In the Interest of J.E., Minor Child
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledOctober 7, 2026
Docket26-1305
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-1305
Filed October 7, 2026
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In the Interest of J.E., Minor Child,
A.E., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County,
The Honorable Patrick McAvan, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell,
attorney for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
Patricia J. Lipski, Washington, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to a son born
in 2024, arguing that severing the mother-child relationship is not in the
child’s best interests. In the alternative, she also argues that she should have
been given an additional six months to work toward reunification. On our de
novo review, we affirm the termination of her parental rights to the child.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On June 26, 2024, the mother called an ambulance because she had
severe abdominal pain. Upon arrival of first responders, she told them that
she might be pregnant, explaining that her stomach had been getting bigger
but that she had been too afraid to confirm or even acknowledge the
pregnancy. She reported that she had used methamphetamine every day
since 2018, and any child she was carrying was likely deceased. During
transport, responders used a fetal doppler and the mother heard the baby’s
heartbeat for the first time. She later described that as the point when she
began to believe “maybe everything would be okay.”
The mother was immediately transferred to a hospital in Des Moines
for fear of a possible placental abruption. On June 27, the child was delivered
by cesarean section at thirty-four weeks gestation—more than a month
premature. He was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit. At the
time of his birth, his mother tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamines. The child’s umbilical cord also tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamines, and the mother admitted that she had
used methamphetamine the day he was born. However, the child never
exhibited signs of withdrawal.
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The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became
involved immediately and petitioned for the child to be adjudicated a child in
need of assistance (CINA). This was not the mother’s first involvement with
HHS, as her parental rights to two older children were terminated in 2019
due to her ongoing alcohol abuse. After learning that the child had tested
positive for methamphetamine, and given the mother’s stated belief that she
did not need abuse treatment, the State sought removal. The application
cited the mother’s ongoing substance use, her lack of insight into the need
for treatment, her lack of stable housing, and the absence of a safe and reliable
support network to ensure the child’s safety. Removal was granted, and HHS
assumed legal custody and temporary guardianship. After an August
adjudicatory hearing, the child was adjudicated a CINA. Motivated by the
possible loss of her child, the mother then entered substance-use treatment,
did well, and the child was returned to her care while she continued
participating in treatment. The mother was successfully discharged from
treatment five months later. Starting in January 2025, she and the child lived
in an apartment provided by an agency that offered her extended outpatient
treatment.
However, the mother immediately began missing substance-use
treatment sessions. Less than two weeks after discharge, she admitted that
she had used either alcohol or marijuana every-other day. She further
admitted that she was actively seeking methamphetamine and would use it
once she had access to the drug. She relapsed on methamphetamine a few
days later. At the end of January, the court again removed the child from the
mother’s care and the child was placed in foster care. The child has remained
placed outside of the mother’s care since that date. Although the mother was
offered readmission to inpatient treatment, she declined.
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Fear of losing the child again motivated the mother to seek treatment
and she enrolled as an outpatient with a local substance-use treatment
provider. Throughout treatment and HHS involvement, the mother was
remarkably candid with providers about her ongoing struggles with sobriety,
which was noted by the guardian ad litem as a “huge positive.” She admitted
that she kept illegal drugs and paraphernalia in her home, so visits with the
child were moved away from her apartment. She admitted trying to stay
sober for at least thirty days to complete ADHD testing and gave providers a
calendar she used to monitor her sobriety, which showed she rarely
maintained sobriety for more than a month between February 2025 and
July 2026. She admitted to using methamphetamine daily during some more
difficult months. But despite repeated recommendations to return to
inpatient treatment, the mother refused for a variety of reasons. As a result,
all of her visits with the child were supervised due to her ongoing
methamphetamine usage and tenuous mental health.
In October 2025, as a part of its case permanency plan, HHS
recommended that the juvenile court change the goal from reunification to
termination of parental rights. After the mother again refused to engage in
more intensive substance-use treatment in December, the State filed a
petition to terminate her parental rights.
The court held the termination hearing over three days on January 20,
March 11, and May 27, 2026, due to the volume of evidence and following
complications in locating the child’s father and securing his participation.1
The mother testified about her bond with the child at the second hearing,
explaining, “When I’m with [the child], it’s the happiest that I’ve ever been,
especially since losing my other two kids.” She continued, “When [the child]
1
The father’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.
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comes around, I’m happy, and I’m smiling, and I’m laughing, and everything
around us just disappears. Everything in the world doesn’t matter . . . He is
everything for me.” The mother urged the court not to give up on her “five
minutes before [her] miracle happens.” The child’s maternal grandmother
corroborated this testimony, telling the court that reunification with the child
was her daughter’s “big incentive” to overcome her addiction.
Yet once again, the mother was candid about her ongoing struggles
with methamphetamine use. Explaining the reasoning for her relapses since
the court last saw her, she told the court:
The last seven years with the exception of when I was in treatment, I used
meth every day consistently throughout the day. And so I’ve been working
really hard on getting that cycle broken. And I had gotten a month—I had
gotten to a month clean after the last hearing when I relapsed, and at the
time it was really just sort of out of habit, I guess, kind of the first time was.
And then after that, I sort of lost hope because I figured I had ruined
all my chances of anything good happening for [the child] and [myself ] after
that relapse, so it kind of snowballed after that.
At the time of her testimony, the mother was not participating in any
substance-use treatment.
On July 13, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the
child under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2025). During the
twenty-five-month period between the child’s birth and the termination of
the mother’s parental rights, the mother admitted to relapsing at least
twenty-six times. By all accounts, the mother was an attentive parent to her
son when sober.
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II. Standard of Review.
Our review of orders terminating parental rights is de novo. In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s
findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the
credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. Analysis.
We apply a three-step analysis to termination of parental rights cases.
In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). First, we
determine whether the State has proved any ground for termination under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1). In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010).
Second, we consider whether the best interest framework under section
232.116(2) supports termination. Id. And finally, if termination is warranted,
we examine whether any exception under section 232.116(3) applies such that
a court need not terminate the parent’s rights. Id.
The mother challenges the second step in this analysis, arguing that
termination was not in the child’s best interests and, alternatively, she should
have been given an additional six months to work toward reunification. We
address each argument in turn.
A. Best Interests. The mother asserts her substantial progress
toward reunification shows termination was not in the child’s best interests.
Although the mother continued to struggle with sobriety, she argues those
challenges did not result in her disengaging from the child or “failing to
perform the parental role during the time available to her.” She emphasizes
that her supervised visits consistently went well, that she independently
sought additional parenting programming as part of her reunification efforts,
and that HHS expressed no concerns regarding her ability to care for the
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child when she was sober. In the mother’s view, nothing in the record
supports severing their close bond, and the child’s best interests are better
served by preserving the established mother-child relationship.
To determine whether termination is in a child’s best interests, we
“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the
physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2). Safety and the need for permanency mark the “defining
elements” of a child’s best interests. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802
(Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially).
The mother’s continued, severe drug use poses a serious and direct
threat to the child’s safety if he were returned to her care. Unfortunately, the
mother continues to use methamphetamine, and despite help, continues to
fall victim to her addiction. “We have long recognized that an unresolved,
severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to raise
children.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012). And even after a
parent begins treatment, continued substance use can prevent the parent
from providing safe conditions for the child because drug use exposes a child
to dangerous people and situations. See In re C.S., No. 16-1593, 2017 WL
362008, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017). Here, the mother’s addiction
prevents her from taking even the first step toward changing the dangerous
behavior that led to her child’s removal. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495
(Iowa 2000) (“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best
interests can be gleaned from ʻevidence of the parent’s past performance for
that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that
parent is capable of providing.’” (citation omitted)). We give the mother
credit for her insight into her addiction, as she knows it is tied to her mental-
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health issues, and her honesty. We hope she can achieve sobriety, but the
child cannot wait for that unknown to occur. Given the mother’s long history
of substance use, repeated relapses, and demonstrated inability to maintain
sobriety outside a supervised setting, termination of her rights is in the
child’s best interests.
The mother loves her child, that much is clear. But love alone cannot
give the child the stability and safety he needs. The child cannot be asked to
wait indefinitely on the hope that a parent will one day be able to provide the
child a safe, stable home. P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41; In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d
620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Fortunately, there is no shortage of people
who love J.E. and are willing to give him the permanency that he needs now.
The paternal grandmother intervened in the case and is requesting she be
considered as an adoption option. From all accounts, the trial transition to
her home in May 2026 appeared to be going well at the termination hearing.
The foster family was also closely bonded with the child and was interested
in adoption.
In the end, on our de novo review, we find clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
B. Extension of Time. The mother next argues that the juvenile
court should have granted her a six-month extension to work toward
reunification. A court may continue termination proceedings for an
additional six months if the court finds “the need for removal . . . will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code
§ 232.104(2)(b). The burden to show removal will not be needed in six
months is on the parent. In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021).
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In support of her argument for an extension, the mother notes how she
complied with all of HHS’s expectations aside from her sobriety. She
obtained and furnished a home for a child, engaged in mental-health
treatment for her PTSD and postpartum depression, obtained medication,
and consistently participated in visitation with the child. Given more time,
the mother argues, she may be able to achieve sobriety and safely parent her
son.
The juvenile court rejected this argument. It questioned the mother’s
willingness to engage in additional recommended services and noted that,
due to scheduling and procedural difficulties, the mother had already
received seven additional months of services after the permanency order
without successfully completing substance-use treatment and, in fact, had
“voluntarily discontinued participation in substance use treatment.” The
court concluded it was “not reasonable to gamble further on this child’s
future while waiting for a ʻmiracle’” and that “[t]he evidence does not
demonstrate that [the child] can be safely returned home within six additional
months if additional reunification services are provided.”
We agree with the juvenile court’s conclusions. The record shows no
evidence that the child’s need for removal from the mother’s care would no
longer exist at the end of an additional six-month period. The mother has
made some efforts toward stability and those efforts are commendable. But
a reduction in drug use without sustained sobriety is not enough. Despite
extensive services and support, a review of the record shows she admitted to
relapsing at least twenty-six times throughout the pendency of this case. A
parent’s long history of substance use and inability to maintain sobriety
despite being given multiple opportunities to do so often demonstrate that
additional time is unlikely to result in reunification. See In re C.S., 776
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N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). On this record, there is no basis to
conclude that the mother would achieve and maintain sobriety within six
months. We conclude it would not be in the child’s best interests to further
extend this case.
IV. Conclusion.
On our de novo review of the termination of the mother’s parental
rights to this child, we find that the child’s best interests are served by
termination and an additional six-month period for the mother to work
toward reunification is not warranted. We affirm the decision of the juvenile
court.
AFFIRMED.
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