enrolled in school, he shall be enrolled in College Community School District and shall continue to attend College Community School District unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. If the parties are unable to open enroll or use other means to have the child in College Community School District then the parties shall mutually agree upon an alternate comparable school in Cedar Rapids. The parties additionally stipulated to Bryce’s child support obligation. The parties calculated Bryce’s child support obligation at $471.25 per month, but they agreed to deviate downward to $400 per month. Since the stipulation, Bryce still lives in his home in Mt. Vernon with his three children from previous relationships, but his girlfriend Jill and her two children have moved in. He continues his work as a union ironworker in Cedar Rapids and makes $74,937 per year. While his typical workweek is Monday through Friday from 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., he consistently works overtime. Because of his work schedule, Bryce occasionally relies on others to transport T.E.C.W. for visitations. Shortly after the stipulation, Katherine married her husband Brad and moved to Le Grand, Iowa. Katherine’s new home is a fifty-minute drive from the exchange location in Atkins and about an hour from the agreed-upon 3 school district. After their marriage, Katherine and Brad had three more children together. Brad has one child from a prior relationship who lives with them half of the time. Prior to her marriage, Katherine worked as a carpenter making $22 an hour. But Katherine became a stay-at-home parent in December 2021 with no intention of reentering the workforce. Katherine hopes to homeschool her four children while Brad supports the household, making approximately $92,000 annually. The changes in Katherine’s life led her to petition to modify the custodial arrangement. She asked the district court to amend the school provision of the custodial decree, to alter Bryce’s visitation to accommodate the school change, and to alter Bryce’s child support obligation.1 Katherine requested to homeschool T.E.C.W. or alternatively have him attend Marshalltown Christian which is only ten miles from Katherine’s home. Bryce challenged Katherine’s petition on all grounds. He took issue with Katherine’s request to homeschool the child, claiming Katherine was not qualified to teach and that it was against T.E.C.W.’s best interest to be homeschooled. Regarding visitation, Bryce objected to Katherine’s move as a qualifying material change in circumstances, arguing the move “is a change but it is certainly not material as the distance from the Respondent and [the agreed school district] is insignificant in consideration of the prior distance and agreements of the parties; all which were known and agreed upon, only a few years ago.” While Bryce did not contest that a modification of his support obligation was warranted, he argued that Katherine’s “substantial” assets, her husband’s income, and the voluntary nature of Katherine’s unemployment weighed in favor of a variance from the child support 1 Katherine also petitioned for sole legal custody of T.E.C.W., but that is not an issue on appeal as the request was denied and Katherine does not challenge the ruling. 4 guidelines. Accordingly, Bryce requested the court impute Katherine’s income at $31,392, Katherine’s calculated income at the time of the original stipulation. The district court granted Katherine’s modification request as it pertained to the child’s schooling, Bryce’s visitation, and Bryce’s child support obligation. After considering the distance from the agreed-upon school district and the fact that Katherine would be homeschooling her other children, the court determined it was in the child’s best interest to permit Katherine to homeschool T.E.C.W. as well. Along with the school change, the district court decreased Bryce’s visitation, reasoning “[t]he current visitation schedule would interfere with the child’s education and places an unfair burden on the child due to the length of commute and interruption of his holiday time in each home.” The court modified Bryce’s schedule to be at minimum: “every other weekend from 5:00 p.m. Friday until 5:00 p.m. Sunday; and every Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.” Regarding child support, the district court modified Bryce’s support obligation from $400 per month to $879.50 per month. This modification was based on the parties’ new incomes, which the court found “Katherine’s gross annual income is $0, and Bryce’s gross annual income is $74,937.00 for purposes of this modification action.” The court also ordered Bryce to pay $2,500 of Katherine’s attorney fees. Now, Bryce appeals the modification of the school provision, his visitation schedule, his child support obligation, and the attorney-fee award. Additionally, both he and Katherine request appellate attorney fees. 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW “Petitions to modify custody orders lie in equity and are reviewed de novo.” Venechuk v. Landherr, 20 N.W.3d 471, 475 (Iowa 2025); Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. “But when we say a case is reviewed de novo, this does not mean that we decide the case in a vacuum or approach it as though the trial court had never been involved.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). Instead, “while not bound by the district court’s findings, we give them weight and defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). DISCUSSION I. Homeschooling The parties agree the district court was permitted to modify the provisions of the previous order as it pertained to designations of a child’s school, but the parties disagree on the burden of proof to modify the child’s designated school placement. See Venechuk, 20 N.W.3d at 477 (finding the court had authority to alter the school provision of a custody decree through a modification action). Bryce believes that a “material and substantial change of circumstances” is required, but Katherine relies on Venechuk for the proposition that she need only prove the change is in the child’s best interests. See id. (bypassing the dispute on “whether the required change of circumstances had been shown,” and instead electing to resolve the modification petition “solely on the basis of the best interests of the child”). Neither party correctly identified the burden of proof. Our caselaw treats school changes like changes to visitation, so the moving party need only show a material change in circumstances and that the change is in the child’s best interest. In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa Ct. 6 App. 2000); In re Marriage of Spears, 529 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); Collett v. Vogt, No. 17-0986, 2018 WL 739333, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018). This is a lower burden of proof than custodial modifications and requires “a much less extensive change in circumstances.” In re Marriage of Brown, 778 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). While Katherine correctly notes the court in Venechuk resolved the issue on the best-interest analysis, Venechuk denied the modification for failure to prove the second prong and therefore did not have to address whether there had been a material change in circumstances. 20 N.W.3d at 477. Applying this standard, Katherine’s marriage, new children, and change in residence fails to meet the bar for a material change in circumstances. See In re Marriage of Biertzer, No. 05-0285, 2005 WL 3116005, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005) (finding a party’s remarriage, change in residence, and new children were insufficient to establish the material change of circumstances necessary for a change in visitation). These changes were ordinary and predictable life developments which the parties would have reasonably anticipated when they entered the stipulation, so they fail to rise to the level of a material change in circumstances. Id. In addition, we fail to see how the mother’s approximate fifteen-mile move—when the original decree contemplated the parties residing fifty minutes apart—significantly impacts the child’s transportation in a manner that triggers a material change in circumstances. So we are we are left with Katherine having more children2 and her dream of eventually homeschooling them as the changes. That is insufficient for meeting the required burden. 2 At the time of trial their ages were 1, 2, and 3. 7 Additionally, Katherine has failed to show homeschooling would be in the child’s best interest. Katherine’s argument in favor of homeschooling hinged on the logistics of transporting the child to school, but her testimony was devoid of details on her specific plans for how to homeschool the child. Katherine failed to detail the child’s curriculum, how extracurricular activities would work, or even account for how she would homeschool the child while simultaneously parenting and supervising her other infant children. Given the state of the record, we cannot find that homeschooling would be in the child’s best interest. Since Katherine failed to prove the requisite change in circumstances and that homeschooling was in the child’s best interest, we reverse the district court’s change-of-school provision and order the parties to return to the terms of the original stipulation. II. Reduced visitation Bryce challenges the district court’s new visitation schedule as it significantly decreased his visitation time from approximately 144 overnights per year to 66 overnights under the modified decree. He argues this result is inequitable as the change of circumstances resulting in the decrease— Katherine’s marriage and move to Le Grande—was entirely outside his control and was done without consideration to T.E.C.W.’s best interest. As with the child’s school placement, “[a] parent seeking to modify visitation must only establish ‘that there has been a material change in circumstances since the decree and that the requested change in visitation is in the best interests of the children.’” Brown, 778 N.W.2d at 51–52 (citation omitted). We recognize that a child’s best interest is served by “the opportunity for maximum continuous physical and emotional contact possible with both parents.” Iowa Code § 598.1 (2025). Yet “[p]hysical care 8 issues are not to be resolved based upon perceived fairness to the spouses, but primarily upon what is best for the child.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). In our review, “we recognize the reasonable discretion of the trial court to modify visitation rights and will not disturb its decision unless the record fairly shows it has failed to do equity.” In re Marriage of Salmon, 519 N.W.2d 94, 95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). However, on our de novo review, we disagree with the district court’s reduction of Bryce’s visitation for two reasons. First—as stated in the previous section—Katherine has not proven the material change in circumstances necessary for a modification of visitation. Second, the drastic reduction of Bryce’s visitation was not in the child’s best interest. The district court’s decision to decrease Bryce’s visitation was based on potential interference with T.E.C.W.’s education. We recognize a “need to balance the statutory goals of maximum parental contact and the avoidance of unnecessary disruption for the children,” but both the district court and Katherine failed to explain how the visitation schedule would disrupt the child’s education, why such a substantial decrease in visitation time was in the child’s best interest, or why the schedule could not be revised to provide an amount of parenting time equivalent to what was agreed to in the original stipulation. In re Marriage of Whiteside, No. 08-0002, 2008 WL 4308275, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2008); see also In re Marriage of Guyer, 238 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa 1976). We also agree with Bryce that it was inappropriate to reduce his visitation when it was Katherine who created the purported material change in circumstances by moving. See In re Marriage of Dewhurst, No. 24-1090, 2025 WL 408335, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025) (“[The parent] should not be denied [their] right to liberal visitation due to [the other parent]’s decision to move.”). 9 Cutting Bryce’s parenting time in half under these circumstances is contrary to T.E.C.W.’s best interests. Accordingly, we vacate the visitation schedule in the modified decree and reinstate the schedule set forth in the original stipulation. III. Child Support Calculation Next, Bryce argues the district court erred in its strict application of the child support guidelines when modifying his support obligation. Changes to support obligations require proof of a substantial change in circumstances. Iowa Code § 598.21C(1). Bryce does not argue there was not a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of his support obligation, only that “[s]trict application of the Iowa Child Support Guidelines does a substantial injustice to Bryce and TECW.” The district court found “Katherine’s gross annual income is $0, and Bryce’s gross annual income is $74,937.00 for purposes of this modification action, and child support shall be ordered in the amount of $879.50 from Bryce to Katherine.” Bryce contends the district court should have “imput[ed] wages to Katherine or variance based upon the substantial household wealth of Katherine.” According to our rules: There is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support which would result from the application of the guidelines prescribed by the supreme court is the correct amount of child support to be awarded. That amount may be adjusted upward or downward, however, if the court finds such adjustment necessary to provide for the needs of the children or to do justice between the parties under the special circumstances of the case. Iowa Ct. R. 9.4; see also Iowa Ct. R. 9.11 (providing the court may vary from the guidelines when following the guidelines would be “unjust or inappropriate” and listing factors to consider in making the determination to vary from the guidelines). 10 Part of Bryce’s argument in favor of straying from the guidelines is based on Katherine’s voluntary decision to become a stay-at-home parent. “One of the factors we consider in determining if we will use a parent’s earning capacity, rather than a parent’s actual earnings, in order to meet the needs of the children and do justice between the parties is whether the parent’s inability to earn a greater income is self-inflicted or voluntary.” In re Marriage of McKenzie, 709 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Iowa 2006). Bryce also suggests the court should have considered Brad’s income in fashioning his obligation since Brad is the one who supports the shared household. While it is inappropriate to include Brad’s income as part of Katherine’s income for purposes of calculating support obligations, it is proper for us to consider Brad and Katherine’s combined income to “determine whether a strict application of the guidelines would result in a substantial injustice.” Id.; see State ex rel. Reaves v. Kappmeyer, 514 N.W.2d 101, 104–05 (Iowa 1994) (determining parents’ incomes for purposes of the child support guidelines without regard to the incomes of others, and then only considering such additional funds in evaluating “whether awarding the guideline amount would result in a substantial injustice” warranting departure from the guidelines). Despite Bryce’s arguments, we are not convinced that Katherine’s decision to become a stay-at-home mom renders the guidelines unjust or inappropriate in this case. While Katherine could find work, this would require additional expenses for childcare which could offset any benefit derived from her employment. Our caselaw supports this outcome as we have previously declined to impute income to stay-at-home parents. See In re Marriage of Bonnette, 492 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re 11 Deierling, 421 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1974). While we decline to penalize Katherine for making the choice to stay home, the issue still needs to be remanded for recalculation to provide for Bryce’s extraordinary visitation under the original decree. To be clear, we affirm the district court’s income determination but remand for recalculation to reduce Bryce’s support obligation due to the restoration of the original visitation schedule. IV. Attorney Fees Bryce also challenges the district court’s decision to order him to pay $2,500 of Katherine’s attorney fees. In proceedings to modify custody or visitation under Iowa Code chapter 600B, district courts “may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees.” Iowa Code § 600B.26. We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 25 (Iowa 2005). Bryce’s argument against the award lies entirely on the perceived financial disparity between himself and Katherine, relying mostly on the wealth of Katherine’s husband. The district court considered Bryce’s position when fashioning its award, stating: Bryce earns substantially more than Katherine and Katherine is the prevailing party in this action, on some issues. However, Katherine has the monetary support of her husband. When balancing Katherine’s need with Bryce’s ability to pay, the court accordingly orders Bryce to pay $2,500.00 towards Katherine’s legal fees within 180 days from the date of this ruling. Given this reasoning, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the attorney fee award. 12 V. Appellate Attorney Fees Finally, both Bryce and Katherine request an award of appellate attorney fees. Whether to grant appellate attorney fees is left to our discretion. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013). “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). After reviewing the relevant factors, we determine that Bryce is entitled to $2,500 in appellate attorney fees due to his meritorious appeal. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 13