Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1674 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Avery L. Smith, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Triston L. Scarborough, Respondent–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, The Honorable Ashley Sparks, Judge. _______________ APPEAL DISMISSED _______________ Triston L. Scarborough, Marshalltown, self-represented appellant. Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, attorney for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Doyle, S.J. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. Triston Scarborough challenges the district court’s custody decree entered by default hearing, arguing the court entered the decree without providing him notice. Because Scarborough’s brief fails to comply with our rules of appellate procedure, we dismiss the appeal. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On March 14, 2025, Avery Smith filed a petition to establish custody, parenting time, and support. On April 24, Scarborough accepted service of the petition, the original notice, and the order for mediation. Soon after, Smith’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, which the district court granted. On May 21, acting pro se, Smith filed a “Notice of Intent to File Written Application for Default Decree.” During this time, Scarborough never filed an answer or other responsive pleading.1 No further action was taken in the case until September 2, 2025, when the district court filed an order setting the default hearing for September 22. In accordance with Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.972, the order stated that it would serve as written notice of intention to enter default judgment and directed the clerk of court to mail a copy of the order to Scarborough’s last known address no later than ten days prior to the hearing. Smith’s current counsel in the case then entered an appearance on September 12 and filed an affidavit with the district court to certify that Smith had mailed a copy of her “Notice of Intent to File Written Application for Default Decree” to 1 Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.303(1), Scarborough had twenty days after service of the original notice and the petition to file an answer or another motion. Because twenty days passed without Scarborough taking action, he was in default. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.971(1). 2 Scarborough at his last known address on May 21.2 Scarborough failed to appear at the default hearing, and the district court entered judgment on the custody decree. Scarborough then filed a notice of appeal to the supreme court on October 6. Three days later, Scarborough filed a motion with the district court to set aside the default judgment. However, the district court properly denied the motion, as it lost jurisdiction over the case when Scarborough filed his notice of appeal.3 Scarborough then improperly filed a motion to dismiss his appeal in the district court, which the court took no action on. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1201. Scarborough now appeals. DISCUSSION I. Violations of the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure The Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure govern the form and content for briefs . . . filed with our supreme court. Failure to comply with these rules can lead to summary disposition of an appeal. We are not bound to consider a party’s position when the brief fails to comply with our rules of appellate procedure. Hanson v. Harveys Casino Hotel, 652 N.W.2d 841, 842 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 2 In her brief, Smith points out that due to a misunderstanding between herself and her attorney as to which address the affidavit was supposed to list, an amended affidavit was later filed that provided Scarborough’s correct address and that Smith had mailed the notice to that address on May 21. 3 See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Iowa 2000) (“[O]nce the appeal is perfected, the district court loses jurisdiction to rule on the motion, and any such ruling has no legal effect.”). Scarborough later filed the same motion with the district court, which the court again properly denied. 3 Scarborough’s brief violates our rules of appellate procedure in many ways, ranging from cosmetic to critical. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(c) (providing what the front cover of a brief must contain); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(e) (double-spaced requirement); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(g)(1) (requiring serifs typeface that is 14-point or larger); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(h) (stating that case names must be italicized or underlined); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(i)(4) (requiring certificate of compliance form); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(2) (formatting of the table of authorities); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(3) (formatting of the statement of the issues presented for review); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(6) (requiring the statement of the facts to make specific references to the record); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(1)– (2) (requiring that each issue in the argument section must address how the issue was preserved for appeal and the scope and standard of review); Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(2)(a) (providing the format parties must follow when citing cases); Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(4) (providing how to properly cite the record). “As a matter of grace, we have on occasion determined an appeal even though the appellant has failed to comply with the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure. Regrettably, we cannot extend such grace in this case.” Conkey v. Iowa Veterinary Supply, Nos. 0-479, 99-1378, 2000 WL 1288970, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 13, 2000) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted). The most problematic issue with Scarborough’s brief is its argument section. While the brief does have an argument section, it fails to make any argument apart from asserting conclusory statements.4 “[W]ithout the critical argument section of the appellate brief to clearly identify and develop [Scarborough’s] claims on appeal, we cannot reach the merits.” Campbell v. Griffin, No. 22-0022, 2022 WL 17826924, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 4 The brief’s certificate of compliance states that the brief contains 294 words. 4 2022); see also State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (“A party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party fails to make more than a perfunctory argument in support of the issue.”). We do not mention the transgressions out of a fit of crankiness, nor do we single out [Scarborough’s] brief, for it is not unique in this respect. Rule infractions are not a trivial matter. A party’s disregard of the rules may lead to summary disposition of the appeal or waiver of an issue. Additionally, we refuse to assume a partisan role and undertake a party’s research and advocacy when a party’s failure to follow the rules would require us to do so to reach the merits of the case. Furthermore, this court’s principal role is to dispose justly of a high volume of cases. A party’s noncompliance with the rules of procedure hinders our effort to meet this mandate. On the other hand, observance of the rules promotes judicial efficiency because uniformity and consistency ease navigation and analysis of the thousands of briefs the court makes it[s] way through each year. State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (footnote and internal citations omitted). We understand Scarborough is a pro se litigant, but “[t]he law does not judge by two standards, one for lawyers and another for lay persons. Rather, all are expected to act with equal competence. If lay persons choose to proceed pro se, they do so at their own risk.” Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see also In re Est. of DeTar, 572 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (en banc) (“Substantial departures from appellate procedures cannot be permitted on the basis that a non-lawyer is handling [their] own appeal.”). II. Appellate Attorney Fees Smith requests an award of appellate attorney fees. “An award of appellate attorney fees is within the discretion of the appellate court.” Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Iowa 2005); see also Iowa Code 5 § 600B.26 (2025) (“[T]he court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees.”). We consider “the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal.” Markey, 705 N.W.2d at 26 (citation omitted). Considering these factors, we decline to award Smith her requested appellate attorney fees. APPEAL DISMISSED. 6