Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1305 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of J.E., Minor Child, A.E., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, The Honorable Patrick McAvan, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Patricia J. Lipski, Washington, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a son born in 2024, arguing that severing the mother-child relationship is not in the child’s best interests. In the alternative, she also argues that she should have been given an additional six months to work toward reunification. On our de novo review, we affirm the termination of her parental rights to the child. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On June 26, 2024, the mother called an ambulance because she had severe abdominal pain. Upon arrival of first responders, she told them that she might be pregnant, explaining that her stomach had been getting bigger but that she had been too afraid to confirm or even acknowledge the pregnancy. She reported that she had used methamphetamine every day since 2018, and any child she was carrying was likely deceased. During transport, responders used a fetal doppler and the mother heard the baby’s heartbeat for the first time. She later described that as the point when she began to believe “maybe everything would be okay.” The mother was immediately transferred to a hospital in Des Moines for fear of a possible placental abruption. On June 27, the child was delivered by cesarean section at thirty-four weeks gestation—more than a month premature. He was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit. At the time of his birth, his mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The child’s umbilical cord also tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines, and the mother admitted that she had used methamphetamine the day he was born. However, the child never exhibited signs of withdrawal. 2 The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became involved immediately and petitioned for the child to be adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA). This was not the mother’s first involvement with HHS, as her parental rights to two older children were terminated in 2019 due to her ongoing alcohol abuse. After learning that the child had tested positive for methamphetamine, and given the mother’s stated belief that she did not need abuse treatment, the State sought removal. The application cited the mother’s ongoing substance use, her lack of insight into the need for treatment, her lack of stable housing, and the absence of a safe and reliable support network to ensure the child’s safety. Removal was granted, and HHS assumed legal custody and temporary guardianship. After an August adjudicatory hearing, the child was adjudicated a CINA. Motivated by the possible loss of her child, the mother then entered substance-use treatment, did well, and the child was returned to her care while she continued participating in treatment. The mother was successfully discharged from treatment five months later. Starting in January 2025, she and the child lived in an apartment provided by an agency that offered her extended outpatient treatment. However, the mother immediately began missing substance-use treatment sessions. Less than two weeks after discharge, she admitted that she had used either alcohol or marijuana every-other day. She further admitted that she was actively seeking methamphetamine and would use it once she had access to the drug. She relapsed on methamphetamine a few days later. At the end of January, the court again removed the child from the mother’s care and the child was placed in foster care. The child has remained placed outside of the mother’s care since that date. Although the mother was offered readmission to inpatient treatment, she declined. 3 Fear of losing the child again motivated the mother to seek treatment and she enrolled as an outpatient with a local substance-use treatment provider. Throughout treatment and HHS involvement, the mother was remarkably candid with providers about her ongoing struggles with sobriety, which was noted by the guardian ad litem as a “huge positive.” She admitted that she kept illegal drugs and paraphernalia in her home, so visits with the child were moved away from her apartment. She admitted trying to stay sober for at least thirty days to complete ADHD testing and gave providers a calendar she used to monitor her sobriety, which showed she rarely maintained sobriety for more than a month between February 2025 and July 2026. She admitted to using methamphetamine daily during some more difficult months. But despite repeated recommendations to return to inpatient treatment, the mother refused for a variety of reasons. As a result, all of her visits with the child were supervised due to her ongoing methamphetamine usage and tenuous mental health. In October 2025, as a part of its case permanency plan, HHS recommended that the juvenile court change the goal from reunification to termination of parental rights. After the mother again refused to engage in more intensive substance-use treatment in December, the State filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. The court held the termination hearing over three days on January 20, March 11, and May 27, 2026, due to the volume of evidence and following complications in locating the child’s father and securing his participation.1 The mother testified about her bond with the child at the second hearing, explaining, “When I’m with [the child], it’s the happiest that I’ve ever been, especially since losing my other two kids.” She continued, “When [the child] 1 The father’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal. 4 comes around, I’m happy, and I’m smiling, and I’m laughing, and everything around us just disappears. Everything in the world doesn’t matter . . . He is everything for me.” The mother urged the court not to give up on her “five minutes before [her] miracle happens.” The child’s maternal grandmother corroborated this testimony, telling the court that reunification with the child was her daughter’s “big incentive” to overcome her addiction. Yet once again, the mother was candid about her ongoing struggles with methamphetamine use. Explaining the reasoning for her relapses since the court last saw her, she told the court: The last seven years with the exception of when I was in treatment, I used meth every day consistently throughout the day. And so I’ve been working really hard on getting that cycle broken. And I had gotten a month—I had gotten to a month clean after the last hearing when I relapsed, and at the time it was really just sort of out of habit, I guess, kind of the first time was. And then after that, I sort of lost hope because I figured I had ruined all my chances of anything good happening for [the child] and [myself ] after that relapse, so it kind of snowballed after that. At the time of her testimony, the mother was not participating in any substance-use treatment. On July 13, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the child under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2025). During the twenty-five-month period between the child’s birth and the termination of the mother’s parental rights, the mother admitted to relapsing at least twenty-six times. By all accounts, the mother was an attentive parent to her son when sober. 5 II. Standard of Review. Our review of orders terminating parental rights is de novo. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted). III. Analysis. We apply a three-step analysis to termination of parental rights cases. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). First, we determine whether the State has proved any ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). Second, we consider whether the best interest framework under section 232.116(2) supports termination. Id. And finally, if termination is warranted, we examine whether any exception under section 232.116(3) applies such that a court need not terminate the parent’s rights. Id. The mother challenges the second step in this analysis, arguing that termination was not in the child’s best interests and, alternatively, she should have been given an additional six months to work toward reunification. We address each argument in turn. A. Best Interests. The mother asserts her substantial progress toward reunification shows termination was not in the child’s best interests. Although the mother continued to struggle with sobriety, she argues those challenges did not result in her disengaging from the child or “failing to perform the parental role during the time available to her.” She emphasizes that her supervised visits consistently went well, that she independently sought additional parenting programming as part of her reunification efforts, and that HHS expressed no concerns regarding her ability to care for the 6 child when she was sober. In the mother’s view, nothing in the record supports severing their close bond, and the child’s best interests are better served by preserving the established mother-child relationship. To determine whether termination is in a child’s best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Safety and the need for permanency mark the “defining elements” of a child’s best interests. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). The mother’s continued, severe drug use poses a serious and direct threat to the child’s safety if he were returned to her care. Unfortunately, the mother continues to use methamphetamine, and despite help, continues to fall victim to her addiction. “We have long recognized that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012). And even after a parent begins treatment, continued substance use can prevent the parent from providing safe conditions for the child because drug use exposes a child to dangerous people and situations. See In re C.S., No. 16-1593, 2017 WL 362008, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017). Here, the mother’s addiction prevents her from taking even the first step toward changing the dangerous behavior that led to her child’s removal. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best interests can be gleaned from ʻevidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is capable of providing.’” (citation omitted)). We give the mother credit for her insight into her addiction, as she knows it is tied to her mental- 7 health issues, and her honesty. We hope she can achieve sobriety, but the child cannot wait for that unknown to occur. Given the mother’s long history of substance use, repeated relapses, and demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety outside a supervised setting, termination of her rights is in the child’s best interests. The mother loves her child, that much is clear. But love alone cannot give the child the stability and safety he needs. The child cannot be asked to wait indefinitely on the hope that a parent will one day be able to provide the child a safe, stable home. P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41; In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Fortunately, there is no shortage of people who love J.E. and are willing to give him the permanency that he needs now. The paternal grandmother intervened in the case and is requesting she be considered as an adoption option. From all accounts, the trial transition to her home in May 2026 appeared to be going well at the termination hearing. The foster family was also closely bonded with the child and was interested in adoption. In the end, on our de novo review, we find clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. B. Extension of Time. The mother next argues that the juvenile court should have granted her a six-month extension to work toward reunification. A court may continue termination proceedings for an additional six months if the court finds “the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). The burden to show removal will not be needed in six months is on the parent. In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021). 8 In support of her argument for an extension, the mother notes how she complied with all of HHS’s expectations aside from her sobriety. She obtained and furnished a home for a child, engaged in mental-health treatment for her PTSD and postpartum depression, obtained medication, and consistently participated in visitation with the child. Given more time, the mother argues, she may be able to achieve sobriety and safely parent her son. The juvenile court rejected this argument. It questioned the mother’s willingness to engage in additional recommended services and noted that, due to scheduling and procedural difficulties, the mother had already received seven additional months of services after the permanency order without successfully completing substance-use treatment and, in fact, had “voluntarily discontinued participation in substance use treatment.” The court concluded it was “not reasonable to gamble further on this child’s future while waiting for a ʻmiracle’” and that “[t]he evidence does not demonstrate that [the child] can be safely returned home within six additional months if additional reunification services are provided.” We agree with the juvenile court’s conclusions. The record shows no evidence that the child’s need for removal from the mother’s care would no longer exist at the end of an additional six-month period. The mother has made some efforts toward stability and those efforts are commendable. But a reduction in drug use without sustained sobriety is not enough. Despite extensive services and support, a review of the record shows she admitted to relapsing at least twenty-six times throughout the pendency of this case. A parent’s long history of substance use and inability to maintain sobriety despite being given multiple opportunities to do so often demonstrate that additional time is unlikely to result in reunification. See In re C.S., 776 9 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). On this record, there is no basis to conclude that the mother would achieve and maintain sobriety within six months. We conclude it would not be in the child’s best interests to further extend this case. IV. Conclusion. On our de novo review of the termination of the mother’s parental rights to this child, we find that the child’s best interests are served by termination and an additional six-month period for the mother to work toward reunification is not warranted. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court. AFFIRMED. 10