Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0721 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ Louis Alfred Evans, Plaintiff, v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, Defendant. _______________ Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Becky Goettsch, Judge. _______________ WRIT ANNULLED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for plaintiff. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (until withdrawal) and David Banta, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for defendant. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Badding, P.J., Sandy, J., and Doyle, S.J. Opinion by Doyle, S.J. 1 DOYLE, Senior Judge. Louis Evans petitioned for writ of certiorari from a permanent restitution order entered after the court sentenced him on one count of assault causing bodily injury. Evans contends that the State’s motion to amend the sentencing order to include restitution was untimely. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the amount of restitution. Following our review, we annul the writ of certiorari. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS In June 2024, Evans was involved in a minor car collision in a parking lot. The incident escalated to a physical altercation with Evans punching and kicking the other driver and striking his head with a car door. The other driver went to a hospital where he was X-rayed to check for a concussion or broken jaw. The State charged Evans with one count of assault causing bodily injury or mental illness. The parties reached a plea agreement, which included Evans paying restitution. The court accepted Evans’s guilty plea and sentenced him. The part of the sentencing order addressing victim pecuniary damages said the amount of those damages was not available at the time and that the State could apply for a supplemental restitution order when they became available. Three months after sentencing, the State filed a statement of pecuniary damages and moved to amend the sentencing order to include restitution of $4,959.42 for the victim’s medical expenses. The court entered a supplemental order requiring Evans to pay $4,959.42 in victim pecuniary damages. Evans moved for a hearing, claiming that the statement of 2 pecuniary damages was untimely. He also challenged the amount of restitution. The State called the victim at the restitution hearing, who testified that he did not have medical insurance when Evans assaulted him. It also admitted into evidence two bills totaling $4,959.42 for the victim’s medical treatment.1 At the end of the hearing, the court rejected Evans’s claim that the statement of pecuniary damages was untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after sentencing, finding that the delay was reasonable. The court also found the State met its burden of proving the amount of restitution. The court ordered Evans to pay the amount set in the restitution order, and Evans petitioned for writ of certiorari. SCOPE OF REVIEW Because Evans challenges the permanent restitution order entered three months after sentencing, appeal is not a matter of right but must be challenged by writ of certiorari. See Iowa Code § 910.3(10) (2025) (“A permanent restitution order entered after the time of sentencing shall only be challenged pursuant to section 910.7.”); id. § 910.7(5) (“Appellate review of a district court ruling under this section shall be by writ of certiorari.”); State v. Patterson, 984 N.W.2d 449, 454-55 (Iowa 2023). Our review is for correction of errors at law. Peterzalek v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 7 N.W.3d 37, 40 (Iowa 2024). DISCUSSION A writ of certiorari is available when a court exceeds its jurisdiction or otherwise acts illegally. Patterson, 984 N.W.2d at 455-56. Illegality occurs 1 Neither bill was itemized, and one bill did not list a date of service. 3 when the court does not properly apply the law or its findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 456. “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find it adequate to reach the given conclusion, even if a reviewing court might draw a contrary inference.” Id. (citation omitted). Evans contends that by amending his sentence to include restitution, the district court acted illegally in two ways: (1) by allowing an untimely request for victim pecuniary damages under Iowa Code section 910.3(5) and (2) by ordering an amount of restitution that the record does not support. I. Timeliness. We begin with the claim that the district court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the sentencing order because the statement of pecuniary damages was untimely. Evans relies on Iowa Code section 910.3(5), which says that a “statement of pecuniary damages shall ordinarily be provided no later than thirty days after sentencing.” (Emphasis added). He argues that the State was aware of the victim’s medical bills at least four months before he pled guilty and was sentenced. Despite this, the State filed the statement of pecuniary damages three months after sentencing. The full text of section 910.3(5) makes clear that the thirty-day limit “is merely directory and not mandatory.” State v. Blakley, 534 N.W.2d 645, 648-49 (Iowa 1995) (interpreting section 910.3 and holding that the thirty- day requirement is not jurisdictional because the State’s failure to abide by the time requirement is not fatal to its effort to secure restitution for crime victims). Although statements of pecuniary damages must “ordinarily” be filed no later than thirty days after sentencing, the statute allows prosecuting attorneys to file them “within a reasonable time after the prosecuting attorney is notified by a victim of any pecuniary damages incurred.” Iowa 4 Code § 910.3(5). This allowance recognizes that “a victim’s total damages may not be ascertainable at the time of sentencing.” State v. Blakley, 555 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Iowa 1996). But even if a victim’s damages are complete before sentencing, other reasons may provide good cause for a delay. See id. (noting that “although the victim’s damages were complete well before the sentencing hearing, the bill for medical expenses provided by the hospital was not submitted to the State by the crime victim compensation program until many months afterward”). Whether the defendant is prejudiced by the delay is another factor the court weighs in deciding whether to enter a restitution order more than thirty days after sentencing. See id. The prosecutor told the court that it took some time after sentencing to investigate why the hospital bill, which was originally $12,982, was reduced by almost $8,000. The prosecutor explained that the State wanted to ensure the victim did not owe more than the reduced amount—“and that did take a little bit of time.” The district court found that the explanation for the delay was reasonable, noting that the bill’s reduction helped Evans rather than prejudicing him. The court added that Evans knew he had to pay restitution and agreed to do so as part of the plea agreement. Although Evans disagrees with the court’s finding of good cause, a reasonable person could reach the same conclusion as the court. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the State provided good cause for the delay. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. We next consider whether substantial evidence supports the amount of restitution the court awarded. Imposing restitution is mandatory, but the court has discretion in deciding the amount of restitution to award. See State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Iowa 2018). The State bears the burden of proving that restitution should be awarded, and it must produce evidence on 5 the amount of damages sought. See id. Restitution may be awarded for any damages causally related to the crime. State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Iowa 2001). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the damages bear a reasonable relationship to the criminal act. Id. A restitution award may include all damages that a victim could recover in a civil action against the offender minus those paid by an insurer on an insurance claim by the victim. See Iowa Code § 910.1(6) (defining pecuniary damages). Evans contends that the bills produced by the State are insufficient to support the restitution award. Although presenting a bill from a third-party alone is not enough to show a victim’s damages, see Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d at 169-70, that was not the only proof the State offered. The victim testified at the restitution hearing about Evans’s assault: “I was punched in the nose. I was punched in the left side of my jaw. And when I was knocked to the ground, I was—continued to be punched and kicked until, finally, he hit me in my head with my car door.” As a result, he sought treatment at the nearest hospital, where he was X-rayed to check for a concussion or broken jaw. The victim explained that he did not have health insurance when he was treated. He testified that he was billed a total of $4,959.42 “as a direct result of being assaulted by [Evans].” The district court found that the State proved that the $4,959.42 in hospital bills resulted directly from Evans’s assault. It rejected Evans’s claim that the State did not prove every charge for treatment at the hospital was medically necessary: They’re medical bills. I think it defies logic to require a victim of a crime under the circumstances to be asking questions or picking and choosing medical treatment when you go to the ER with significant injuries . . . . I also am not going to require under these circumstances to have a doctor 6 come in and say why he ordered or she ordered X-rays when there’s a head injury. I think that is common sense, and that proves the amount due by a preponderance. A reasonable person could find that the amount of the victim’s hospital bills, after reduction, was causally connected to Evans’s assault. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that the State met its burden of proof. WRIT ANNULLED. 7