Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1104 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of B.S. and A.S., Minor Children, T.S., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, The Honorable Kristal L. Phillips, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Maura C. Goaley, Council Bluffs, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Ryan Gaskins, Ida Grove, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to B.S., born in 2023, and A.S., born in 2021. 1 She argues the juvenile court erred in finding that the State proved the statutory grounds for termination and in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. Upon our review, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in July 2024 due to concerns about the use of methamphetamine and other drugs by the mother and father and because the mother assaulted the father in front of the children. The children were removed from the mother’s custody and adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.96A(3)(b), (14), and (16) (2024). Since removal, the mother has struggled with drug use and her sobriety. Furthermore, the mother has been charged with various crimes, including distributing methamphetamine. The termination hearing was held in May 2026. Following the hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to both children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(l) (2026). The court also terminated the mother’s 1 The father’s parental rights are not at issue on appeal. 2 parental rights to B.S. under section 232.116(1)(h). 2 The mother now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW “Termination proceedings are reviewed de novo.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). “We give weight to the [juvenile court’s] factual findings but are not bound by them.” Id. “We generally apply a three-step analysis to review termination of parental rights. First, we consider whether there are statutory grounds for termination. Second, we determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child. Third, we consider whether we should exercise any of the permissive exceptions for termination.” Id. (internal citations omitted). However, we do not address a step if it is not raised by a parent. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). DISCUSSION The mother argues the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination and that termination was not in the children’s best interests. We address each argument in turn. I. Statutory Grounds We begin with the grounds for termination. “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm 2 This ground was also alleged in the termination petition as to A.S., who turned four years old between the time the petition was filed and the termination hearing occurred. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1) (requiring the child to be three years old or younger). Because of this, the juvenile court declined to terminate the mother’s parental rights on this ground as to A.S. 3 the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We analyze the mother’s challenge to the statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(l). That section provides that the juvenile court may terminate parental rights when: (1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96 and custody has been transferred from the child’s parents for placement pursuant to section 232.102. (2) The parent has a severe substance use disorder as described by either of the following: (a) The severe substance use disorder meets the definition for that term as defined in the most current edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual prepared by the American psychiatric association, and the parent presents a danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts. (b) The disorder is evidenced by continued and repeated use through the case, the parent’s refusal to obtain a substance use disorder evaluation or treatment after given the opportunity to do so, and the parent presents a danger to self or others as evidenced by prior acts. (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to be returned to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and need for a permanent home. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(l). As to the first element, the children have been adjudicated CINA, and custody has been transferred from the children’s parents.3 3 The record shows the children were originally removed from the custody of both parents and placed in the temporary custody of HHS. However, the children have since continued to reside in the father’s home after HHS no longer had any concern about his drug use. Nonetheless, the mother has not had custody of the children since removal. 4 Turning to the second element, it must be shown that the mother has a severe substance-use disorder. We analyze this element under subparagraph b. In August 2024, the mother was diagnosed with cocaine dependence, cannabis abuse, and other stimulant use. By the time of the termination hearing, the mother remained diagnosed with cannabis abuse, alcohol abuse, and other stimulant abuse. In addition to these diagnoses, the record shows that the mother has continually and repeatedly used drugs throughout the case. While the mother has had various opportunities to receive treatment, she has either refused to do so, or when she has, she has not been consistent with her treatment. The mother contends that while she struggled to maintain her sobriety for part of the case, she has since found and maintained her sobriety. The mother testified at the termination hearing that she had been sober for five months. While we are sympathetic to the mother’s recent efforts to maintain sobriety, they do not overcome her inconsistencies throughout the case. See In re C.H., No. 09-0678, 2009 WL 1681054, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2009) (“[The mother] testified that she had been sober for almost four months. While we commend her recent efforts at sobriety, those efforts are insufficient in light of her lengthy . . . history of substance abuse, past failed attempts at treatment, and relapses during this case.”). The mother’s prior acts are evidence that she is a danger to herself or others. This case arose because the mother assaulted the children’s father in front of the children while using methamphetamine. Moreover, at one point in the case, HHS found that the mother had drugs, paraphernalia, and an unsecured firearm in the home during visits with the children. Not only was the mother using drugs, but she was also selling them, which eventually led 5 to her being arrested for distributing methamphetamine. These acts put both the mother and the children in danger. Lastly, there is clear and convincing evidence that because of the mother’s prognosis, the children will not be able to be returned to her custody in a reasonable amount of time. We agree with the juvenile court’s finding in the termination order: Given [the mother’s] continued struggles with maintaining sobriety in the twenty-one months this case has been open despite participating in both outpatient and inpatient treatment services, the evidence is both clear and convincing that the [children] will not be able to be returned to [the mother’s] custody within a reasonable period of time. The children should not be forced to wait for permanency in the hope that one day their mother will overcome her substance use. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 314 (Iowa 2021) (“This is exactly the sort of case where we must not deprive a child of permanency on the hope Mom will get better. Mom clearly loves her children. Yet, we cannot deprive these children of a stable home on the hope that Mom will someday be able to succeed in her efforts to remain sober.”). Thus, we find that the State proved a statutory ground for the termination of the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(l). The mother also argues that the State failed to make reasonable efforts “to eliminate the need for removal of the child[ren] or make it possible for the child[ren] to safely return to the [mother’s] home.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a). “The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child[ren] cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). 6 The mother admits that various services were offered throughout the case, including visitation, substance-use evaluation and treatment, mental- health evaluation, random drug screens, supervised visitation, relative placement, inpatient treatment, and social work/case management. However, the mother argues that HHS did not provide reasonable efforts because visits occurred in public and because there was a lack of consistency in service providers and transportation assistance. The mother sought visits that were not in a public setting because of her trauma from her involvement in the system as a child. While some visits occurred in the mother’s home, visits were moved to public settings due to safety concerns in the home. As noted, these concerns included the presence of drugs in the home. There is nothing here to suggest a lack of reasonable efforts, as “[a] child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern in making reasonable efforts.” Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a). While the mother has preferences regarding where visits should occur, they do not overcome the children’s safety. We understand the mother’s frustration in the turnover of service providers over the course of this case. However, this does not mean HHS failed to make reasonable efforts. Rather, the record shows that HHS maintained or attempted to maintain regular contact with the mother. The record also shows that at times transportation was provided to the mother so she could attend visits and treatments. Furthermore, the mother was permitted to utilize telehealth to engage with services. Therefore, we reject the mother’s claim that the State failed to make reasonable efforts. 7 II. Best Interests The mother also asserts that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Under the best-interests analysis, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We find termination is in the children’s best interests. A May 2026 HHS report noted the children have “continued to thrive” in the father’s custody. But the mother argues that the bond she has with the children supports a finding that termination is not in their best interests. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 535 (holding that the bond between a parent and child should be considered in the best-interests analysis). While the mother clearly loves her children and a bond exists between them, the bond does not override the children’s best interests in termination. See In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the parent-child bond “is not an overriding consideration, but merely a factor to consider”). As explained above, the mother’s prior acts raise serious concerns about the children’s safety. The mother’s actions since the children were removed from her custody illustrate that termination is in the children’s best interests. See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 172 (Iowa 2020) (“In determining [the children’s] best interests, ‘we look to [the mother’s] past performance because it may indicate the quality of care [she] is capable of providing in the future.’” (citation omitted)). And while the mother has made recent efforts to maintain her sobriety, “[i]t is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent 8 and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010).4 CONCLUSION Because we find that the State proved a ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(l) and termination is in the children’s best interests, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 4 The mother alternatively argues the juvenile court should have entered a bridge order under Iowa Code section 232.103A. However, a bridge order requires that the CINA case can safely close. See Iowa Code § 232.103A(1)(e); see also In re L.M., No. 19-0426, 2019 WL 2373649, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2019) (“We find continued concerns for the children’s safety precluded the use of a bridge order in this case.”). Additionally, “[e]ntry of a bridge order is not the preferred solution when there is long-standing discord between the parents.” In re I.L., No. 25-0477, 2025 WL 2538875, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2025). This case began because the mother assaulted the father in front of the children, and the relationship between the parents has been strained since. Thus, we conclude that the entry of a bridge order is not in the children’s best interests. 9