Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1688 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jaylen Michael Derek Davis, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Interlocutory Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, The Honorable Justin R. Wyatt, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Amanda Heims, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. On interlocutory appeal, Jaylen Davis challenges the district court’s order denying his motion for reverse waiver to juvenile court. Upon our review, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In April 2025, Davis was sixteen years old when he was alleged to have engaged in sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old female. The State filed a trial information charging Davis with second-degree sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1, 709.3(1)(b), and 903B.1 (2025). Davis moved to transfer jurisdiction to juvenile court. A waiver hearing took place in August 2025. The State introduced a waiver report completed by juvenile court officer ( JCO) Teresa Conway, along with Conway’s testimony recommending that Davis’s case remain in district court. The defense introduced a report by psychologist Dr. Kirk Newring, along with Dr. Newring’s testimony opining Davis did not present a risk of recidivism and recommending that Davis’s case be transferred to juvenile court. The district court denied Davis’s motion for reverse waiver. Davis filed an application for interlocutory appeal. The supreme court granted the application and transferred this case to our court for disposition. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because Davis’s challenge to the district court’s waiver decision involves the court’s “statutory discretion under Iowa Code section 232.45, we review for an abuse of discretion.” See State v. Erdman, 996 N.W.2d 544, 2 548 (Iowa 2023). “We review constitutional claims de novo.” State v. Mahana, 36 N.W.3d 706, 712 (Iowa 2026) (citation omitted). ANALYSIS “A child age sixteen or older charged with a forcible felony is not subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but is subject to the jurisdiction of adult court.” State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011); accord Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(c). “However, upon a motion and for good cause, the court may transfer jurisdiction of the child to the juvenile court in a ʻreverse waiver.’” Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d at 618; accord Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(c). In cases initiated in adult court, such as here, the child has “the burden to show good cause for a reverse waiver to juvenile court.” Erdman, 996 N.W.2d at 549. In considering whether jurisdiction of the child should be transferred, the court “may direct a juvenile court officer to provide a report regarding whether the child should be transferred to juvenile court for adjudication and disposition as a juvenile.” Iowa Code § 803.6(1). The court may then “hold a hearing on whether the child should be transferred [to juvenile court],” id. § 803.6(2), after which “the court may transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court if the court determines that waiver to the criminal court would be inappropriate under the criteria” set forth in section 232.45(6)(c) and (8), id. § 803.6(3). Here, the district court followed this procedure, applied the statutory factors, and considered the evidence in the record, which included recommendations from the JCO and Dr. Newring. Ultimately, the court determined “the State has met its burden to show that there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation if juvenile court retains jurisdiction 3 and Davis has failed to meet his burden” to show “that his case should be transferred to juvenile court.” Specifically, the court noted in part: Juvenile Court Services routinely works with youth sex offenders through inpatient programs and extended outpatient programs. Inpatient sex offender treatment programs typically last 18 to 24 months. Outpatient programs normally take participants 1 to 2 years to complete. Davis is currently 17 years and 4 months old. He turns 18 in about 8 months. JCO Conway believes that is insufficient time for him to successfully complete treatment before his 18th birthday. Treatment services could continue through the juvenile court on a voluntary basis beyond [Davis]’s 18th birthday for up to 18 months. There would be no Iowa Code 232 funding available for continued treatment, so it would have to be paid for by [Davis]’s family. Once on a voluntary basis, the only sanction for non-compliance would be contempt of court with a relatively short jail sentence as the only remedy. [Davis] could be undergoing treatment now on a voluntary basis, but the family says they cannot afford it. JCO Conway[] believes that Davis’[s] lack of compliance with school rules, lack of attendance, not completing homework, and suspensions do not indicate that he would successfully complete sex offender treatment before his 18th birthday, or after on a voluntary basis. JCO Conway’s report further states if Davis does not admit to the offense, a trial could extend past his 18th birthday, leaving Juvenile Court with no enforceable sanctions and limiting any reasonable prospects for rehabilitation. .... Davis is charged with one forcible felony—sexual abuse in the second degree. The charge involves sexually abusing a much younger child. The nature and extent of the delinquent acts, weigh against a transfer to juvenile court. Furthermore, Davis is only 8 months from his 18th birthday. Davis’s insubordination and non-attendance at school do not support the argument that he could complete sex offender treatment on an accelerated basis prior to his 18th birthday. Based on these factors, as well as Davis not admitting to the allegations, there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation for Davis through juvenile court services. 4 On appeal, Davis does not challenge the court’s determination that he met the first two factors in section 232.45(6)—that he is fourteen years of age or older and that probable cause existed to believe he committed a public offense. Id. § 232.45(6)(a)–(b). Instead, he claims the court “failed to apply all of the factors of Iowa Code section 232.45(6)(c)”—which requires the court to “determine[] that the state has established that there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child” in juvenile court, and that adult-court jurisdiction “over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and the community.” Id. § 232.45(6)(c). Section 232.45(8) “contains a nonexhaustive list of factors that the juvenile court must consider in deciding” the third element of section 232.45(6). Erdman, 996 N.W.2d at 549. That list includes: a. The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circumstances under which it was committed. b. The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts. c. The programs, facilities and personnel available to the juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the programs, facilities and personnel which would be available to the court that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult. Iowa Code § 232.45(8)(a)–(c). Davis acknowledges the district court “correctly cited . . . the factors it should include in its analysis,” but he claims the court “failed to provide analysis with respect to these factors.” This claim is unpersuasive. The court received evidence and testimony from both parties as to the necessary 5 factors, which the court evaluated in its ruling. The court noted the circumstances of the offense, whether Davis had a criminal record or prior contact with juvenile court, and Davis’s prospects of rehabilitation given his personal characteristics and social history. The court evaluated the treatment programs available to Davis whether his case was prosecuted in juvenile or adult court. Ultimately, based on the evidence presented, the court determined what option would provide Davis with the best chance for rehabilitation under the circumstances of this case. Davis also claims the court “relied heavily on the testimony of [ JCO] Conway and gave little weight to the testimony of Dr. Kirk Newring.” According to Davis, if the court had appropriately analyzed the factors, the court would have concluded “they weigh strongly in favor of [Davis].” However, it was within the court’s discretion to weigh the evidence and testimony. And in doing so, the court was “not limited to” consideration of the enumerated factors in section 232.45(8). Id. § 232.45(8); accord Erdman, 996 N.W.2d at 549. We further observe that the court detailed information provided by both Dr. Newring and JCO Conway in its analysis and ruling. Upon our review, we conclude the district court considered the appropriate factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s motion to transfer to juvenile court. Davis also claims “the State denied [him] due process when it purposely delayed his charging.”1 Davis further argues the State’s decision to charge him with a forcible felony for “allegations of sexual contact between a sixteen (16) year old and a thirteen (13) year old” when “[n]o force, drugs 1 Specifically, Davis claims the police began investigating his case in April 2025, but the State—“for unknown reasons”—“did not execute the arrest warrant until August 1, 2025,” which violated his right to due process. 6 or alcohol, or coercion was used” “goes against public policy and violates his constitutional rights.” The State counters that Davis’s constitutional claims are not preserved for review because they were neither raised before nor decided by the district court. But we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over these claims, as such were not raised in Davis’s application for interlocutory review. See In re Marriage of Zahnd, 567 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); accord In re Marriage of Graziano, 573 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1998); Iowa R. App. P. 6.104(1)(a). Davis only requested and received permission to appeal the district court’s denial of the reverse waiver.2 See Koss v. City of Cedar Rapids, 300 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1981) (finding the issues raised in an application for interlocutory review “set the parameters of any appellate-court jurisdiction” and jurisdiction of issues not raised in the application). We limit our consideration to this issue for which interlocutory review was requested and granted. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.104(1)(e) (requiring applications for interlocutory review to comply with “the content and form requirements of rules 6.1002(1) and 6.1007” and “state with particularity the substantial rights affected by the challenged ruling or order”). Having considered the claim properly before us, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 2 Even if Davis had included his constitutional claims in the application for interlocutory review, the district court did not rule on the claims Davis now raises or any variation thereof. Because Davis’s constitutional claims were neither raised before nor decided by the district court, they are not preserved. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). 7