Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0576 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jeffrey Brian Bettis, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, The Honorable Patrick A. McElyea, Judge. _______________ APPEAL DISMISSED _______________ Erin Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (until withdrawal) and Tessa Register, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Badding, J., and Doyle, S.J. Opinion by Doyle, S.J. 1 DOYLE, Senior Judge. The State charged Jeffrey Bettis with four counts of first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm as a habitual offender. Bettis moved to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop, which the district court denied. The parties eventually reached a plea agreement in which Bettis agreed to plead guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. The agreement did not provide for Bettis to enter a conditional guilty plea. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(9). Before sentencing, Bettis filed a motion in arrest of judgment. Bettis claimed the plea proceedings were procedurally defective for not fully explaining what rights he was forfeiting and that he was not informed of the possibility of entering a conditional guilty plea to preserve his ability to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. The district court considered the motion in arrest of judgment at the sentencing hearing. When the district court asked Bettis whether he would have still pled guilty if the purported plea deficiencies had not occurred, Bettis equivocated. He stated, “I just want to give my definitive answer of I don’t know.” The court then questioned the attorneys as to whether a conditional plea would have been an option in this case. The prosecutor explained that the State never offered to enter into a conditional plea. The court then explained to Bettis that the plea proceedings were not deficient for failing to discuss a type of plea that was never offered to him, to which Bettis agreed. And then it denied the motion in arrest of judgment in its entirety and proceeded with sentencing. Bettis then filed this appeal challenging the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment and claiming he has good cause to appeal as a matter of 2 right despite his guilty plea. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025). The State counters that because Bettis is seeking review of the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment, he must seek discretionary review under Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(f ) rather than appeal as a matter of right. We agree with the State. State v. Merten, No. 24-1614, 2026 WL 222308, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026) (“Discretionary review, not direct appeal, is the appropriate appellate vehicle for denials of motions in arrest of judgment.”); see also id. at *4 (Badding, P.J., specially concurring) (“[T]his case is only concerned with the denial of a motion in arrest of judgment and thus solely within the discretionary review provisions of section 814.6(2).”). However, our rules of appellate procedure allow us to proceed as though the proper form of review has been requested. Iowa R. App. P. 6.151(1). So we proceed as though Bettis sought discretionary review, and “consider whether to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction and grant discretionary review.” Merten, 2026 WL 222308, at *2. We may grant discretionary review if we determine “substantial justice has not been accorded” to Bettis. Iowa R. App. P. 6.106(2). Because Bettis did not demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the purported plea deficiencies, the State contends Iowa Code section 814.29 precludes us from granting discretionary review. See Iowa Code § 814.29 (“If a defendant challenges a guilty plea based on an alleged defect in the plea proceedings, the plea shall not be vacated unless the defendant demonstrates that the defendant more likely than not would not have pled guilty if the defect had not occurred.”). Again, we agree with the State. Here, the district court specifically asked Bettis if he would have refused to plead guilty had the purported plea deficiencies not occurred. And he responded that he didn’t know—falling far short of section 814.29’s requirement that Bettis show “more likely than not [he] would not have pled guilty if the defect had not 3 occurred.” We understand Bettis now claims in his appellate brief that he would not have pled guilty had he better understood the rights he was forfeiting, but the underlying record betrays his present assertion. And we highlight that the plea favored Bettis. The agreement resulted in the dismissal of three class “B” felonies and one class “D” felony, significantly reducing his sentencing exposure. Because section 814.29 forecloses our ability to grant Bettis any relief, Bettis’s claims are unfit for discretionary review. We decline to grant discretionary review and dismiss the appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. 4